COMMISSION ON REVIEW OF OVERSEAS MILITARY FACILITY STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

HEARING

THURSDAY,
SEPTEMBER 2, 2004

The hearing convened in Room 138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., at 9:30 a.m., Al Cornella, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT:

AL CORNELLA Chairman
LEWIS CURTIS, Maj Gen U.S. Air Force (Retired) Vice Chairman
KEITH MARTIN, BG, PA ARNG (Retired) Commissioner
PETE TAYLOR, LTG U.S. Army (Retired) Commissioner

WITNESSES:

GEORGE HARMEYER, MG U.S. Army (Retired)
MARY M. KELLER, Military Child Education Coalition
THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE KORB, Center for American Progress
MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, Brookings Institute
DONALD PILLING, ADM U.S. Navy (Retired)
JOYCE WESSEL RAEZER, The National Military Family Association
JACK SPENCER, Heritage Foundation
MIKE WILLIAMS, Gen U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
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COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This hearing constitutes the second public meeting of the Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, more commonly known, thankfully, as the Overseas Basing Commission, or OSBC.

My name is Al Cornella, and I'm serving as the Commission's Chairman. Other Commissioners present today are the Vice Chairman, Lewis Curtis, Major General U.S. Air Force (Retired); Pete Taylor, Lieutenant General, United States Army (Retired); and Keith Martin, Brigadier General, Pennsylvania Army National Guard (Retired).

Commissioner James Thomson is currently traveling overseas.

By way of introduction, let me explain the Commission. The Overseas Basing Commission was established by public law in FY2004. The Commission's task is to independently assess whether the current overseas basing structure is adequate to execute current missions and to assess the feasibility of closures, realignments, or establishment of new installations overseas to meet emerging defense
The Commission's work is not intended to preclude the Department of Defense's efforts towards developing an integrated global presence and basing strategy. Rather, the Commission report will serve as another data point to assist Congressional committees in performing their oversight responsibilities for DoD's basing strategy, military construction appropriations, and, in 2005, Base Realignment and Closure Commission determinations.

This Commission has been active since May 2004. In addition to standing up the Commission, Commissioners have engaged in briefings from the Department of Defense, the Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, and other entities. The Commissioners have just returned from our first trip abroad where we met with Commanders and received extensive briefings on the transformation plan for the European Command.

We visited military installations in several countries, meeting with U.S. forces, Embassy representatives, foreign military officers, and local officials. We ended our trip by meeting with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the European Combatant Commander, General James Jones.
Additional trips are planned this fall to three other regions of the world. The composition of the Commission staff has been established. We have hired lead research analysts, administrative staff, and received two analysts detailed from the Department of Defense with six more applied to -- or planned to arrive within the next month.

Additionally, the Commission is in the process of acquiring several additional professional analysts and plans on being fully staffed by mid-September.

At this point, I would like to describe the procedure for today's hearing. We have three panels, and we will introduce each panel as they appear. Each panelist will receive up to 10 minutes for an opening statement, if they so desire. At the conclusion of all opening statements, each Commissioner will have up to 10 minutes to ask questions.

We will use lights only as a courtesy reminder. When the yellow lights appear, you have two minutes remaining. When the red appears, time has expired. But I would ask all panelists to please take the time necessary to complete your comments.

It is my privilege to introduce our first
panel. Joining us today are three distinguished military experts whose combined military expertise spans over 100 years of distinguished service. Admiral Donald Pilling, U.S. Navy (Retired), is the former Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Pilling also served as Commander of the 6th Fleet and Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe.

    General Michael Williams, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), is a former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Williams was also the Commanding Officer of Marine Air Group 26, Commanding General of 2nd Force Service Support Group, and Commander, Joint Task Force 160.

    And Major General George Harmeyer, U.S. Army (Retired), served as Commander, Operations Group, of the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Kentucky. General Harmeyer also commanded the 7th Army Training Command in Grafenwoehr, Germany.

    Gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for appearing before us today. And a special note of thanks to General Harmeyer for appearing on such short notice after we learned that General Saint had a death in the family and could not appear today as planned.
We hope to hear from General Saint at a later date, and we certainly extend condolences to him and his family.

The Commission understands that General Harmeyer has a previous commitment and will need to leave a bit early. Therefore, I ask for the other panelists' understanding, and we would like to begin with your statement. Do you have a statement at this time, General Harmeyer?

GENERAL HARMEYER: Yes, sir. First of all, Mr. Commissioner, I am certainly honored to be here today, and I am flattered to have been asked to come replace one of my long-time mentors, General Saint. Our condolences to General Saint also.

A couple of items in my career that may be appropriate for -- hopefully will be appropriate for the panel. I have deployed a number of times with units into the European Theater and Southwest Asia. I'm familiar with the deployment process from that aspect, and also the family support issues that go along with that.

Having deployed for Desert Storm/Desert Shield, we really spawned the issues of family support in the military from that exercise. So that's significant, and now I believe the Army has a
tremendous family support system to take care of deploying organizations and taking care of their families.

Since my retirement five years ago, I've maintained currency with the Army working with future combat systems training, Army training, to include distance learning, courseware development. I have also been involved with training the Stryker brigades. We established the Mission Support Training Facility at Fort Lewis and are still operating that facility today.

So we've been involved in that network-centric battle command training for them, plus their deployment, and we track how they are doing in Iraq today.

So Army transformation -- I have also participated in a couple of the Chief of Staff's panel's task force modularity and some of the reorganization of the forces that will be in the future deploying over to Europe. I understand the basic premise of General Bell's plan for the reorganization of United States Army Europe.

My concerns initially were maintaining a presence in Europe, but his reorganization of the headquarters seems to satisfy that. And the
deployment for training exercises into the East European countries, when the situation will allow that with the global war on terror, will also provide appropriate presence in the Theater.

So I look forward to your questions and discussion. Appreciate your asking me on short notice to come join you.

Thank you, sir.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, General.

Admiral Pilling?

ADMIRAL PILLING: Good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your Commission. I believe that you have many difficult problems to address with conflicting perspectives on the various options that should be considered.

Although I retired from the U.S. Navy as a Vice Chief of Naval Operations four years ago, I have tried to remain current with DoD thinking through my membership in the Defense Science Board and the national security work that my firm is involved in.

I believe it makes sense to restructure our permanently deployed forces to reflect the dissolution of the Soviet Union and our increasing involvement in troubled areas worldwide. However, the
devil is in the details. There are numerous issues that need to be addressed, such as the conventional forces in Europe, limits on equipment in Eastern European countries, the upcoming BRAC, and our relationships with our long-term allies.

The return of 70,000 members of our armed forces currently stationed overseas to the United States, along with what could be a temporary increase in Army end strength of 30,000 people, argues that we should factor this growth into the objectives of the fiscal year '05 BRAC.

We should also consider the restructuring impact on our allies. This is much more than an economic issue. Some of our allies have provided extraordinary support for our forces over the last several decades. This is especially true in countries like Italy, which made its facilities available to us in the 1960s when France withdrew militarily from NATO.

The final point I would like to emphasize is that the restructuring of our forward deployed forces argues even more strongly for the advantages sea-basing offers. This concept of sea-basing is primarily a Navy and Marine Corps initiative at present, and we must ensure that it gets developed in
a way so that it will support joint forces, not just
the Navy and the Marine Corps, in the future.

I'm happy to answer any of your questions.

Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.

General Williams?

GENERAL WILLIAMS: Good morning. I'd like
to read a similarly short statement for the record.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear.

This Commission is addressing a very
complicated subject at a very difficult time. The
confluence of the President's basing initiative, the
upcoming BRAC, and the projected increase in the size
of the Army combine to make your task especially
difficult.

The Marine Corps' role in overseas basing
is limited but important. Over 20,000 Marines and
their families are deployed in Japan, most of them on
the island of Okinawa. The 3rd Marine Expeditionary
Force, headquartered in Okinawa, provides a strategic
strike force for the Regional Combat Commander in the
Pacific and the Commander of U.S. forces in Korea.

The relationship between the Marines on
Okinawa and the Japanese government is a cordial one.

But Marine presence on the island periodically causes
political and social problems for the residents. The Marine Corps is committed to reducing its footprint on the island by 10 percent in the coming year by rotating Okinawa-based forces to forward training locations.

The Marine presence in Japan is part of the delicate balance of power in the Pacific, and its diplomatic, economic, and military consequences would have to be carefully weighed before any substantial change is made. The current Navy/Marine Corps sea-basing initiative offers some long-term opportunity to achieve desired forward presence without the burden of overseas basing.

I'm happy to answer your questions.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.

Today we would appreciate your frank and professional views on the suggested focus for the Commission to investigate in its review of overseas basing, potential unintended consequences, returning large numbers of troops stationed overseas to the U.S., your thoughts on the issues surrounding DoD's integrated global presence and basing strategy, and other alternatives that the Commission should consider. And I think that you'll find that our questions will be directed at those subjects.
And I'm going to open the questioning with -- just direct it to the panel, and you can decide who might want to lead off. But how would you envision the global posture review changes increasing our ability to carry out our defense commitments more effectively?

ADMIRAL PILLING: I'll just take the first shot at this. It just strikes me that the critical dimension in all of these discussions about our ability to project power in the future is a question of time.

So as you bring forces back to the United States, how do you offset this loss of time that you have to deploy these forces? Which is why I think ideas like sea-basing, which gives you the capability to combine the logistics and operations required for power projection overseas as a viable alternative in the future to having more of our forces resident in the United States.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Any other comments?

GENERAL HARMeyer: Yes, sir. I think we've developed several concepts to reduce the amount of time for deploying organizations. I think part of the rebasing strategy is to have the reorganized units
of action in the Army actually deployed almost on a
continuous basis into Eastern European countries for
training exercises, but be in a posture so that they
can move from there rapidly to points needed.

We still, I think, will entertain
prepositioned equipment stocks and even prepositioned
float stocks to be close to flash points or points
that we'd need to get to more rapidly. I still think
that the joint force must concentrate on strategic
lift. Even the Stryker brigade requires significant
strategic lift to meet its deployment timeframe. So
fast sealift and significant airlift is critical.

