TREATMENT OF MASS FUTURE CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
Massive tort or contract liabilities can have an enormous impact on otherwise
viable enterprises that are vital to the American economy. Parties have found that
traditional individual tort or contract litigation for mass torts or mass contract is
unwieldy and too expensive for all parties, and has forced them to seek more efficient
alternatives. The bankruptcy system offers a structured system to manage multiple
liabilities and has provided a forum for companies with massive liabilities to attempt
to do so. At least 15 asbestos manufacturers, including UNR, Amatex, Johns-Manville, National Gypsum, Eagle-Picher, Celotex, and Raytech, have reorganized
or liquidated in attempts to address massive numbers of known and unknown
asbestos claimants using the Bankruptcy Code. The fact pattern is not
unique to asbestos; manufacturers of other products also must find ways to deal with
mass claimants alleging injury or damages from products such as silicone implants,
polybutylene pipe, airplanes, and intrauterine devices, and some are resorting to
bankruptcy to do so.
Treating massive claims is inherently complicated, partly because of the sheer
number of the claims. In addition, a more difficult conceptual issue arises with
"future claims" that have not manifested but that are relatively certain to manifest in
the future and are based on prior acts of the debtor. A collective process that
commences well before the damages or injuries develop might be the only
opportunity for future claimants to receive any compensation, both because otherwise
early claimants may take all the assets of the company or the company's
extraordinary potential liability will dry up access to all capital needed for ongoing
business operations. A company may not be able to preserve its going concern value
and its work force if it is not able to deal collectively and definitively with all actions
arising out of a certain activity. Acknowledging these issues, Congress took the first
step in recognizing the treatment of future claimants in bankruptcy in amending the
Bankruptcy Code in 1994 to authorize the treatment of future asbestos-related
demands against a debtor. Now, after several years of experience with future claims
in the bankruptcy system under the 1994 amendments, the Commission recommends
additional provisions, not limited to asbestos, to guide the structured treatment of
mass future claims in the bankruptcy system.
RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1.1 Definition of Mass Future Claim
A definition of "mass future claim" should be added as a subset of the
definition of "claim" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). "Mass future claim" should
be defined as a claim arising out of a right to payment, or equitable relief
that gives rise to a right to payment that has or has not accrued under
nonbankruptcy law that is created by one or more acts or omissions of
the debtor if:
1) the act(s) or omission(s) occurred before or at the time of the order
for relief;
2) the act(s) or omission(s) may be sufficient to establish liability when
injuries ultimately are manifested;
3) at the time of the petition, the debtor has been subject to numerous
demands for payment for injuries or damages arising from such acts
or omissions and is likely to be subject to substantial future demands
for payment on similar grounds;
4) the holders of such rights to payments are known or, if unknown, can
be identified or described with reasonable certainty; and
5) the amount of such liability is reasonably capable of estimation.
The definition of "claim" in section 101(5) should be amended to add a
definition of "holder of a mass future claim," which would be an entity
that holds a mass future claim.
2.1.2 Protecting the Interests of Holders of Mass Future Claims
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a party in interest may
petition the court for the appointment of a mass future claims
representative. When a plan includes a class or classes of mass future
claims, the Bankruptcy Code should authorize a court to order the
appointment of a representative for each class of holders of mass future
claims. A mass future claims representative shall serve until further
order of the bankruptcy court.
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a mass future claims
representative shall have the exclusive power to file a claim or claims on
behalf of the class of mass future claims (and to determine whether or
not to file a claim), to cast votes on behalf of the holders of mass future
claims and to exercise all of the powers of a committee appointed
pursuant to section 1102. However, a holder of a mass future claim may
elect to represent his, her, or its own interests and may opt out of being
represented by the mass future claims representative.
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that prior to confirmation of a
plan of reorganization, the fees and expenses of a mass future claims
representative and his or her agents shall be administrative expenses
under section 503. Following the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization, and for so long as holders of mass future claims may
exist, any continuing fees and expenses of a mass future claims
representative and his or her agents shall be an expense of the fund
established for the compensation of mass future claims.
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a mass future claims
representative shall serve until further orders of the bankruptcy court
declare otherwise, shall serve as a fiduciary for the holders of future
claims in such representative's class, and shall be subject to suit only in
the district where the representative was appointed.
2.1.3 Determination of Mass Future Claims
Section 502 should provide that the court may estimate mass future
claims and also may determine the amount of mass future claims prior
to confirmation of a plan for purposes of distribution as well as
allowance and voting. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) should
specify that core proceedings include the estimation or determination of
the amount of mass future claims.
2.1.4 Channeling Injunctions
Section 524 should authorize courts to issue channeling injunctions.
2.1.5 Plan Confirmation and Discharge; Successor Liability
Sections 363 and 1123 should provide that the trustee may dispose of
property free and clear of mass future claims when the trustee or plan
proponent has satisfied the requirements for treating mass future claims.
Upon approving the sale, the court could issue, and later enforce, an
injunction to preclude holders from suing a successor/good faith
purchaser.
DISCUSSION
As a consequence of modern technology and a global marketplace, there is
an unlimited list of products that might cause massive liabilities. Unlike typical
liabilities that are addressed every day in the bankruptcy system and in individualized
adjudication, mass tort and mass contract liabilities often have geographically
widespread effects and a "long tail;" this means that once a product is distributed, it
may take one or several decades for individuals to discover their injuries or property
damage caused by that product. As a corollary, widespread damage caused by the
product will appear at sporadic times, not all at once.
Asbestos provides a classic example. After asbestos exposure occurs,
diseases generally do not manifest for another 15 to 40 years. This means that 100
people might have been exposed to asbestos simultaneously but their injuries are
revealed at 100 different times. Fundamental principles of justice require that a
person who develops asbestosis 40 years after exposure should have the same
entitlement to compensation as a person who got asbestosis 25 years earlier from the
same exposure. However, providing reasonable and equitable compensation to
victims is not simple, evidenced by the inadequate results of traditional tort litigation:
Dockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow; long
delays are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated
over and over; transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery by
nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the
process; and future claimants may lose altogether. (784)
The bankruptcy system is designed to provide equality of distribution to
similar creditors in a collective proceeding while ameliorating the devastating effect
that a huge liability may have on the worth of a business and, correspondingly, the
compensation available to all victims. (785) Bankruptcy therefore provides an appropriate vehicle to resolve massive liabilities. In theory, incorporating all
claimants into the collective bankruptcy process should be workable and universally
beneficial: mass future claimants would benefit from the segregation of assets on
their behalf, which otherwise will be exhausted long before they would be entitled
to collect, while present creditors would benefit by the enhancement in the debtor's
going concern value and the company's rejuvenated ability to attract new capital that
will accompany a global resolution to the company's massive liability problems.
As commentators amply have highlighted, (786) notwithstanding its inherent
advantages, the bankruptcy system has to correct several significant ambiguities and
shortcomings if it is to deal with mass future claims fairly and with certainty. In the
absence of statutory guidance, courts have reached vastly different determinations of
the ability to treat and discharge future claims in bankruptcy. Since the early 1980s,
a large handful of courts have presided over cases dealing with uncertain future
liabilities, and some have confirmed plans using channeling injunctions to protect the
reorganized entity against individual collection attempts while providing a pool of
resources for the claimants' treatment. Yet, because the Bankruptcy Code did not
contain express authorization for these procedures, the resulting uncertainty over the
legality of the resolutions restricted access to capital and depressed public stock
value. (787)
Recognizing these concerns, Congress enacted amendments in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 to provide explicit legislative guidance to ensure
equitable treatment of mass future asbestos claimants in bankruptcy. (788) Marking an
important first step, these amendments introduced a series of additional detailed
provisions with limited application to section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code.
As their name suggests, the "asbestos amendments" apply exclusively to
demands for payment on account of asbestos injuries. (789) A legislative response to
other types of massive future liabilities was specifically reserved for another day. (790)
In recent years, it has become even clearer that products other than asbestos give rise
to massive liability issues. Similar problems already have arisen in the context of
intrauterine devices, polybutylene pipe, lead-related injuries, and silicone implants.
The 1994 asbestos amendments have not precluded the use of bankruptcy to deal
with other types of mass future claims, (791) and cases currently are pending that might
result in plans that deal with mass future claims. (792) However, all parties to such cases
continue to suffer the consequences of uncertainty that formerly plagued asbestos
cases. Moreover, these cases remain subject to disparate treatment in the courts due
to the lack of statutory guidance. The Commission's Proposal is not limited to a
certain type of liability or industry. Instead, the Proposal focuses on determining the
conditions under which it is appropriate to treat mass future claims in the bankruptcy
process and the safeguards required in such cases.
The scope of the asbestos provisions enacted in 1994 is limited in other ways
too. The provisions are available only to Chapter 11 debtors, (793) and yet mass future
claimants of a debtor liquidating in Chapter 7 also should be entitled to equal priority
with present claimants. The amendments authorize the establishment only of trusts
constructed and funded exactly like the Johns-Manville trust, and therefore do not
foster innovation and flexibility that might accommodate other circumstances or
yield more successful results. (794) Moreover, the 1994 amendments treat asbestos
injuries as "future demands, " not claims, a distinction that calls into question the
applicability of other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to the holders of these future
demands. Although the asbestos amendments spell out different procedures for
asbestos demand holders, depriving demand holders of "claim" status in the
bankruptcy process strips parties with asbestos injuries of the other protections of the
Bankruptcy Code, and thus, in a sense, provides them with inferior treatment in the
course of the case but discharges their claims as if they were claimholders. At the
same time, several attributes of the asbestos amendments afford present claimants
with more leverage, potentially undercutting the notion of equality of distribution to
similar claimants. (795) The Commission's Recommendations address all three of these issues.
