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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BRIEFING WITH
BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMITT,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR COALITION OPERATIONS;
AND DANIEL SENOR, SENIOR ADVISER, CPA
LOCATION: BAGHDAD, IRAQ
TIME: 9:43 A.M. EDT
DATE: FRIDAY, APRIL 23, 2004
MR. SENOR: Good evening. I have a short opening statement. General Kimmitt --
(off mike) -- remarks, and then we'll be happy to take your questions.
I wanted to begin by just providing a brief summary for you on the subjects
addressed by Ambassador Bremer in an address to the nation which he taped
earlier. It was broadcast at 3:30 p.m. local time. It will be broadcast again
later this evening, at 9:30, and then it will be broadcast again tomorrow. We'll
be playing it several times, broadcasting it several times, over the next couple
of days.
The address covers four areas: Iraqi security, Iraqi jobs, the issue of Iraq
coming to terms -- Iraqis coming to terms with the brutal and horrific past of
the former regime, and looking forward, the political transition going forward.
Firstly, on the area of coming to terms with Iraq's past, I understand there's
been a lot of confusion earlier today in the reporting. I just wanted to clarify
one thing in particular, and that relates to the issue of de-Ba'athification.
De-Ba'athification was and remains the right policy for Iraq. The Ba'ath Party
poisoned Iraqi (life ?), and it was one of the brutal instruments of Saddam's
tyranny.
There is no room in the new Iraq for Ba'athist ideology or for Ba'athist
criminals. Banning the party and removing from public life those who used it to
commit crimes was necessary when we and the Governing Council implemented this
policy earlier, and it continues to be necessary.
As many of you know, Ambassador Bremer signed the de-Ba'athification order in
May. It was the first order he signed. To this day, that policy is the single
most popular policy we've heard about in Iraq, in the thousands of conversations
we've had from Iraqis. That was the case back in May. It remains the case today.
We then in the fall delegated -- in October of 2003 delegated the authority for
de-Ba'athification going forward to the Iraqi Governing Council. And on January
10th, the Governing Council's Committee on De-Ba'athification and the Coalition
Provisional Authority agreed on procedures for implementing the policy. And then
the procedures were expected to move forward from there, and they have in most
cases.
But many Iraqis have complained that the de-Ba'athification procedures have been
applied at times unevenly and sometimes unfairly, particularly in the education
sector, where the requirement for teachers and professors to join the Ba'ath
Party was strongly enforced. Many teachers were Ba'athists in name only, and the
result was that many of these teachers were dismissed from their jobs when the
de-Ba'athification policy was implemented.
Therefore, in coordination with the Iraqi minister of education, the minister of
higher education and the chairman of the Supreme National De-Ba'athification
Commission, we are taking steps to ensure that the policy is implemented fairly
and efficiently.
De-Ba'athification review committees were established last year to review the
thousands of appeals from former Firqa-level Ba'athists who were dismissed from
the jobs but, under the de-Ba'athification procedures, have a right to apply for
reinstatement.
The decisions made by local de-Ba'athification appeals committees at the
Ministry of Education will be effective immediately. That is what Ambassador
Bremer announced in the speech today. This will allow thousands of teachers to
return to work.
Thousands more will begin receiving pensions this week, those that have applied
for them and for those to whom the pensions have been granted but, again, not
issued.
Primary and secondary school teachers formerly of the rank of Firqa members
whose appeals have not yet been heard will have their appeal adjudicated within
20 days -- again, effective immediately.
The National De-Ba'athification Commission will handle the cases of hundreds of
university professors with the same urgency. Professors who do not use their
post to intimidate others or commit crimes should be allowed to return to work
promptly.
So just to summarize on that particular point: The procedures were set up on
January 10th to allow for a very progressive appeals process, a two-level
appeals process. Iraqis who were de-Ba'athified could choose to appeal or,
rather than appeal, they could opt out and apply for a pension, a regular
pension payment that is commensurate with whatever their ministry-level salary
would have been. Those were their options.
Thousands of teachers appealed to get their jobs back, those who believed they
were Ba'athists in name only, and in the case of thousands, their appeals were
granted, but their jobs were never reinstated. It was a procedural matter. That
is what Ambassador Bremer announced today. That procedural snafu will now be
corrected.
Secondly, those who have applied or appealed and have not heard a response back
yet, that process will be expedited, 20 days. It relates specifically to
teachers. And going forward, we will be engaging a similar policy for
professors.
That is the extent of the technical procedural fix with regard to de-Ba'athification.
