CHAPTER 2: BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION
Business bankruptcies are only a small fraction of all filings - about 4%
overall - but the bankruptcy system is a critical part of the cycle of business life and
death in the American economy. Principally through Chapter 11, business
bankruptcy creates the opportunity to restructure failing businesses, to preserve jobs,
to prevent the spread of economic failure to smaller suppliers and other dependent
businesses, and to permit communities to retain their tax base. Liquidation is also
an important part of the business bankruptcy system, providing an efficient and
orderly way to dissolve a business and to distribute its assets equitably among parties
who might otherwise see no recovery at all.
The Commission's recommendations reflect a conclusion that the business
bankruptcy system generally works well, at times very well, but that it can be
improved. The Recommendations, many passed without dissent, reflect the diversity
of issues that arise in business bankruptcy and the possible approaches to improving
the system. Four different working groups addressed issues that arise in business
cases: the Chapter 11 Working Group, the Small Business, Partnership and Single
Asset Working Group, the Transnational Bankruptcy Working Group, and the Mass
Tort and Future Claims Working Group. In addition, the Commission as a whole
worked to develop proposals on some of the issues that arise most often in a business
context, such as the treatment of executory contracts and leases.
The Commission addressed different types of problems in business cases. In
some areas, new problems have arisen that were not fully anticipated at the time
Congress adopted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and, as a result, must be resolved with
little or no statutory guidance. The unique challenges of mass tort cases have forced
courts and parties to struggle in a legal framework not designed for those cases,
creating inconsistent approaches in different cases. Partnerships, with their dual
partner/partnership liability, also have presented special challenges not recognized
in the 1978 Code. The increasing globalization of businesses has intensified the need
for transnational cooperation to deal with failing companies. While the 1978 Code
reflects Congress' foresight in including some provisions to deal with transnational
bankruptcies, international developments now present both a new need and a new
opportunity to improve the bankruptcy system. In these three areas, the Commission
developed new structures tailored to significant changes in the business and financial
world.
In general, however, most of those who use the system or comment on it
agree that the basic structure of business bankruptcy law is sound and needs only fine
tuning to clarify ambiguities and reduce cost and delay. The structure of the system
has been largely intact since the Great Depression. The major change in the 1978
Code involved the consolidation of three chapters and approaches: separate systems
for publicly traded companies, small businesses and single asset cases were fused
into a single business reorganization chapter. Chapter 7 liquidation continued to be
available for both individuals and businesses of all sizes, but reorganizations for all
business entities were combined into a new Chapter 11. It is unsurprising that such
an important conceptual change would produce inconsistencies and controversy.
Moreover, as more diverse businesses have used the business bankruptcy system,
additional areas of the Code have been tested, revealing some ambiguities in the law
and some inefficiencies in practice.
From the Commission's work comes the creation of three new statutory
frameworks: mass future claims, transnational bankruptcy, and partnerships. The
remainder of the Commission's recommendations address the existing system,
offering recommendations to amend or to clarify current provisions: Chapter 11
generally, small business bankruptcy, and single asset real estate bankruptcy.
Mass Torts
Mass torts present a new challenge to the entire American civil justice system.
The present system of case-by-case litigation is not only extraordinarily expensive
and wasteful, but it also threatens to deprive claimants at the end of the line of any
recovery if the business eventually fails. Those who do not seek immediate legal
representation when they are injured and those who discover their injuries only later
may find that the first claimants have recovered and the business has disappeared,
leaving the latecomers with no compensation. Moreover, huge prospective liabilities
can have an enormous, adverse impact on otherwise sound enterprises that are vital
to the American economy; their destruction can cost thousands of jobs and seriously
harm the communities that depend on them. A mechanism to deal with prospective
liability can give these businesses access to capital markets and permit them to
remain contributing members of a community, while it gives them the opportunity
to generate the money they will need to compensate those they have injured.
