DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL BRIEFING
BRIEFER: BRIGADIER GENERAL CARTER HAM, COMMANDER,
TASK FORCE OLYMPIA
RE: TASK FORCE OPERATIONS
LOCATION: VIDEOTELECONFERENCE, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
TIME: 8:59 A.M. EST
DATE: TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 2004
STAFF: Good evening. Welcome to this evening's press briefing, where
Brigadier General Carter F. Ham will update you on operations within
Multinational Division North. He will make a brief opening statement and then
take your questions.
This is a live broadcast to the Pentagon press pool and they will be given the
opportunity to ask questions every third question. If you have a cell phone,
please turn it off. If you have a radio, please turn it down; same with the
pagers. Cameramen, please do not walk in and among the journalists that are out
Brigadier General Ham will address you on issues about Multinational Brigade
North operations only. He will not address policy issues or governmental issues.
Please keep your questions to those related only to Multinational Brigade North
area of operations.
Also, as a reminder, immediately following this press briefing Brigadier General
Kimmitt and Mr. Senor will have a press briefing as well. Please stay in your
seats immediately following this; once General Ham is off the stage General
Kimmitt and Mr. Senor will enter and begin their press briefing.
Shikran (ph); thank you.
GEN. HAM: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. And good morning to those in
Washington, D.C. It's indeed a pleasure for me to be here with you today as this
is my first opportunity to share with you my observations of coalition forces
operations in northern Iraq. I welcome this opportunity and extend to each of
you an invitation to come visit us in Mosul.
Task Force Olympia, the Multinational Brigade North, officially assumed
responsibility for coalition military operations in the northern portion of Iraq
on February 5th of this year. We have the good fortune to follow the soldiers of
the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), whose soldiers accomplished so much
in Iraq over the past year.
Our responsibility extends over the three northern governates of Dohuk, Erbil
and (Nineveh ?). Our principal coalition military unit is the 3rd Brigade 2nd
Infantry Division, the United States Army's 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The
Stryker Brigade is headquartered in Mosul and focuses much of its effort in that
important city. We also have elements of the Stryker brigade based near Tall
Afar and at the airfield Qaiyara West. Additionally, Task Force Olympia has
attached engineers, military police, civil affairs, and combat service support
units. In total we are about 8,000 U.S. personnel, over 6,000 of whom are in the
Stryker Brigade combat team.
In addition to U.S. forces, we have an Albanian commando that serves alongside
us, and we're most grateful for their role. And, as you can see, there are many
Iraqi security force units which perform missions under my operational control.
These include Iraqi civil defense corps, border police, and newly assigned in
the north, Iraqi armed forces.
One of our highest priorities is to help build the capabilities of Iraqi
security forces. We do this through a program that includes formal schooling for
police and ICDC leaders as well as more informal cooperation such as joint
manning of security outposts. We work closely with the Coalition Provisional
Authority regional and governate coordinators to obtain funding and equipment
required for Iraqi security forces. And we work together with Iraqi local and
regional leaders to support projects that contribute to stability and economic
growth. These projects, mostly funded through the Commander's Emergency Response
Program, include schools, small business opportunities, security facility
repairs, road improvements, oil, and electrical power initiatives. I'm very
proud of what our soldiers, the Coalition Provisional Authority representatives
in the north, and the many brave and dedicated Iraqis have accomplished.
And I'd be glad now to answer any questions you may have.
Q Hi. I'm Jim Crane with the Associated Press. General, you guys have about a
third, or maybe a little over a third of what the 101st Airborne had in -- as
far as troops go, or U.S. coalition troops in your AOs. Was wondering how you're
making do with such a smaller amount of troops, and how you've had to cut back
in operations such as the ones you described, some of the civilian development
operations, and was also wondering if there was any sort of cutbacks in
operations on the street, combat-type operations. Thanks.