Thank you.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: And I would just add
that the focus of this is mostly in Europe. If you
look at the Pacific Theater, you have enormous
distance problems, which exacerbates any strategic
lift shortage. And, therefore, large-scale
redeployments out of the Pacific become even more
difficult, notwithstanding any problems you would have
back in the States for the redeployed Marines and
their families. Sort of the tyranny of distance that
you face in the Pacific really does add a dimension to
this problem.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
I think General Williams just addressed the Pacific issue on my next question. But one thing that we always hear asked is: with such advantages as long-range strike and strategic lift, other technologies, why not just bring all of our troops back to the United States?

ADMIRAL PILLING: Well, there is some virtue in maintaining established relationships with our allies overseas. I can tell you that when I was stationed overseas in Italy I had the opportunity to establish personal relationships with the leadership of the Italian Armed Forces. We exercised with them all the time. We understood each other. So there is that virtue, which you don't get on a six-month deployment if you're on a ship that's based in CONUS.

So there is an argument to be made. There is value of being able to routinely exercise and work with our allies overseas.

GENERAL HARMEYER: If I could follow on, also I feel that we certainly need to maintain presence on the senior staffs of our alliances, particularly NATO. And the reorganization there in Europe provides for having permanently stationed joint task force capable headquarters, one large and two small, and that will maintain the presence with our
allies and be continuously planning for contingency operations as well as the training operations that are foreseen throughout the EUCOM AOR.

So I think we still must maintain a presence for, you know, political as well as operational strategic issues.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Do any of you have any concern about the number of troops being left overseas or permanently assigned would diminish those capabilities in regard to the alliances?

ADIMIRAL PILLING: Sorry to go first on all of these. But, I mean, I think if we can have the senior commanders permanently stationed overseas, and then the rotational forces can be CONUS-based, it's the personal relationships that if you can call your counterparts in other countries among our allies, I would argue we shouldn't bring everybody back, keep staffs and senior commanders deployed overseas.

GENERAL HARMEYER: If I could follow on, also with rotational troops going into areas on a temporary basis for training, that provides the linkage with the allied forces, if you will, and one of the objectives of those training exercises is to raise the level of training and expertise of the newly -- new NATO members. And also, it provides the
impetus to improve facilities and technology for training support.

So I think the periodic or the -- well, it's supposed to be continuous deployment for training of these units is critical. But I agree with Admiral Pilling that with the senior staffs there you have the presence that can be felt by political and governmental people in our allied countries.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: In the Pacific, the Marine Corps has been a rotational force for quite a few years. And the model we've used is to try to stabilize the leadership -- the senior leadership and the support personnel -- with three-year tours with their families, and rotate the units on six-month -- the infantry battalions and the aircraft squadrons and logistics units -- on six-month rotational tours through Okinawa.

And we've found, in agreement with my colleagues here, that having the commanders and senior staff there to deal with the host governments, and also the other governments in which we train, the theaters in which we train -- a little bit in the Philippines, a lot in Korea, some in Australia, some in Guam. It's helpful to have the continuity and not have everybody churning every six months, because you
really lose a lot when you do that.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: During our recent trip -- and I'd say almost to a country -- it seemed that every nation was reducing their military, their defense spending. Do you think that our changes are what will promote changes in their thinking in regard to their own national defense? I mean, do you have any feel for how that will all play out?

GENERAL WILLIAMS: I'll go first on this one. I think that having United States forces deployed in Japan reduces a lot of tensions that would otherwise result if there were no U.S. forces deployed over there. The guarantees we made for Japanese security and their constitution, the way that China and Taiwan look at one another across the strait, the relationships between China and Japan, would change in ways that I don't completely understand if the American military presence was removed.

And I think that may well be one of the toughest parts of your assignment here is to try to make an educated guess as to what those diplomatic moves might be. If this presence that has endured there for almost 60 years was plucked out, what would happen to the vacuum?

ADMIRAL PILLING: I lived in Europe for
six years while I was in uniform, and, with the exception of Great Britain, I don't think what we do really would make that much difference on the Parliaments in our allies -- in the allies' countries.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

GENERAL HARMEYER: One of the concerns I have is the impact on the newer countries that we would be taking our troops into. As we all know, any concentration of U.S. forces or American citizens in this day and age is a potential target of terrorists.

So the security impact on the new host nations is an issue I think that must be examined. I'm sure it has been or is being examined. But that's a thought that has come across my mind -- the force protection that the host nation will have to take on in conjunction with forward deployed troops.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.

Thank all of you.

And I will turn to General Taylor.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'll add my thanks to the Chairman for you being here today and providing us insights into what is a difficult and short time fuse requirement that we have. We deeply appreciate that.

And I believe, General Harmeyer, that you
have to depart early. So if you don't mind, I'll start my questions with you. A lot of your background is associated with training in various places all over the world, but largely in Germany.

We just came back from, as the Chairman has indicated, from a visit over there. And one of the questions I would ask your opinion on is the capability of the training areas and ranges in the European Theater to accommodate the forces that are remaining there and rotational forces that might come back there.

GENERAL HARMeyer: Yes, sir. As you know, Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels are quite well developed, even though they are relatively small training areas.

And the advances in constructive simulation training are increasing on a daily basis.

Now, when we went into Bosnia, I was tasked to build a sustainment training base in Hungary. And we found an old Soviet base that the Hungarians were still training on, and in 1996 we basically had to start from scratch and rebuild everything. Their concept of range fans just didn't exist. They shot right up to the boundary of the training area, and, you know, stuff landed in the village next door, didn't matter to them. And the
facilities themselves had to be rebuilt.

We have the capability in the United States military to build and construct superb modernized training ranges. I'm sure in the last six or eight years, since I left Europe, that there is -- a lot has been done. One of the criteria for being accepted into NATO was to have their military meet certain standards, NATO standards, and that involved a lot of training.

So I would venture to say that many of the training areas in the former Eastern European countries have been upgraded. They do have large training areas that can be utilized, and I know we've been training in a huge training area in Poland for a number of years now. USEUR does a huge joint combined arms tactical exercise over there every year. So I would say the land is, in fact, there.

Modernization has been taking place in the Eastern European militaries. And having U.S. forces planning to be stationed in those areas for training purposes would be an impetus to modernize, and, of course, we would assist in that modernization. I think it would be very welcomed by those countries.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: There is a new exportable training system that they told us about
when we were in Europe called the DYE system. It can be used to export on an expeditionary basis fairly cheaply and fairly easy on resources, and to other countries or other areas in order to set up instrument and training. Are you familiar with that? And would you like to comment on your views of that being used as a part of our engagement strategy with Eastern European countries?

GENERAL HARMeyer: Yes, sir. That is an instrumentation system, portable instrumentation system, that has been worked for some time. I think it is a very good system. It is the 80 percent solution that is much less expensive and quicker to establish than other folks who want to have a 100 percent solution.

Also, distributed constructive training, simulation training, is increasing. I have worked with several countries over there -- Uzbekistan, for instance. We are installing a simulation training system, establishing a simulation center, and training their folks on how to use the more modern systems like JANUS to do command and control training down to the company team level. So they are making improvements and great strides in their training capabilities in the East.
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Then, do I understand from your statement that you feel that the option is there for establishing temporary training areas and facilities and without a huge investment of resources in some of the Eastern European countries?

GENERAL HARMeyer: Yes, sir, I do.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Okay. To change the focus just a little bit, you mentioned -- the Chairman mentioned the importance of maintaining presence overseas in terms of our relationship with NATO and other allies.

I guess the question I would have: what is the break point? How much of a relationship, how much of a presence do you have to have, in your opinion, in order to sustain the capability, to feel the key positions in the staff, like SACEUR and others? And maybe that's not important, but I would be interested in your opinions on that. Any of you?

ADMIRAL PILLING: I would support what General Williams said about the model that the Marine Corps follows in Japan as sort of being a model we should think in terms of -- with rotational forces, but the senior staff and the support personnel being forward deployed permanently.

I think that model has worked well for the
Marine Corps. The Navy follows a similar model in the Mediterranean, where they have very few ships homeported there, but the senior staffs are in Europe, and establish those relationships.

So if you're looking for at least data points on what's a reasonable size to maintain this, I think the Marines in Japan and the Navy in Europe are good models.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Any other comments?

GENERAL HARMEYER: Sir, I really think it's critical that we maintain our headquarters, of course EUCOM, and our presence on the NATO staff. A large amount of the resources committed to NATO are U.S. resources, joint. So we -- it is my opinion that we should maintain significant parts of the command and control and planning process within NATO.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Yes, sir. I'm sorry.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: I was just going to comment that we -- in fairness, we need to talk to the Regional Combatant Commanders as well, because at least in the Pacific Theater the mission of the force obviously is going to have some impact on how big it is and how quickly the Regional Combatant Commander expects it to show up.
In the case of U.S. Forces Korea, you know, he wants a military viable strike force that he can reach out and touch pretty quickly. It may not be that way in Europe, but that would certainly impact on the numbers and the question of how much is enough.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Yes, sir. And in the case of Europe, we have -- we will again, and we will be doing that with the commanders in the Pacific as well.

Could one of you address -- we talked about strategic lift and our -- obviously, with the rotational concept, you have to have a robust strategic lift. Would one or any of you comment on our current capability as you see it to execute a plan of only having principally higher level staffs forward deployed and rotating all of the other forces?

ADMIRAL PILLING: I think if you look at the numbers we can lift with strategic sealift, what's necessary, the problem is the time. And so that argues that you either have to go to fast sealift or more prepositioned equipment afloat overseas in order to reduce the timelines. I think that equation has been that way for years. It just takes a long time with standard sealift to move forces forward from the United States.
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Okay. Other comments?

GENERAL WILLIAMS: And as far as moving by air, I mean, no commander in history has ever had enough strategic airlift. We don't have enough now, and we'll never have enough. And we've mitigated that by -- at least in my service by forward deployments and also forward deployments with the Navy. So we have amphibious forces forward.

Fast sealift is certainly good, but then you have to look at where we're going. In the case of our most recent conflict, the number of airheads that we had was limited, the number of ports we had was limited. So even if we had had more sealift, there's some question of what the throughput would have been.

We can move pretty quickly, and if we pull our forces back to the extent that we move people in Europe by train to ports and embark them to bring them into the theater, we'd have to think through, how would we get them there? And that -- the delta between what we moved in Europe and what we would have to move from the States, those will be the resources that we're going to have to invest either in strategic air or strategic sealift to make up the difference.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I believe my time is
up, Mr. Chairman.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Commissioner Curtis?