By enacting the 1994 asbestos amendments, Congress made clear that those
amendments were a much-needed and important first step in giving legislative
approval to the treatment of mass future claims in bankruptcy, but also acknowledged
the potential need for a mechanism to deal fairly with nonasbestos mass future
claims. (796) Building on the spirit of the 1994 amendments, these Proposals are intended to be the second step in establishing procedures to assure that future
claimholders receive fair and equitable treatment in the bankruptcy process by
addressing some of the issues left open in 1994.
In both reorganizations and liquidations, the Proposals should further the
equality of distribution among claimholders, preserve the going concern value of
viable businesses, and enhance the likelihood of compensation for parties who might
otherwise end up with no compensation. These objectives are applicable in all cases,
but the Proposals offer a workable solution for future liabilities in the most pressing
and most complex cases, where the claims that are contingent and likely to give rise
to future liability are so massive that they warrant special procedures and protections
of the type suggested here. Consideration of whether it will be necessary to develop
a statutory framework expressly articulating the approach to deal with individual
future claims has been reserved for another day. In the meantime, the Commission's
Proposals would not change in any way the general handling of obligations that fall
within the statutory definition of "claim," including contingent, unmatured, and
unliquidated claims, which currently are treated under the Bankruptcy Code.
2.1.1 The Definition of Mass Future Claim
A definition of "mass future claim" should be added as a subset of the
definition of "claim" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). "Mass future claim" should
be defined as a claim arising out of a right to payment, or equitable relief
that gives rise to a right to payment that has or has not accrued under
nonbankruptcy law that is created by one or more acts or omissions of
the debtor if:
1) the act(s) or omission(s) occurred before or at the time of the
order for relief;
2) the act(s) or omission(s) may be sufficient to establish liability
when injuries ultimately are manifested;
3) at the time of the petition, the debtor has been subject to
numerous demands for payment for injuries or damages arising
from such acts or omissions and is likely to be subject to
substantial future demands for payment on similar grounds;
4) the holders of such rights to payments are known or, if unknown,
can be identified or described with reasonable certainty; and
5) the amount of such liability is reasonably capable of estimation.
The definition of "claim" in section 101(5) should be amended to add a
definition of "holder of a mass future claim," which would be an entity
that holds a mass future claim.
In one sense, the characteristics of mass future claims outside bankruptcy are
relatively self-evident: "mass" claims are associated with a single product, are large
in number, and are dispersed geographically and over time. (797) However, defining
mass future claim in the statute not only would establish that mass future claims can
be treated in the bankruptcy system, but would provide guidance in identifying them.
Clearly delineated statutory requirements will enhance uniform treatment in this
complex area of the law.
Parts (1) and (2). The key to dealing with claims in a bankruptcy case is to
determine whether the liability meets the definition of a claim and whether the claim
"arose" before the commencement of the bankruptcy case in Chapter 7 cases or
before confirmation of a plan of reorganization in Chapter 11 cases. Unlike the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that required that these claims be "provable," the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978 adopted an expansive definition of "claim."(798) Notwithstanding this
broad definition, courts have had varying degrees of reluctance in bringing claims
into the process if all of the elements establishing liability are not yet known.
Because courts have reached different interpretations of when a claim has arisen and
thus can be dealt with in the bankruptcy case, debtors and plan proponents have been
afforded vastly different degrees of latitude in bringing mass future claims into the
bankruptcy process. (799)
Some courts will not permit a liability to be a bankruptcy claim if a cause of
action has not accrued under nonbankruptcy law. (800) Under this approach, similar
parties subject to the same prepetition conduct by the debtor are treated entirely
differently depending on when their injuries happen to appear. Numerous courts and
commentators have been highly critical of this interpretation, particularly because it
appears to directly contradict the statutory definition of "claim" that explicitly
includes "contingent," "unmatured," and "unliquidated" claims. (801) Notwithstanding
widespread condemnation of this approach, the theory remains good law in some
courts. (802)
Other courts have deemed mass future claimants to be "parties in interest"
under section 1109, but have not given "claim" status to requests for compensation
on their behalf. (803) While this approach arguably is preferable to denying recognition
altogether, parties in interest do not obtain all of the entitlements of being considered
"claims."(804) As stated previously, the 1994 amendments to section 524 for asbestos
cases refer to "demands," not "claims," and thereby raise the same questions in the
interpretation the rights of future asbestos victims in the context of other Bankruptcy
Code provisions.
Some courts do not foreclose the possibility that a party who faces future
manifestation of an injury has a cognizable bankruptcy claim, but they require some
prepetition, (805) or preconfirmation, (806) relationship between a potential claimholder and
the debtor or the debtor's products in order to create a claim. Under this test and
variations thereof, the fact that the debtor produced and distributed a product
prepetition is not sufficient to create a claim; there must be a threshold showing that
a person purchased, used, or was exposed to the product in question before the
bankruptcy or before the case was confirmed.
Still other courts believe that the current definition of claim requires only that
the debtor's culpable action occurred prepetition and thus encompasses mass future
claims under those circumstances. Courts taking this view known as the "conduct
test" have permitted debtors to discharge identified groups of mass future claims if
the debtors made adequate provisions for their treatment through a trust or similar
mechanism. (807)
Taking the latter approach one step further, at least one court has permitted
certain unanticipated claims to be discharged without identification, representation,
or treatment in the plan. (808) This approach raises significant fairness concerns that the
Commission's Proposal specifically addresses with respect to mass future claims. (809)
The definition of mass future claims that is proposed by the Commission was
crafted in light of the benefits and shortcomings of each of these approaches taken
by the courts over the past twenty years. First, the definition makes clear that mass
future claims can be dealt with in the bankruptcy process as "claims," not as some
other type of interest. This ensures that mass future claims receive the statutory
entitlements of claims, such as voting and protection by the "best interest of creditors
test" under section 1129(a)(7). (810) Aside from adding a "mass future claims" subset
to section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, this Proposal would not change the
meaning of "claim," "contingent claim," "unliquidated claim," or "unmatured claim."
The proposed definition clarifies that the time at which a mass future claim
"arises" is determined by the timing of the debtor's conduct, not by the claimant's
discovery of the injury or an interim relationship between the parties. The
Commission therefore adopts as a threshold matter the "conduct test" that currently
is used by some courts, but with significant additional limitations built into other
components of the definition.
In addition, the definition requires that the acts or omissions "may be
sufficient to establish liability." This language was chosen to recognize that use of
the bankruptcy process to manage mass future claims is not, in itself, a concession
of liability on those claims.
Sections (3), (4), and (5). These components of the definition perform a
gatekeeping function and limit "mass future claims" to significant mass tort and
contract liabilities. The Proposal is not designed to permit debtors to channel future
liabilities away from the assets of the reorganized debtor if those future liabilities are
so unforeseeable or speculative that they are not reasonably capable of
approximation. This definition would provide a more uniform and constrained
conception of the appropriate circumstances in which to treat the claims of mass
future claimants in both reorganization and liquidations while it filters out attempts
to treat mass future claims that are wholly speculative and do not affect the
company's ability to attract capital or deal with the public. The following example
illustrates the distinction:
Company X, a pipe manufacturer, is litigating numerous cases
regarding polybutylene pipes that cracked from contact with water
containing certain chemicals and caused damage to the walls in
peoples' homes. This type of pipe system was installed in millions
of homes. Although Company X already had stopped producing this
type of pipe, it could anticipate significant future liability on account
of the pipe previously manufactured and installed. Because the time
of the cracking depends on when a local water supplier adds certain
chemicals to the water, the pipes might not start to leak until after
many years of use, while some pipes may last for the ordinary
lifespan of pipes without leaking at all. Unlike a pipe company that
has been sued sporadically for occasional and different problems with
pipes of varying composition and continues to produce those pipes
(which would not fit the standards of the mass future claims
definition), Company X might be an appropriate candidate to use the
mass future claims mechanism. Its potential liability for a clearly
delineated type of damage claim, with liability that might extend far
into the future, may decrease public confidence in Company X and
affect its access to the capital markets. (811)
The targets of the Proposal are enterprise-threatening massive liabilities, but
the definitional threshold purposely does not require a predicate showing that
potential mass future claims liability will make the debtor insolvent. Such a
requirement would exclude companies that are ideal candidates for the use of these
provisions: an asbestos manufacturer with looming future liabilities may not be
nearing insolvency on a cash basis, but that manufacturer may suffer any number of
consequences (e.g., inability to raise money for capital investment, public rejection
of its products) that so hinder its ability to function productively that it ultimately will
not be able to operate without resolving its mass tort and contract problems. (812) In
addition, because insolvency is a malleable concept, a company could plan around
such a requirement without much difficulty by changing its capital structure or
overleveraging itself through the debt market so that the balance sheet would indicate
that potential future claims will put the enterprise over the brink of insolvency. For
these reasons, an insolvency predicate is neither a desirable nor an effective method
of targeting the appropriate group of cases.
Instead, the Commission recommends additional threshold restrictions that
will filter out inappropriate cases. Requiring that the debtor has been subject to
substantial previous demands, and is likely to be subject to substantial future
demands, captures those cases that are most easily recognized as mass claim cases
outside of bankruptcy. Requiring that the liability be reasonably capable of
estimation targets those debtors dealing with real, not incidental, threats of massive
liability when debtors already have dealt with a sufficient number of claims to be able
to estimate or predict their value. (813)
The proposed definition of mass future claims encompasses both tort claims
and contract claims, both property damage and personal injury, because the same
economic pressures are involved in any of these instances. The underlying cause of
action, whether in tort or in contract, does not change the need for a mechanism to
deal with mass future claims in a single forum to compensate mass future claimants.
