



**U.S. CENSUS
MONITORING
BOARD**

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CONGRESSIONAL
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Charles Wickliffe Caldwell III
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Dear Mr. President and Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to P.L. 105-119, the Congressionally-appointed members of the U. S. Census Monitoring Board transmit our final scheduled letter-report to Congress.

We have witnessed one of the most remarkable achievements in the American experience: the most accurate census in our history. Not only was this success ***unprecedented***, it was ***unexpected***. According to the then Census Bureau Director Dr. Kenneth Prewitt's prediction in 2000, the Census Bureau was going to have to run harder, but this was only going to "allow us to stay even." He predicted falling response rates and an even larger undercount than 1990. In fact, many experts did not believe that further coverage improvements were possible, citing statistical methodologies such as sampling for non-response follow-up and adjustment as the only remaining ways to reduce the undercount.

Yet with the release of Census 2000 data and the subsequent analyses, we now know that this was the most successful census in the twentieth century (without using statistical adjustment). ***The net undercount for the United States, 1.18 percent, is the lowest ever calculated. The Black-White differential undercount was reduced by 60 percent — the largest ever-recorded decrease.*** Moreover, the undercount for every population group was reduced — the undercount for Latinos was reduced by 45 percent.

This success was only possible because of the support of Congress and an enormous effort that linked the Census Bureau to thousands of local governments, to even more thousands of community organizations and ultimately to the 280 million members of the American family.

For these communities, the success of Census 2000 moves them closer to the fulfillment of American promise. This census will help these communities to realize greater democratic participation by providing the framework for fair representation. This census will also provide a better means to ensure the fair distribution of resources. A new voice in a state legislature; a new school for an over-crowded city school system; a new "ESL" (English as a Second Language) teacher for a school in a rural area with a growing immigrant community; a new urgent care center in a suburban community; and even a new street light for an inner-city street are possible because ***the census shows that there are real (and, in many cases, more and new) people living in these places.***

The Board believes Census 2000 is an accurate depiction of the American family. The results of Census 2000 were not perfect. However, the Board's research and the Bureau's research indicate that it was a clear success. To be sure many people were missed or counted at the wrong address, but we believe that Census 2000 was a very good census, and, in some ways, an excellent census.

This is a census that also tells us we are changing as a nation. The Bureau counted 281.4 million people — a 13.2 percent increase from the 1990 population of 248.7 million or 32.7 million more people than in 1990. ***One of the most surprising results of Census 2000 is the dramatic increase in Hispanic population — from 22.4 million in 1990 to 35.3 million in 2000, an increase of 57.9 percent.*** Latinos are now the largest minority community in the United States and account for 12.5 percent of the total population.

The Hispanic population grew by 50 percent in 39 states. ***In North Carolina, the Hispanic population quadrupled in ten years, reaching almost 400,000 people.*** Hispanic immigration and migration to the southern states and to the Midwest have significantly changed the demographic profile of the nation. The Hispanic population of Columbus Junction — a small town in southeastern Iowa centered on meat processing — grew by 215 percent, now comprising over one-third of the town's population. The materials in Columbus Junction's schools have been rewritten with Spanish-language additions. The town's schools serve the Hispanic population not only for Columbus Junction but for the surrounding communities as well. These changes are occurring throughout the United States, and as the Latino population grows, many cities and towns are changing forever. Census 2000 reflects these changes.

However, it is not only these final data that tell a story. There is also the story of "how" the census was taken — how the millions of persons and thousands of neighborhoods were counted. Census 2000 reflects the stories of struggles by local communities and community leaders to ensure that every person living in the neighborhoods and in the communities throughout the United States, were counted. We know that the level of local involvement was unprecedented. Moreover, we know that the efforts of local governments and community leaders to ensure that their communities were counted were not solely about a population total. They were efforts to ensure the recognition that their neighborhoods and communities were part of the American family.

"Discovering" and documenting those stories as a critical part of the Census Monitoring Board's mission. We listened to the real stories of this struggle and to the aspirations of countless people over the past three years. Further, we not only listened and we learned to what the census meant to these communities, but how the census should be conducted to ensure a more accurate count, especially in those neighborhoods that were the hardest-to-count. In short, we learned from real people in real neighborhoods what worked and what did not work.