GEN. HAM: In short, we're doing quite well. It's -- while we do have a smaller
coalition force presence than the 101st Airborne Division had, we have a much
more significant Iraqi security force contribution. We have over 12,000 Iraqi
security force members who are under my operational control and perform missions
throughout the north. So it is this balancing of missions that we wrestle with
each and every day.
I think we are in good shape. My assessment is the Iraqi security forces are
improving their capabilities each and every day and taking on an increasing
role, thereby reducing the burden on coalition forces.
Q (In Arabic.)
GEN. HAM: Thank you for that question. There has been a change in the assigned
area for Task Force Olympia. This occurred before we got there. The governate of
Sulimaniyah previously was under the control of the 101st Division. That was
changed prior to our assumption of responsibility in the north. So that segment
of the Iranian border is under the control of the 4th Infantry Division at
We do have a small segment of the Iranian border that is in our area of
responsibility, as well as the Turkish border. We have -- Iraqi Border Police
are primarily responsible for the security along Iraq's borders. We assist them
in their training and in the execution of their duties.
Maybe we can go back to Washington, D.C.
Q General, I'm Carl Osgood. I write for Executive Intelligence Review. Could you
talk a little bit about the nature of insurgent activity that you might be
seeing in your area of responsibility and what the security situation is like
GEN. HAM: I'd be glad to. We clearly find ourselves still countering an
insurgent enemy in the north. We see this enemy taking the shape of former
regime elements, extremists, and as well as foreign fighters, international
terrorists. Those cells I think are becoming increasingly desperate and
isolated. This evidences itself, I think, in some ways that we've seen in the
past weeks, and that is attacks against Iraqi security force members in what I
assess to be an attempt to dissuade Iraqis from contributing to the future of
their nation. I think that -- to me, that indicates the desperate nature of our
enemy in that regard.
We certainly do see continuing terrorist activities in the north, and we conduct
operations -- as we are able to identify the sources and cells that participate
in those operations, we are very aggressive in attacking those as we identify
Q General Ham, Rajiv Chandrasekaran. I'm from The Washington Post. Two questions
for you. Some of your fellow commanders in other parts of Iraq have reported of
late seeing sort of a different composition in the insurgent threat: less
Ba'athist, more Islamist extremist. And I'm wondering if you've seen those
similar trends up in your AO, in terms of a lessening in terms of the FRE
threat, but an increase in terms of what you're seeing from both indigenous and
And the second, just sort of following on to that, if you could just speak a
little bit about what you're seeing currently in terms of cross-border
infiltration of terrorists and others.
GEN. HAM: Let me take the last part first, if I may. We do have some indications
of cross-border operations. Small unit infiltrations -- individual
infiltrations, I think, would be more accurate. We focus our collection efforts
to try to detect those and intercept those as we are able.
I think you've seen in recent days renewed emphasis on border operations.
Principally, this is the Iraqi border police responsibility, and we work closely
with them to try to increase their capability.
With regard to the changing threat in the north, I think there is some evidence
that the former regime elements, the former Ba'athists, are losing their
influence and becoming smaller in number. I think as they see -- in my view, as
they see more and more Iraqis participating in the free development of their
governments, that the former regime elements are seeing that their chances for
success are nil or, at least in their views, perhaps dwindling.
We do see a continued terrorist threat in the north. And that is -- in my view,
that is the most dangerous threat that we pose that -- that we are opposed with
at present, and we are focusing collection efforts and operation against them.
Q (In Arabic.)
GEN. HAM: In an overly simplistic way, we only detain important people. If
they're not important, we would not detain them.
We do see evidence of Ansar al-Islam operations in the north. We do focus our
efforts against them very specifically, because we recognize the threat that
they pose not only in northern Iraq but throughout the country. So that's a very
high priority for us.
Yes, please, sir.
Q (In Arabic.)
GEN. HAM: What we try to do with all of the Iraqi security forces is to find
those men and women who are best qualified for the positions that we have
available. That -- in most cases, that means that there is a mix of those who
have served previously in the security forces and those who are new. And we find
that this balance generally pays the best dividends for us.