Business failures involving mass torts were largely unknown when the Johns-Manville Corporation's Chapter 11 filing in 1982 required a bankruptcy court to
resolve tens of thousands of claims for present and future asbestos injuries. The
bankruptcy court and the appellate courts, as well as all of the litigants, had no choice
but to create procedures and practices in this uncharted territory. Not surprisingly,
the practices were disputed at almost every turn. Although Congress ultimately
adopted amendments to deal with asbestos cases, other mass tort cases involving
breast implants, toys, plastic pipe, airplanes, medical devices, and boilers have
worked their way through the courts without the benefit of a specific statutory
structure. The result is excessive cost and litigation, delay, and uncertainty. Too
large a fraction of available resources is devoted to attorneys' fees rather than to
compensation for victims and the reorganization of the company to preserve jobs.
When Congress adopted the asbestos amendments in 1994 to address massive
personal injury and property damage in a single industry, it took the first step in
developing a coherent procedure for dealing with these kinds of claims through
bankruptcy. The Commission has built on the experiences of the asbestos cases and
other cases involving massive liabilities to make recommendations to deal with mass
tort and mass contract claims.
Resolving massive claims is inherently complicated, in part because of the
sheer number of claims and in part because the claims themselves involve difficult
conceptual issues. Mass tort cases often involve claimants not yet injured or injured
but not yet aware of the injury, invoking questions about the fairness of compensation
for both present and future victims. The Commission's Proposal creates a special
class for "mass future claims" and establishes procedures in a reorganization to
safeguard the rights of the people who hold these claims. Parties may work together
with a future claims representative to create a mechanism, such as a trust or private
insurance, to provide compensation for people who may not even know of their
injuries for years to come. The Proposal establishes guidelines for the
appointment of mass future claims representatives, for channeling injunctions and for
plan confirmation issues. In addition, it creates other specialized tools to deal
with massive liabilities in bankruptcy, without disturbing the basic Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11 structure.
The mass future claims issue may have been one of the most conceptually
challenging issues addressed by the Commission. At several points, the Commission
was on the verge of concluding that any system designed to deal with these
extraordinarily difficult questions would be inadequate in some way. The
Commission has made specific and comprehensive recommendations, however,
without dissent and with the realization that the only way that all victims in mass
liability cases can receive fair compensation, where the mass liability threatens the
very existence of the company, would be through a fully developed structure to
address the problems. That would maximize the value of the business, enhancing the
ultimate return to all victims, from the first to file a claim to the last.
Transnational Bankruptcy
In the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Congress included, for the first time,
provisions to enable courts to deal with the insolvencies of businesses that had assets
or creditors across national borders. Since then, the United States has encouraged
international cooperation in multi-national business failures, but the tools have been
limited and successes have been hard won. As a business fails, the impulse is nearly
irresistible in most countries to seize all of the assets located within that jurisdiction
for distribution to domestic creditors. This approach essentially destroys the concept
of equality of distribution for all creditors. It also eliminates any opportunity to
reorganize a failing business. The seizure of foreign assets is an event from which
few troubled businesses can recover. While the transnational provisions in the
United States' Bankruptcy Code today are among the world's strongest in promoting
international cooperation, without similar provisions in the laws of other countries,
they will remain inadequate to deal with most international business failures.
Since Congress adopted the 1978 Code, the growth of global businesses and
the global failures that followed prompted the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law to develop a more comprehensive approach to dealing with
insolvent businesses. In September 1997, UNCITRAL adopted a model law to
develop a basic structure when bankruptcies involve debtors and creditors that are in
more than one country. The United States has taken a leadership role in this work.
The Commission, with the able guidance of Professor Jay Westbrook, has had the
opportunity to review the model law and to explore the modest changes necessary to
bring the United States' laws into conformance with the model law on transnational
insolvency. The Commission unanimously recommends these changes to further the
efficient and fair treatment of both debtors and creditors involved in international
businesses in liquidation and reorganization.
Partnership and Partner Bankruptcies
Another difficult conceptual issue is partnership and partner bankruptcies.