Five Things that Worked Well — Lessons to Take Forward to the Future

1. Flexibility

When it comes to the census, one size does not fit all.

A successful census operation demands flexibility to adapt to local conditions. Taking the census in a colonia such as Delmar Heights in south Texas is a much different operation than taking the census in Champaign, Illinois. Fear, distrust of the government, and linguistic isolation are obstacles that the Census Bureau confronts in many communities. Confronting these challenges will often mean modifying “the plan” — for example sending enumerators who are non-citizens who know and understand their own neighborhoods who speak not only the language, but the dialect appropriate to the neighborhood; sending enumerators out in teams; sending enumerators out at non-traditional hours; and using special promotional efforts tailored for the hardest-to-count communities. In Los Angeles, flexibility meant the creation of a special team that analyzed hard-to-count areas in Los Angeles and then sent teams of several specially-trained enumerators to count in these areas. ***For Census 2000, Regional Offices were given unprecedented flexibility and resources to meet the needs of local communities. Regional Directors were allowed to implement solutions according to local needs.*** For instance, in some areas this meant reducing the average enumerator hiring test score, for others this meant hiring temporary workers who took a Spanish-language hiring test. The Local Census Office, Chicago Central, that was responsible for the State Street Corridor completed non-response follow-up in record time, before most of the other Chicago Local Census Offices. In 1990, the Local Census Office for this area (one of the hardest-to-count neighborhoods in all of America and includes Robert Taylor Homes, the nation’s largest housing project) was the last office in Chicago to finish. Why was this possible in 2000? The ability to hire enumerators who were local residents and the availability of community partnership specialists who could answer the community’s concerns contributed significantly.

One of the best examples of the Bureau’s ability to adapt to local conditions was the approach used in the enumeration of Native Alaskan communities. Enumerators were not required to pass tests and were hired on their ability to locate houses and communicate with members of their community. Many persons were hired as guides for the crew leaders who were often from outside of the community. The Bureau’s success in Native Alaskan villages is a model for success in 2010. ***We know that decentralization works and should be expanded even further in the future.***

2. Partnership

Partnership was expanded and contributed to the success.

Over 140,000 organizations joined the Census Bureau’s national partnership program and thousands more joined the Regional Offices and Local Census Offices to promote Census 2000 in their communities. These invaluable partners included groups such as the NAACP, MALDEF, Pacific Islander Community Council (PICC), AKA Sorority, PIMA County Association of Governments, National Urban League, Asian Pacific American Legal Center,

Valdosta-Lowndes Chamber of Commerce, the City of New York. ***These partners promoted the census before the mail-out; provided local perspective to Local Census Offices in identifying hard-to-count areas and concerns; and helped to encourage trust during the non-response follow-up phase.*** Regional Directors and Local Census Office Managers extolled the value of the partnership program to the Monitoring Board at every meeting, as their jobs were easier due to the efforts of local governments, community organizations, and community leaders.

3. LUCA, the Local Update of Census Addresses program

Due to local involvement, the address list was dramatically improved.

An accurate address list and the corresponding TIGER¹ files are integral parts of the decennial infrastructure. The address list, or Master Address File, enables the Census Bureau to mail out questionnaires and to determine which housing units enumerators should be sent to during non-response follow-up. Over the last decade local governments, as well as private companies, have made great strides in the development of accurate and timely address lists. They use these lists to create taxation registers and to deliver services such as E-911, water, and utilities. Local governments have, since the development of the TIGER system, created sophisticated mapping systems that allow them to track the progress of their communities, as well as map new roads and subdivisions. These local sources are often more accurate than the Census Bureau's address list/TIGER system, barely updated since 1990, or the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File.

During the last census and throughout the decade it was apparent to local governments, Congress and the Census Bureau that one potential source of census undercount was an incomplete address list. In planning for Census 2000, census shareholders strongly advocated for allowing local governments the opportunity to "partner" with the Census Bureau to create and update the Master Address File. The passage of PL 103-430, the Census Address List Improvement act of 1994, allowed the Census Bureau to invite the cooperation of the 39,000 tribal and municipal governments across the country. ***For the first time, local governments were allowed to see and correct their local address lists prior to Census day.***

However, even this program had its share of problems — indicating that there is room for improvement for the 2010 census. The Census Bureau consistently missed deadlines and did not consider the extent of effort required on the part of local governments — often limited by a lack of the resources of time, people and expertise — to participate in the program. However, ***LUCA contributed over eight million housing units to the address mailing list. Many of these were housing units that otherwise would not have been counted.*** This program was an essential part of the decennial census and allowed the Bureau to access local address and geographic information that was often more accurate and more reflective of local conditions than the Census Bureau's traditional sources. LUCA was one of the best advancements made during the course of Census 2000.