The border police have a very, very important responsibility on all the borders
of Iraq, and the more that we can help them improve their proficiency through
equipment, through training, through advising, then the better off that this
country will be.
Q (In Arabic.)
GEN. HAM: I agree that we want to get the absolute best results we can along the
border. At present, most of our border -- and I can only speak to the north --
most of our positions are filled. I think it would be advantageous to increase
the number of border police. We are in discussions with my headquarters, CJTF7,
in an effort to do that.
Q (Name inaudible), the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. General, how do you
feel that you are being met by the local population in Mosul: as liberators, as
a necessary evil, or as an occupation force that should leave as soon as
GEN. HAM: All of the above, I think. It certainly depends on whom you're
speaking with in Mosul. I think the precedent that has been set by the 101st --
and I hope that our soldiers are continuing in that mode -- is that our primary
responsibility is to help Iraqis. We understand that it is not a pleasant
circumstance to have an armed force in your country, in your city, and so we try
to be very respectful and conduct all of our operations with dignity and
Having said that, there certainly are members of the community who wish that we
were not there. There is a much larger number, an overwhelming percentage who, I
think, know, understand and respect the mission that our coalition soldiers have
and are performing.
In a very personal sense, I can tell you that we have been very warmly welcomed
in Mosul and throughout the northern portion of Iraq by the overwhelming
majority of people.
Perhaps we could go back to the Pentagon.
Q Good afternoon, General. This is Sandra Jontz with Stars and Stripes. Recently
there's been some testimony on Capitol Hill, from military leaders as well as
observers from -- of the lawmakers, who have said that some of the Iraqi forces
that are there to assume some of the responsibilities and jobs, that there are
some shortcomings in their training. Could you please kind of characterize for
us the level of adequacy, for lack of a better word, of those Iraqi forces,
where the shortcomings are, what you're doing to overcome those shortcomings,
and what risk they might present to U.S. forces in the short term.
GEN. HAM: Thanks. There are training, organizational and equipment shortfalls in
the Iraqi security forces. There's no question about that. Our job is to help
them through that, to find for them the equipment, to provide for them the
training, and to advise them so that they can become ever increasingly
responsible for their own security.
In my view, the principal shortfall, however, is not tactical but it is in the
culture of a people trusting their security forces. Remembering that we are in a
place where previously, Iraqi security forces were an oppressive element of the
regime, to now convert that and foster in the people of Iraq a trust and
confidence that these security forces are their security forces, they are here
for the good of all the people, I have found that to be quite a challenge up in
I'm very confident that we will -- through equipping and training and advising,
over time develop in the Iraqi security forces the operational capability that
is required. Changing the mindset of the people, in my view, will be a little
Q (In Arabic.)
GEN. HAM: Could I ask you to restate the second part of your question, please?
Q (In Arabic.)
GEN. HAM: If I understood the second part of your question, it was regard to --
it was have we captured al-Douri. Is that correct? I can assure you that when
that happens, it won't be me that's up here to tell you that.
Q (In Arabic.)
GEN. HAM: The peshmerga are a militia. It is very clear from statements from the
administrator, from the commanding general of CJTF-7, and it is now encapsulated
in the transitional administrative law that militias that are not under the
federal structure are not helpful to the future of Iraq.
We have -- we are looking for ways to increasingly incorporate peshmerga forces
into legitimate Iraqi security force structure, whether this be taking former
peshmerga units and forming them under the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, or whether
this is individual members, former members of the peshmerga serving in the Iraqi
armed forces or in another security force construct. It is clear that that is
the role ahead for the former peshmerga forces, is with Iraqi security force
So do we conduct operations with peshmerga? No. Do we conduct operations with
ICDC that were formerly peshmerga? And the answer is yes.
(Pause.) Perhaps back to the Pentagon?