Now otherwise in the address, Ambassador Bremer talks about how we intend to
build out the command structure of the Iraqi military, something he has talked
about for some 10 months now. That following the disbanding of the military, the
old Iraqi army, as we built out the new Iraqi army, something like 70 percent of
the personnel in the new Iraqi army would come from the old Iraqi army, provided
they did not -- they were fully vetted and did not have a hand in the atrocities
and the crimes of the former regime. That has always been the case. And
certainly as we built up -- which was always expected to happen -- months after
we built up the lower ranks, we'd need senior ranks as well. They would have to
also come from the ranks of the former army, and that would entail bringing some
senior-level officers back into the new army, again, subject to a very strict
vetting process and subject to ensuring that they did not have blood on their
hands. That was our policy 10 months ago. That continues to be our policy.
In the speech, Ambassador Bremer also talks about the situation in Fallujah, and
I quote. He says: "The situation in Fallujah has calmed in recent days, but
those responsible for the lawlessness and unrest that began in Fallujah in
February with the murder of 17 Iraqi policemen still bear heavy arms in the
streets. Some of these men belong to the banished instruments of Saddam's
repression. Others are foreigners working for professional terrorists like Abu
Musaab al-Zarqawi. These are the people who have brought death and destruction
to Fallujah."
And he goes on: "We call upon the people of Fallujah to support the legitimate
Iraqi authorities in bringing this crisis to an end. We hope that they join in
ridding the city of heavy military weapons. Those who turn in weapons
voluntarily will not be arrested for weapons violations. The current cease-fire
is a good start, but without exception armed bands in the city must submit to
national authority. If these bands do not surrender their military weapons and
instead continue to use them against Iraq and Iraqi and coalition forces,
offensive operations will resume." Again, he's highlighting points that we've
been making for some days.
He also talks about militias that are present in Najaf and Karbala, and I quote
from the speech again: "We in the coalition recognize the holy nature of these
cities. I add my voice to those of the religious authorities who have called for
disarmament in these holy cities. We are prepared to work with these authorities
to achieve disarmament. Armed militias should not be allowed to exploit holy
shrines to advance personal political interests." And he goes on to talk about
the situation there and the steps we are taking.
Consistent with the area of security, he talks about our policy on detainees and
steps we are taking to get information out to the families of detainees and
steps we are taking to expedite the process by which detainees can be processed
through the system and be released, if they should be released, in an
expeditious manner. General Kimmitt, if you have questions, can elaborate on
that.
On the issue of the economy, he -- Ambassador Bremer indicates that he has
ordered the -- he has instructed the coalition to accelerate all reconstruction
projects, particularly ones that employ Iraqis, everywhere in the country. And I
quote, he says, "We expect that they will create over a million-and-a-half jobs
over the next year. I have instructed the coalition," Ambassador Bremer
continues, "to give priority to Iraqi firms whenever possible in order to create
as many opportunities for Iraqis as possible. To date, the firms working on
these projects have given contracts to several hundred Iraqi firms."
And he goes on to update that he has given our military commanders and coalition
offices around the country an additional $500 million to spend on reconstruction
projects which can be quickly completed, like fixing roads or schools.
And then again, he gets into issues related to national remembrance and
reconciliation, particularly this issue of de-Ba'athification that I spoke about
earlier, and funding that he is setting aside for the Iraqi special tribunal, as
they continue to take important next steps, and funding for a national
commission on -- for remembrance, which will be part of a broader effort to --
for Iraqis to come to terms with their past. He -- the commission will
administer a $10 million fund for these remembrance projects and will -- and for
one central -- some sort of memorial project, and will of course accept private
funds as well.
These are the highlights from the address. As I said, they touch on a number of
issues relating to de-Ba'athification, to security, to the economy and, as I
said, the political process, which -- he goes on to talk with very encouraging
words about the work of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi and the path to Iraqi sovereignty on
June 30th, and how that is beginning to take clear shape.
And with that, General Kimmitt, do you have --
GEN. KIMMITT: I think, because of the late hour, let's go ahead and dispense
with the operational update and move right on to questions.
MR. SENOR: And of course, if you have any questions on operational items, he'll
be happy to -- General Kimmitt will be happy to answer them.
Yes, sir?
Q David Willis from the BBC. You've made clear that your patience is running out
as far as Fallujah is concerned. What is the deadline there in Fallujah for the
hand-over of heavy weapons?
GEN. KIMMITT: We have not established a specific deadline. We want to keep those
times to ourselves, so that when we decide to conduct offensive operations, if
we decide to conduct operations, that will be kept as part of normal operational
security. We don't want to necessarily telegraph our moves, but we've been very,
very consistent over the past 14 days that these discussions must bear fruit.
Our patience is not eternal, and if we don't start seeing some results of these
discussions, some good-faith efforts on the part of the enemy, we're prepared to
end the suspension of offensive operations and resume them.
