Archive
Please remember to use your browser's REFRESH button to
ensure you are veiwing the most recent version of the web page.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ______________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Jack L. Williams Defendant. ______________________________ ______________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. ARCHIBALD R. SCHAFFER, III, Defendant. ______________________________ UNITED STATES REPLY REGARDING ITS
MOTION TO EXPEDITE APPEALS I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendants
assertions -- that the United States motion for a briefing schedule and oral
argument before June, 1999 is untimely -- are difficult to comprehend. The government has promptly pursued these appeals
and there is nothing in the Courts rules or case law that prohibits it from setting
a briefing schedule that will provide for oral argument by the end of May, 1999, following
a jury verdict rendered on June 26, 1998. Further,
defendants claims of prejudice are insupportable and should not delay these
proceedings into September, 1999. II.
ARGUMENT
A.
The Governments
Motion Should not be Denied as Untimely
The
United States has diligently prosecuted and promptly pursued these appeals. Following the jurys entry of guilty verdicts
on June 26, 1998, the district court filed an order granting Schaffers motion for
acquittal and denying Williams post-trial motions on September 22, 1998. It did not conditionally deny defendant Schaffers
motions for new trial until October 6, 1998. Shortly
thereafter, on October 9, 1998, the government noticed its appeal of the district courts
judgment of acquittal as to defendant Schaffer. This
Courts November 2, 1998, Order set forth a date of November 17, 1998 for procedural
motions which would affect the calendaring of [the Schaffer appeals, Nos. 98-3123 and
98-3126]. Only after his sentencing did
defendant Williams file a notice of appeal of his conviction on November 12, 1998. On November 17, 1998, the government filed its
motion to consolidate, believing that the Court would consolidate the two appeals, since
they arose from a single trial, and issue a briefing schedule in the very near future. The Court did not rule on the governments
motion until January 13, 1999, ultimately denying the motion. Following the Courts issuance of that order,
government counsel contacted the Clerk concerning the whereabouts of a briefing schedule. He was then informed that no briefing schedule
would be issued in the immediate future as the Court does not usually hear oral argument
between June through August, and the order, when it was issued, would most probably
schedule the hearing of the appeals in September or thereafter. Upon hearing this, the government immediately
moved for expedited treatment requesting that the Court set a schedule that would permit
oral argument during May, 1999.
Thus,
only following the Courts order denying consolidation and following contacts with
the Clerks Office did the government learn of the need to have the appeals briefed
and heard by May, 1999, to avoid a three to four month delay in resolution of the appeals. If the pendency of the Courts order denying
consolidation did not enlarge the permissible time in which the government could request
expedited treatment, then the otherwise unannounced window during which the Court will not
hear oral arguments during the summer clearly provided good cause for an enlargement of
time during which the Court can consider the governments motion.[1]
Defendant
Schaffer additionally asserts that, with respect to the governments appeal of his
acquittal, the governments appeal should have been expedited by statute, pursuant to
D.C. Circuit Rule 47.2. On October 9, 1998,
the United States filed its Notice of Appeal as to defendant Schaffer and expressly stated
the statutory basis for the appeal (in fact the only possible statutory basis for an
appeal of a district courts grant of a motion for acquittal): [p]ursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3731 . . . . Even if
additional notice to the Clerks Office were required, this Circuits rules also
permit for expedited treatment via motion. Circuit
Rule 47.2 does not, as Schaffer erroneously contends, foreclose expedited treatment by
motion as an alternative to expedited treatment by statute.
B.
The Government
Demonstrates Good Cause for Expedited Treatment and Defendants Demonstrate no Prejudice
Defendants
concede the strongly compelling public interest in prompt resolution of independent
counsel matters. As the Court recognizes in
its Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures, Part 8(b), [t]he Court may . . .
expedite cases in which the public generally . . . have an unusual interest in prompt
disposition. Despite this important
basis for expedited briefing, defendants argue that (1) they intend to raise issues other
than those briefed before the district court below, and (2) their lead counsel are
otherwise preoccupied with other cases.