¹ TIGER: Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing system, the Census Bureau's mapping system.

4. Advertising

The first-ever paid advertising campaign boosted the mail return rate.

One of the most historical aspects of the Census 2000 operation was the use of a highly creative paid advertising program. The Census Bureau awarded an advertising contract, ultimately totaling over \$160 million, to Young and Rubicam and four partner agencies: Chisholm-Mingo Group, The Bravo Group, Kang & Lee; and G & G. These groups worked together to develop an overall national strategy to reach diverse communities throughout the country. While Young & Rubicam developed the national English-speaking “Diverse America” campaign, the partner agencies developed specially targeted media programs for African-Americans, Latinos, Asians, and American Indians. Creative ads such as “Census Rap,” “Generations,” “Icons,” and “Lift,” reached millions of Americans. The Census Bureau believes that the ad campaign, ranked by a *USA Today* poll as the second most effective, contributed to increased awareness. ***This may have contributed to an increase in the mail response rate from 65 percent to 67 percent*** — the first time in history that a census mail response was higher than the previous census. The case can be made that a creative, well-planned, and targeted advertising program could pay for itself by increasing the mail return rate.

5. Competitive Pay-Rates

Competitive pay-rates ensured a quality workforce.

In spite of record “full employment” in many areas of the country, the Census Bureau hired and trained hundreds of thousands of temporary workers to take the census. ***Almost every Local Census Office met, surpassed, and maintained their hiring targets*** — ensuring the non-response follow-up operation was not affected by attrition. The Board was told by Local Census Office staff and by community members in Atlanta, San Diego, New York City, Washington, DC and in other areas that ***the draw of high hourly wages — “top dollar” — enabled people to take these temporary jobs.*** The Bureau’s hourly pay rates ranged from \$8.50 to \$18.50 for enumerators. Other pay scales were as high as \$21.50 for Field Operations Supervisors; \$26.00 for Assistant Managers for Field Operations; and as high as \$30.50 for the Local Census Office Managers. These pay scales allowed the Bureau to customize the wages to localities. For example, in New York City the enumerator pay rate was \$18.50 an hour; in Chicago, the pay rate was \$15.00; and in Corbin, Kentucky the pay rate was \$8.50 an hour. These differential pay scales (first used in the 1990 census) and the ability to compete with the prevailing wage rates were major contributing factors in the Bureau’s ability to hire and retain census workers. The accurate count of individual neighborhoods requires an emphasis on local hiring — ensuring that the people who are living the neighborhoods should be involved in the enumeration of the neighborhood.

Room for Improvement

Each of these programs may have contributed significantly to the success of Census 2000 and represent innovations or enhancements over previous censuses. They are a part of the enormous effort made by the Census Bureau and local partners to improve the decennial census.

However, as successful as the census proved to be, it is evident that there are still members of the American family who are undercounted. Many believe that this census was the best ever and there is little room for improvement. This is not true. ***The census can be more accurate and more inclusive.*** The differential undercount can be further reduced or even eliminated. This must be the Census Bureau's fundamental goal for the future.

Statistical adjustment will never completely eliminate the differential undercount or the overall net undercount. No statistical methodology available to the Bureau can replace the thousands of real people living in real neighborhoods who are missed. Moreover, as this Board has reported, ***statistical adjustment does not eliminate the undercount by putting the people who were missed back in the neighborhoods in which they were missed in the census.*** In no instance have we found a severely undercounted neighborhood, such as Washington Heights in New York City or San Ysidro in San Diego, which will receive the full count of who is missed as a result of statistical adjustment. Instead, people are added back randomly throughout the census. So that persons missing from the Second Ward in Houston are added throughout Houston — and throughout the country.