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: All of the services over the past 10 years have developed significant new capabilities, and all of the services have new capabilities on the horizon. Clearly, the threat in the evolving world situation is one of the factors that influences overseas basing. Would you comment on, in your respective services, the implications of new capabilities, new technologies, on overseas basing, both those that allow redeployment and maybe those that would argue against some of the things that are being proposed?

GENERAL WILLIAMS: For the sea services -- and I won't speak for the Navy, but we're in this together, the Navy and the Marine Corps -- I think the biggest, most exciting technology on the horizon are those set of technologies that would allow us to sea base. In other words, keep -- be able to receive forces onto a sea base, process them, and then push them forward from a sea base and have them return to the sea base.

If you think of our amphibious forces today, we have a very limited sea-basing capability.
We can sustain forces from the sea for a period of time, but always in the commander's plan we're going to offload the ships and push everything ashore.

What we would like to do, and with the help of the Navy, is to reduce the size of that mountain ashore and be able to sustain forces from offshore. To the extent we can do that, we reduce some reliance on overseas bases, we reduce reliance on prepositioned stocks ashore, and those things are all good for the thought that we can have more of our armed forces in the rear.

We can't do that yet, and it's going to require substantial investments, new classes of ships. The redesign of much of our materiel, command and control systems, are going to have to be thought through. It's a very complex subject, but both of our services are embarked on it now. And probably the first manifestation that we'll see will be the next class of maritime prepositioned ships, whose design is being argued and tugged about right now. And when that emerges, it will be I think the first solid move toward a sea-based force.

ADMIRAL PILLING: I would only add that the Defense Science Board has conducted a study on sea-basing to identify the strategic needs and the
technological needs to make this happen. And it may be worth your while to take that brief.

General Williams and I were on that study, so if you would want at some future hearing to have us actually talk about sea-basing we'd be happy to do that.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you.

GENERAL HARMEYER: Sir, I think the most promising technology that I see is the tremendous capability in communications and digital networking of the force. Your force can be connected and in communication en route to a crisis. They can plan en route, rehearse en route, train to do what they need to do when they hit the ground, and be in constant communication in a distributed manner back to their home base, so that they can receive logistics and intelligence and simulation for rehearsal generated right from their home base in CONUS.

I think we saw General Franks use a great deal of that capability from his headquarters in Tampa as they fought the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Of course, he moved closer to the battlefield when his presence on the battlefield was required, but that shows you the capability of taking off in CONUS and being in continuous communication, constantly updated.
intelligence-wise, plan and rehearse and hit the
ground ready to fight rather than have to spend days
and weeks getting yourself organized when you get
there. So that's I think the most promising
technology that we're working.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thanks.

You have given us your opinion on
strategic lift, clearly a key element, and sea-basing.
And I appreciate that; that's clearly something that
we need to look into in more detail. But beyond those
two elements of the logistics implications of this,
would you comment on what you see in a general way for
prepositioning or readiness reserves and the potential
for additional investments in those areas? Driven not
only by the return to the CONUS of some units but also
the shift in emphasis -- for example, the move south
and east in Europe, and equivalent moves forward in
the Pacific.

ADMIRAL PILLING: Although the company
that I run has the title "logistics" in its name, the
advantage of sea-basing is it combines operations and
logistics, and that's the virtue. And until we
eliminate this boundary between war fighting and
logistics, and view it as a whole entity unto itself,
we're going to have problems, and we'll keep going
back to this question of: how do we get the tanks there?

How do we get -- sea-basing offers an opportunity to have all of that predeployed, and so at that point all you're talking about transporting are the troops, to marry up with their equipment at sea and to operate from the sea base.

And I know that the four service chiefs have conducted war games among themselves and with joint chiefs of staff to understand the advantages that offers. And it really looks like it's a very appealing concept, and you -- it does eliminate this distinction between the logisticians and the war fighters.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: At the present time, both the Army and the Marine Corps have prepositioned stocks. The Marine Corps' prepositioned equipment is afloat, and we have three squadrons of ships -- one in Diego Garcia, one in Guam, and the third one in the Mediterranean somewhere. And each of them has equipment and sustainment for a brigade, a Marine brigade, which is a fairly robust 12- to 13,000-person outfit.

The disadvantage of that prepositioned
equipment is it can only be used in a benign environment. We can't -- we have to have somebody allow us to come ashore with it. But it is in excellent shape. It's offloaded every three years and completely rebuilt. We are using it in Iraq. We used it in the last Iraq war. So that's sort of the state of the art of the technology of sea-basing.

Our problem is now we can take the equipment ashore, but we can't throughput the troops. The troops have to marry up with the equipment in a benign environment somewhere, and so with sea-basing what we're hoping to do is take the next step where we can deploy the troops to the sea base.

GENERAL HARMeyer: The problem I see with land-based prepositioned equipment is: how close to the crisis area is it going to be prepositioned? You're still going to have to have strategic lift in most cases to go from the POMPKA site to the crisis. Now that would be closer most of the time than coming from the CONUS, but you still have to get the strategic lift to the site, get it loaded, and move it to the crisis area.

So there are advantages of prepositioned equipment. It certainly lets us put equipment in places where we're going to train often. That cuts
down expense, but being close to the crisis area, of course, that's an intelligence process.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Clearly, implementation of the recommendations involve a number of challenges. I'd be very interested in knowing what each of you views as the most significant challenge from your perspective in moving to the new global posture.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: Speaking for a service that's in that posture, if we bring troops home we're going to see impact on all of the families, the children, the schools, the infrastructure back here, to support those additional 70,000 families. That's going to mean impact aid to schools. I mean, there's a long -- obviously, a very long laundry list.

And there's also -- there's likely to be a problem with -- and I'll let the General address this. The Marine Corps sort of gets away with being a rotational force, because we're the youngest force. At any given minute, two-thirds of the Marine Corps is in their first enlistment. And that's purpose -- that's on purpose. We are a very young organization.

So I don't -- I think there would be a different set of impacts, is what I'm trying to say, on a force that's older, that chances to have probably
more family members, aging parents, all of the issues
that grow as the professional force grows older.

And we haven't seen that in the Marine
Corps, because of the fact that we're such a young
force. But I think it could be a large issue for the
Army.

ADMIRAL PILLING: If I can just give a
Navy perspective, and this strictly is a Navy
perspective. Things like strategic lift and the
platforms for sea-basing are Navy bills. So I think
this boils down to, if you really want to do what we
have in mind, it's going to cost a lot more money for
lift and platforms than we presently have in our
program.

GENERAL HARMEYER: As I have thought about
this issue of families, my concern is, you know, we
have a superb military at this point. The Army, the
soldiers, from day one when they join the Army, are
educated on the warrior ethos and the soldiers creed,
and they have no problem deploying for the mission,
the combat mission. Go to Iraq for a year, morale is
high, they're working 24/7, no problem.

My concern is when we go to the peacetime
situation, and we're going to send an organization to
Eastern Europe for a year on a training peacetime
deployment for a year without dependents, I do not believe the troops will be exercised 24/7 like they are in a combat zone.

How will we control families from flying to Romania to be with their troops on the weekend? And what will the troops do, you know, being lonely away from their family for a year in a peacetime situation? That is a concern I think we really need to work our way through.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Martin?

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think we've opened a very interesting line here that I'd like to explore just a little bit farther if I might.

General Williams, your comment about the youngest force and the unique demands, challenges, and strengths of that as a member -- long-time member of the oldest force, which is the RC side of things, Reserve and National Guard, now very heavily deployed, deployed, and heavily depended upon.

I'm interested in your opinions if you would see all having experience with RC to a certain extent, if you see the other side of that coin being
detrimental to the long-term repositioning plan, especially on the rotational basis that General Harmeyer was just talking about.

General Williams, your thoughts?

GENERAL WILLIAMS: If I understand you correctly, you're talking about the reserve component.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Yes, sir.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: My experience in deploying with reserves -- half of my air group in the first Gulf War were reservists called to active duty to deploy for the conflict. The good news is they were superb, young and eager, everybody did what they were supposed to do. The bad news was many of them had never prepared their families for this.

They didn't have ID cards. They didn't understand commissary and PX privileges. They didn't understand health care privileges. And so we had a tremendous education problem in sorting through all of the issues associated with that deployment.

I think we're better today. We learned a very painful lesson in that deployment, and so when this came around it was better. But we generally -- we, the Marine Corps, do not generally rotationally deploy reserve component. They come on active duty for training. Occasionally, a unit will come on
active duty for an extended period for a humanitarian crisis and that sort of thing.

But they are normally not part of our rotational base, and so I think under extraordinary circumstances when they become part of the rotational base, as they are today, there is a set of unique issues associated with the reserve component. And God bless them, they do a great job. But there is always going to be more friction there than there is with the active component who are used to it.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Admiral?

ADmiral Pilling: The Navy is very much like the Marine Corps. We don't rotationally deploy our reserve component forces. But on the active side, the General talked about peacetime deployment of a year. The Navy and the Marine Corps have been routinely having six-month deployments overseas for about the last 50 years.

And we make sure that the young people that come into the force know up front that when they're on sea duty they're going to be gone six months to 12 months in every 30-month period. And we still make our retention and reenlistment goals, because they know and expect that. Now, a year in peacetime to some Far Eastern country, that might be
tough for a trooper.

General Harmeyer, I am particularly interested in your comment on this, on the basis it's been built.

GENERAL HARMEYER: Well, you know, that -- you know, I think that is the issue. A six-month deployment is half as long as a one-year deployment. One year gets very long when it's in a peacetime situation and you're not working 24/7.

Now, you know, we have improved the family support business. I know we had a disaster deploying from Fort Hood, Texas, for Desert Shield. You know, when I told my soldiers and their families that we would probably be gone for a year, you could hear a pin drop in the stadium with 3,000 people sitting there. You know, it was a shock.

We've gotten over a lot of that, because family support is worked on day in and day out. The Guard that I'm familiar with had significant problems when they started long-term deployments. When the 49th Division went from Texas to Bosnia for a year, they only took several hundred troops, but they had a significant family support structure to create and it cost a lot of money.

Now all of that is in place, and I would
hope that before we start these one-year peacetime training deployments that a lot of the issues will be discussed and talked about and thought through, and we have good, solid plans to take care of our families.