Q Are we talking about a week? Are we talking about a week here, General, or --
GEN. KIMMITT: I think we're talking days.
Q Days.
GEN. KIMMITT: Jane?
Q Thank you. Jane Arraf, CNN. Dan, you said this is not a change in policy, de-Ba'athification.
Hard to see how it isn't, given that this started out as a very black and white
policy, and now there are major changes, okay, in implementation. I wonder if
you could address that.
And since it has prompted such problems in this country, why has it taken a year
to address this?
MR. SENOR: Well, first of all, if you look at the original de-Ba'athification
policy, Jane, it disqualified those individuals that were part -- members of the
top three layers of the Ba'ath Party and/or the top four layers of any ministry.
That remains intact.
If you look at the original policy, there was an appeals process. So Iraqis had
the opportunity to either make the case that they were members at that level in
name only, or they were forced into it, or there were some other extenuating
circumstances that deserved them to be granted some sort of exception or appeal.
That was the policy. That continues to be the policy.
What we have found recently, based on discussions with many people, particularly
in the area of education, is that the policy's fine, but the manner in which
it's been implemented has at times been uneven. And in the case of the teachers,
where you have over 10,000 teachers who have appealed because they really do
fall into that category, at least many of them do, they have appealed because
they believe that they were Ba'athists in name only, and the appeals have been
granted, but they haven't gotten their jobs reinstated. That's a procedural,
technical matter that we are correcting.
But the fundamental policy remains intact: top three layers of the Ba'ath party,
you are disqualified; top four layers of the ministry, you are disqualified.
There is an avenue, there is an appeals process, or a process to get your
pension reinstated. But the policy remains intact. It was the same as it was
when we implemented the policy or announced the policy last May, it's the same
-- the procedures are the same as they were when they were announced on January
10th. And now we just have to inject some technical fixes here to ensure that
it's implemented fairly.
Q Why did it take so long to do it?
MR. SENOR: Sure. We -- obviously, these are based on discussions we've had with
a number of Iraqis, teachers, senior ministry officials from Ministry of
Education, Ministry of Higher Education, and those are discussions we've had
over the past several months. And it's really -- for instance, if you think
about it, January 10th the procedures are announced. So over the subsequent
several months, many Iraqi teachers are applying for appeal. So they apply for
their appeals, they wait to get an answer. We learned recently that it took many
of them long to get answers, you know. That's why we have announced that going
forward, it must take 20 days. If you apply for an appeal, you get an answer
within 20 days, when we learned that it was taking so long. B, many teachers who
were granted the appeals were not getting their jobs reinstated. And so they
were waiting and waiting for their jobs to be reinstated and no word, no
reinstatement occurred.
And so, as there was a groundswell of information coming forward, coming up, as
we were hearing more and more that there was a real problem here for the
teachers, we sought to address it.
Q Those are the teachers. What about the army generals and the colonels?
MR. SENOR: Well, that policy is intact as we announced it months and months ago.
I mean, we've said all along that we'd have to recruit from the senior ranks of
the military in order to build up the military from the bottom up. We started
with the lower ranks, which is what was done in the first few months of the
reconstruction, and then you begin to work on the more senior ranks. As General
Kimmitt articulated yesterday, you cannot pull generals out of thin air; you
cannot recruit and train generals in a matter of weeks or a couple of years.
These are people who have to have tremendous experience.
And so we've said all along that we would be pulling from the pool of the old
Iraq army, so long as they were fully and robustly vetted, and so long as they
did no have Ba'athist blood on their hands. And that is the case with the senior
ranks that we have been and continue to look at as we build out the senior
ranks.
(To General Kimmitt) I don't know if you have anything to add to that?
(No audible response from the General.)
Yes?
Q Gregor Mayer from the German Press Agency. Dan, how does it come that if
somebody gets an appeal granted and he was not reinstated in his job, did you
analyze why this was the case? Because if somebody has a paper he's --
MR. SENOR: Sure.
Q And then a question to General Kimmitt. Yesterday you accounted about the
turn-ins of old rusty weapons. During today, have there been any other attempts
to get weapons turned in? Was there a difference or was there nothing at all?
MR. SENOR: On your first question, it's something we're concerned about -- how
is it that someone gets an appeal granted and their job isn't reinstated. And
we're obviously still looking at it. What it looks like thus far, however, is
that the appeal committee -- the way this procedure is structured is there is an
appeal committee in each ministry designated for each governate. And then
there's a second layer of appeal at the national level, at the National De-Ba'athification
Commission level.
At the local level, the local ministry level, the appeal may be granted and
there's, I presume, some sort of piece of paper, some document that's issued.