The Board believes that the Clinton Administration's insistence on the use of "sampling for non-response follow-up" significantly detracted from the Census Bureau's ability to pursue creative solutions to improve the census count — especially in the hardest-to-count neighborhoods.

The Census Bureau is currently planning for the decennial census in 2010. The Bureau is making decisions now that will affect the outcome of the 2010 census. The Board believes ***the Bureau should use their energy to focus on methods that will work to reduce the actual undercount in the census and to actually help empower the hardest-to-count neighborhoods to be counted.*** In order to make a full effort to count every person, the Census Bureau must make an effort to reach every person and to create every opportunity for people to participate in the census. By "working smarter" with increased sensitivity to the needs and concerns of the hardest-to-count communities, the Census Bureau can develop methods to improve the census even further and to potentially eliminate the differential undercount

Six Things to Improve the Census for the Future

1. Spanish-Language Questionnaire

A targeted Spanish-language mailing is critical to reducing the undercount of Latinos

The Census Bureau knows that there are many neighborhoods in the United States in which almost every resident speaks and reads **only** Spanish. According to the Bureau's own Planning Database, based on 1990 data, there were over 1000 census tracts in Texas and over 540 in California that were "linguistically isolated" at 95 percent or above. However there are also linguistically isolated tracts in states such as Arkansas, Georgia, Missouri and North Carolina. The Bureau printed questionnaires, available upon request, in Spanish. This is not enough. For 2010, the Bureau needs to ensure that those residents who require such a form have ready access to the Spanish-language form.

In 2000, the Census Bureau sent pre-census letters in English and English census questionnaires to every household in America — even those households that were known to speak and read only Spanish. In order to receive a census questionnaire in a language other than English, a person had to respond to a letter written in English. ***This failure to ensure that the census is accessible to these members of the American family who speak and read only Spanish contributes to a persistent undercount in the Hispanic population.*** For 2010, the Census Bureau should use the Planning Database, as well as local expertise, to determine where the nation's most severely linguistically-isolated census tracts are located. To encourage full participation in the census, the Bureau should provide Spanish-language questionnaires in these census tracts as a matter of standard operating procedure.

2. The Long-Form

Good riddance!

The Census Bureau has known for decades that ***the long form suppresses response rates and may contribute to the differential undercount.*** The long form includes questions that ask for a person's income, whether a person pays for a second mortgage on their home, and whether a person may have a "physical, mental or emotional condition" that causes difficulty in their daily lives. Many, as evidenced during this census, believe that these questions are intrusive and are an invasion of privacy. There is as much as a 12 percent differential in the response rates between the short and long forms. The long form costs more to process and also costs more during non-response follow-up operations due to the amount of time it takes to complete the form.

The Census Bureau has tried to counter resistance to the long form by citing the uses of the data for funding purposes and by pointing out that the long form is only sent to one in six households. However, the Bureau has not always been forthcoming in admitting that that the one-in-six is a *national average*. There are many areas where the long-form is sent to ***one-in-two*** households. This is an inappropriate burden to rural areas that on average receive more long forms than urban areas, and is inappropriate for households in public housing and rental housing where many of the questions are irrelevant.

Current planning for 2010 indicates that the Bureau is moving toward the elimination of the long form. This is a fundamental change that must happen. ***By eliminating the long form, the Bureau will have more resources to devote to the core purpose of the census — counting every person at the correct address — without having to ask 15 million households questions such as “how much is your regular monthly payment on all second or junior mortgages and all home equity loans on this property.”***

3. Local Hiring

The best enumerator is the one who looks and sounds like the person answering the door.

Trust is a major factor in reducing the differential undercount. The Census Bureau, when it enters many hard-to-count neighborhoods, encounters generations of suspicion and mistrust of government. Many immigrants have left countries where government lists were linked to persecution. While the Census Bureau has an unbroken record of ensuring confidentiality, it is still not possible to rely on this in many communities. In these areas, ***it is the face of a trusted neighbor who is best able to talk with the residents and complete the census.***

In 2000, the ability to exceed hiring goals for Census 2000 almost surely contributed to the record-breaking finish of non-response follow-up. Further, the Census Bureau made great strides in the area of local hiring. They set out with the goal of having “indigenous enumerators” for every census tract. We understand that this is hard to do, but it is essential, and in many areas the Bureau met this goal. However, in other areas schedule concerns prompted Local Census Offices to send non-residents, who were unfamiliar with the community and therefore less culturally sensitive, to complete the non-response follow-up operation. This discourages trust.