The 1980s saw a sharp rise in the number of businesses operating in partnership
form, and they range from informal two-person arrangements to complex structures
of general and limited partners whose constituents are all corporate entities. As the
partnership form has grown, both in number and complexity, some have entered
bankruptcy either for liquidation or reorganization.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of high profile partnership
bankruptcies, including some well-known law firms, highlighted gaps in the
Bankruptcy Code for partnership failure. Because both a partnership and its partners
are liable for the partnership's debts, both liquidation and reorganization become
very complex. For example, difficult questions arise when a trustee tries to enforce
contribution claims against individual partners as the trustee collects the assets of the
partnership estate. In addition, the Uniform Partnership Act dissolves a partnership
whenever either the partnership or a single partner files for bankruptcy. If this rule
is applicable in bankruptcy, the business will dissolve -- calling into question not
only whether a partnership can ever reorganize in bankruptcy, but whether a
bankruptcy court can administer any of the assets or oversee their pro rata
distribution to creditors in liquidation. In this area, the case law is chaotic. With few
statutory provisions in place in the 1978 Code, courts have taken diametrically
opposing views on a number of important issues.
The difficulties presented by the bankruptcies of individual partners are
equally complex. Questions arise about the disposition of the debtor partner's
interest in a partnership if the partnership agreement contains a buyout provision
triggered when a partner files for bankruptcy. The enforcement of these provisions
could deprive the bankruptcy estate-and the debtor's creditors-of substantial
economic value. State partnership laws determine which assets are used to pay
individual debts and which are used for partnership debts, notwithstanding the
bankruptcy rules establishing priority of creditors' payments. As with partnership
bankruptcies, courts have had little guidance in this area, and the case law is divided.
The Commission's task was to develop recommendations to create a new
legal framework for the bankruptcies both of partnerships and of individual partners
that fit the existing structure in Chapter 7, Chapter 11 and Chapter 13. The
Commission was able to build on the work of the National Bankruptcy Conference
and an ad hoc committee of the American Bar Association, which collectively
addressed many of the issues. The Commission's recommendations create an
efficient, unambiguous mechanism for the complete resolution of the liability of
general partners to partnership creditors and the related contribution and indemnity
claims of and against general partners. These recommendations would help resolve
the conflicting case law that now governs partnership and partner bankruptcies.
The Current System
The Commission's other business bankruptcy recommendations proceed from
a very different perspective, and some of which were the subject of more controversy
within the Commission. In these areas, the Commission reviewed the typical
business cases. The Commission working groups studied Chapter 11 generally and
small business and single asset real estate cases separately.
Throughout the discussions, the lack of data available to evaluate the Chapter
11 system was particularly troubling. The statistics most frequently cited dealt with
the low plan-confirmation rate in Chapter 11, which an Ernst & Whinney study
pegged at 17% for cases filed between 1979 and 1986. (781) The study estimated that
20 to 30% of the confirmations resulted in liquidating plans, leading one government
researcher to speculate that perhaps only one in ten companies that enter Chapter 11
successfully confirms a plan to reorganize the business. (782) As the Chapter 11
Working Group explored these data, however, the Group did not conclude that the
numbers were necessarily a cause for dismay. More than 95% of the publicly traded
companies in Chapter 11 successfully reorganized, (783) suggesting that Chapter 11 was
a successful vehicle for the largest cases involving the greatest number of creditors,
the most significant assets, and the largest number of jobs.
The low confirmation rate also suggests that many businesses use bankruptcy
to solve business problems without the need to complete a formal plan of
reorganization. Many of the practitioners who testified noted that Chapter 11 cases
that were dismissed did not necessarily fail. They explained that once the debtor and
its principal creditors reached an agreement, they often would voluntarily dismiss the
pending bankruptcy case. Some of the most successful Chapter 11 cases appear in
the data under the heading "dismissed." Of course, since Chapter 11 also attracts
some "dead-on-arrival" businesses, one of its principal functions is to identify and
to funnel hopeless cases into a speedier, more efficient liquidation than under non-bankruptcy law. Without more complete data, it is impossible to know just how
much success and just how much failure are represented in the low Chapter 11
confirmation rates.