But the communication -- the information transfer from the ministerial committee
that grants the appeal, that grants the job to be reinstated, that information
flow from that point to the actual ministry office that's in charge of rehiring,
and the school to which teachers are to report back to, there was a gap. And so
the second point in that process was not getting the information.
Now, it remains to be seen; in some cases we think the information wasn't being
transmitted, in other cases the information wasn't being received. But in either
case, the problem is the same. Teachers who deserve their jobs back weren't
getting their jobs back. And for teachers who were Ba'athists in name only, do
not deserve to be excluded from the reconstruction of this country and the
rebuilding of their country, particularly if they're innocent, capable and
competent people who have skills that could make an invaluable contribution.
It's not fair to Iraqi children to deny competent and qualified teachers just
because they were Ba'athists in name only. These are not people who have blood
on their hands; these are not people who were involved with Ba'athist
atrocities. And so there was an information glitch, a technical glitch.
Ambassador Bremer, since it affects thousands of Iraqis across the country,
Ambassador Bremer sought to address it in a national speech.
GEN. KIMMITT: On your second question, there were a couple of weapons turned in
today, far less than yesterday, but the weapons that were turned in today were
of generally the same low quality as those we saw yesterday.
MR. SENOR: Yes?
Q Quinn O'Toole with NPR, for Dan. Have other members of the Governing Council,
other ministries, made similar requests to this one with the Ministry of
Education to make changes to the process that you're talking about?
MR. SENOR: No, not to my knowledge, Quinn. My understanding is that the problem
with teachers and, to some extent, professors has been the primary problem. In
the case of the teachers, it affects over 10,000 teachers, and so that is a
problem that seems to be unique to the relevant education ministries.
Q Will they be addressed if other ministries or members of the Governing Council
raise concerns about other areas?
MR. SENOR: Not to us. The area that we have heard repeatedly -- and it was less
from the Governing Council -- I mean, this has come up at Governing Council
meetings, but it's more in meetings we and Governing Council members have had
with teachers and senior members and senior officials of the relevant education
ministries.
So if your question is could it be a problem in other ministries -- quite
possibly; we haven't heard about it. The teachers issue is one we've heard about
repeatedly. It seemed to be a real problem, where literally thousands of
teachers were wiped out of jobs.
And it was really -- a tool to career advancement was joining the Ba'ath Party.
But in the case of teachers, it's not as though, unlike other areas -- it's not
like -- particularly ones at the Firqa level -- it's not like they were directly
involved in Ba'ath Party activities. They got their Firqa level and they went
back to work teaching. They were skilled people who were innocent as far as the
Ba'athist crimes were concerned. And since it affected so many of them, we're
hearing about it so frequently, we thought to repair this technical glitch.
By the way, we have thought that it would have been addressed based on how the
procedures were intended to be implemented, but when we learned it was being
done so unevenly and unfairly, we sought to fix that.
Yes, Najim?
Q (Through interpreter.) Thank you, Mr. Dan. Najim -- (inaudible) -- Rubaie,
Distor newspaper. Mr. Dan, there was an old song, Iraqi song. It's called "Dear
to my Name" -- called by my name. How will you identify this Ba'athist only by
name? How about by his job? And if this identification was from the Ministry of
Education or the Ministry of Justice -- this case is supposed to be specific.
There are other cases where -- the other thing is, there are questions -- who
will talk to who? The people will talk to the Ba'athists? The Ba'athists will
talk to the people? The politics will talk to the nationalists? Who will talk to
who? I need to understand this situation. Thank you.
MR. SENOR: Confusion in the translation. I apologize for that.
When I said Ba'athist in name only, what I meant was that while these teachers
had the -- were members of the Ba'ath Party, that was the extent of their
involvement with the Ba'ath Party is literally that they had a membership card
that said that they were a member of the Ba'ath Party. But as far as their
activities were concerned, they weren't involved in the activities of the Ba'ath
Party, particularly insomuch as those activities involved torture and repression
and spreading the criminal Ba'athist ideology. They were innocent of those
crimes. They literally were just -- had ID cards that said that they were Ba'ath
Party members, which from my understanding was something they had to do in order
to in many cases get jobs as teachers or get any sort of career advancement.
Q (Through interpreter.) I agree with you. I agree with you. However, who does
it come from? Is it a specific council? Is it from the people? Who does the
endorsement come from?
MR. SENOR: The endorsement -- this process, there is a national de-Ba'athification
body that oversees this. There is an appeals process that is managed through the
ministries. So each ministry layered down to each -- decentralized down to each
governate has an operating body that overseas the appeals process, and then if
an appeal is rejected it can be taken up to a second layer of appeals, up at the
national level to the national body.
Yes, ma'am.