Q General, this is Carl Osgood from Executive Intelligence Review again. I'd
like to ask you, you've got this transition coming up on June 30th, this
hand-over of sovereignty, what form that's going to take. Can you say how you're
planning -- I mean, how is your mission going to change after June 30th? Do you
have some notion of what will occur?
GEN. HAM: From a security standpoint, I don't think our mission will change
significantly on the 30th -- from the 30th of June to the 1st of July. It's very
clear that coalition forces are going to remain in Iraq performing a security
role for some period of time. That period of time will be dependent on the
capability of Iraqi security forces to perform those missions.
There will be, certainly, a difference in that -- for us in that the Coalition
Provisional Authority is presently the sovereign government, and we get all of
our instructions, the country gets its instructions from the CPA. From the
military side, we will continue to receive our instructions from CJTF-7. And so
I don't see -- I don't see that there will be a major shift in security
operations post-the 30th of June.
Q Hi. Rachel from NBC. If the peshmerga, for example, militia -- if you have
difficult time incorporating them under the ISS, how much of, in your opinion,
of a threat do these militias or this specific militia pose to the national
security of Iraq and sovereignty?
GEN. HAM: Well, we don't really have a big problem incorporating them into an
Iraqi security force construct. It is finding the right role for them to play in
the future of Iraq.
I wouldn't say that the former peshmerga pose a threat to Iraq. It is just that
having militias that are outside of a federal architecture is inconsistent with
the federalist nature that Iraq is developing toward. So I -- if you're going to
have -- if there are going to be military forces, security forces in a country,
they have to be part of an authorized and approved and structured organization,
not separate entities with loyalties to something other than the federal
Q Yeah, hi, Jim Crane again. Wanted to ask you about -- one of the things that
General Petraeus was real big on was some of the rebuilding projects that he was
doing up there with some of the CERP funds. In October or November, they had a
big spate of attacks on them when they ran out of CERP monies, and one of his
brigade commanders I believe said that he thought the two were related; that
they weren't -- they were getting shot at basically because they didn't have any
more money to rebuild, you know, some of the -- work on some of the rebuilding
Now you guys, from what I understand, are doing a much smaller number of
projects, rebuilding projects. I was wondering if you could contrast the amount
of rebuilding-type work that you're able to do versus what 101st was able to do
and let us know if there's been any kind of resentment or pushback from the
community; if there's been -- if you think there's any attacks that were maybe
related to the smaller number of jobs, perhaps, in these projects. Thanks.
GEN. HAM: Well, I'm certainly not to refute anything that General Petraeus said.
I've known him for almost 30 years, and I got to tell you, I stand in awe of
what he and his soldiers accomplished up there.
There is, I think, a direct relationship between the projects -- many of which
were CERP-funded -- and stability, and that really is the link. It's not
necessarily a specific number of dollars that results in a threat, but it is
rather the application of CERP and other funding that helps bring an environment
of stability to the region.
It's also important to remember that, of course, when the 101st first got into
northern Iraq in April of 2003 there was little to no structure, so they had to
do most everything themselves. Now, almost a year later, that structure is
starting to form. There certainly are local and provincial governments that are
standing up and are functioning. The ministries here in Baghdad certainly are at
a higher state of capability than they were.
So the reliance on CERP and other programs does become less over time. It
doesn't mean there's not a lot to do. There is -- I mean, you all have been
here. You know that there is a vast amount of work that is still required, but I
do not see and have not seen attacks against coalition that I would make a
direct link to CERP or other funding.
Q (In Arabic.)
GEN. HAM: I want to make it clear that I do not want to leave you with the
impression that the peshmerga are on Iraq's borders. It is the Iraqi Border
Police who are responsible for Iraqi's borders. It is -- in my opinion, there is
a possibility of employing former peshmerga in an increased role in the Iraqi
Border Police, but it must be as Iraqi Border Police, not as former peshmerga.
I welcome Ambassador Bremer's support to increasing border protection services,
not just in the north, but all over the country. We are engaged on a frequent
basis with my higher headquarters, CJTF- 7, to identify what is, in my opinion,
the requirements necessary to improve border police operations in the north.