The Commission was aware as well that Chapter 11 serves as a model for out-of-court restructuring. Parties negotiate in the shadow of Chapter 11, restructuring
companies without taking them through a formal bankruptcy proceeding. This "non-bankruptcy-bankruptcy" and a related mechanism, the "prepackaged" bankruptcy,
demonstrate the advantages of a clear legal structure to identify the rules of business
reorganization. America's thriving work-out business may demonstrate that a
functioning bankruptcy system is most valuable to troubled companies that do not
formally use it but that rely on its guideposts in debt restructuring negotiations. It
also served to remind the Commission that any changes to Chapter 11 will affect
business workouts generally.
The difficulties of understanding and making policy recommendations with
limited data were magnified for some business cases-especially small business
reorganizations and single asset cases. For example, while the Working Group on
Small Business, Partnership, and Single Asset cases tried to develop specific data
about these cases, the recommendations were ultimately drafted without empirical
information on the differences in practices between these cases and Chapter 11 cases
generally. The absence of data also made it difficult to estimate how many small
business would be swept into particular definitions of "small business cases" and
"single asset cases." The difficulties encountered in developing these Commission
Recommendations emphasize the importance of the Commission's discussion of the
need to improve data collection and reporting. The adoption of the data collection
and reporting Recommendations, which appear in Chapter 4 of this Report, would
be particularly useful in making policy decisions designed to affect only a subset of
troubled businesses.
The Chapter 11 Working Group, charged with reviewing the business
bankruptcy system generally, began its work with a broad-ranging discussion of the
policy objectives in the law. The initial meeting, in June 1996, started with the
question of whether Chapter 11 should be sharply modified or abandoned altogether.
Judges, lawyers, investment analysts, bankers, accountants, businesspeople, and
academics joined the working group in these discussions. Some of the lawyers
represented only creditors and others represented debtors, while the academics
included critics of the current system. The debates were lively and wide-ranging, but
there was widespread agreement about the general goals served by a Chapter 11
system:
- Maximize enterprise value
- Preserve jobs
- Rehabilitate viable businesses
- Encourage out of court restructuring
- Resolve distributive decisions
- Promote efficiency
- Benefit other parties affected by business failure
After the initial meetings, the Chapter 11 Working Group called on the
business and legal community to help it develop an agenda for the most pressing
problems in reorganization cases. As the issues were identified, the Working Group
drew on the expertise of a diverse and ever-changing group of professionals.
Ultimately, the Chapter 11 Working Group worked with approximately 200
businesspeople, practicing lawyers, investment analysts, academics, trustees, and
judges and with 15 organizations to ensure that it had considered every idea and
alternative in dealing with business bankruptcy issues.
In addition, a group of bank representatives formed an Ad Hoc Group of
Secured Creditors to review in detail every proposal from the Chapter 11 Working
Group. The group offered its well-reasoned thoughts and suggestions at a series of
Commission meetings. Notwithstanding the diversity of perspectives represented,
there was widespread (although not unanimous) agreement that the Chapter 11
system was generally functioning well and that adjustments to the system, which
could have widely-felt implications throughout the economy, should be modest in
scope.
One challenging task undertaken by the full Commission was a review of the
chaotic case law involving executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 365. This section
of the Code governs the treatment of all of the debtor's contracts in force at the time
of the filing, based on a determination that a contract is "executory" at the time of
filing. The Commission proposes a more direct analysis, dropping the concept of
"executoriness" in favor of straightforward rules regarding the breach or performance
of a contract. While the Commission's Recommendations will not solve all the
difficulties that have arisen in section 365, they will provide a more solid conceptual
foundation and eliminate a large portion of the current litigation. The
Recommendations also would grant compensation to nondebtor parties for injuries
they suffer from the trustee's delay in the decision to breach or perform a contract,
thus assuring balance between the interests of the estate in reorganization and
fairness to the nondebtor party who may or may not be called on to perform under the
contract.
Prepackaged bankruptcy plans are cost-saving, time-saving innovations that
have become a significant part of the business bankruptcy system in the last 20 years.
The Commission developed a number of proposals to permit the efficient resolution
of these cases, such as elimination of mandatory waiting periods for plan voting and
expansion of the opportunities for prepetition solicitation of support for a plan. In
cases that are appropriate for a prepackaged treatment, the Commission's
Recommendations should facilitate their use.