Defendant
Williams already briefed his appellate issues in his motions for new trial and for
judgment of acquittal, filed in the district court. Despite
his claims that he dealt with some of these issues in a perfunctory manner
before the district court, his 88 pages of post-trial motions covering precisely the
issues he indicates he will raise in his appeal indicate otherwise.
Similarly,
Schaffer filed 100 pages of post-trial motions addressing all of the issues he indicates
will be raised in his appeal with the exception of two issues: the district courts
reasonable doubt jury instruction (citing only a case from the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals for support) and aiding and abetting jury instruction. The Court took both jury instructions verbatim
from the Redbook -- the authoritative pattern instructions for this Circuit,
and these two issues are neither complex nor inappropriate for expedited briefing. Defendant Schaffer also complains that the
governments appeal of the judgment of acquittal requires analysis of the entire
record. Defendant Schaffer previously
reviewed that record in order to file a motion for acquittal 44 pages in length before the
district court.
Both
defendants accuse the government of moving for expedited treatment for the convenience of
government counsel. Rather, the government
simply pointed out in its motion that the temporary nature of an office of independent
counsel creates turnover in personnel and that the turnover can render the prosecution
inefficient. The government does not seek
expedited treatment for the convenience of its counsel; rather, it is the defendants that
ask the Court to consider the schedules of its counsel -- Messrs. Jeffress and Levine --
despite that defendants were each represented by four attorneys during trial.
Given
the schedules presented by both defendants for their lead counsel, they would have
difficulty complying with any reasonably prompt briefing schedule issued by the Court. Furthermore, [t]he right to counsel of ones
choice does not include a lawyer whose other commitments preclude compliance with a courts
reasonable scheduling of its cases. United
States v. Delia, 925 F.2d 574, 575 (2d Cir. 1991) (criticizing motion for additional
time to file appeal because appellants counsel occupied with a lengthy trial)
(citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983)).
In
a final diversionary argument, defendant Schaffer contends that the Court should dismiss
the governments appeal. For support,
Schaffer disingenuously cites two inapposite cases that briefly comment, in dictum
relegated to footnotes, on a Circuit Rule of the Second Circuit, but not this Circuit: United
States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1064 n.4 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 869 n.2 (1973). The
unpersuasive nature of these cases was noted in United States v. Dennison, 891 F.2d
255, 257-58 (10th Cir. 1989), which held that the government did not fail to diligently
prosecute its appeal even after requesting two extensions totaling sixty days to file its
opening brief. In any event, the government
here is attempting to further prosecute these appeals diligently by requesting an
expedited briefing schedule. III.
CONCLUSION
For
the foregoing reasons, the government requests that the Court grant the expedited schedule
as requested for both appeals, or, alternatively, to expedite the Williams appeal and to
permit oral argument on separate days. If,
however, the Court will not grant a schedule that permits oral argument for either appeal
during the month of May, 1999 (or before) the government respectfully requests that the
Court order a normal briefing schedule. Dated: February 9, 1999
Respectfully
submitted,
OFFICE
OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
In
Re Alphonso Michael (Mike) Espy
Donald
C. Smaltz
Independent
Counsel
By: _________________________
Wil
Frentzen
Associate
Independent Counsel
103
Oronoco Street, Suite 200
Alexandria,
Virginia 22314
Phone: (703) 706-0010
Fax: (703) 706-0076 [1] Defendant
Williams cites as authority, Part 8(b) of the Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures
for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Despite the fact that Williams erroneously refers
to this section as Rule 8(b), as the Handbook makes clear in its Preface,
the Handbook is for guidance only and does not set forth a Rule of this Court. In fact, there is not a D.C. Circuit Rule that
specifically addresses motions for expedited treatment.
|