Q (Through interpreter.) Sharina Mahay (ph) from the Iraqiyah newspaper. My two
colleagues, (name inaudible) and the journalist, my question is regarding the
statement of Ambassador Bremer through the Iraqiyah newspaper, Iraqiyah TV. Are
you only trying to present a -- are you going to do an investigation on this
death, on the Iraqiyah TV with everything that has happened, everything that has
occurred with those two journalists that have died, a complete description of
exactly what happened?
GEN. KIMMITT: There is an ongoing investigation at this time as to the
circumstances surrounding the death of the two Al-Iraqiyah employees.
MR. SENOR: Yes, Nick.
Q Nick Riccardi, L.A. Times. How long has Ambassador Bremer's speech been
planned, and is it partly due to the somewhat unsettled past few weeks that
we've been seeing here? And as a second, unrelated question, I'm curious,
General Kimmitt, if you know anything about reports of a soldier being fatally
shot by a sniper in the Green Zone.
MR. SENOR: As you know, Ambassador Bremer communicates regularly with the Iraqi
people. He appears weekly on the television set, on which he delivered his
address today. He -- there is a news program that I think is taped every
Thursday and runs through the subsequent couple of days. That features
Ambassador Bremer taking questions from many Iraqi journalists, some of who are
in this room. He holds a regular round table with Iraqi journalists also,
off-camera, usually on a weekly basis.
In light of recent events, however, he has thought about delivering a broader
national address that deals with issues not limited to the issues he deals with
week to week. And so on a weekly basis, he may bring up or get questions on
various coalition policies. He thought to deliver a longer address -- it runs
some 20 minutes -- to deal with a number of high-level issues, give Iraqis an
update on the situation in Fallujah and in the south.
We have heard from a number of Iraqis who have said they really want to hear
from Ambassador Bremer on where things stand, sort of get a state of play from
his perspective. And so we -- while he does that in general on his -- with his
weekly press appearances with the Iraqi press, we thought: do something a little
broader and lengthier to get into a number of the issues that Iraqis were
concerned about, particularly as these issues in Fallujah and the south were
related.
GEN. KIMMITT: On your second report, I don't have any reports of any sniper
incidents in Baghdad at all today. That's as of about an hour and a half ago.
Q Not necessarily today, possibly in the previous couple of days.
GEN. KIMMITT: No knowledge. No reports.
MR. SENOR: Yes, sir?
Q (Through interpreter.) Ahmed Famderni (sp) from Hurei TV (sp), Baghdad. In
regards to the peshmerga militia and Kurdish, there has been a lot of talk
around that situation and their involvement in the military operations. And this
has come from statements from the Kurdish -- the pro-democratic party. We ask
from you a statement. Are these militias involved in the military operations, or
are they not involved?
GEN. KIMMITT: There are no peshmerga militia operating under Iraqi or coalition
command and control. There are many former members of the militia that have
joined the Iraqi armed forces, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, who now answer to
the coalition, answer to the Iraqi security forces who have their allegiance to
the people of Iraq. But there are no peshmerga militias that are under our
control, nor are we -- are they operating under any direction from the
coalition.
MR. SENOR: John?
Q Dan, you just said that you'd heard from so many Iraqis that they wanted to
hear from Ambassador Bremer. My sense is, if you take in the round what he said,
it's the ambassador wanting to hear from Iraqis; that is to say, elaborating on
a point that we've heard him make with increasing insistency in the last couple
of weeks, that he thinks it's time for Iraqis who support a democratic
transition in this country to come forward. Is it because he felt that there was
a deafening silence from the silent majority of Iraqis during this critical time
that he felt it necessary to come forward with a whole series of measures which
seem to invite increased support?
MR. SENOR: I wouldn't read too much into the purpose of this speech, other than
what I've described.
Look, there have been many Iraqis who have spoken out. Particularly members of
Iraq's Governing Council have made strong statements. Many Iraqi religious
leaders have made strong statements. We are pleased that many leaders in
Fallujah have agreed to engage in discussions with us.
Is there room for more Iraqi leaders to speak out at any given moment or any
given crisis? Certainly, but let's give Iraqis -- those Iraqis that have spoken
out their due. There have been many of them, and they have been quite vocal.
Watch Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, LBC, Al-Raqia (sp). Listen to BBC Arabic. Watch or
monitor the Iraqi news any day or any night. You will see Iraqis all over the
television, all over the radio, engaged in a discussion about what is going on,
on the ground in Iraq.
Now many of them have a different view from our view of the situation. Some of
them have a sympathetic view to our view of the situation, but I think it's safe
to say that there is a real discussion going on in the country.
Ambassador Bremer's decision, John, to deliver this lengthier address is more a
function of the fact that the coalition right now, under international law -- it
is a fact -- the coalition is responsible for security in Iraq. And while we are
building up Iraqi security forces, some 200,000 Iraqis serving, and while there
have been complaints in some areas about underperformance of some of the
security services, the fact is, the vast majority work hard and serve
courageously. Some -- many have lost their lives. That's a fact, too.