The actual operation of business cases received significant attention. The
Commission recommends simplification and clarification of the asset sale process
during a bankruptcy, freeing assets more quickly for distribution to creditors. Pre-bankruptcy waivers have been increasingly included in loan documents as one
creditor attempts to limit the rights of other creditors in bankruptcy and to tie the
hands of the debtor in a reorganization effort. The Commission recommends
invalidation of these clauses that potentially permit one party to opt out of a
collective bankruptcy proceeding.
The Commission recommends several changes to the plan confirmation
process that are designed to settle disputes or uncertainties in the law that have led
to expensive, time-consuming delays. Not without dissent, the Commission
explicitly endorses the new value exception to the absolute priority rule, as
articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bonner Mall and,
more recently, by the Seventh Circuit in203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. That
support, however, carries an important qualification: the Commission recommends
that any debtor in possession that attempts to "cram down" a new value plan should
lose the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization. This caveat will give
other parties the right to propose their own plans of reorganization and, in effect, to
make their own bids for the business. This proposal is more favorable to creditor
interests than the current case law in the area and thus adjusts the Chapter 11 balance
slightly, but the Commission believed that it was beneficial to permit the market,
rather than the court, to value a business in reorganization.
The rules governing classification of creditors are also clarified in the
Commission's proposals. The appellate courts have used some variation of the
"rational business justification" test adopted by the Commission, but litigation
continues as other standards also have been used. The Commission's
Recommendation would settle the litigation by focusing on the business reasons for
classification-the standard that best embraces the business-oriented approach that
should guide most decisions in any reorganization.
The Chapter 11 proposals also include amendments to facilitate mediation,
to strengthen the investigatory powers of examiners, and to govern postconfirmation
modification. Some small, but persistent, injustices in Chapter 11 are also addressed.
The Commission recommends, for example, that when a company files for
bankruptcy, the money it holds for its employees, such as deductions to pay for
medical insurance or savings bonds, be treated as the employees' funds, not assets
of the debtor company. That will free those funds from the grip of the law's
automatic stay, making them immediately available to the employees. Overall, the
Chapter 11 proposals make changes that should reduce litigation and enhance the
procedures of most Chapter 11 cases.
Perhaps the most substantial changes recommended in the Chapter 11 process
address small business bankruptcies. The Working Group on Small Businesses,
Partnerships and Single Asset Cases dealt with some of the practical effects of the
decision by Congress to bring all business reorganization cases into a single chapter
in 1978. While there were many points of view on the subject of small businesses
that file for bankruptcy, the Small Business Working Group focused on evidence that
small cases are not flourishing in the general Chapter 11 structure. The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994 enabled businesses to elect small business treatment that shorten
deadlines for plan confirmation, but the work of the Small Business Working Group
has gone further.
The Recommendations separate the treatment of small businesses and large
businesses in both their access to Chapter 11 and the rules by which they may try to
confirm plans of reorganization. With some dissent, the Commission adopted a
series of proposals to make Chapter 11 less hospitable for some small businesses,
intended to force the dead or dying small businesses into liquidation more quickly.
Unlike the 1994 Amendments, the proposed small business Recommendations would
be mandatory for all small businesses, and they would increase rather than decrease
some reporting requirements, heighten supervision, and shorten other deadlines.
The Commission's proposal on small businesses applies to all businesses with
unsecured debts less than $5 million at the time of filing and to all single asset real
estate cases, regardless of size. Debtors would have increased reporting
responsibilities. A small business debtor would be required, for example, to file
within three days after filing bankruptcy a balance sheet, statement of operations, and
cash-flow statement and the debtor's most recent tax return or a statement made
under penalty of perjury that no such financial statements had been prepared or that
no tax return had been filed. Small business debtors would then be required to attend
meetings for initial debtor interviews and court-ordered scheduling conferences--in
addition to the meetings of creditors that all debtors, large and small, must attend.
