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OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION SENDS FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT, CONGRESS 

Document includes list of unresolved issues regarding global basing for Congress to ask the Executive branch

WASHINGTON, D.C., August 15, 2005 -- The Overseas Basing Commission sends its final report to Congress and the President, which includes a list of 13 questions offered to Congress to help resolve issues within the Executive branch as the nation undertakes the most comprehensive restructuring of its global military presence in more than 50 years.

The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission are unchanged from its initial report, which was made public on May 9. Those were reached after more than a year’s research and raised concerns about the need for the Legislative and Executive branches of government to proceed with caution in the implementation of the current overseas basing plan.

The Commission’s concerns centered around two major areas -- the U.S. global presence and the impact on military members and their families returning to the United States.  The Commission feels the United States must secure its presence in the world for years to come and give priority consideration, in funding and planning, to the needs of returning military forces.  

Following its May 9th Report, the Commission said  “our subsequent efforts have not led the Commission to alter or otherwise modify the findings laid out in the interim report.”  

“Indeed, events that have unfolded over the intervening months have underscored many of the concerns raised by the Commission and highlighted the need for all parties involved in both the Legislative and Executive branches of government to proceed with due caution in the implementation of the overseas basing plan, ensuring that each step in the unfolding process leaves U.S. national security strengthened,” the Commission said.

After submission of the initial Report, the Commission learned it is the fifth such Commission to suggest that there be a stronger interagency participation  in strategic issues affecting U.S. presence in the world.   The others were the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (May 1995), the National Defense Panel (December 1997), the Commission on National Security/21st Century (January 2000) and the 9-11 Commission (March 2005).

 In its Report, the Commission underlined additional concerns identified in the initial report: 

* It reiterated its caution about reliance on new allies and the imperative of having formal treaties in place before we begin to presume a lasting relationship such as the ones we enjoy with our traditional allies.

* It spelled out concerns about the lack of adequate strategic and tactical lift capabilities (air and sea), and underscored the importance of replenishing pre-positioned stocks worldwide (drawn down a significant degree by ongoing operations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia).  

* It expressed great concern on quality of life issues and their ultimate impact on our ability to maintain an all volunteer force, and suggested that it will be necessary for the U.S. Congress to ‘fast track’ some of the necessary budget appropriations.  The Commission cautions that recruitment and retention may be affected adversely if we fail to properly synchronize preparation of facilities back home for some 60-70 thousand troops along with over 100,000 family members returning home to unprepared bases and local communities.     

The Commission said it remains concerned about the costs associated with global re-organization and whether budgetary forecasts have adequately addressed the investments that will be required to meet the implementation timetables set for fiscal years 2006 through 2011.  The Commission questioned the Defense Department estimated cost of $9-12 billion for the re-organization and suggested the cost will be in excess of $20 billion.  Neither of these estimates includes the costs associated with additional aircraft, ships, and equipment that is needed to effectively deploy a force based primarily at home.

The Commission is concerned that any underestimates would have to be made up out of the budgets of the military services with deleterious consequences on readiness and modernization.  

Finally, the Commission said that although the overall conclusions are validated by its research and current world events, a number of issues remain unresolved.  To that end, the Commission strongly suggested that Congress ask the following questions of the Executive branch as they continue their oversight of planning and funding of our global presence:

Ø	What are the specific incremental and overall costs associated with IGPBS and how are they programmed?
Ø	What savings can be expected from implementation of IGPBS, and when will those savings begin to be realized?
Ø	 To what degree will the individual services be expected to make up unfunded IGPBS costs in the short run and how will the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding needed to provide for sustaining the rotation of units to Europe and Korea (and elsewhere abroad) be programmed and identified so that it competes effectively in the budgetary process?
Ø	Will host nation agreements be in place before military construction funds are requested?  
Ø	What are the specific numbers of returning servicemen, the estimated numbers of family members by major unit, and where will they be relocated?
Ø	What facilities, by category (i.e. housing, barracks, training areas/ranges, maintenance facilities, Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) outlets, etc.) will returning units occupy, and if temporary facilities are contemplated, when will they be replaced by permanent facilities?
Ø	To what degree will increased CONUS basing of U.S. forces affect mobility requirements, especially in regard to strategic and tactical air, sea lift and prepositioned stocks, to meet new QDR-determined timelines?
Ø	How is the DOD plan to project forces from receiving bases impacted by the IGPBS?  What is the implementation cost of such a plan?
Ø	What additional aerial and sea port infrastructure will be required at the point of embarkation to accommodate an expanded CONUS expeditionary force?  What are the associated infrastructure costs?  
Ø	What will be the mobility costs created by the implementation of IGPBS?  
Ø	When and how can we expect to field an organic, offensive tank-killing weapons system with the Stryker brigades and their successor units?
Ø	In the event of a flare up in the Balkans within the next few years, what is the plan to deploy rapidly a heavy brigade, if needed, in a timely manner?
Ø	Over the course of a military career, what is the impact of frequent lengthy peacetime rotations abroad on a volunteer force over the course of a military career?   

Established by public law, the Overseas Basing Commission’s task was to assess independently whether the current overseas basing structure is adequate to execute current missions and to assess the feasibility of closures, realignments, or establishment of new installations overseas to meet emerging defense requirements.  

This Commission has been active since May 2004, and has engaged in meetings and received briefings from the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, and other entities.  The Commission met with commanders and staffs, and received extensive briefings on the transformation plan from the European Command, Pacific Command, Central Command, Transportation Command, Special Operations Command, and Southern Command.  The Commission traveled overseas to areas of greatest change and to many proposed new locations.  Four formal hearings were conducted to receive testimony from military experts, defense analysts, and experts on military family issues.  The Commission provided testimony to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, as well as, the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.  

(THE  FULL REPORT CAN BE VIEWED AT HTTP://WWW.OBC.GOV )