Just as the proposed provisions could apply to personal injury claims from asbestos
exposure, interuterine devices, silicone implants, and pharmaceuticals, it could apply
to mass future claims resulting from defective products that cause extensive and
expensive property damage but do not necessarily cause personal injury. Examples
of products that give rise to alleged contract claims and property damage include
polybutylene pipe, crop-destroying fertilizers, and defective heat pump thermostats.
The term "mass future claim" does not encompass police and regulatory
causes of action that might be brought against a debtor in the future based on
prebankruptcy actions. The incorporation of additional private claimants into the
bankruptcy process does not affect the ability of the government to exercise its
functions. There is no question that the debtor has an ongoing obligation to comply
with applicable laws and the government has the ability to act in its police and
regulatory capacity. Nothing in this Proposal changes the current obligations. As the
United States Department of Justice has observed, (814) police and regulatory causes of action are of a different nature from mass future claims and do not fit within the
definition and scope of this Proposal. The recommended amendments would not
alter a debtor's obligation to operate its business and maintain its on-site conditions
in compliance with all applicable laws, regardless of whether a hazard or condition
existed prebankruptcy. (815) To the extent that government entities currently can regulate postbankruptcy behavior of debtors whose prefiling acts or omissions
injured known claimants, government entities would remain equally able to regulate
debtors whose behavior injured unknown claimants. In other words, the fact that a
future claims representative pursues claims on behalf of unknown claimants would
have no effect on the government's ability to act pursuant to its police and regulatory
capacities postbankruptcy.
2.1.2 Protecting the Interests of Holders of Mass Future Claims
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a party in interest may
petition the court for the appointment of a mass future claims
representative. When a plan includes a class or classes of mass future
claims, the Bankruptcy Code should authorize a court to order the
appointment of a representative for each class of holders of mass future
claims. A mass future claims representative shall serve until further
order of the bankruptcy court.
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a mass future claims
representative shall have the exclusive power to file a claim or claims on
behalf of the class of mass future claims (and to determine whether or
not to file a claim), to cast votes on behalf of the holders of mass future
claims and to exercise all of the powers of a committee appointed
pursuant to section 1102. However, a holder of a mass future claim may
elect to represent his, her, or its own interests and may opt out of being
represented by the mass future claims representative.
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that prior to confirmation of a
plan of reorganization, the fees and expenses of a mass future claims
representative and his or her agents shall be administrative expenses
under section 503. Following the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization, and for so long as holders of mass future claims may
exist, any continuing fees and expenses of a mass future claims
representative and his or her agents shall be an expense of the fund
established for the compensation of mass future claims.
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a mass future claims
representative shall serve until further orders of the bankruptcy court
declare otherwise, shall serve as a fiduciary for the holders of future
claims in such representative's class, and shall be subject to suit only in
the district where the representative was appointed.
The Commission's Recommendation seeks to remedy the inherent injustice
of permitting all resources to be distributed to present parties when some of those
resources should be reserved and shared with future parties. (816) Treating only present
claimants in bankruptcy is unfair to the future claimants who may be left with equally
serious injuries but without any recovery. (817)
Explicitly recognizing mass future claims in the bankruptcy process has its
own serious risks that must be carefully addressed. Under the Supreme Court's
decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., procedural due process
requires notice and the opportunity to be heard to the extent practicable, yet the
Supreme Court specifically recognized that it may be impracticable to provide actual
notice to parties with future or conjectural interests. (818) This has several implications
in the context of mass claims and mass future claims.
Notice. It is incumbent on the plan proponent to make every reasonable effort
to provide notice to individual claimants. Companies facing massive liabilities that
involve geographically diffuse claimants have taken widespread measures to ensure
notice to the fullest extent practicable, such as press releases, public relation
initiatives, advertisements in the print media and on television, direct mail, mailings
to particular interest groups that might be able to further disseminate information or
help to locate actual or potential claimants, and use of modern technology, such as
the Internet. (819) As a matter of public policy, the Commission recommends that a plan
proponent or trustee be permitted to treat mass future claimants in bankruptcy only
if the plan proponent or trustee provided sufficient notice, the adequacy of which
could be determined by the court.
Constructive Notice and Representation - The Mass Future Claims
Representative. When a debtor or trustee plans to treat and discharge claims held by
people who are unaware of their injuries, widespread notice efforts by themselves
may not be sufficient. The use of mass future claims representatives has become
readily accepted in the reorganization context under present law, (820) yet nothing in the
Code expressly requires representation for mass future claimants or gives any
guidance on the parameters of appointing such representatives. Although some
commentators have questioned the cost-efficiency of requiring the use of a
representative in every case, (821) the Commission considered this representation an
absolute necessity and a fundamental prerequisite to the discharge of mass future
claims. A legal representative is essential to represent the interests of classes of
holders who were not identified individually during the bankruptcy proceedings. (822)
The Commission recommends that discharge of mass future claims be permitted only
if the mass future claimants were represented in the plan negotiation process or
Chapter 7 distribution process to help ensure that the plan provides reasonably
sufficient resources to fund the payment of mass future claims. Each class of mass
future claimholders would be entitled to its own representative, as the interests of the
classes of mass future claims may be adverse to one another. In addition, the
representative neither could hold nor represent an interest adverse to the class other
than the necessary fact of the representative's payment out of the estate or trust fund.
The Commission recommends that the Code require the appointment of mass
future claims representatives for mass future claimants, regardless of whether the
debtor is reorganizing or liquidating. While the courts disagree over whether
representatives are necessary or required in liquidation cases, (823) the Commission's Proposal is premised on the notion that mass future claimants of a liquidating
company are entitled to adequate representation and equal treatment just as if the
company reorganized. (824) Other reasons also support this effort to strive for symmetry in the protection of mass future claimants; for example, if mass future claim holders
only were entitled to representation and protection in Chapter 11 cases but not in
Chapter 7 liquidation cases, creditors and shareholders who believed they would
receive larger distributions from the debtors without the inclusion of mass future
claimants would have an incentive to push for Chapter 7 liquidation of a viable
company, even if everyone ultimately would benefit from a successful reorganization
and an enhancement in the company's going concern value. (825) The Commission's Proposals would lessen that incentive.
Fiduciary Standard of Care. The mass future claims representative would be
a fiduciary for the class of holders of mass future claims that he or she represents.
Making the representative a fiduciary is consistent with the standard of care charged
to representatives in asbestos bankruptcy cases involving future liabilities in which
the representative was considered a guardian ad litem. (826) This heightened standard of care reflects the significant responsibility that accompanies the representation of
holders of inchoate claims. At the same time, the Commission recognizes that the
Bankruptcy Code cannot make a mass future claims representative the guarantor for
eventual payment to the members of the class. The actions of the representative
should be judged on information known or reasonably knowable at the time
the representative serves and exercises his or her judgment, not based on perfect
judgment or hindsight. The Proposal would not interfere with otherwise applicable
statutes of limitations, nor would it preclude parties in bankruptcy cases from making
arrangements that may limit or condition liability after a certain date. Such
arrangements would have the salutary effect of channeling and limiting the eternal
threat of litigation that might deter qualified individuals from serving in this capacity,
chill negotiations between the representative, the debtor, and other creditors, and
preclude the development of methods of victim compensation out of fear that any
course chosen could result in significant personal liability. Moreover, because
expenses such as insurance for the mass future claims representative would be borne
by the trust, mass future claimants themselves would bear the increased costs of
liability. Conditions for liability of a mass future claims representative need to be
carefully weighed by the parties in a case for both costs and benefits, and standards
need to be developed on an ex ante rather than post hoc basis.
Consideration of Alternative Approaches to Dealing with Mass Liabilities:
Class Action Settlements. The Commission's Proposal is premised in part on the
availability of the bankruptcy system for collective resolution of massive problems
and the evident shortcomings of individualized tort or contract litigation in a mass
context. (827) Bankruptcy also yields a jurisdictional advantage; filing for bankruptcy automatically enjoins actions pending in state or federal court. In addition, the
bankruptcy court can obtain personal jurisdiction over all parties with an interest in
the debtor and can consolidate both state and federal law suits in one forum. (828)
However, bankruptcy is not the only alternative to individualized litigation. Class
action law suits under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been
used to manage massive liabilities, including future claims, in cases involving
asbestos and other products. (829) Rule 23 imposes seemingly rigid conditions on the
certification of a class. (830) Yet, "since the 1966 revision of Rule 23, class action
practice has become ever more 'adventuresome' as a means of coping with claims
too numerous to secure their 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination' one by
one."(831) Part of this "adventure" arises through the use of class action certification
solely for the purpose of settlement of mass claims;(832) this approach brings certainty
and finality, but also can yield particularly acute consequences if future claimants are
inadequately represented in a class that contains parties with competing interests.
Class members lack the opportunity to protect themselves against this risk. If the
case is certified as a Rule 23(b)(1) "limited fund" class action, claimants lack the
power to opt out of the class. Even if claimants have the power to opt out, as they
do in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, they lack the information necessary to exercise the
right in a manner that would protect their interests. (833) Although some of the more
far-reaching uses of class actions for mass future claims cases may subside in light
of the Supreme Court's recent settlement class action decision that is discussed in the
coming paragraphs, (834) class action settlements still may be less protective of mass
future claimants' rights than bankruptcy. (835) Indeed, some courts and commentators
have noted that some class action settlements are "end runs" to attain the benefits of
bankruptcy without the extensive requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, as the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed when a district court agreed to supervise
the negotiation of such a settlement:
[I]t is clear that the complaint is an attempt to compel an adjustment
of Keene's creditors' rights outside the Bankruptcy Code and is
defended almost entirely by the argument that a mandatory class
settlement of present or future asbestos claims would be better for all
parties than a bankruptcy proceeding. Indeed, the process
contemplated by Keene mirrors a bankruptcy proceeding. The
finding of a limited fund corresponds to a finding of insolvency. The
preliminary injunction serves much the same function as the
automatic stay under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. [citation
omitted] The class representatives correspond to creditors'
committees in Chapter 11 proceedings. [citation omitted] The
proposed mandatory class settlement mirrors a reorganization plan
and "cram-down," [citation omitted] followed by a discharge [citation
omitted]. Keene's argument is self-defeating, however, because it is
a self-evident evasion of the exclusive legal system established by
Congress for debtors to seek relief. [citation omitted] The adoption
of Keene's position would surely lead to further evasion of the
Bankruptcy Code as other debtors sought relief in mandatory class
actions. (836)
Among other conditions, Rule 23 requires that there be questions of law or
fact "common" to all class members that predominate over questions affecting only
individual members, and that the class representatives be "typical" of the class.