Small business debtors also would have to permit on-site inspection of their
premises and of their books and records. They would have 10 days to establish
separate deposit and tax accounts, and they would be limited to 30 days to file all
schedules and statements of financial affairs. These businesses would face dismissal
from Chapter 11 if they failed to comply with obligations to file their tax returns,
maintain current insurance, or pay all non-contested post-petition tax claims in a
timely manner. Small businesses, unlike their larger counterparts, would not receive
an automatic stay if they made a second trip to bankruptcy within a two year period.
The Commission's Proposal would impose on small businesses new and
uniform reporting requirements on the debtor's profitability, projected cash receipts
and cash disbursements, including comparisons with actual cash receipts from prior
reports. Small business debtors also would be required to report on "such other
matters" as "may be called for in the best interests of debtors and creditors and the
public interest." The Commission's Recommendations would simplify plan
disclosure statements, but they also would shorten the time available to confirm a
plan of reorganization. Extending the time to confirm a plan would be more difficult
for small businesses than for large ones. Even if no creditor objected to the extension,
the U.S. Trustee would be required to be involved in any decision to extend the time
to confirm a plan of reorganization to "defend the public interest."
Not all of the Recommendations from the Small Business Working Group
were limited to small businesses. The Commission adopted the Recommendation of
the Small Business Working Group to modify the Code for all debtors to expand the
grounds for which any debtor-not just a small business debtor-could be dismissed
from bankruptcy. The Commission recommends 12 new grounds for the dismissal
of a Chapter 11 case, as well as additional grounds for the appointment of a trustee
to replace the manager of the business. One important feature of the Commission's
proposals is the enhanced role the U.S. trustee would play in intervening in small
business bankruptcies.
The Small Business Working Group also proposed a set of Recommendations
to deal with single asset real estate cases. These cases typically involve a single
apartment house or office building, although the proposed Recommendations would
expand the definition. Since their inclusion in Chapter 11 in 1978 , these single asset
businesses have been the source of a great deal of litigation, significantly influencing
the development of the law governing reorganizations. In 1994, Congress added a
provision to the Bankruptcy Code to move small single asset real estate cases through
the system more quickly. Here, the Commission offers a group of proposals to
change further the treatment of such cases. The single asset real estate proposals
were not fully developed until after the final meeting of the Commission. In a
divided vote, the Commissioners voted by mail ballot to approve them. An
alternative approach, prepared by Professor Kenneth Klee, which the full
Commission did not have the opportunity to consider, also appears in the final
section of this chapter. Five Commissioners expressed their support for the
alternative approach.
Two principles guided the Commission in developing its business bankruptcy
recommendations: reducing cost and inefficiency in business reorganizations and
liquidations and enhancing the effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with
business failures. The number of Recommendations in this section - more than 70
were adopted-suggests that there are many ways in which these principles found
expression. Some recommendations, such as those dealing with mass tort and
partnership cases, would replace cumbersome and uncertain procedures developed
in the absence of clear statutory guidance. In other cases, such as prepackaged
bankruptcies, new rules proactively would facilitate the reorganization or liquidation
process. Other types of recommendations would resolve disputes in the courts over
ambiguous statutory language. And all of these recommendations should reduce
delay, attorneys' fees, and court time in developing a workable plan of
reorganization, leaving more money on the table for the creditors. Collectively, the
business bankruptcy proposals are designed to improve a system that generally works
well and to create and sharpen the tools needed to deal with business failures for the
next 20 years.
Notes:
781 Ernst & Whinney, Report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts on Bankruptcy Financial Information (May 1989). Under contract to the government to review
bankruptcy fees, the firm studied 2,400 Chapter 11 cases filed between 1979 and 1986 in 15 districts.
The Administrative Office analyzed these data and their own data to estimate that confirmation rates
after 1986 would rise to 25-30%. Ed Flynn, Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11, 10-13 (October 1989).
Return to text
782 Id. at 10-13 . Susan Jensen-Conklin conducted a single-district study of 45 confirmed Chapter 11 cases to determine how many of those cases consummated their plans. She discovered
that 10 cases were either liquidated or dismissed. Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11
Plans Consummate? The Results of a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL 297
(1992).
Return to text
783 Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 411, 441 n. 105
(finding a confirmation rate of 89-96% among largest cases filed between 1979 and 1988).
Return to text
|