This ranges from additional border police units to technical solutions to better
training. I think all of those components are necessary to improve the
capability of the Iraqi Border Police for us along the Syrian, Turkish and a
small portion of the Iranian border.
Q General, I was wondering, when you mentioned terrorist elements, insurgent
elements that you see up north, you didn't mention the PKK. And now thinking of
the border operations, which you just talked about briefly, what evidence do you
see of the PKK operating up in the north, and what steps can you tell us that
you are doing to minimize their threat?
GEN. HAM: We do see intelligence reports that indicate that there is a PKK
presence along the northern border area. We have not had any contact with any of
those forces, have not had any engagement with them, and do not at this time
have any plans that are focused in that direction.
Q (Off mike.)
GEN. HAM: No. Clearly, if we had evidence of PKK members, then we would be -- we
are certainly obliged and authorized to detain them. But we have not seen that.
Yes? In the back, please.
Q (Name inaudible) -- from NHK. General, could you give me a more clear picture
of when you mentioned that you have indications of infiltration? These chaps, do
they like cross the border in night, secretly, disguised, or like do they enter
the formal points of entry with a fake passport? Or what kind of picture shall
we image when you say that there are infiltrations of foreign fighters?
GEN. HAM: Well, I wouldn't like to be very specific, frankly, because we still
are conducting -- are trying to collect that information and conduct operations
against them. But we do see evidence that mostly individuals and small groups,
very small groups, may be infiltrating across the border, using the variety of
means that you address. It's not one -- it's not just one technique that we're
seeing but a variety of means.
Q On that same question, do you have any estimate of how many people would come
across in a week, given the number of people you see and the number of people
you probably miss?
GEN. HAM: I would say small numbers. My concern is not so much the numbers but
if these are truly dedicated and motivated, perhaps well-trained foreign
fighters, then these could possibly form the nucleus of the most challenging
threat to us. So again, I think small numbers, but very lethal.
To the Pentagon, please.
STAFF: General, this is Lieutenant Colonel Keck (sp). There are no more
questions from the Pentagon. Thank you.
GEN. HAM: Okay. Thanks.
Any more here? Yes, sir?
Q (In Arabic.)
GEN. HAM: On the 30th of June, when sovereignty is returned to Iraq, coalition
forces will continue to have a security force responsibility. It is very clearly
my intent -- and the direction that I have received from General Sanchez and
others -- is to as expeditiously as we can train the Iraqi security forces, so
that they may assume their rightful role in protecting the people and the
territory of Iraq. In my view, the sooner we can do that, the better that will
be for all. But we must make sure that they are properly trained and experienced
before we hand over full responsibility to them.
Q (In Arabic.)
GEN. HAM: There is -- in my AOR, area of responsibility, we have indeed only a
small coalition presence in what is now the Kurdish regional government area.
That is driven based on my assessment of the threat. I view the threat as -- in
that area, while it is important, it is not as significant a threat as in other
parts of my area. So we have the ability and the authority to conduct operations
in that territory should we need to do so. We have done so in the past and will
do so in the future should we need the -- or find the requirement to do that.
Yes, please, in the back.
Q General, The New York Times, John Burns. I may have missed something in your
earlier remarks, but I'm a little uncertain as to the pattern of military
activity, of insurgent and terrorist activity over the last several months. We
know it was pretty bad up there, and from what you're saying, it seems to be
well down. We hear the chief administrator saying that he expects things to get
a good deal worse between now and June the 30th. I wonder if you can give us the
broadest possible picture of how the United States armed forces are faring, on
the whole, in this war.
GEN. HAM: Well, I can only talk about in my area.