Another quite crucial consideration of Rule 23 is whether the representatives
adequately and fairly protect and represent the interest of a class. However,
superimposed onto these requirements is the possibility of certifying a class solely
for the purposes of settlement. A controversial amendment to Rule 23 proposed by
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules would permit certification for settlement
purposes without a showing that common questions of law and fact predominate over
noncommon questions in individual cases. (837) Parties previously have argued
with a fair level of success that settlement class certification should be subject to less
stringent scrutiny under the Rule 23 standards, but the United States Supreme Court
recently held inAmchem Products v. Windsor that settlement classes warrant more,
not less, scrutiny in certification:
[S]pecifications of the rule [23]-those designed to protect absentees
by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions-demand
undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context. Such
attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a
settlement class will lack the opportunity, present when a case is
litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they
unfold. (838)
The class action settlement can be problematic for mass future claims if
courts do not assess adequate representation and commonality with a high level of
scrutiny. (839) In the Amchem Products case, a district court certified a class to achieve
global settlement, (840) but the class included both current and future asbestos-related
claims of potentially millions of people who might experience a wide range of
adverse effects due to past asbestos exposure. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling
of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which had reversed the district court
and decertified the settlement class for failure to satisfy the Rule 23 requirements of
commonality of legal and factual issues and adequacy of representation. The
Amchem Products ruling affected a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in a similar case: in Flanagan v. Ahearn, the district court certified a
settlement class that included both present and future claims and also held that the
use of one class counsel for both present and future claimants did not constitute a
conflict of interest, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the certification and holdings, albeit
with a strong dissent. (841) Shortly after the Supreme Court issued the Amchem
Products decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Flanagan, vacated the
Fifth Circuit decision, and remanded it for further consideration in light of the ruling
in Amchem Products. (842)
Although the Supreme Court's decision may reign in the current class action
practices that cause the most concern, there remain substantial apprehensions about
the ability of Rule 23 class actions to establish adequate rules to deal with mass
future claims. (843) Indeed, the very aspects of bankruptcy that make it an anathema to some lawyers, with rules requiring collective action, extraordinary disclosure
requirements, and regular and extensive court supervision from the inception of the
case, make bankruptcy more protective of future claimants because it is a forum that
mandates scrutiny of all arrangements. (844) The fundamental structure of the bankruptcy system, with restrictions such as the "absolute priority rule,"(845) provides
safeguards for the interests of mass future claimants that are unmatched in the class
action system. (846) Bankruptcy is designed to give more claimant protection, and
therefore to yield fairer and more equitable results, than Rule 23 mandatory
settlements.
2.1.3 Determination of Mass Future Claims
Section 502 should provide that the court may estimate mass future
claims and also may determine the amount of mass future claims prior
to confirmation of a plan for purposes of distribution as well as
allowance and voting. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) should
specify that core proceedings include the estimation or determination of
the amount of mass future claims.
Although it does not prescribe a particular method, section 502(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code authorizes estimation of claims for purposes of allowance for
contingent or unliquidated claims, "the fixing or liquidation of which, as the case
may be, would unduly delay the administration of the case."(847) Using this provision,
courts have estimated the aggregate value of pending unliquidated claims in the mass
future claim context, which may be the most challenging context for estimation. (848)
Estimation is meant to expedite the bankruptcy process notwithstanding pending and
protracted nonbankruptcy litigation. (849) The Commission's Proposal makes mass future claims a subset of claim and distinguishes them from other contingent or
unliquidated claims; thus, a specific amendment is recommended to authorize the
estimation and determination of mass future claims. This amendment should not
have any effect on the estimation of other contingent and unliquidated claims; the
extent to which this estimation should be used for assessing feasibility or determining
distribution for other unliquidated or contingent claims is a question that remains
open under current law, unaltered by this Proposal. (850)
The Commission recommends an amendment to make clear the court's power
to make determinations of the present value of mass future claims, whether
individually or in the aggregate, for purposes of allowance, voting, and distribution. This amendment would inject certainty
into the process for debtors and creditors. Such certainty is necessary in situations
where the value of the claims is a necessary component of adequate funding for a
trust. The notion that courts can determine mass future claims for purposes of
distribution has been strongly endorsed by many who have commented on the
Commission's work in this area. (851) By expressly authorizing courts to determine
mass future claims for purposes of distribution, this Proposal would circumvent some
of the confusion over the meaning of "estimation" in the context of contingent or
unliquidated claims. Of course, it must be kept in mind that absent a change to the
provisions governing bankruptcy jurisdiction, liquidation of personal injury claims
may have to take place in the district court. (852)
The Commission's Recommendation deliberately retains flexibility for the
court and the parties in a number of ways. First, it does not prescribe a method of
estimation of mass future claims. Multiple methods of estimation have been
employed and additional methods are always in the process of being developed. (853)
Second, the recommended amendments would not require courts to make binding
determinations in all cases, as there may be circumstances where such determination
should be deferred and claims should be estimated for purposes of allowance only.
Courts also could permit the use of determinations from other fora or the use of other
fact finders to help estimate or determine the amount of mass future claims. Third,
the Proposal would not require estimation in all cases. The reasonable estimability
of mass future claims is an essential consideration, but the need for actual estimation
necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. For example, if all
parties, including the mass future claims representative, consent to a plan of
reorganization or an arrangement in a liquidation, estimation or determination during
the pendency of the bankruptcy case might invoke needless cost and expense. Some
trusts are funded with one hundred percent of a company's stock, (854) so that actual estimation of the value of the claims may serve little purpose in a fully consensual
plan; the claimholders already own everything. However, estimation might serve
other purposes, such as improving the adequacy of disclosure to claim holders and
other creditors.
Accuracy of Estimation or Determination. Accuracy is an important
component of the integrity of the process whether mass future claims are temporarily
estimated or finally determined. This is particularly true when the trust is funded in
a way that relies heavily on estimation. The process of developing the Commission's
Recommendations has been accented with extensive discussions of claim estimation
procedures. The process of estimation can be complicated by challenges to the
underlying liability, such as in the Dow Corning case, (855) and by concerns about underestimation of claims, which occurred in one of the earliest asbestos bankruptcy
cases, the Johns-Manville case. However, neither of these issues is insurmountable.
First, courts dealing with difficulties in estimation due to underlying liability disputes
have encouraged the development of various mechanisms to ensure adequate
compensation without actual estimation in a traditional sense. (856) In addition, the underestimation in the Johns-Manville case can be attributed to a number of
distinguishing factors that have prevented its problems from being repeated in other
cases. The case was one of the earliest cases of its kind and the estimation process
was novel. The case also ultimately involved multiple and unanticipated types of
mass future claims, which the Commission's Proposal would not accommodate if not
specifically delineated in the bankruptcy proceeding. In addition, the Johns-Manville
trust faced procedural problems that affected its adequacy. Parties "jumped the
queue" and proceeded to litigation, while group settlements to avoid litigation
multiplied, forcing the trust to litigate on several fronts at once, and not surprisingly,
these problems undermined the trust's ability to devote its resources to equitable
compensation of asbestos claimants. (857) The adequate funding of trusts in subsequent cases reflect that parties have learned some lessons from Johns-Manville. Most trusts
in cases involving mass future claims consistently have made timely distributions
without difficulty. Indeed, the A.H. Robins trust was funded in excess of original
projections and was able to provide a second distribution to claimants. (858) In addition, nothing in this Proposal precludes parties from agreeing that there will be future
adjustments to a trust.
In addition, creative mechanisms have been proposed for structuring trusts. (859)
For example, the parties might establish a liquidating trust to pay mass future claims.
After estimating all mass future claims and discounting them to present value, the
judge would approve establishing a trust with assets, perhaps common stock of the
debtor, in a quantity sufficient to satisfy equitably mass future claims as a group and
individually. Such satisfaction would follow the principle that less need be set aside
for a claim in the distant future than for a claim in the near future. As claims
accrued, the holders would receive shares of the trust, which would liquidate at a
time in the future when all claims will have accrued. Of course, those with claims
that accrued shortly after the trust was established would receive a larger share of the
trust than would those whose claims accrued just prior to liquidation of the trust and
distribution of its assets. Retaining flexibility to employ various procedures,
therefore, should promote efficiency and economy.
2.1.4 Channeling Injunctions
Section 524 should authorize courts to issue channeling injunctions.
A channeling injunction steers claimants toward a trust or pool of assets to
compensate claimants as it simultaneously steers those claimants away from the
reorganized entity. Without explicit statutory authority, but perhaps under the
discretionary mandate of section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, some courts have
issued channeling injunctions in cases involving mass future claims. (860) The 1994 asbestos amendments specifically provided for channeling injunctions, but only in
the limited instance of future asbestos demands. (861) Channeling injunctions serve an
appropriate and beneficial role in the equitable treatment of mass future claimants.