In many areas (especially hard-to-count neighborhoods or linguistically-isolated neighborhoods) it is crucial to understand the perspective of the residents: to understand when an enumerator would have the best opportunity to find residents; to understand how individual families may be living together in one physical structure; and to understand the fears and concerns of the residents. For example: Hillsborough County, Florida, has a large seasonal migrant population which numbers in the thousands. These primarily Hispanic workers live and work on various farms in rural areas. These agricultural workers leave their dwellings (which are almost always located on the land they work) well before dawn, returning often times late into the evening. While the Census Bureau’s enumerators had considerable difficulty counting them, the County was able to conduct their own count by using local individuals who knew the area, they knew where the workers were, what hours they worked, and most importantly, their language. The Bureau could effectuate a much more accurate count of these important residents, if they followed the lead of the County and hired knowledgeable local individuals to count their neighbors.

Individual enumerators and even teams of enumerators face challenges that are difficult to overcome — such as locked buildings, dangerous streets, and unfamiliar cultural practices. By sending enumerators who are not “indigenous”, these challenges are magnified. The Bureau should consider (in neighborhoods where they encounter difficulty hiring qualified enumerators who are residents) turning to the use of

facilitators, or “ambassadors,” to help guide enumerators through hard-to-count neighborhoods.

Facilitators could act as liaisons between enumerators who are qualified to ask census questionnaires and residents who are unsure of whether or not to participate. These facilitators can give the census a “familiar face” and encourage trust. In 2000, facilitators were used successfully in some areas such as the El Paso local census area and along the Gulfcoast of Mississippi. In remote Alaska, the Anchorage census office relied on village leaders to instruct the crew leaders on hiring issues. As a result, many villages not only trusted the Bureau intentions but felt integrally involved in the success of the census.

Efforts to include input from local leaders and hire local residents for guidance to enumerators are practices that should be continued and expanded for the future.

4. Master Address File

A sensitive solution to the “Post Office Box problem” should be a priority for the 2010 census.

The Census Bureau’s partnership with local governments to create the address list for Census 2000 was revolutionary. However, there is evidence that suggests that the Master Address File was not as complete or as accurate as it could have been for 2000. The foremost example of this is what is now known as the “Post Office Box problem.” Many communities and small towns have street addresses, but use Post Office (PO) Boxes for mail delivery. As the Census Bureau constructed the Master Address List, they recorded such addresses to be included in the mailout-mailback phase of the census. However the United States Postal Service (USPS) does not deliver to these **houses** in these communities. Rather, mail comes to the PO Boxes. Furthermore, because the decennial census is a count of persons living in housing units, the *Census Bureau decided, early in their planning, not to use PO Boxes*. Therefore, the USPS did NOT deliver census questionnaires to PO Boxes — only to physical addresses with “city-style” addresses. At the same time, the USPS did not allow enumerators to deliver questionnaires to PO Boxes. As a result, there were hundreds of thousands of households throughout the nation — especially in small towns and rural communities — that did not receive questionnaires via the mail. For these households, a census enumerator was sent to hand-deliver the form — attaching it to a fence post, hanging it from a door, or placing it in the yard.

In many areas, Local Census Offices were responsible for delivering tens of thousands of *Undeliverable as Addressed (UAA)* questionnaires. The Conway, South Carolina office was responsible for over 10,000 UAA questionnaires; the Orleans Parish office in Louisiana delivered over 15,000; the Battle Creek, Michigan Local Census Office was responsible 17,000 forms; and there were over 60,000 forms returned to the Tampa office that included other areas of Hillsborough County. Many of these UAAs were addressed to houses in communities that rely on PO Boxes.

As the need to deliver these UAAs was unforeseen during initial census planning and was a burden in terms of staffing, many Local Census Offices were unable to do this effectively. In central and southwest Mississippi, areas covered by the Jackson Local Census Office — many towns and subdivisions of Jackson reported not receiving a census questionnaire in the mail or from an enumerator. These reports came from Hattiesburg and Brandon, as well as smaller communities such as Amory, Corinth, Laurel and Mound Bayou. Later

reports indicated that the Jackson Local Census Office did not deliver all of the UAAs and was forced to enumerate those households during the non-response follow-up operation, causing confusion and inflating costs.