I am encouraged by the Chief of Staff of the Army's plan to have folks stabilized in their first five to seven years at a base with rotational deployments for training and for operations. I think that will give families a tremendous advantage that we haven't had in the past.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: I think one of the challenges that we would have is trying to have -- get the best of the best news without having the worst news. The best news is a great plan for forward deployment changing our posture but having no force left to deploy, because the rules, the regulations, the procedures, the protocols, and the support package in terms of families, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, leaves no one left to deploy. So that's one of the things that I think we as a group have to sort out.

The training issue, General Harmeyer, that you raised about having use of other facilities in other countries, and the other point that was made about developing relationships with new countries and
how much you can count on them, over what period of
time and during crunch time, how important is it to
have live fire, real maneuver ground training from
your perspective as an armor commander as we go
forward in looking where we're going to put our bases
and what we're going to do?

GENERAL HARMeyer: Well, I think live
training is absolutely essential. We can do a lot of
training prior to live training, and, in particular,
live fire training that raises the expertise of the
force to the point where we don't have to do
repetitive live training and live fire training, you
know, on a continuous basis.

So there is a balance to be created there,
and a simulation becomes more realistic, and we can
have the joint force participating in simulated
training. Then, the need for live fire and live
maneuver diminishes somewhat, but it's still -- you
have to get out in the mud and the dirt and do it for
real, because you just don't get those stresses
anywhere in a benign setting in a simulation.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Admiral, let me cast
the question to you this way. The value of exercises
with partners and using ground forces in theater level
or at least area level exercises. Do you see any
impact on what has been proposed at this point and the value of continuing those exercises? Do we need to do that and build that in?

ADMIRAL PILLING: I certainly believe we need to continue those exercises, because you are going to fight like you've trained. So, I mean, I don't think there's any argument about that. The question is: do you need all those forces there all the time, or can they just be rotational forces?

There are certain things in the European Theater that you can't do, that you can only do in the United States, such as low levels. I mean, we even have the German Air Force doing low levels in our country, because they can't do it over Germany, and live bombing ranges.

So it becomes, instead of a land force issue, it becomes an aviation issue in Europe. And so we have to think through how we're going to do all of that, and those sort of training exercises for our air forces, both Navy and Marine Corps and the Air Force.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: General Williams?

GENERAL WILLIAMS: On Okinawa, training, especially live fire training, is a very, very sensitive subject. And over the years, we have watched live fire training on Okinawa erode to the
point that there essentially isn't any live fire training.

Fortunately, there are places we can go in Korea, on the mainland Japan, on a small scale in the Philippines, to Australia, to Guam, and Marines routinely deploy from Okinawa to all of those places.

In fact, one of the things that we shouldn't forget when we talk about rotational forces is youngsters join -- the Marine Corps at least -- to go exciting places, not necessarily to sit in Fort Polk for five years.

So there is some good to be gained here by having Marines go to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Romania. I mean, these are exciting things, as long as there are useful things for them to do there.

For the Marines, what we struggle is with the worst possible scenario for deploying commanders six months on Okinawa. I mean, he wants to get his youngsters off, get them on a ship, get them to the Philippines, take them somewhere where they can shoot, move, and communicate, especially with the Japanese or Koreans or whoever we might be training with. So it is a very, very big deal in lots of ways.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: I guess my final question is a little bit rhetorical, Mr. Chairman, and
that has to do -- if we asked soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines the question of how would they want to be used, when we get back to our era of the unaccompanied short tour being defined as the 12 months in South Vietnam and Cambodia or Korea, would we get a mix of answers? Would there be a consensus among soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines? Given this is what the nation needs, how do you think you want to be used? Or would we come to some fractionalization there?

I just don't have a clear sense of that, and I guess are we left -- I guess my question is: are we left, in a sense, having to tell them, as we always have, what we need and how we need them to support that mission?

Admiral, that's kind of a 500-pound question, but I wonder what your thoughts are.

ADMIRAL PILLING: Well, my experience with young sailors in the Navy is they look forward to rotational forward deployments, because, just as General Williams said, they can be fun. You get port visits. If this is peacetime, you get port visits, you see a different part of the world, and these make great stories for the year that you -- when you come back after you've been forward deployed for six
months.

    I think if you ask the typical sailor, they would relish the opportunity to deploy. Now, I can't speak for the land forces, so that's strictly a Navy answer.

    COMMISSIONER MARTIN: General Williams?

    GENERAL WILLIAMS: Typically, the highest reenlistment rates in Marine units are deployed units, which I think answers the question of how the youngsters feel about it. The two important things are, first of all, that you need to deal honestly, so that the expectation that a young man or woman has -- is what happens to them. I mean, this is what we're going to do, this is why we're going to do it, this is why it's important to your country.

    And if we're honest and up front, I think that they are very, very accepting, and, in fact, eager to deploy. And so I think you will get a consensus that, yes, as along as we're going to do something useful, we want to do it.

    COMMISSIONER MARTIN: General Harmeyer, with the force mix that the Army faces constantly and regularly now asking -- reaching into the Reserve and the National Guard, what -- is your answer a little bit different for the land base?
GENERAL HARMeyer: Not really. I agree with General Williams; our highest enlistment rates are in the combat units that are deployed. Now, not necessarily in the combat service support units, but I have also experienced, you know, the National Guard troops coming back. You know, the news media says, well, they're all going to get out of the force. Not so. Not so.

I was with the TAG (The Adjutant General) of Kentucky a couple of weeks ago, and they've got the highest enlistment and reenlistment in the State of Kentucky they have ever had. And they've had guys deployed all over the world for the last couple of years like everybody has.

So the troops are more well informed, they understand the needs of the nation, they are absolutely dedicated to accomplishing the mission with their buddies, and I don't think you'll have an argument from the troops about deploying, as long as they know about it and they've planned on it, and they -- they see what they're doing is productive and necessary for the country.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
Gentlemen, if you would not mind, we'd like to take another five-minute round with each Commissioner and ask questions. We're way ahead of time in regard -- I think due to the brevity of opening statements and some other issues. So what I'd like to do, again, is start out with the questioning.

I think everyone understands the importance of Ramstein, and I think the troops have been deployed out of Germany under both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. So my question would be: has the Cold War infrastructure served us poorly?

ADMIRAL PILLING: That is really a 500-pound question. We won, so it did serve us well while we had a Cold War. The issue for us now is we're not in that environment anymore, and so your Commission is challenged with, how do you restructure that makes sense.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I guess my question is in regard to OIF and OEF, did the Cold War infrastructure serve us well or not? I mean, the fact of where we had folks based.

ADMIRAL PILLING: I think that's a land forces question, and I'll just let it pass.

GENERAL HARMEYER: Well, sir, I think we
did very well. We deployed forces through Ramstein. You know, Ramstein is a huge base. It's well located next to the Landstuhl Hospital. We've been able to save many troops' lives and limbs by being able to get them to that major hospital relatively quickly from the theaters that we've been fighting in -- Afghanistan and Iraq.

You know, Aviano Air Base, near the 173rd Airborne, functioned to get them deployed into Mosul very rapidly. And we moved a heavy task force by C-17 into Mosul shortly after the airborne guys went in and secured the area -- secured the air strip. So I -- you know, those major facilities that we're still operating out of have served us well, and I think will serve us well into the future.

You know, deploying into Bosnia, I was heavily involved in that. And, you know, equipments flew from the United States into Ramstein, were taken off the C-5s and the C-17s, put onto C-130s and flown into Bosnia without skipping a beat, into the smaller airfields. So they are fairly well positioned for what we're doing today.

Now, establishing a base closer to Afghanistan has been extremely critical. Uzbekistan has been very critical to that piece.
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: It has been said that to achieve any savings out of the transformation that some soldiers would have to be released, that the size of the force would have to be reduced, rather than just repositioning forces to the United States. Do you have a feel for what is required for the size of the force that -- will transformation result in a reduction of military forces, or is it just strictly repositioning?

GENERAL WILLIAMS: I'll take a shot at that. I think the -- you know, the original goal of transformation was to turn the Armed Forces into a capabilities-based force rather than a threat-based force. And to the extent that you can achieve capabilities with technology, you might be able to reduce force structure. And so there were -- and it is reasonable to assume that in some cases you can actually do that.

With 63 percent of the DoD budget spent on manpower, it's going to be pretty difficult to save money unless you do reduce people. And there are some promising technologies that may allow us to do that, but I don't think we went into transformation necessarily to save money.

And it certainly isn't clear that bringing
troops home rather than leaving them overseas, with
the attendant infrastructure issues that we'll have
back here in the States and the expectations of the
families that housing and schools and those kinds of
things will be made available, is going to result in
any savings of money. Certainly, I wouldn't -- I
would be very uncomfortable making a projection like
that.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Any other
comments?

GENERAL HARMER: Well, certainly, as far
as the Army goes, there is tremendous debate right now
what the size of the force should be. With our
significant use of the reserve components -- National
Guard and Reserves -- and all of the commitments that
the Army is involved in at this point in time, I
believe temporarily we've added some 40,000 troops to
the end strength of the active force.

And that is necessary as we do the
reorganization into these units of action from the old
brigade and division structure, so I don't think we
can answer that question in the near term. I believe
it's going to take several years to determine what the
size of the force needs to be to have the effective
fighting force that the nation requires.
Effectiveness is what we have to have in a military sense, not necessarily efficiency. There must be some redundancy, because you never know -- you know, the enemy always has a vote. You never know what's going to happen. And if you do not have redundancy, and you have single points of failure, failure is not an option.

So I think it's going to take a couple more years, several years, to sort out what the real size of the force has to be, because this global war on terrorism is going to continue for several more years.

Now, as we work on transformation in the future combat systems that the military are focusing on, technology may, in fact, produce something that will allow us to reduce the size of organizations and still be as combat effective. There are some really superb technologies being worked on, but, again, they are several years over the horizon yet. So that question is going to take a while to answer, sir.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Commissioner Taylor?

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: General Williams, I was struck by your comments about capability-based force versus threat-based force. And I know that the
"T word" is not in vogue at the moment. But I would assume that as we position our forces, reposition them around the world, that that's not going to be a short-term thing. It'll be -- it'll last a while.

That there's some considerations about the threat, so I'd be interested in your comments, and any of the panel's comments about where these capabilities should be positioned and why. Have we got what we hear now, what we've read in the paper, and what we know about the plan -- are we positioning them in the right place for the next 20 years?