The channeling injunction reinforces the effect of the discharge while it clearly
directs claimants toward a specific fund. At the same time, if a mass future claims
representative releases the third-party liability of an insurer in exchange for the
insurer's contribution, a channeling injunction can be used to bring insurance
proceeds into the estate for administration on behalf of the claimants. (862) Without the imposition of a channeling injunction, claimants might attempt to pursue individual
suits against defendants, unwinding the benefits of collective action and equality of
treatment, which is a particularly detrimental result if the trust is to be financed with
stock or payments from the reorganized entity. The channeling injunction is
therefore critical to the structure of the overall mass future claims Proposal.
Authorizing channeling injunctions would ensure that the Bankruptcy Code
specifically empowers the court to use this valuable tool in appropriate cases to direct
mass future claimholders to a reasonably funded pool of resources. Any uncertainty
about the effectiveness of a channeling injunction would be eliminated, thus
enhancing both the effectiveness of the reorganization and the pool available to fund
repayments to victims.
The Proposal deliberately does not mandate that the channeling injunction be
used in a particular fashion. Taking a slightly different approach from the 1994
asbestos amendments, the Commission did not seek to prescribe the precise form of
a plan involving mass future claims. Traditional trusts in connection with channeling
injunctions need not be the sole mechanism of directing compensation to mass future
claimants. For example, a plan could entail future contributions of the debtor or
enable the trust to seek additional funding from the debtor under certain
circumstances. Likewise, a plan might provide that the excess in an over-funded trust
would be returned to the debtor or distributed to the debtor's shareholders. Other
approaches, such as purchasing insurance policies in favor of mass future claimants,
may be superior in selected cases. (863) Negotiations among the mass future claims representative and other parties may produce lower-cost, creative alternatives to deal
with mass future claims. The Commission's Proposal would encourage rather than
chill these alternatives.
2.1.5 Plan Confirmation and Discharge; Successor Liability
Sections 363 and 1123 should provide that the trustee may dispose of
property free and clear of mass future claims when the trustee or plan
proponent has satisfied the requirements for treating mass future claims.
Upon approving the sale, the court could issue, and later enforce, an
injunction to preclude holders from suing a successor/good faith
purchaser.
Plan Confirmation and Discharge. This Proposal does not alter any of the
otherwise applicable standards of confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Among
other requirements, a plan of reorganization involving mass future claims must be
feasible and must meet the "best interest of creditors test,"(864) and, in a nonconsensual
case, objecting claimants would be protected against unfair discrimination. (865)
Because a mass future claim would be a subset of all claims, the Code would
authorize the discharge of a mass future claim without specific additional
amendment. However, the repeal of section 524(g) and the modification of section
(h) would eliminate confusion over whether special steps are necessary to discharge
a mass future claim and to avoid a dual track treatment of future liabilities.
Because the mass future claims provisions deal only with liability for
prepetition acts or omissions of the debtor and do not create immunity from
postpetition acts, the Proposal would not authorize the discharge of a company's
obligation on any liability based on postpetition acts of the debtor. Any debtor in
bankruptcy has a duty to abide by all laws and regulations, and the debtor that deals
with mass future claims in its bankruptcy case would be subject to the same
requirements. If, for example, a manufacturer has a duty to warn consumers when
it learns of certain kinds of defects and the duty to warn arose or continued
postpetition, then the debtor would be required to meet those postpetition
obligations.
Successor Liability for Asset Transfers. Preserving the value of an enterprise
is not always accomplished by a reorganization in a traditional sense. In some cases,
selling certain assets to third parties may be the most sensible and economically
beneficial way to proceed. Similarly, in the liquidation of an ongoing, multi-faceted
business, it may be necessary to sell some assets before the estate is liquidated in its
entirety. The Commission recognized that a Proposal setting forth the conditions for
treating mass future claims should be applicable where reorganization is actually
accomplished through asset sales. This Proposal also applies in Chapter 7 cases to
eliminate incentives to favor a liquidation to avoid the operation of the mass future
claims provisions.
Under current law, an issue that unavoidably arises in a sale of assets is
whether the purchaser of the assets can be sued by mass future claim holders.
Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee or debtor in possession
to sell property free and clear of "interests" in such property. (866) Whether the term
"interests" means only security interests and liens, or whether it also includes
unsecured claims, is an unresolved question. (867) "A fundamental idea of bankruptcy
is that bygones should not prevent the best current deployment of assets."(868)
However, to the extent that sales of assets in bankruptcy may involve the risk of mass
future claims liability, the "prices obtained for the assets in bankruptcy will fall to
their scrap value,"(869) which in turn, yields a lower return to all claimants.
In the corporate law context outside bankruptcy, transfer of assets from one
entity to another generally is not accompanied by the liabilities of the transferor. (870)
While some state laws have altered this general rule in some contexts to apply
successor liability more liberally, the majority of courts and commentators have been
critical of that approach. (871) This Proposal incorporates this state law concept with
respect to mass future claims if those claims have been represented and the debtor or
trustee has made provisions for their treatment. The Proposal would prevent a debtor
or trustee from selling off the major assets of the business and cutting off mass future
claimants' access unless the debtor satisfied the requirements for treating mass future
claims. Without the appointment of a mass future claims representative, for example,
the successor would not be protected from liability for mass future claims. The
protection given to the purchaser is the same protection that would have been given
to the reorganized debtor that kept the assets, assuming that the debtor satisfied the
set of conditions set forth throughout this Proposal. The Proposal intentionally does
not distinguish between sales that are incorporated into plans of reorganization and
sales that occur independently under section 363.
By enabling debtors to sell assets free and clear under the circumstances set
forth in this Proposal, the Code would give parties the flexibility to choose the form
that will maximize the value of the assets of the debtor without empowering parties
to act strategically to disadvantage one class of claimants. Freeing the productive
assets of the business from the uncertainty of mass future claimants will encourage
buyers to offer a better price. In so doing, more assets would be available to fund a
greater return for present claimants and holders of mass future claims. At the same
time, this approach promotes the equitable treatment of similar creditors by ensuring
that holders of mass future claims do not receive preferential treatment over the
debtor's other creditors by following assets on a successor liability theory, (872) nor
would they receive worse treatment by being omitted from participation in the
benefits from the sale even if they live in a jurisdiction that does not recognize
successor liability.
A buyer would receive injunctive protection from successor liability for
claims of mass future claimants that the debtor/seller had treated in the bankruptcy.
Because entering a free and clear order would entail a finding that the debtor satisfied
the requisite standards for treating mass future claims, the injunction would ensure
that the successor is protected from certain suits when insulation from liability had
been factored into the purchase price. This procedure would avoid a situation in
which a court must decline to enforce its own free and clear sale order because mass
future claimants did not receive treatment in the bankruptcy case. (873) The fact that the
bankruptcy court would be empowered to enforce this order would not preclude other
courts from enforcing the order, especially if the issue arose long after plan
consummation or closure of the bankruptcy case.
Notes:
784 See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS
LITIGATION 2-3, 27-35 (Mar. 1991) (reform will require "federal legislation creating a national
asbestos dispute-resolution scheme"). See also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS
TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY
DEVICES 2 (Northwestern Press, 1995) ("We need seriously to readdress the problems of mass toxic
tort litigation. Improvements are possible. Litigations involving large numbers of plaintiffs, such as
Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, heart valves, atomic weapons pollution sites, Bendectin, repetitive task
syndromes (particularly carpal tunnel problems), breast implants, and the like, require us to treat a
wide variety of problems-jurisdictional, scientific, substantive and administrative, as well as
philosophical and ethical-differently from the way we have met them in the traditional one-plaintiff-one-defendant case").
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785 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 154 (1991).
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786 See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down Future Claims in Bankruptcy: Fairness,
Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Lessons of the Piper Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. L J.
329 (1996) (current system does not provide sufficient flexibility to reach optimal value of company
faced with mass tort liability. Code should be amended to permit flexibility to bring future claims
into process and deal with them); Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future
Claims: The Unfinished Business Left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L. J. 487 (1995)
(future claims should be defined as claims, with concomitant rights, powers and burdens of claimants,
and framework for handling mass torts should be devised instead of legislation designed to fix only
certain disputes); Kathryn R. Heidt, Products Liability, Mass Torts, and Environmental Obligations
in Bankruptcy: Suggestions for Reform, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 117 (1995)(suggesting reforms
to Code to define claim to include future claims, to provide for appointment of future claims
representatives, and to authorize trust mechanism); Anne Hardiman, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11
Reorganization: The Problem of Future Claims, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1369 (1985) (future claimants
need to be treated as creditors to protect all parties and promote uniform treatment of future
claimants); Georgine M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992) (Dalkon Shield mechanism should be the model for future cases since
it handled large number of claims fairly and efficiently); Richard Epling, Separate Classification of
Future Contingent and Unliquidated Claims in Chapter 11, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 173 (1989)(warning
against unfair treatment of future claimants under present Bankruptcy Code); Harvey J. Kesner,
Future Asbestos Related Litigants as Holders of Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code and Their Place in the Johns-Manville Reorganization, 62 AM. BANKR. L. J. 159
(1988)(should recognize that claim arises when debtor's act occurred, but treatment of future claims
should meet "fairness test"). See also Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort
Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367 (1994) (future claimants are hurt by current system's inability to
estimate liability and balance interests of future and present claimants. Proposes the creation of a new
type of tradeable security to ensure fair treatment for future claimants, since capital markets are
superior in processing available information).
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787 H.R. REP. NO. 103-835 (Oct. 4, 1994). See also Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser,
Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The Unfinished Business left by the Manville Amendments,
69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (1995) (uncertainty of law contributed to failure of Manville reorganization).
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788 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (authorizing
establishment of funds for demands arising from exposure to asbestos).
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789 11 U.S.C. §524(g)(2)(B)(I)(I) (1994) (requiring that the trust is to assume liabilities of
debtor named as defendant for asbestos related damages). See Linda J. Rusch, Unintended
Consequences of Unthinking Tinkering: The 1994 Amendments and the Chapter 11 Process, 69 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 349, 389 (1995) (discussing limited scope of these amendments and potential
repercussions).