The decennial census must fulfill two principal requirements: 1) To count every person living in America and 2) To count every person at the correct address. Ensuring the accuracy of the location — the address — is the only guarantee for the fair distribution of political representation and resources. The Master Address File, therefore, is the foundation of the decennial census. In 2000, there were too many “holes,” such as the UAAs, that allowed hundreds of thousands of households to potentially slip through. ***The Census Bureau must take steps during the early parts of this decade to ensure that the address list is complete and accurate. Moreover, the Census Bureau should make every effort to work with the United States Post Office to effectively use the mail system and avoid reliance on enumerators for delivering questionnaires.***

5. Post-Census Local Review

There is no reasonable justification for not reinstating post-census local review for 2010.

As this census has proven — and what many knew always to be true — local governments are indispensable sources of information. Their knowledge is far more attuned to real-time data than the Census Bureau's once-in-a-decade approach to local communities. Local governments are literally involved in the lives of the neighborhoods and communities.

However, ***one of the “missing pieces” of Census 2000 was a final quality check — the opportunity for local governments to see their block housing unit counts before the census was finalized.*** The Census Bureau argued that LUCA was a replacement for post-census local review and the final quality check will be easier because of LUCA. Yet, it should also be pointed out that a good LUCA is a good partner to post-census local review. There are two justifications for implementing this final quality check. The first is obvious, to ensure that every housing unit was accounted for in the census count — one more way of ensuring a reduction of the undercount. The second justification is as important. By allowing local governments to verify the block information, the Census Bureau can ensure that housing units, and especially group quarters locations, are located in the correct census block and tract. This ***location, or geocoding, is as important as counting — as the responsibility of the census is not only to count every person but to count every person at the accurate location.*** Representation and resources are distributed according to geography — not demographic groups. When determining which neighborhoods should get new schools or that lack fair representation on city council or county supervisors, it is important to know where people are living.

In 1990, 9,847 local governments participated in a similar program, Post-Census Local Review. This program yielded an addition of 80,923 housing units or 127,000 persons that otherwise might have been missed. Post-Census Local Review also corrected the location for 198,347 housing units that were not geocoded accurately.

The lack of such a program in 2000 may account for reported errors in the location of group quarters throughout the country. In almost every state, the locations of group quarters (prisons, colleges dormitories and other institutions) were reported incorrectly for many

jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the census data are final and official. In order to correct these errors, thousands of local governments must participate in the Count Question Review Program. Had local jurisdictions been given the opportunity to review the census data before they were final, the Bureau would not have released those incorrectly geocoded data.

Census 2010 should allow local governments to review housing unit block counts or similar data before the census is finalized. This is the only reliable and effective way to correct errors such as geocoding and to ensure that every known housing unit was counted.

6. Proven Coverage Improvements

The smart, but limited, use of administrative records may be the only way to find the last and most challenging portion of the hard-to-count.

Finally, the Census Bureau must really examine the undercount to develop ways to reach the sub-groups who comprise it. In the past, the Census Bureau used proven coverage improvements — such as administrative records — to ensure that every person was counted. These ***coverage improvements will not replace the census in severely undercounted communities, but can provide a method to count real people at real addresses who may have been missed.***

In 1988, the Bureau hired Dr. Jerusa Wilson, a professor at Coppin State College in Baltimore, Maryland, to examine the causes of the differential undercount and present possible ways to reduce it. Dr. Wilson concluded that the differential undercount resulted from certain characteristics of hard-to-count populations, such as poverty, high unemployment rates, low education, fear and crime. Dr. Wilson believed parolees and probationers were highly representative of the hard-to-count Black male group that he observed as having the highest rates of undercount. Since parolees and probationers were required to report regularly to officers of the court (and may have been unlikely to report themselves on a census questionnaire) the Bureau reasoned that the administrative records were an ideal source to ensure that these individuals were counted. The Bureau developed the Parolee/Probationer Coverage Improvement programs in 1990 to count this particular segment of the hard-to-count population. The Bureau matched forms that were completed by court officers to the census. When they found a name with an address that was not reported on the census, they added the person to the census. These programs added 447,757 persons that otherwise would have been missed in the 1990 census — 0.2 percent of the population. Moreover, a disproportionate number of the persons added were members of minority communities. The Bureau reported that approximately 27.1 percent of all persons added were Black males — in reality only 6 percent of the total population. For some states this program significantly improved the census count. In Mississippi, for instance, 40 percent of the parolees and probationers were not counted. Had the Bureau not used this program, Mississippi's undercount in 1990 would have been 15 percent higher.