GENERAL WILLIAMS: This is a question I find it difficult to answer, because I haven't seen anything that speaks to repositioning of Marine forces in the Pacific. And I think if you ask -- if you were to ask the Regional Combat Commander in the Pacific or the Commander, U.S. Forces in Korea, he would say that Okinawa is a pretty good place, because it's close to a lot of places that there's a reasonable chance of forces being used.

So strictly from the parochial point of view of a Marine looking at the Pacific Theater, I think we're in pretty good shape where we are. And it's pretty -- it would be pretty difficult to guess a better place to put people that would give us a better
standing than we have currently.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I know you've looked at the world in a broader view, though. Any comments about the remainder of the potential places where our forces could be used?

GENERAL WILLIAMS: Well, I know that the Combatant Commander in Europe, of course, is focused on Eastern Europe, on the emerging nations in Eastern Europe. Clearly, the last several years tell us that the nations of Northern Africa and through the areas of the Islamic nations of the world are where the unrest is.

And so, consequently, moving people into Eastern Europe seems like a reasonable -- a reasonable counter to that. I suspect in the long run that we would like to have some way to put at least rotational forces in some of the friendly nations of Africa. The Marine Corps routinely goes to Kenya for training. Whether or not that might lead someday to a more robust presence down there I don't know enough about to answer. But I suspect that's another area where we're looking to get a little closer.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Comments from others?

ADMIRAL PILLING: As you know, the Navy is
not going to do very much change in its forward
deployed structure, though I think they're talking
about putting a carrier in Hawaii, and that's about
the biggest move the Navy will make. So I think this
is really a question on land forces, and I'd defer to
my --

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: But, sir, I'd be
interested in your comments about any of the forces.

ADMIRAL PILLING: We do have some legacies
from the Cold War that I think have to be included in
the calculations. And by that I mean the CFE limits,
the conventional forces in Europe limits, on equipment
in Eastern Europe is still there. And we're going to
have to figure out if you're going to station U.S.
forces in some of the Eastern Europe countries, how we
work around those limits that are already imposed,
because it was imposed 10 years ago.

That may be we'll end up being mal-
deployed because we have those limits, and I just
don't know whether you're going to address CFE in your
review.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: General Harmeyer?

GENERAL HARMEYER: Sir, I really do not
know what General LaPorte's plans are for Korea. I
understand the U.S. forces are being repositioned, and
some forces are going to be moved out of Korea. But I do not know enough about that area to give an intelligent comment.

I think in the European Theater moving into the southeastern portion of Eastern Europe certainly goes to what General Williams just said, getting closer to the areas of unrest in the world. I would assume that strategic lift from in and out of those areas to move our forces to critical positions will be there before we make a commitment to position forces in those countries.

And as far as, you know, the Stryker brigade, they can move relatively long distances rapidly self-deployed. You know, they did that from Kuwait all the way to Mosul in a very short period of time and fought on their way up there and were in combat immediately upon arrival.

So that's a capability that is new, and a lot of folks still don't understand what they can do. But I think they're doing quite well.

So I think repositioning the forces from Central Europe into Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe, is a good thing.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Curtis?
COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Following on Commissioner Taylor's comment, the global posture brings a military focus to some areas where we've had very limited involvement in the past. Africa is one, Central Asia is another.

From the top level, I'd be interested in your views, the pros and the cons, the challenges of our increased military involvement in these non-traditional areas for us.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: Well, there is just a long host of problems associated with starting military-to-military contacts in places where we've had very limited access. There are always going to be political ramifications, because many governments don't have the civil rights or human rights records that we would want them to have.

The argument is: should we hold those governments at arms-length, or does our involvement there actually lead to a better human rights posture in that government? That's a political argument, but it ends up in the Combatant Commander's lap often.

Infrastructure, of course, the interaction of the youngsters with the local population in areas where you have -- where the AIDS pandemic is rampant. I mean, there are just -- you can almost make a list...
country by country of all of the challenges. But it's fair to say that -- I think that having interaction between the peoples of the world and the youngsters who constitute our armed forces generally reflects well on the United States.

And in areas where I've seen that happen, the net result is a good result. And so whenever we weigh all of those factors, I think where the United States can influence, where we can send our young men and women, and help countries either to build democratic institutions, to have more professional armed forces, NCO corps, understand how to build a professional military, I think there are very, very positive things that can come from that.

ADMIRAL PILLING: I would only echo what General Williams says on the maritime side. Being able to operate with the Navy's and the Coast Guard organizations of these new countries to us is very, very worthwhile, if we have to go and project power, because you'll have the relationships and the understanding of each other's capabilities. So I think it's very, very meaningful that we do things like that.

GENERAL HARMEYER: I would have to agree.

As we look at the successes of the Partnership for
Peace exercises that were started shortly after the wall came down, you know, the impact that has had on peoples of Eastern Europe and their militaries has been significant. And I think stationing our troops, as good as they are, in problem areas and put pressure on these folks that would be terrorists is a good thing. Initially, it may cause some security difficulties, but eventually they will stabilize the area.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Martin?

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Mr. Chairman, just one area that I think that I want to pin down a little more specifically in the expert opinions of our panel today. If we follow through on the global repositioning of forces, does our existing log base -- you referred to Ramstein, Landstuhl, the K Town complex, and some of the others around the world.

Are they able to support what you know of global repositioning, or do we need to reposition and rebuild the log base as well? And this is a hugely financially significant question when you talk about.

Or are the facilities that you are aware of, given what you know of the repositioning, adequate to the
task, able to support our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in future conflict?

GENERAL WILLIAMS: Starting in the Pacific, the network of bases starting in Hawaii and reaching out to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam, Kadena in Okinawa, Yokota in Japan, is a pretty robust string of pearls there across the Pacific.

And if we make the assumption that although we might rotate some forces, we wouldn't close or lose access to those bases, and we'd be able to keep that infrastructure warm. Then, I think we could be reasonably comfortable that we have what we need in that part of the world.

ADMIRAL PILLING: From a maritime perspective, the infrastructure that we have in Europe and in the Middle East I think is adequate for maritime forces in the future. The land forces issue is -- I'll defer to my --

GENERAL HARMeyer: Gee, thanks.

ADMIRAL PILLING: -- to General Harmeyer.

GENERAL HARMeyer: I'm starting to become a little bit familiar with the current BRAC process. And there is tremendous emphasis on analyzing the entire logistics infrastructure within the CONUS to determine the capabilities that exist at each
installation in the logistics arena, and to determine what functions can be realigned to make the logistics system more effective to support not only the United States Army but, as you well know, the Army is responsible for an awful lot of joint logistics.

So I know the BRAC process is focusing on that issue, and I believe the answers that come out of BRAC this time will make the logistics system much more effective. As far as logistics, things in Europe, as our units depart there, I'm sure the realignment and movement of logistics facilities is going to have to take place.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Let me just try to bring this to a joint level here, and you have all served in various joint capacities or are familiar with all aspects of the joint arena today. What about when we get into the joint service operations?

CINCs in my era, now Combatant Commanders, what is the impact at that level of thinking beyond the individual service component?

General Harmeyer, if you would care to start with that one. I'm a good guy. I really am, General.

GENERAL HARMEYER: Well, being a tanker, you know, the logisticians have always been in my
gunsight, so I -- no, the responsibilities of joint logistics weigh heavily on the Army. There is a tremendous effort to improve the joint logistics system, and I think you'll see, as we analyze what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan logistics-wise, we've made tremendous strides in joint logistics vice 10 years ago when we did this in Southwest Asia before.

So I'm not a logistics expert, and basically I -- that's about as far as I can go with anything worthwhile.

Thank you, sir.

ADIMRAL PILLING: I agree with the General that we are getting better at joint logistics, and it is mostly an Army function. But I think we don't want to lose sight of in the Pentagon it's a Title X responsibility for the service chiefs to equip his forces. So you do have -- we were talking about Cold War legacies.

We have these problems that from 1947 on -- that's a service prerogative, and so there are some natural rivalries that just have to be overcome.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: The Regional Combatant Commander in every case has component commanders from each service who are responsible to provide organized training and equip forces to him to meet any of his
contingency responsibilities.

If I were a Regional Combatant Commander, my biggest concern would be if -- the longer it takes me to reach out and touch those forces committed to me for a particular contingency, the more friction in the system to get them to where I need them to be. And the longer the logistic pipeline, the more I'll worry.

I think that's a fact of life. And if we withdraw forces that the Regional Combatant Commander thinks he might need forward, it's going to bother him. And, yes, we are getting better at logistics, and we're getting better operationally at working with one another, too. And both of those things are good, but they're not going to overcome the fact that if you're not there you're not there.

And when the Regional Combatant Commander wants something quickly, having a forward deploy is a certain comfort from his point of view. And so not having it there, you're forcing him to accept a little more risk than he probably would like.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: So longer supply lines with more nodes for interdiction become an issue for all services, then, in the joint environment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I believe we have
one final question from Commissioner Taylor.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Our Commission is certainly not charged to look at BRAC, and, in fact, we are expressly prohibited from getting involved in that. But one of the things we do have to be concerned about, as if we bring back 70,000 military and the accompanying dependents and family members from overseas, do we have adequate places to bed them down here in the CONUS, without an inordinate expense, additional expense? Would anyone like to make a comment about that? Just in the generic sense, not necessarily specifics.

GENERAL HARMEYER: Well, sir, as you well know, you know, the force is a heck of a lot smaller than it was 10, 12 years ago, and we had lots of place for them there. I'm sure the folks at Fort Hood would absorb a few more troops. I think Fort Riley, Fort Carson, are basically underutilized. Fort Lewis could handle some more troops.

So I think the facilities that we have in existence, they may need some modernization and some facilities for the -- to take care of the troops a little bit better, new construction. But I think the bases that we have currently are going to be adequate.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: At this point at least,
based on what I know, this is not a Marine issue. But if it were, military construction would be needed, and as well we would have to offset the fact that the Japanese government pays a fairly substantial part of the costs of maintaining Marine forces in Japan, as I'm sure host governments do all over the world.

And those offsets are going to have to be replaced, because the -- you know, the cost of buildings and grounds maintenance, just the cost of keeping people on a base, is extremely expensive. If you add 15- or 20,000 people to a base, there is some expectation that family housing will grow commensurately, that schools will open commensurately, impact aid will go up. Just the general costs of doing business if any city were to grow by 20,000, you'd have the same kind of an impact here, with the additional fact that you wouldn't have a partner helping to offset those costs, which we certainly do now.