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790 "The Committee expresses no opinion as to how much authority a bankruptcy court may generally have under its traditional equitable powers to issue an enforceable injunction of this kind.
The Committee has decided to provide explicit authority in the asbestos area because of the singular
cumulative magnitude of the claims involved. How the new statutory mechanism works in the
asbestos area may help the Committee judge whether the concept should be extended into other
areas." 140 CONG. REC. H10752, 10766 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).
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791 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 111(b), 108 Stat.
4106, 4117 (uncodified) (asbestos amendments do not affect court's power to deal with other mass
claims); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 267 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (permitting inclusion
of lead personal injury claims in trust in addition to asbestos claims, and establishing trust for
property damage claims as well).
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792 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 1997 WL 435029, 95-20512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 29, 1997) (potential massive liabilities from alleged injuries from silicone implants).
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793 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A)(1994).
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794 In fact, some commentators have noted that this type of trust actually might impede full compensation of claimants and successful reorganization. See Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser,
Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The Unfinished Business Left by the Manville Amendments,
69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 500 (1995).
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795 Id. at 502-503.
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796 See 140 CONG. REC. H10752, 10766 (Oct. 4, 1994).
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797 Deborah R. Hensler and Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 965 (1993).
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798 H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95-595 309 (1978).
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799 Tests employed to determine whether a potential liability is a claim include the "conduct test," see, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988) (claims arise based on time when acts giving rise to alleged liability were performed), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1260 (1988);
"preconfirmation relationship test," see In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995)
(recognition of claim requires prepetition breach and preconfirmation contact, privity, or other
relationship between debtor and creditor); the "prepetition relationship test," see, e.g., United States
v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) (recognition of claim requires
prepetition act or omission and prepetition contact privity or other relationship), the "fair
contemplation test," see, e.g., In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (prepetition relationship is
not enough; claim must have been within fair contemplation of parties prior to bankruptcy petition);
and the "accrued state law claim test," see In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984) (claim
not cognizable in bankruptcy if not yet cognizable under state law), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160
(1985).
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800 See, e.g., In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984) (automatic stay did not
enjoin creditor action against the debtor, even though debtor's act occurred prepetition, since actual
cause of action did not accrue prepetition).
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801 According to some commentators, "[b]y far, the most frequently cited and criticized case is the Third Circuit's Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.)." Kenneth N. Klee & Frank A. Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years of Judicial Legislation, 62 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 28 (1988); see also Ralph R. Mabey & Annette W. Jarvis, In re Frenville: A Critique
by the National Bankruptcy Conference's Committee on Claims and Distributions, 42 BUS. L. J. 697
(1987); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 839 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); In re Food Barn Stores, Inc., 175 B.R. 723, 730-731 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1994); In re Black, 70 B.R. 645, 648-50 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986). But see Gregory A. Bibler, The
Status of Unaccrued Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 61 AM. BANKR. L. J. 145
(1987) (Code is merely distribution mechanism, thus, if cause of action has not arisen under state law,
bankruptcy court lacks authority to discharge such claims).
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802 In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 71 F.3d 1113 (3d Cir. 1995) (nonbankruptcy law
determines when claims accrue for bankruptcy purposes), cert. denied sub nom., 116 S. Ct. 1851
(1996), citing In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). Other courts continue to recognize
the reasoning of Frenville. See, e.g., In re Kewanee Boiler, 198 B.R. 519, 528 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996), remanded on other grounds, 1996 WL 556736 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 1996).
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803 See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'g 37 B.R. 613 (E.D. Pa.
1983); In re UNR, 46 B.R. 671, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985). Even in the widely-cited Johns-Manville
case, the treatment of future claims was not predicated on a finding that future claims were actually
"claims." In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 52 B.R. 940
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).See also In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 628 n. 15 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1994) (noting that lack of recognition as bankruptcy claim did not preclude reservation of funds for
future claimants), aff'd, 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995).
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804 For discussion of "uncertain and weak position afforded future tort claimants" under the
current bankruptcy laws, see Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.), 90 F.3d 963, 985 (5th Cir.) (arguing that non-opt-out global settlement asbestos claimant class would be worse off if Fibreboard handled these matters in bankruptcy because
"courts that have allowed representation of future tort claimants have left them in an uncertain
position that falls short of full 'creditor' status"),
reh'g en banc denied, 101 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case
remanded on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
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805 In re Correct Mfg. Corp., 167 B.R. 458 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994); Pettibone Corp. v.
Ramirez, 90 B.R. 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). The prepetition relationship test requires some
prepetition relationship, such as contact, exposure, impact, or privity, between the debtor's prepetition
conduct and the claimant for the claimant to hold a section 101(5) claim. See also United States v.
LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay), 994 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991) (prepetition relationship between
debtor and EPA/creditor provided "sufficient 'contemplation' of contingencies to bring most
ultimately maturing payment obligations based on pre-petition conduct within the definition of
'claims.'");In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (prepetition conduct and prepetition
relationship might give rise to bankruptcy claim if claim is in fair contemplation of parties).
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806 See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995). Under the broader "Piper
test" that was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, a person has a section 101(5) claim against a debtor
manufacturer if " (i) events occurring before confirmation create a relationship, such as contact,
exposure, impact, or privity, between the claimant and the debtor's product; and (ii) the basis for
liability is the debtor's prepetition conduct in designing, manufacturing and selling the allegedly
defective or dangerous product. The debtor's prepetition conduct gives rise to a claim to be
administered in a case only if there is a relationship established before confirmation between an
identifiable claimant or group of claimants and that prepetition conduct." Id., 58 F.3d at 1577, citing
Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Calabro, 169 B.R. 766 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
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807 See, e.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 839 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir.
1988). See also Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Aguiar, 141 B.R. 552, 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated
on other grounds, 157 B.R. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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808 See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Sanders, 182 B.R. 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (unnoticed and
untreated liabilities of debtor were claims that were discharged in bankruptcy).
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809 See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay), 944 F.2d 991,1003 (2nd Cir. 1991) (questioning most liberal reading of "conduct test").
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810 See REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW PROJECT, 40 (rev. ed., 1997) (advocating that with only selected exceptions, future
claims should be treated like all other claims).
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811 Polybutylene pipe has been the subject of litigation in the U.S. Brass Corp. bankruptcy and products liability cases. However, the facts of this example are not intended to recount all the
details of those cases.
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812 "Another basic bankruptcy goal, that of debtor rehabilitation, justifies an early resolution of future tort claims. To preserve the firm's equity and pay early-maturing claims while huge but
future claims hang over the firm could bring about the firm's operational collapse . . . the enterprise
is likely to be affected severely and adversely. Access to capital markets will be reduced. The
enterprise will shrink; contract claims will mature and be paid. Worthwhile projects will be foregone.
Stockholders will be motivated to march the firm down risky paths. Customers and suppliers will
flee. Mergers will be barred; management, no longer fearful of ouster by merger, might slacken its
performance. To the extent it performs, it must donate its time and energy to the resolution of the
firm's financial troubles, not to operations. An early resolution of a large, contingent tort liability
may be necessary, not just to serve distributional norms of creditor equality and priority, but also, as
an important bankruptcy value, to prevent the debtor firm's operational collapse." Mark J. Roe,
Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 855 (1984).
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813 For example, A.H. Robins had litigated Dalkon Shield cases for 15 years before filing for bankruptcy in 1985. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE
EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 326 N.149 (1995).
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814 Letter to Chairman Brady C. Williamson from Francis M. Allegra, Deputy Associate
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, May 12, 1997; Letter to Chairman Brady C.
Williamson from Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,
Environment and Natural Resources Division, May 12, 1997.
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815 "Having been a debtor in bankruptcy does not authorize a firm to operate a nuisance today, Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985), or otherwise excuse it from complying with laws
of general application."In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1992), citing
In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1006-09 (2d Cir.1991); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 944 F.2d
164, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992); In re Chicago, Rock Island & P.
R.R., 794 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1986).
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816 Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L. J. 367, 370 (1994) (noting that insufficient recognition of future claimholders in bankruptcy is
illustrative of larger social problem of expending resources that "rightfully belong to future persons").
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817 Michael J. Saks and Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 826 (1992). See also
James S. Kakalik, et al, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES, at v, 84
(Rand Institute For Civil Justice 1984) (stating that by 1982, $1 billion in legal expenses and
compensation already had been expended, but study showed that legal fees tended to comprise over
1/3 of total compensation paid out by defendant companies).
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818 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Some commentators have argued that the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution may not extend due process
protection to an inchoate claim. See, e.g., Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie Andra Gavrin, Constitutional
Limitations on the Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 745 (1993), citing
Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929). But see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
429 (1982) (cause of action is property interest). Whether or not procedural process is actually and
Constitutionally required, the Commission's Recommendations reflect the intention to provide notice
and an opportunity to be heard to the greatest extent and to promote fairness to mass future claimants.
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819 These are some of the methods employed in the Dow Corning bankruptcy case, in which the debtor initially spent $8 million on these activities to disseminate notice of the case to persons
with implants produced by the debtor. See In re Dow Corning Corp, 211 B.R. 545, 553 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1997). "To achieve that end [of providing notice], the court may well craft a combination of
devices, including publication notice and the appointment of a class representative." In re Fairchild
Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) citing In re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig.,
996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir.1993). "What process is due in a given instance requires the balancing of a
variety of interests. In some cases, 'the marginal gains from affording an additional procedural
safeguard ... may be outweighed by the societal cost of providing such a safeguard.'" In re Agent
Orange, 996 F.2d at 1435, citing Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320-1
(1985). See also In re GAC Corp., 681 F.2d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 1982) (notice published in fifty-three major newspapers satisfied notice requirement for class action filed on behalf of purchasers of
debentures in debtor company).