However, for Census 2000, the Census Bureau chose not to use administrative records, a proven coverage improvement method. The Bureau cited flawed conclusions from PES research and stated their belief that the efforts to use of administrative records would “detract from a more pressing need to build consensus for the use of sampling to account for nonresponding households.” Further, when several states, including Pennsylvania,

asked to make use of their parole and probation offices as “Be Counted” sites, the Bureau refused.

In the end, it is reasonable to believe that the use of administrative records could have reduced the differential undercount even further. Records such as Medicaid and Food Stamps could have allowed the Bureau to reach thousands of children (a group who accounted for as much as 50 percent of the undercount in the past). Moreover, ***the use of administrative records could compensate for correlation bias that is undetected by statistical methodologies such as adjustment.*** The Board believes that the Census Bureau must re-evaluate their position on proven coverage improvement methods, such as administrative records, that ***ensures counting real people at real addresses.*** The 2010 census should make use of these records. Proven coverage improvements, like administrative records, would enhance the Bureau’s ***ability to count hundreds of thousands of adults and children who might otherwise remain uncoun-***

Conclusion

The Congressional Members of the Census Monitoring Board are proud of our oversight role and its contribution to the success of the 2000 census. Among the issues we raised to the Census Bureau before the census was completed (and we believe contributed positively to Census 2000) are the following:

- The need for ***Spanish-language materials to promote the census***
- The importance of ***allowing Regional Directors to have the flexibility to adapt the census operations in ways that were sensitive to local needs***
- The need for waivers to ***allow people to take temporary census jobs without losing important government assistance benefits***

In fact, it was not until our involvement, by taking the unprecedented step to contact governors’ offices, that many states joined the waivers programs developed by federal agencies. Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas were among those states that allowed people to take work in these temporary jobs, without fearing that they would lose their benefits. We provided the relevant letters of instructions developed, by the federal agencies, and helped many states by providing information (that the Census Bureau had not supplied) regarding these waivers.

Further, by devoting our time equally between field operations and statistical methodology, we have developed an in-depth understanding of the census process. We visited over 50 Local Census Offices, observed the enumeration in places such as Remote Alaska and Cheyenne, Wyoming to Washington, DC and Los Angeles, California.

In spite of exhaustive research by the National Academy of Science, the General Accounting Office, the Commerce Inspector General’s Office and numerous Congressional committees, only the Monitoring Board’s original and groundbreaking analyses of the methodology determined that adjustment of the 1990 census would not have put people back in the neighborhoods where they were missed. It was not until the Monitoring Board had acquired the original results of the Post-Enumeration Survey (PES) of 1990, that anyone outside of the Census Bureau had attempted to assess the effects of adjustment at local levels. This research and our analyses were presented at a formal meeting of the

National Academy of Science and to the Census Bureau. To date no one has offered a data-based argument to refute this research. We have demonstrated that **severely undercounted neighborhoods remain severely undercounted — even after statistical adjustment. Severely undercounted congressional districts will also remain severely undercounted.**

We need to understand that the census is like many things: you get what you pay for. The Congress' decision to **fully fund** the 2000 census was an expensive decision. However, we believe that **this was a wise decision to invest in a program that will provide fair political representation for every person living in America.** The Congress and the American people have spent the necessary time, resources and efforts on an accurate census and the dividends of this investment will be paid for the next ten years.


Finally, we hope that the success of the 2000 census is the mark that future census shareholders will view as the starting point. The success of Census 2000, the first census of the next millennium, should assist the planning for future censuses. We hope that each census in the future is more accurate and that the differential undercount will be completely eliminated.

Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to serve as members of the Census Monitoring Board.

Respectfully submitted,



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Chairperson, Congressional Members



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