But ultimately, right now, we are responsible for security. We are the
occupational authority until June -- occupation authority until June 30th. And
we have a responsibility to address a situation publicly when it's on the minds
of the Iraqi people, when it is a deep concern to the Iraqi people. We heard
from many Iraqis on this point. Many Iraqi journalists in this room have
communicated that point.
Yes?
Q (Through interpreter.) Saad Abrahim (ph) Azzaman (ph) newspaper, daily. Mr.
Dan, you have mentioned right now that -- you have said that people will
receiving donations from -- today Ambassador Bremer has said that this council
-- has said that it is an unjust council in its operations. How will they
receive donations when you say that it is unjust? This is one end.
From the other end, those people that are returning to their positions, will
they be reimbursed for the years that they have missed -- or actually, I'm
sorry, the year that they missed?
MR. SENOR: Let me take your first question. What Ambassador Bremer announced was
a $10 million fund to establish some sort of national memorial to memorialize
the atrocities that occurred in this country from 1968 to 2003, something that
has affected literally every single community in Iraq. And that fund will also
receive private donations. The fund's activities and the sources for the fund
are not limited to the $10 million that we are granting. There's opportunities
for private donations.
On your second question, Iraqis that have been out of work because of the de-Ba'athification
policy have not been out of work for years. They have been in some cases out of
work for a few months. And that is an issue that I would defer to the national
de-Ba'thification entity, national de-Ba'athification body to determine how they
will compensate those who should not have lost their jobs and did, and
consequently lost out on compensation.
Ed?
Q Two questions. One is for General Kimmitt. Do you have any details on a
firefight going on in Kufa, either right now or earlier today, between members
of the Mahdi Army and occupation forces?
And the second question is for Dan. You said that this sort of roadblock in
granting appeals came about after Chalabi's new policy in January, but in
December I talked to the president of Baghdad University and he said that
hundreds of teachers or professors who had applied for appeals had not been
granted them for a long time. And then in addition, Chalabi was very open in
January, when he put in place this new policy, that the top three levels of
former members of the Ba'athist Party would have no chance of returning to
public life, that they would have no chance of appeal whatsoever. So it seems to
me that your new policy here or your change in policy is to partly roll back
what Chalabi had done because he was very open about that policy being a
stricter policy than the previous one.
MR. SENOR: Go ahead.
GEN. KIMMITT: On the first question, we had reports of a firefight in Karbala
today, but nothing in Kufa.
Q I'm sorry, I mean in Karbala.
GEN. KIMMITT: Yeah. At about -- I want to say about noon today there was a
Bulgarian patrol that was operating inside of Karbala, and during its patrol it
was attacked by seven to eight men that were identified as potential Sadr
militia based on their uniforms and based on the way they acted. One of our
vehicles was disabled. We did have one of our coalition soldiers wounded, taken
to a medical facility, later died of the wounds.
MR. SENOR: And to your question, there may have been appeals granted prior to
January. What we thought was so important in the procedures that were
established and finalized on January 10th, the procedures agreed to by the
coalition and the Governing Council, was that it expedited the implementation of
these appeals; that we recognized that there were lags and we're hoping that
these tightened procedures and the more progressive appeals process would seek
to correct these problems across the board. At that point we weren't aware that
it was limited to teachers. We just knew there were appeals. In some cases
appeals were granted. In some cases appeals took too long to be granted or too
long for an answer to be provided.
And so this policy -- and if you can go through I can provide the text of the
procedures that were agreed to in January -- sought to address these matters
because it had a very robust appeals process and a very progressive appeals
process and it cited quite explicitly that these matters must be addressed going
forward in a very expeditious manner. They have not since then, particularly in
the area of the teachers, and so that's a technical point that we are
correcting.
You chose the word policy correction. I would substitute that for a technical
correction on the implementation of procedures. This has nothing to do with
policy. The de-Ba'athification policy remains intact. As I said earlier, it was
the right policy when it was issued back late May or mid-May, and it's the right
policy today.
To your second question, I can't respond to statements made by individual GC
members when I haven't seen them. But I can refer you to the actual policy, and
the policy's quite clear. There is an opportunity for appeal. There is an
opportunity to opt out of the appeals process and apply instead for a pension
payment so that there was an opportunity for some Ba'athists to at least
re-integrate into society and avoid a path of poverty and do with a sense of
dignity, even as they were being de-Ba'athified, even as there was no role for
them in the government. That is explicit in the procedures, and that continues
to be the policy and the procedures today that we have to ensure are
implemented.