ADMIRAL PILLING: From a maritime perspective, again, there are not many big moves envisioned for the Navy. If the Navy were to bring back all of its permanently deployed forward forces, probably the biggest impact would be the carrier in Japan, because that introduces a population of about
5,000 people into some area of the United States.

And, again, like General Williams says, we'd have to do some pier construction and some other things. But if you leave them in Japan, I don't see much of a maritime impact, just restructuring.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: What I think I'm hearing from all of you, that you do want us to understand there will be a substantial cost to this. Okay.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.

GENERAL HARMEYER: But I think that cost, like the Admiral just said, if we -- or General Williams said, if we close facilities overseas and turn back facilities to the host nations, there should be an offset there to help new construction or refurbishment construction here in the United States. We do own some property and own buildings and things that --

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Has that been the experience we've had, though, in getting an offset from them when we turn the property back to them?

GENERAL HARMEYER: Yes, sir. As I closed Erlangen and Nuremberg and Amburg, we had significant monies back from the host nation to refurbish troop billets and build family housing and do all kinds of
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Okay. Thank you.
That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Gentlemen, I'd ask each of you if you have any final thoughts you'd like to share with the Commission.

ADMIRAL PILLING: Nothing from me, sir.
Thank you.

GENERAL WILLIAMS: No, sir.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Well, I'd like to thank you for taking time away from your busy schedules to join us. Your insight will be invaluable to this Commission as we move forward, and my fellow Commissioners and I thank you for your military service and the sacrifices you and your families have made to this nation, as well as you continue to make.

Thank you very much.

We're going to take a short break and -- well, maybe a little more than a short break. I think our next panel is scheduled for 11:30, or are we going to -- okay. Well, we'll take at least a 15-minute break.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, the proceedings in the foregoing matter went off the record at
10:58 a.m. and went back on the record at 11:37 a.m.)

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Well, we'd like to continue. We're waiting on one panelist, and when he comes in we'll introduce him.

I'd like to describe the procedure for today's hearing. Each panelist will receive up to 10 minutes for an opening statement. At the conclusion of all opening statements, each Commissioner will have up to 10 minutes to ask a question. If we have a lot of extra time, we may go an additional five minutes.

But we will use lights only as a courtesy reminder. When the yellow light appears, you have two minutes remaining. When the red light appears, time has expired. I'd ask all panelists to please take the time necessary to complete your responses.

On our second panel we will hear from members of three leading authors of some of Washington's most respected think-tanks. From the Center for American Progress, The Honorable Lawrence Korb, Senior Fellow and Senior Advisor to the Center for Defense Information, as well as the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Logistics. And from the Heritage Foundation, Jack Spencer, who is a Senior

Mr. Korb, would you like to proceed with an opening statement?

DR. KORB: Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to be here. Let me -- as I pointed out in my statement, I'm coming at this from two perspectives. One is having had to deal with a lot of the issues that you're coping with when I was privileged to work for President Reagan, and the other is that I got involved quite a bit in the whole base closure process.

I don't know if many of you know how that came to be, but in the late '70s Congress had passed a law that said you couldn't close any base in the United States unless you gave Congress a year's notice and you did all of these impact statements, which basically meant we couldn't close any bases.

And when the late Senator Goldwater took over Chairman of Armed Services Committee, he came to me and said, "Why aren't you closing any bases?" I said, "Well, we can't." So we sent up a list of bases we would close if we could close, and I've got to tell you that was one of the most interesting hearings I was ever at.

And then, as a result of that -- and
people like Dick Armey picked it up -- we do have this process, and I think that that's terrific. And the other is that when -- my last year on active duty with the Navy, I was home ported in Okinawa, so I saw what it was like to be stationed abroad permanently.

As I pointed out in my statement, as you make your decisions, I'd just ask you to consider a few things. First of all, whatever you recommend, it should be part of an overall security strategy and force structure review. It should not be taken apart from it. You know the next Quadrennial Defense Review comes in September -- in 2005, and, of course, I would also urge you, as I pointed out, that we need a new national security strategy, or at least the President to say if the same one exists.

Interestingly enough, under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, we're supposed to get one every year and we haven't. And I think that that makes it difficult to make both the resource and base closure decisions.

Secondly, obviously, to the extent that we can, we ought to keep it out of politics. Politics come and go. Officials come and go. But, you know, our national security interest should remain constant.

Third, I know a lot of people think, well, if you people do your job, we won't have to close any
bases at home. I don't think that's true. Even if you get rid of them all overseas, we're still going to have to confront that. And I think it is unfortunate that we did not have any rounds almost for a decade. The last one was in '95.

Fourth -- and I used to confront this during the Cold War -- our troops around the globe are not there as a favor to these host countries. They're there to protect our national interest. And they're not there to prop up their -- the economies of these countries, though it does have an economic effect, nor to have them to spend less on defense.

And, in fact, as you know -- as you already know, and I'm sure you'll find out, a lot of our forces are in countries where the populous are not very happy about it.

Fifth, when you take a look at cost, remember that if the host nation building the facilities, offsetting the cost, it may cost more money to actually have the troops in the United States.

And the only way that you can ever specifically save money is you could bring the troops home and demobilize them. And, obviously, that's not going to occur, given how busy men and women in the
armed forces are today.

Seventh, the idea that somehow being stationed abroad is a hardship -- you know, as I point out, you know, men and women like myself, we did join the Navy to see the world. And so this is not something that is a hardship, particularly if you can bring your family with you, as they do in Europe and in Japan, and we have proposals -- and I know we worked on them when I was in government, and I'm sure they're even better now -- to help the spouses find employment. And you've got a terrific school system around the world. I was also privileged to have the DoDDS (Department of Defense Dependents Schools) system report to me.

Eighth, remember that these men and women stationed around the world are one of our best ambassadors for the values we're trying to promote. And, obviously, in this war as people define it, the global war against terrorism, it is, among many things, a war of ideas.

And, finally, whatever you do, or whatever you recommend, or whatever the government does, it needs to be done in concert with our allies and host nations. The worst thing we can do is send the wrong signal to our friends and foes.
Thank you very much for having me. I appreciate it, and I look forward to your questions.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Mr. Spencer?

MR. SPENCER: Thank you very much for having me today. I really appreciate the opportunity to speak with you all.

Let me first apologize for my voice. I lost my voice yesterday. It's coming back a little bit, so I might get a little raspy here as we move forward.

Let me say, first, that I agree with most of what Dr. Korb just said. I thought he made some great points, and they're all very important. To me there are a few issues facing the long-term health of America's national security apparatus that are of greater import than our international basing infrastructure.

The fact is that the world is changing, technology is changing, our national security interests are changing, and our base infrastructure needs to change to reflect that.

A few points that I'd like to point out, and these are all in my statement that I handed in to you.
The current base structure was developed to defend against a largely static and predictable enemy -- the Soviet Union, which no longer exists. It's true that we have these bases in Germany that are great for families, that are high tech, are very conducive to the military, but the fact is it still is a reflection of the Cold War.

It still very much is indicative of an adversary that we need to fight in Europe, and that adversary just isn't there anymore. So I think that changing your base infrastructure is part of that overall transformation that we're undergoing right now.

Secondly, today's threats, in stark contrast to those during the Cold War, are dynamic and unpredictable and demand flexibility that is currently lacking. It's true that we can respond and react to whatever we need. We've shown that with Afghanistan where, after September 11th, we fought in a country that was landlocked, that was surrounded by countries that were former adversaries or current adversaries, and we made that work.

And maybe we were lucky that time. Maybe we were prepared. I don't know. But the fact is I think that one thing is true historically. It's very
difficult to predict where future threats are going to emerge, and recognizing that, having a basing -- a global basing infrastructure that is flexible, that we don't need to worry about whether or not we'd be able to respond, I think is very important.

A flexible basing structure will promote adaptability in a world of diverse political, strategic, and diplomatic interests. Again, this is the same sort of theme -- that the world is changing quickly. We didn't think a few years ago, even though there were people who were warning about it, that this emergence of Islamic fundamentalism was going to provide the sort of comprehensive threat that is -- that it is right now.

The same thing with things like weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile proliferation, all these sorts of things. Sure, there were warnings about it. There were warnings about mass terrorism, but no one really heeded them until September 11th.

This is all a function of the diversity that's in the world today. You don't have two blocs anymore. And a basing infrastructure that allows us to respond and react to crises as they emerge is incredibly important. And you add on to that the many things that our military is asked to do every day,
which I personally don't necessarily agree with, but
they are still a fact of life -- the peacekeeping, the
contraband interdiction, the anti-drug stuff, the drug
war stuff.

You know, there is any number of
operations other than warfare that our military is
asked to do. And if they're going to do it, we should
have a military that can do it efficiently, that can
do it the right way. Not that we can't do it now, but
it's all about efficiency and doing it in the best way
possible.

America's commitment to regional stability
can no longer be measured by manpower alone. This is
one of the things that as this debate has emerged over
the past few months that I think has been overlooked
politically, certainly internationally.

Just because the United States might be
changing around its -- where it puts troops in the
Pacific, for example, does not mean the United States
is no longer committed to the security of that country
or of a specific country or a specific region. The
same is true in Western Europe.

I would suggest that it is every bit as
important to the United States, every bit as vital to
the United States, that a dominant power not emerge in
Europe as it was 25 or 20 years ago. It just so happens that the security environment right now dictates that that's not a high priority or a high risk. Therefore, we don't need to have troops and infrastructure focused in on that potentiality.

A more efficient global basing infrastructure will free manpower resources and help alleviate personnel strains. Again, I think this is one of the most important aspects, both of domestic BRAC and global BRAC. If we create a defense -- a basing infrastructure that promotes the adaptability, the maneuverability, the flexibility of a lighter, more lethal force, then what that creates is the ability to put your resources, so they can respond to crises as they emerge, rather than building an infrastructure that's geared towards a specific threat.

Korea in the Pacific is a good example. Right now the idea is that we were preparing to dissuade and deter aggression on the Korean Peninsula. And, of course, we've been successful in doing that. But technology will allow the United States and its friends and allies to continue to deter and dissuade on the Korean Peninsula without necessarily having the same amount of manpower stationed there over the long
term.