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820 See In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 261 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
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821 See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down Future Claims In Bankruptcy: Fairness, Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Lessons of the Piper Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J.
329 (1996).
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822 See Kathryn R. Heidt, Future Claims in Bankruptcy: The NBC Amendments Do Not Go Far Enough, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 515 (1995) ("due process problems resulting from insufficient
notice or knowledge can be addressed by appointing a representative for the future claimants and
establishing a fund to pay the claimants as their claims become fixed").
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823 Compare Locks v. United States Trustee, 157 B.R. 89 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (goals of liquidation did not necessitate appointment of representative) with In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,
58 B.R. 476 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (appointing future claims representative to prevent inequitable
distribution to similarly situated creditors).
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824 For example, Forty-Eight Insulations filed for bankruptcy in 1985 with 26,000 asbestos-related property damage and personal injury claims pending and with the anticipation of many more
to follow. The bankruptcy case entailed a ten-year asset liquidation process. Pursuant to its Chapter
11 plan of liquidation, the debtor established a trust with two accounts-one for present claimants and
one for future claimants-along with a detailed procedure for claims allowance.See In re Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 115 F.3d 1294 (7th Cir. 1997).
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825 This tension between present and future claimants is what also may preclude the use of one representative for both groups. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610, 630-31 (3d Cir. 1996)
(inherent conflict between extant claimants who desire immediate, unlimited recovery and latent
claimants who desire that recovery be capped or delayed to ensure that extant claimants will not
deplete fund), aff'd sub. nom, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
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826 See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'g, 37 B.R. 613 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 29 B.R. 741, 748 (N.D. Ill. 1983), app. dismissed, 725 F.2d 1111
(7th Cir. 1984), motion to reconsider granted, 46 B.R. 671, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (appointing
representative under section 105 to represent future claimants who were "parties in interest"); In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 52 B.R. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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827 See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 91 (1984) (RAND study concluding that for every dollar paid to compensate an
asbestos plaintiff, $1.59 was spent on litigation and transaction costs); JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 2, 119 (1995) (traditional one-plaintiff-one-defendant model is not effective for mass toxic tort litigation);In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.
Supp. 1396, 1402 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("in the case of Agent Orange implementation of any distribution
plan based on traditional tort principles is impossible because of a virtual absence of proof of
causation, financially impracticable because of administrative costs, and not feasible for other
compelling reasons"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub
nom., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988); Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future
Claims: The Unfinished Business left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 487, n.1
(1995) (noting "uniquely expensive" American products liability system). See also Robert L. Rubin,
Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation, 98 YALE L. J. 813, 829 (1989).
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828 Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The
Unfinished Business left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 487, 490 (1995)
(explaining jurisdictional advantage of bankruptcy over class action mechanism).
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829 Another option that is not explored in this chapter is consolidation of claims. Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for consolidation of related case in a single
jurisdiction. In addition, the Multidistrict Act permits consolidation across federal jurisdictional lines
for pretrial purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994); see generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL
JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER
MULTIPARTY DEVICES 137 (Northwestern Press 1995).
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830 Rule 23 provides as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites
of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would
create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters
pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1994).
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831 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2247 (1997), citing FED.R. CIV. P. 1 (1994).
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832 Indeed, some defendants request decertification in the event that the settlement fails.See,
e.g., Keene v. Fiorelli (In re Joint E, and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 14 F.3d 726, 731 (2d Cir. 1993).
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833 "Many persons in the exposure-only category . . . may not even know of their exposure,
or realize the extent of the harm they may incur. Even if they fully appreciate the significance of class
notice, those without current afflictions may not have the information or foresight needed to decide,
intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252
(1997).
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834 Id. at 2247.
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835 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1350 (1995) (asserting that defendants have learned how to limit their tort
liability in mass tort class actions and solicit plaintiffs' attorneys to bring such class actions, all of
which uniquely disadvantages future claimants). See also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE
IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER
MULTIPARTY DEVICES 57 (Northwestern Press 1995) (stating that appellate courts have preferred
bankruptcy to class actions for settling large mass tort cases against defendants with insufficient
assets to satisfy all claimants, but expressing concern about bankruptcy fees).
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836 Keene v. Fiorelli (In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 14 F.3d 726, 732 (2d Cir.
1993); Frederick M. Baron, Counterpoint: An Asbestos Settlement With a Hidden Agenda, Wall S.
J., May 6, 1993 (concluding that if asbestos producers want to limit their liability to their victims, then
"all of their financial resources should be on a table in a bankruptcy" so that "everyone gets a fair
share of the available assets" rather than taking the route of a limited fund non-opt-out class action).
See also Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.), 90 F.3d 963, 996 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) ("Permitting Fibreboard to effect a reorganization bankruptcy proceeding in the guise of
a futures-only class action circumvents the detailed protections of the Bankruptcy Code for the
express purpose of imposing the entire cost of the bailout on Fibreboard's most vulnerable creditors,
to the betterment of its shareholders"), reh'g en banc denied, 101 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997). John C.
Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1355
(1995) (in comparing class actions to bankruptcy, "[i]n terms of both its fairness to creditors and its
ability to rehabilitate a financially strained debtor, the latter wins on all counts -- except its ability to
preserve management in control").
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837 This proposed amendment was recommended by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
in April 1996 and was approved by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States for publication and public comment. Proposed
Amendment to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b), 117 S. Ct. CXIX, CLIV to CLV (Aug. 1996) (Request
for Comment). The amendment has been met with significant opposition. Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2247 (1997) (reporting on negative commentary submitted to Committee).
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838 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2248, n .16 (1997); Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.), 90 F.3d 963, 982 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 101 F.3d 368 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. granted and judgment vacated, and case remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997); White
v. National Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1994) ("adequacy of class representation .
. . is ultimately determined by settlement itself"), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1137 (1995), abrogated by
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2247 (1997); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d
709, 740(4th Cir. 1989) ("[i]f not a ground for certification per se, certainly settlement should be a
factor, and an important factor, to be considered when determining certification"), cert. denied sub
nom., Anderson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989), abrogated by Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2247 (1997); Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 900 (2d Cir. 1985)
(certification appropriate, in part, because "the interests of the members of the broadened class in the
settlement agreement were commonly held"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 (1986), abrogated by
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2247 (1997).See also In re General Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liability Litig., 55 F.3d 768,778 (3rd Cir. 1995) (for settlement
purposes, Rule 23(a) requirements must be satisfied as if case were going to be litigated), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 88 (1995); Keene v. Fiorelli (In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 14 F.3d 726 (2d
Cir. 1993) (vacating injunction of all pending litigation and vacating class certification for settlement
for lack of case or controversy).
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839 Amchem Prods., 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2247 (1997).
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840 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (permitting mandatory class action to be certified where prosecution of separate actions would create risk of adjudications for individual class members that
would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of interests of the other members not parties to
adjudications, or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests). A court
must find that the defendant is a limited fund, potentially because payment of all claims would leave
the defendant insolvent. See In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721,
739 (2d Cir.1992), cited with approval in In re Joint E. and S. District Asbestos Litig., 78 F.3d 764,
777-79 (2d Cir.1996).See also In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 1088 (1993) (approving 23(b)(1)(B) class action on basis that
individual litigation would reduce recovery for all plaintiffs from Drexel's limited assets).
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841 Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.), 90 F.3d 963, 982 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc denied, 101 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 117
S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
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842 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
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843 See, e.g., Eric Watt Wiechmann, et al., Mass Tort Class Actions: Is the Tide Turning?, 64 DEF. COUNSEL J. 67 (1997) (mass torts should not be handled by class action mechanism because
too many questions can be raised about propriety of class, prompting more, rather than reducing,
litigation); Bruce L. Hay, Assymetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1997) (inequality between class counsel's effective share of settlement he
negotiates and counsel's effective share of what class members would receive if he did not negotiate
a class settlement encourages counsel to settle case for less than it is worth to class); Judith Resnick,
et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
296 (1997) (discussing problems with attorneys' fees in class litigation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159
(1995) (new ethical rules should be constructed to handle new methods of conflict resolution, which
should consider what fair and just settlement would look like in collective procedure; strong
protections or deep scrutiny of outcome is necessary); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow
Weeps, Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (strongly criticizing
process in Georgine, specifically noting collusion between class attorney and defendants, court's
willingness to liberally construe law and facts, and subordination of class interest to nonparties);
Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571 (1997)
(arguing that reasonably identifiable members of class should not have to be bound by class
representative, but should have right to prosecute their causes of action by presenting evidence and
making different legal arguments); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94
MICH. L. REV. 899 (1996) (to legitimize class action settlements, procedure essentially must be
modeled after review of administrative agency rule-making activities administrative agencies, and
courts should demand reasoned explanation for settlement, taking criticisms into account, before
approving such settlements); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82
VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996) (legitimization of class action settlement process requires that approval of
class action settlement should not shield class action attorneys from suits arising from their conduct
based on state law such as consumer protection, tort law, antitrust); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:
The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995) (because class action
has become shield for defendants instead of sword for plaintiffs, at expense of future claimants, class
action should apply only at liability stage and individual damage determinations should be made, with
future claimants given choice to opt out); William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class
Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837, 840 (1995) (questioning court authority to
certify mass tort claims as mandatory class actions that can provide end run around bankruptcy law,
enabling defendant to take benefits of bankruptcy without burdens); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions,
Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs' Due Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 871, 911-912 (1995) ("due process quandary" created by class actions); Roger C.
Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions:" an Introduction, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995) (highlights issues and problems of mass tort class action settlements
and recommends judicial involvement to protect plaintiffs, to correct abuses and to restrain private
attorneys); Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995)(class actions should not be end run around problems with state tort
actions); Michael D. Ricciuti, Equity and Accountability in the Reform of Settlement Procedures in
Mass Tort Cases: The Ethical Duty to Consult, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 817 (1988)(class members'
interests do not receive adequate considerations in settlements, guidelines must be constructed to
ensure proper representation and rebalance attorney-client relationship in this context); Robert G.
Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 561, 575-76 (1993) (inherently long trial delays coerce mass tort plaintiffs to accept
settlements that otherwise would be unacceptable); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877 (1987) (mass tort settlement values often have little relationship to merits of case);
Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 440 (1986)(alternative dispute resolution techniques for complex cases are warranted but
experimentation should take place in principled, careful manner); Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder
Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779 (1985) (class action is questionable
for mass tort litigation when victims have substantial individual claims that deserve full measure of
due process, and joint trial of common issues is irreconcilable with fairness. However, joinder should
be used for discovery, pretrial matters, and for determination of punitive damages); Michael J. Saks
and Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling
in the Trials of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 839 (1992) (extreme dissatisfaction of plaintiffs
regarding mass tort settlements); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1183 (1982).
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844 See Bob Van Voris, Bankruptcy In Lieu of Settlements?, Nat'l L. J., July 28, 1997 at A1, A21.
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845 Under the absolute priority rule, if claimholders in an objecting class of claims or interests will not receive the full amount of their allowed unsecured claims, members of junior classes
are not entitled to receive anything. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1994).
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846 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1383 (1995); Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of
Future Claims: The Unfinished Business left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 493
(1995) (noting explict procdures and substantive protections of claimants that are absent in class
actions); William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 837, 840 (1995) (questioning court authority to certify mass tort claims as
mandatory class actions that can provide end run around bankruptcy law, enabling defendant to take
benefits of bankruptcy without burdens); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort,
72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986) (bankruptcy is best option for putting more assets into victims' hands).
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847 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1994). Estimation also can be used for temporary allowance for purposes of voting on a plan. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018(a) (court may temporarily allow claim or
interest in "amount which the court deems proper for the purpose of accepting or rejecting a plan").
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848 For example, the claims in A.H. Robins were estimated on the basis of a six-day trial in which the parties' experts testified on the estimates they had reached on the basis of extensive data
collection. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 698 (4th Cir. 1989)
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
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849 See Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co., 691 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir. 1982).
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850 Cf. In re Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R. 527 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986) (estimation
dictates distribution), In re Baldwin-United Corp., 57 B.R. 751 (S.D. Oh. 1985) (estimation
establishes cap, not floor, on distribution), and In re MCorp. Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1992), dismissed 139 B.R. 820 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (distribution not limited by estimation); In re
Farley, Inc., 146 B.R. 748 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (estimation can be used for voting and feasibility);
In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (estimation can be used for voting
and claim allowance); In re MacDonald, 128 B.R. 161 (Bankr.W.D. Tex. 1991) (estimation can be
used for feasibility); In re Rusty Jones, Inc., 143 B.R. 499 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (estimation used
for allowance, liquidation, and distribution). See also In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 189 B.R. 681,
683 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) ("it is 'contingent or unliquidated' claims, the value of which we are
estimating. This is to be distinguished from estimating the value which claimants might take in
satisfaction of their claims through some bankruptcy mechanism such as a trust"). The proposed
Recommendation is not intended to disturb current law governing estimation of contingent or
unliquidated claims that are not mass future claims.
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851 See, e.g., Memorandum from Stephen H. CaseComments on 11/26 Future Claims Memo
( December 3, 1996) ("what is needed, may I submit, is a clear statement, not using the weasel word
"estimation," that the provisions in the plan providing for distributions to future claimants are final
and binding and not subject to being reopened"); Letter from Prof. Barry E. Adler, dated February
24, 1997, at 4 (suggesting that bankruptcy court should be empowered to make binding determinations).
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852 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1994) (district court shall order that personal injury tort and
wrongful death claims shall be tried in district court where bankruptcy case is pending or in district
court in district in which claim arose). See REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: NATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW PROJECT, 40 (rev. ed. 1997) (noting that change to 28
U.S.C. § 157(b) might be necessary if bankruptcy court were to make binding determinations of
distributions to personal injury claimants).
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853 See, e.g., David S. Salsburg & Jack F. Williams, A Statistical Approach to Claims
Estimation in Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (Forthcoming 1997) (explaining the Face Value
Model, the Zero Value Model, the Market Theory Model, the Forced Settlement Model, the
Discounted Value Model, the Summary Trial Model, and recommending an alternative Statistical
Approach to claims estimation). See also FED. R. EVID. 706; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017 (authorizing use
of independent expert witnesses appointed by court); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 982
F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming district court appointment of expert witnesses testifying on
expected number of future claimants against Manville Trust), modified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1993), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
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854 See, e.g., In re National Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that settlement trust became sole shareholder of reorganized National Gypsum).
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855 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
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856 See id. (encouraging litigants to consider more creative mechanisms for compensation,
citing Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L. J. 367,
394 (1994) (recommending that tort victims receive shares of liquidating trust).
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857 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 57, 106 (Northwestern Press
1995) (noting that in Manville case, "some plaintiffs' attorneys used their control to amass huge fees
for themselves, stripping the trust of its assets, despite the efforts of the courts supervising the trust
to limit the fees to reasonable amounts"); Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment
of Future Claims: The Unfinished Business left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J.
487, 496, n.37 (1995) ("the power of present claimants to jump the queue by filing or prosecuting
litigation and thereby force the Trust's hand can hardly be overemphasized as a factor contributing
to the early insolvency of the Manville trust"); Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig.), 129 B.R. 710, 753 (E & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
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858 The claims in A.H. Robins were estimated on the basis of a six-day trial in which the
parties' experts testified on the estimates they had reached on the basis of extensive data collection.
See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 698 (4th Cir. 1989). See
generally Georgine M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992) (recommending Dalkon Shield mechanism as model for future cases
since it handled large number of claims fairly and efficiently); see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS,
AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 280, n.88 (Northwestern Press 1995) (citing Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust as example of trust mechanism that has functioned very well, given its goals of
treating all claimants fairly and equally and focusing on best interest of claimants collectively,
preserving funds by keeping administrative expenses to minimum, and preferring settlement and
prompt payment of claims); Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future
Claims: The Unfinished Business left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 487, 497
n.45 (1995) (explaining current highly solvent state of Robins Trust).
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859 David S. Salsburg & Jack F. Williams, A Statistical Approach to Claims Estimation in
Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (Forthcoming 1997); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 864 (1984) (advocating that the firm place in trust expected value of tort
claims as combination of firm's debt and equity, with debt equaling the minimum expected value of
the liability and equity equal to the difference between
the minimum and maximum expected value); Morris Shanker, Insuring Payment to Contingent and Unidentified Creditors in Bankruptcy, 92
COM. L.J. 199 (1987).
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860 See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 87 (2d. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
868 (1988); In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989)(referring to doctrine of marshaling); Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus.,
Inc., 124 B.R. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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861 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B) (1994) provides that "An injunction may be issued under subparagraph (A) to enjoin entities from taking legal action for the purpose of directly or indirectly
collecting, recovering, or receiving payment or recovery with respect to any claim or demand that,
under a plan of reorganization, is to be paid in whole or in part by a trust described in paragraph
(2)(B)(I), except such legal actions as are expressly allowed by the injunction, the confirmation order,
or the plan of reorganization."
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862 See In re MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville, 837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d. Cir. 1988) (noting that
channeling claimants away from insurance company and toward insurance proceeds was essential to
reorganization and thus fell within bankruptcy court's equitable powers), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868
(1988); Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(approving channeling injunction that also enjoined workers from pursuing claims against settling
insurers because section 105 permitted court to protect property of estate and claims against insurers
already had been settled). Compare In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(disallowing channeling injunction that also entailed release of settling insurers from parent
corporation claims). REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S
CODE REVIEW PROJECT, 40 - 41 (rev. ed, 1997) (noting channeling injunctions can be used to bring
insurance proceeds to estate).
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863 See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 881 (1984)
(discussing how otherwise unaffordable insurance policies become conceivable through mass tort
bankruptcy).
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864 It may be necessary to amend section 1129(a)(7) to clarify that the best interest of creditors test can apply to the aggregate estimation of mass future claims. REFORMING THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE: NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW PROJECT 39 (rev. ed,
1997).
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865 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1994).
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866 Additional discussion of section 363(f) can be found later in this chapter. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c)(property dealt with in plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors).
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867 See, e.g., In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996) (application of
section 363(f) not limited to in rem interests), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1251 (1997). But see The Ninth
Avenue Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 B.R. 716 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (suggesting that
section 363(f) authorizes sales free and clear of liens, but not unsecured claims), citing Zerand-Bernal, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994).
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868 In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1992).
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869 J. Maxwell Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles, Reorganization Law, and the Just Demand that Relief be Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEV.
J. 1, 7 (1995).
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870 Id., at 8.
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871 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Ch. 3 §12, at 263 (Proposed
Final Draft, Reporters' Note, April 1, 1997) (citing cases and scholarly literature noting that "strict
liability on successor corporations is inconsistent with the principles of products liability law to
impose responsibility on the party who created the risk and was in a position to prevent its
occurrence").
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872 See Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In re White Motor Credit
Corp.), 75 B.R. 944, 951 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (successor liability subverts Congressionally
created priority scheme in bankruptcy). See also William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan,
Inequality Among Creditors: The Unconstitutional Use of Successor Liability To Create a New Class
of Priority Claimants, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 325 (1996) (courts hold purchaser liable for
prepetition claims against debtor essentially burdens property in favor of individual creditor's private
interests and constitutes a servitude).
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873 Cf. In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) (declining to
enforce prior free and clear sale order because claimants were not recognized and treated in
bankruptcy case). See also Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994) (court did
not have "related to" jurisdiction to enjoin suit against successor for post-sale injuries,
notwithstanding language in Chapter 11 plan stipulating that court would enforce terms of sale
agreement).
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