You know, Ed, I think there's a lot of confusion and misreporting out there.
I've seen some of the wire reports, and I saw one -- I saw some statements that
senior-level Ba'athists will now have a role in the interim government that Mr.
Brahimi has been addressing. Again, it's just factually incorrect. The policy is
the same as it was; it remains firmly intact. We believe it's the right policy.
None of those issues have been modified.
Yes?
Q Yes, Stephen Farrell of the London Times. I hear what you say. But Dr. Chalabi
has today said that this is akin to letting the Nazis back to run Germany. He
doesn't seem to think that it's a technical matter or a procedural glitch.
MR. SENOR: I would encourage anybody who has that view to read Ambassador
Bremer's address. It is quite clear.
Q I spoke to another member of the Governing Council who said that in the
meeting yesterday Mr. Bremer just read out what he was going to say, he took no
consultation, and then just basically presented it as a fait accompli, but
didn't give them time to consider or come back the next day. He just said, "This
is what I'm doing" and walked out.
MR. SENOR: Actually, I was in that meeting, and there was a discussion following
Ambassador Bremer's presentation. And I know that Ambassador Bremer has been
consulting other Iraqi officials, including Governing Council members who are
directly involved with this issue, over the past couple of weeks.
Yes?
Q Nick Pallum (sp), Financial Times. Yesterday you used the word "reform" to
describe the stance on de-Ba'athification. Now you're saying it's a technical
correction. Could you explain what has changed between yesterday and today?
MR. SENOR: There's been no change between yesterday and today. I can take a look
at the transcript, but I'm pretty sure I was quite clear that we were dealing
with -- I made it clear yesterday we were dealing with implementation issues,
technical fixes with regard to procedurals -- procedures and implementation.
Period. End of issue. At no time yesterday did I address anything regarding the
de-Ba'athification policy.
Again, if you want to take a look at the transcript and then follow up with me
if you have any other questions.
Yes?
Q Thanks. Larry Kaplow with Cox Newspapers. You explained the educational sector
on this. Could you give a similar explanation on the potential army officers?
Are these guys who have won appeals or are waiting for appeals? What's their
status?
MR. SENOR: No. With the military it's not an issue of appeals, all it is is that
as we build out the senior ranks, just as we've done with the junior ranks, we
will hire people for those positions. Some of those people will have had past
experience in the old Iraqi army, and those individuals will be fully vetted and
then show that they had no direct role in the Ba'athist crimes or atrocities,
that they had no blood on their hands, before they'll be hired. The whole
military was disbanded. The old Iraqi army was disbanded by an order issued by
Ambassador Bremer last spring, and then immediately thereafter there was a
pension program put in place for those who were put out of work. But that's
completely separate from this.
There is no appeals process. There was a pension program that was put in place
immediately. There was no appeals process. It is separate from the de-Ba'athification
policy. And we had said all along that we would be hiring members of the old
Iraqi army to serve in the new Iraqi army, and in fact some 70 percent of the
current personnel in the new Iraqi army served in the old Iraqi army. They have
been fully vetted along the lines I described earlier, and we're going to do
same now with some of the senior ranks.
Yes.
Q Jason Burke, The Observer. Have you got any information you can share with us
on the investigations into the Basra bombings, who may be responsible? Is it
still thought that it could be al Qaeda or an al Qaeda-affiliated group?
GEN. KIMMITT: Yeah, as I said yesterday there's, one, been no group to claim
responsibility; number two, we're not aware at this point that any physical
evidence has been discovered that directly links the bombings with any
particular group or organization. Nonetheless, if you take a look at what we've
seen, sadly, over the past 10 months, the operation that was used, the type of
-- the techniques that were used, what would appear to be the motivation,
suicidal bombers attacking symbolic targets -- Iraqi police stations, signs of
democratic institutions here in Iraq -- attempting to reach and achieve a
spectacular effect -- this was not a precision weapon, but this was a huge
chance to kill and maim many, many people -- those are the techniques, those are
the tactics, those are the procedures that we have seen over and over again
coming out of groups such as the Zarqawi network, with their affiliation to al
Qaeda, and groups such as Ansar al-Islam.
MR. SENOR: Yes.
Q (Through interpreter.) Muqtdam Hamid Ali (ph) of al-Kaza (ph) newspaper. What
if it was proven that a few of the American soldiers who were involved in the
death of the two Iraqi journalists from Al-Iraqiyah TV station, how will they be
dealt with and who will deal with them?
(Mr. Senor and Gen. Kimmitt consult off-mike.)
GEN. KIMMITT: Well, we have a very routine procedure, a very process-oriented
procedure that takes us -- very simply, we look at the results of the
investigation; we try to ascertain, as part of that investigation, if there was
any negligence, criminal negligence, non-criminal negligence; and then if in
fact there is any negligence on the part of anybody involved in that. Then it
goes to another investigation for prosecution.