The reason for -- and by pulling back a little bit you can -- by pulling back and maintaining a more Spartan sort of basing infrastructure, what we can then do is if a crisis were to emerge here you can surge resources to that area. By the same token, you can surge resources to another area in the Pacific, which I think underscores and promotes stability there and increases our commitment to the overall stability of that region, rather than focusing our scarce resources on one specific place.

Evolving military technology allows the United States to apply greater amounts of military force over greater distances in shorter periods of time. Now this is becoming more and more true every day. I don't think that it's as true today as what some would have us believe, because if you look at where our investments continue to go it's still largely -- our investments are still largely a function of a Cold War military.

We still are investing billions of dollars on tactical aircraft, platforms that are still heavy. We talk transformation, but we're not really acting transformation. But that's not to say that we're not evolving towards that transformational force over
And as we do that, we're going to be able to not just out of -- not just will we be able to project that force over greater distances, it will become imperative that we're able to, especially whenever you look at places like the Pacific where you have these huge sloughs of water, you have potential adversaries that are technologically just a step behind us, you have potential adversaries who have had all the time in the world to focus their resources on those capabilities that are directed specifically at the United States. So if we can -- we will have to be able to reach from far way.

And then, finally, diversifying basing infrastructure throughout vital regions will allow the United States surge capability to crisis areas. And this is -- I guess I had gone over that quickly before.

I'd like to just follow up with a few principles that I think are important as we move forward with this important global base realignment and closure process. And I think, as Dr. Korb pointed out, this cannot be looked at in a vacuum. This has to be looked at comprehensively.

Domestic BRAC and global BRAC are one in
the same process. I understand that's not the focus of your Commission necessarily, but as we move forward that has to be taken into consideration. You can't just take away a base abroad and put one at home or vice versa. It has to be part of the same overall -- the same overall process.

Strategically, a base must advance America's overall objectives. Obviously, that would seem to be the case, but there are a lot of political considerations and other considerations that come into the process. Operationally, a base must improve America's ability to respond to current threats as well as facilitate and enhance America's ongoing military operation.

I went into some detail about that earlier, but I think that's important to take into account when you're talking about having to go over long distances. We can't become too dependent, I don't think, on bases that are geographically -- in close geographic proximity.

Politically, the decision to maintain an existing base or open a new one must not be driven by political differences, yet it must take into consideration evolving political realities for the 21st century. We know all the stories about Turkey
not letting us use their country as a basing point
during the Iraq War.

We all know about the problems with
Germany that we had. There was -- everything worked
out with Germany, thankfully, but there was a movement
within the German government to not allow the United
States and the Coalition to have flyover rights.

So that's not to say that we should punish
any country, but we need to take into consideration
their realities.

And finally, economically, base structure
decisions must not be driven by cost concerns but
should embrace economic prudence. The driving overall
concern has to be military value. We should not do
this -- not do this because of economic reasons.

Thank you very much. I look forward to
your questions.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I'd like to
welcome and introduce our third panelist -- from the
Brookings Institute, Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow,
Foreign Policy Studies. Welcome.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, sir, and I'm
sorry I couldn't be here earlier. It's an honor to
appear today and be on this distinguished panel. I
very much admire the testimonies that were just given.
I may have a little more voice than Jack, because I probably spent less time whooping and hollering during the Senator Miller and Vice President Cheney speeches last night --

(Laughter.)

-- than he may have --

MR. SPENCER: He's right. That's what it's all about.

(Laughter.)

MR. O'HANLON: But I also know you are pressed for time, so I won't abuse what's left of my voice and take a lot of your time.

Let me just say, in terms of the Germany and Korea issues, I generally support what President Bush outlined a couple of weeks ago. I'm happy to explain more in our discussion period about why, but I generally support that.

So let me make four quick points about four other issues that were not at the centerpiece of Mr. Bush's remarks, but I think very much are on your agenda still, and then I'll be done. Because my colleagues have done such a great job of framing the broader issue, I don't need to go over that material again.

One, in terms of these new bases that are
proposed for Eastern Europe, the so-called lily pads as General Jones has often described them, the temporary bases, the smaller bases, good ideas in principle, dangerous ideas for the U.S. Army right now, because as you know as well as anybody our Army is so badly overdeployed the last thing we need right now is more temporary deployments away from home base.

Larry mentioned, I think very eloquently and correctly, that Germany is not a hardship post in that sense, but a new temporary deployment in Romania or Hungary would be. Nothing against those new members. I'm sure if we built up our infrastructure there we could probably have our troops very happy in those places, but what's being proposed is temporary, unescorted deployments. We don't need more of those now. That should be handled over time. Any new deployments should be very minimal I think in scope and scale in the near future.

The Army doesn't need more missions; it needs less and/or more people to share in the burden. And, therefore, that part of the plan, as I can understand it, worries me a little bit. That's my only critique, really, of what's being done in regard to the German and Korea basing arrangements we have today.
Second point. Okinawa, Japan -- that Larry mentioned where he had been several decades ago.

Hard to believe, he's such a young man still today, that he could have been there when it -- when we still had a Navy aircraft carrier or a number of ships home ported there. But in any event -- of course, as you know today, the primary capabilities in Okinawa are about 20,000 Marines and about 7,000 Air Force that use the Kadena Air Force Base.

My own view on Okinawa -- and I've done some work on this topic with a Japanese security expert named Mike Mojazuki, George Washington University. It's a deployment that I think we should reconsider, especially the Marine Corps fraction of that deployment. The Kadena Air Base is critical. It's a critical hub to our Pacific operations.

We have to protect that against the fact that the Okinawan population is concerned about what it sees as too many Americans on a fairly small island that has become more and more densely populated over the years. Now, admittedly, the Okinawans are conflicted, because they don't have a very strong economy, and if we were to pull forces away they would suffer, at least in the short term, economically.

And some of their aspirations for what
could replace a large Marine Corps presence in my judgment are not realistic. I don't think Okinawa is going to become the kind of hub of commerce in the Pacific that, you know, Shanghai and Hong Kong and other places have become. And sometimes you get the flavor the Okinawans think they have easy ways to replace the bases.

So it's a complicated issue, and there would be an economic net detriment to the Okinawans from losing these facilities. On the other hand, they are fairly adamant that they want change. The airfield right now that's in Ginowan City that we cannot find a substitute for, and it's going very slowly, could be a major problem if there's an accident there.

I met with the Mayor of Ginowan City this year. I met with both recent Governors of Okinawa. They are very worried about this problem. And I think we have to think about not only the Okinawan politics but our own U.S. Marine Corps. I don't believe the Marine Corps benefits that much from being on Okinawa. Training space is not that extensive.

It's true, it's nice to have a hub of operations for the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit. I want to keep a hub of Marines there, and the ability
to reinforce in the event of a crisis. But I think you can do that with 5- to 7,000 Marines in normal conditions, as opposed to the nearly 20,000 we have today.

And if you made that change, I believe you could also then have more flexibility in what you do with Marine Corps deployments around the world. As you know, right now we take our Marines usually from California or North Carolina, and we send them to Okinawa on temporary deployment.

So they're essentially being deployed once just to get to Okinawa, which by itself is not a conflict zone, not a crisis zone. And then if they're deployed again, there is sort of a lost efficiency. And it's not the most efficient way, in my judgment, for the Marine Corps to deploy its forces.

So when we have crises in Afghanistan or Iraq, we cut down the number in Okinawa, because we realize we really don't need them there all the time in these numbers anyhow. And I think we should make that sort of a change permanent, or at least consider alternatives, maybe having more Marines based in Australia.

Right now, the Australians aren't crazy about the idea of permanent basing, but we could
probably do more training in Australia at a minimum. We may be able to bring some of these forces to other parts of the Asia-Pacific, if we are creative and flexible. And I think we could bring some of those home as well without any harm to our Asia-Pacific presence, as long as we compensate with more pre-deployed equipment, more ability to reinforce fast if we need to in the event of a crisis.

So I would propose, in summary, that the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa might want to be cut by more than half. Still keeping the key elements of the hub, the access to airfields, the access to ports, at least for crisis or emergency circumstances. The 31st MEU I think should still operate out of Okinawa, but the fact that we have almost 20,000 Marines there I think is an old idea that should be reconsidered.

And the Marines don't all have to stay in Japan. They can go to other parts of the region or even, in part, come home, and I think with no harm to our security position. I think Mr. Rumsfeld has been looking at this question from what I understand. They haven't managed to make much progress.

As you know, the President didn't talk much about this in his speech two weeks ago. I hope you can investigate this and look at some options,
because I think there really is an opportunity, as well as potential danger, to the U.S.-Japan alliance if we don't reconsider some of that.

A third point -- let me take my hat off to what the military has been doing on Guam, and I think this backs up a point that Jack made. This helps us compensate, to some extent, for some of the reductions in Korea. We are now showing we're adaptable. We can put more attack submarines on Guam and have fewer Army forces in Korea. On balance, I think that enhances our regional flexibility, and I think we can do more of that on Guam.

And I'm very curious to see what you can discover about the possibility of putting more attack submarines on Guam, possibly even considering putting an aircraft carrier -- an additional aircraft carrier in home port in the Asia-Pacific region. Whether it's Guam, Hawaii, or somewhere else, it's an idea already being considered. I think it makes good sense for a number of reasons.

So Guam is already providing us more and more in the way of assets and help, and I think we might be able to pursue that logic further.

Last point and I'll stop: the idea of sea swapping, as you know, is now an idea the Navy is
intrigued by. What it's trying to do is instead of sending a ship overseas for a few months and then bringing that ship home because the crew needs to go back to its home port, and we don't want to deploy our crews for more than six months at a time, now we're trying to keep the ships deployed overseas for a longer period of time and rotate the crews by airplane, so the crews can come home but the ship stays overseas.

That way you don't waste all the time in transit, but this requires a certain kind of facility overseas where you can fly people in, where you can do some exercises so the crews have a smooth handover. We need to consider facilities that will allow us to do more and more of this sort of thing in the future. It doesn't require a permanent home port for ships necessarily, but it does require some repair facilities, some barracks, a certain kind of working relationship with a number of countries.

I don't think we want to do all of that in one place. I think we want to do some in -- maybe some in Thailand, some in Singapore, some in the Philippines. It doesn't require the same level of close home porting relationship that we've had in the past, but it does require a certain degree of
flexibility and receptivity on the part of those countries. And I think we can look into that more.