GEN. HAM: I think there is every likelihood that we will see an increase in
activity, again, based on -- from each of those entities that we talked about --
terrorists, former fighters, extremists, criminals, former-regime elements --
because I think what those elements see now is that they -- in my view, they
have lost their opportunity, but they may not quite see it that way; that we
have achieved great momentum in progressing toward a future free Iraq, and I
think those who are opposed to that will find these next couple months
opportunities as they arise to try to stop that. Each of them, I think, are
differently motivated, but the results are often the same, evidencing themselves
by attacks on coalition forces, attacks on Iraqi security forces, attacks on
symbols of progress, whether those be economic or otherwise.
I think that we have the forces necessary, the coalition forces necessary in the
north to cope with that threat as we build capability in the Iraqi security
forces. We improve our capacity each and every day, and I think, again, that we
will be able to meet the threats as they arise. It doesn't mean that there won't
be attacks. There almost certainly will be. There may be even spectacular
attacks in the north, though we have not seen those since the 1st of February
attacks in Irbil. There could certainly be that. But in my view, those are
evidence of the desperate nature of our enemy.
Perhaps two more questions. Yes, please?
Q General, Seb Walker from Reuters. When the 101st was hit by a spike in attacks
back in November, General Petraeus's commanders were mostly of the view that
these are being carried out by former regime elements. Could you say whether
you've seen an increase in border infiltrations, if you're saying that the
terrorist threat is presently the biggest that you're facing in the north? Or
would you think it's possible that foreign fighters that are in Iraq are
starting to use the north as a base from which to launch their operations?
GEN. HAM: I think the terrorist threat, in my view, is the most dangerous
because these are the most capable and most dedicated enemies that we face, at
least in AOR north. We have seen in past weeks attacks against Iraqi security
forces, most notably against Iraqi police. And I think those, too, are conducted
by different groups. I think they are -- those attacks against Iraqi police
specifically are done by former regime elements who are opposed to a capable
police force that will administer justice throughout the region, and I think
it's also -- those attacks on police are also conducted by terrorist
organizations, as we've seen in the Zarqawi letter and others, in an attempt to
remove civil control to allow for the emergence of perhaps a civil war.
Other side, please. Yes? Last question.
Q General Ham, the Stryker brigade, if I'm not mistaken, was intended to be a
smaller, more flexible force and the Army is planning to introduce others. Could
you tell us a little bit about how your training and organization and
preparation have prepared you for your task in northern Iraq? And also, as a
follow-up, whether there's any lessons that you've already learned in the less
than a month that would affect the future training of similar brigades.
GEN. HAM: The Army designed the Stryker Brigade Combat Team to be a very agile
and adaptive force. I think it is that. I think the soldiers of the Stryker
brigade have demonstrated that. While I have been and Task Force Olympia have
been officially in charge of the AOR only since the 5th of February, it is
important to note that the Stryker brigade began operations under the command
and control of the 4th Infantry Division in early December of 2003. So they had
some very good experience under their belt before they moved into the northern
I think what we see with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team are soldiers who are
very comfortable in the ambiguous situations that we find ourselves in. They are
comfortable with junior leaders making very important decisions at the tactical
level, based on incomplete information, based on their interpretation of the
tactical situation. What the technology of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
allows them to do -- first of all, with the Stryker vehicle, it allows them to
move very, very quickly, very stealthily at night, in mass combat forces, mostly
just mounted infantry at the point of decision. They also have a suite of
situational awareness equipment that allows them to see one another across the
entire sector that we operate in so they have great -- they understand where one
another are all the time and are able to thereby coordinate their operations
much more quickly, much more decisively.
I think, though, the greatest lesson learned that we have seen for the Stryker
Brigade Combat Team is that when the Army forces are equipped with the most
modern equipment, when they are provided ample training opportunities and when
they are empowered at the junior officer and junior non-commissioned officer
level to train and make decisions and operate the way we would like them to, the
result has been very, very satisfactory.
Thank you all very much. And I was very serious about my invitation to come to
Mosul. I think you would enjoy it. We look forward to the opportunity to host
you up there where you can learn a little bit more about what we're doing in the
Thank you very, very much.