We've seen that time and time again. It's fairly routine. I'd be glad to take
you through the entire process with one of our criminal lawyers right after
this.
But I don't want to speculate on whether anybody was directly at fault in this
particular incident. Let's wait for the investigation to be completed. You can
be assured that it will be a thorough investigation. All aspects of the incident
will be explored by a non-biased, an unbiased observer -- by an unbiased
investigator. And we should probably wait to talk about guilt or innocent until
we have the facts on the ground ascertained.
MR. SENOR: Ma'am?
Q (Through interpreter.) Excuse me. I'm sorry. Will there be an investigation on
a public -- in a public way, or is it going to be through a mouthpiece or a
spokesperson? And who will announce the conclusion of the investigation?
GEN. KIMMITT: We can talk about how those -- the results of the investigations
will be published, if they'll be published, at a time after this press
conference.
We have a procedure by which the investigation results can be examined, and it's
fairly routine. It happens all the time.
MR. SENOR: Yeah? Last question.
Q Hi. Karl Vick, Washington Post. Regarding Fallujah, General, do you have --
does the coalition have confidence that the people who negotiated the cease-fire
can control everybody who's in the city? And after that, is there a distinction
between made between people who basically want to gun for Americans and see this
as an opportunity to battle Americans, and residents of the town who feel they
want to defend their town?
GEN. KIMMITT: Well, on the first point, we have been concerned over the past few
days, with people that we've been talking to in these discussions, whether they
in fact can deliver.
We have no doubt in our minds that the people inside Fallujah understand what's
at stake here. They understand what they have to deliver themselves. But whether
the leaders are part of that or not part of that, at this late date, may start
to become irrelevant. The very fact that these people are not able to bring
everybody in Fallujah together for town hall meetings to discuss this loses some
currency after awhile. We certainly understand that these discussions are being
broadcast inside the city. We've used our own radio stations, we've used other
media outlets to get the word out. So we're at this point fairly certain that
the vast majority of people in Fallujah understand the conditions to achieve
peace, which is, as a first step of many, to turn in the heavy weapons.
Now, as regards to who are the combatants and what their particular motivations
are, it really doesn't matter as we go into Fallujah. Anybody who takes up arms
against the coalition and Iraqi security forces will be responded to. Anybody
who aims a weapon at a coalition force puts himself or herself in a position of
having a response to that threat. Our soldiers and our Marines have the inherent
right of self-defense, and as they are conducting offensive operations inside
that city, whether that is somebody who is trying to defend their city, which
seems to be somewhat of a ludicrous concept, or somebody who's just out to kill
an American, both of those will find the full force of the United States Marine
Corps and the coalition brought down on them.
Q I hear you, but I can understand how there might be confusion when you -- you
mentioned both -- you said defending, the right of self defense while conducting
an offensive operation; and the concept of homeland and your land, it's an
occupation. I'm just wondering to what extent the coalition is estimating the
contagion effect.
GEN. KIMMITT: Let's talk about that for a moment. The very fact is that these
operations are run with the Iraqi security forces. Our conditions are very
simple: we are trying to put Iraqi security forces back into that town. We are
trying to put Iraqi police back into that town. We are trying to put Iraq
governmental authority back into that town. We're trying to put Iraqi Civil
Defense Corps persons back into that town.
If, for some reason, the people in Fallujah believe that they are in fact
fighting against the coalition, the truth is they are fighting against a free
and democratic Iraq. If Fallujah believes that it is somehow going to be a
different country, that's a different question here, but there is no other city
inside Iraq that is establishing fortifications for the purpose of holding off
the coalition because they want to defend it from the coalition in order to
protect it for -- what? I mean, it's a ludicrous concept. I'm just sort of
having a hard time understanding where that takes us.
The very fact is we are attempting to bring Iraqi government control back into
the city of Fallujah. It is not there. If you're suggesting perhaps a private
militia be responsible for Fallujah, you know our position on that. You know the
Iraqi position on that. If you believe somehow it has its own separate
organization running security for that, that's inconsistent with a democratic
country of Iraq, a nation. If you believe that somehow they can subcontract the
responsibility for security perhaps to some foreign fighters from Syria or
Turkey or any other country in the region, that's a ridiculous concept as well.
And I suspect that many of the foreign fighters and the terrorists inside that
city may be trying to put that ridiculous notion inside their heads, that
somehow they can best defend the city of Fallujah and the nation of Iraq by
fighting the Iraqi security forces and the coalition forces. That just doesn't
square with reality.
Thanks.
MR. SENOR: Thank you, everybody.
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