For the Navy, I think it's a very promising idea for the future to do more and more of this sea swapping concept. It's a way to get maximum benefit for whatever size fleet we have. And if the defense budget stops growing at $20 billion a year the way it has been of late, and we start having some more pressure on the defense budget because of the federal deficit problem, which I think will happen sometime this decade, then we're going to have to figure out ways to make do -- do more with less.

And one of the ways is to do this crew swapping idea, which allows you to, again, get more forward presence out of a given size fleet. So we have to consider ways to maximize the use of facilities to help with that process.

Thank you very much for your time, and I look forward to the discussion.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

I know that some of the questions may address items that some of you have addressed in your statements as well, but I don't believe you're all on the same page, so we're going to ask a lot of those questions.
In what's proposed in regard to a lighter, more mobile force, do you feel it will be geared more to the global war on terrorism and brush fires, or will it also be able to deal with the major regional conflict?

Dr. Korb?

DR. KORB: Thank you for talking about the lighter -- yes, we're talking about the so-called transformation and making it lighter, more agile. I think one of the things that we discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan is you also still need boots on the ground. You need forces.

So I don't think you can get too carried away with just making everything lighter, more mobile, more flexible. We've seen that in Iraq. The Bradleys, which a lot of the transformationists wanted to do away with, have done a heck of a job. In fact, the Marines were asking for Bradleys and Abrams when they were going into Najaf.

So, yes, I think you want to keep making us lighter, more flexible. And as you know, the Army and -- I mean, the Navy and the Air Force are actually cutting people, whereas I do think you need more Army troops and Marine troops.

MR. SPENCER: Not if you don't want to
find yourself in a world of hurt at some future point, I would argue. We should not be transforming our military, in my estimation, to fight the war on terrorism. The war on terrorism is here today now.

Hopefully we will not be fighting the war on terrorism a decade from now, which is when you begin to achieve some of those transformational capabilities that people would like to see happen. When we talk about from a transformation perspective -- agility, maneuverability, flexibility -- those things are important, but so is capability.

It's not about building a lighter tank that operates like a lighter tank. It's about building a lighter platform that gives you the same capability, if not more, the same survivability, if not more, as a tank that we have today. So that's what transformation is about. Too often people confuse transformation with just normal military modernization.

MR. O'HANLON: Just to add a word, Mr. Chairman, about Korea. And one of the reasons I support the change here is, in my judgment, the forces we've had in Korea over the years have really been just for Korea. We haven't had much flexibility with them, and so I think we shouldn't see what capability
we had there as serving a larger regional purpose. It had to be evaluated in terms of its contribution in Korea.

With the South Koreans so much stronger than they used to be, I believe we can afford to downsize. And, in fact, in a book that I did last year on Korea, the last chapter was on future force planning for Korea beyond the North Korean crisis and conflict, if we ever get to that happy stage. And how would you want to reposition your forces?

And, frankly, it's in the general thrust of what Mr. Rumsfeld is now proposing. You want to have somewhat fewer forces, but you want to have more regional mobility, have the forces perhaps somewhat more southerly on the peninsula, so you're closer to regional hot spots.

A lot of what he's doing, it may be designed more for the here and now, but it also is consistent with what I think our long-term structure might want to be in Korea for the regional scenarios that you mention, whether they're small or big. And, therefore, that's one of the reasons why I think this Korea repositioning and redeployment is moving in the right direction and why I support it.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
How does -- and I think Mr. O'Hanlon touched on it, but how does Iraq affect the ability to implement the global plan as it's being considered?

MR. O'HANLON: I will just follow up and say, again, thank you for -- I agree that I did touch on it, because I said that we can't really afford more deployments in the short term in Eastern Europe. It's also one more reason why I support the Korea change. We need that second brigade or the 2nd Infantry Division to help out in Iraq.

We need a lot more help in Iraq, too, from allies, from the 40,000 more troops Mr. Kerry wants to add to the force structure, from the 6,000 individual ready reserve that Mr. Rumsfeld has called up. I think we need all of these things in Iraq. And if we can afford to make a reduction somewhere else, we should, because the Iraq mission I think is on the verge of breaking the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, and we'd better act before that happens, not afterwards.

DR. KORB: One of the considerations, if you're talking about going to Eastern Europe, that you should not overlook is the fact that you've got horrible environmental problems at those bases. And if we go in there, we're going to have to clean them up.
The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union didn't really have an EPA going around making sure that things were clean, and so we're going to have to do that. Those countries are not in a position to provide any of the support that a country like Germany or Italy or Japan has been able to do, so it will be more expensive.

You'll also have the problem that Mike talked about, and that is that if the troops are over there they're away from home. And then, if you have to send them someplace else, they're going to be away from home even longer. The brigade we're taking out of Korea, a lot of those people are being taken out of Korea, being sent to Iraq, a lot of those people have already been away from home close to a year, no dependents. Now they're getting another tour, and that causes you more problems.

And then, finally, if you deploy the troops to these so-called lily pads without their equipment, the question is: how do you get their equipment where it needs to go? In Western Europe, you have much better rail facilities to get it to the ports if, in fact, that's what you needed to do.

MR. SPENCER: I would suggest that Iraq demonstrates exactly why these things need to happen.
Right now we have about 2.3 million military personnel available for operations when you combine everything together. We have something under 200,000 of those personnel involved in some way, shape, or form, in Central Command in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Yet the Army is about to break, yet the Marine Corps is about to break. That should not be the case. And these are structural problems, I would argue. I think that we need to change the system comprehensively.

Yes, if you take today's system, the capabilities we have, the platforms we have, the force structure that we have, the basing infrastructure we have, and do the war on terrorism like we're doing, and then you add on top of that the lily pads -- I mean, add on top of that more rotational bases, yes, then you're going to have problems. You're going to create more tension. You're going to create more retention problems and make less -- fewer families happy.

But it's not about adding on top of it. It's about evolving into something else, having a basing infrastructure that can do the Iraq and have the flexibility in place, so that we can take full advantage of our -- all of our military resources.
And that's why you keep coming back to words like efficiency. Efficiency is what allows you to use your resources comprehensively, without breaking it.

And let's also not forget that we are involved in the global war on terrorism, and we haven't gotten rid of other commitments that we have, so you're going to have stress on the force. I would argue that we don't want a force so big that we can fight a global war on terrorism and not feel stress on it. And we need to have a force and a capability that you're able to surge to do that over some period of time, but, you know, there's going to be stress given what this country is being asked or being forced to do right now.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. If we have a little time later, I'll ask a follow-up question on that. But for right now I want to get one more question out. And that's in Europe, one of the concerns is that we have enough of a presence remaining there that we continue to have a seat at the table in regard to NATO, and with the emergence of the EU, and so I'd like the panel to address that concern.

Dr. Korb?

DR. KORB: Well, I think if you want to have the United States -- first of all, if you want to
keep NATO -- and I think you should -- you want to have an American commander, the so-called SACEUR, you're going to have to have a significant presence there. And you do want to have a seat at the table, because you want to ensure, as people say, that Europe stays whole and free.

The United States wants to have influence, and if you have influence in one sphere it carries over into other spheres. So I think you have to take a look at what that number is. Does it have to be 70,000? Could it be 35,000? And as I understand the President's plan, the only -- we are taking the two -- two heavy divisions out of Europe, the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions.

We're not clear on what we're going to -- you know, what we're going to -- going to leave there. But I think that is a terrific point, and that's why I said in my last point whatever you're going to do, you need to do it in concert with you allies. If the President was going to make the announcement that he did two weeks ago, I think it would have been much better if he had made it at Istanbul in concert with the rest of the NATO nations, so it would look like this is something the alliance had decided all together, and then it becomes a win-win proposition.
MR. O'HANLON: I'm glad you asked that question, because it does raise one of the concerns I have, and it's also something I had read as a concern of General Monty Meigs, who I know many of you are aware of and in contact with.

The question of how you maintain strong interoperability and joint exercises with the alliance. When you're taking all four heavy combat brigades out of Europe and replacing them with one single Stryker brigade, which as we all know is performing reasonably well in Iraq, and people that I've spoken with are fairly happy with it, but it is still a new, innovative sort of platform.

I think, from what I've discerned from General Meigs' comments, and others, there's an argument for keeping one of the heavy brigades at least in Germany, one of the four that we're planning to take home. And this is in the level of detail. I support the overall thrust of the President's plan, but I think we might want to ask if in addition to the Stryker brigade we plan to deploy we should perhaps keep one additional heavy brigade, because, of course, that is, as Jack and Larry have mentioned, it's still an important kind of combat capability in our military. It will be in the future. It's important
in our allies' militaries.

If we want to continue to do rigorous joint exercises and training with them, we may want to rethink that one before we fully commit to the entire drawdown of all four heavy brigades. So I think there's a case to keep one of them while we also bring the other three home, and then add the Stryker brigade to Germany.

And I'm not sure which option I would prefer between what the President has now proposed and this alternative still in the spirit of the President's plan, but that would keep one heavy brigade in Germany as well as the new Stryker brigade.

MR. SPENCER: I would just add that I think we are in no -- there is no threat of us losing our seat at the European table. As of right now, Europe spends very little on defense. They are very dependent on us, on defense. I hope that will change.

At some future point, if some chain of events were to lead to a fissure in U.S.-European relations, then maybe we lose our seat at the table. But I don't think that's a concern right now.

The second point is that we need to really concentrate I think on capabilities rather than numbers. You know, the President said 70,000 troops
is what -- who could be affected here. But we need to keep our eye on the capability that we're able to bring to bear in Europe. That capability might be housed in Kansas, but it can be brought to bear in Europe. So that's incredibly important in this overall process as it moves forward over the next 10 years.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, gentlemen.

Commissioner Curtis?

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to turn the question to strategic lift a little bit. During the Cold War, we constantly lived with war plans, and we had a hard time finding the strategic lift and support. In an error of increased deployment, strategic lift becomes a key factor. I'd like -- I appreciate you gentlemen's comments on strategic lift and particularly where you believe we should go on the entire issue of strategic lift.

MR. SPENCER: Well, strategic lift is always important. It's going to continue to be important. It's how you get things from point A to point B. But there is -- when you look into the
future, one of the things we need to keep our eye on is the vulnerability of moving our assets into place. That's one of the main driving forces behind the whole idea of transformation.

It's not about whether we can or can't change our basing infrastructure, our ability to fight from long distances. It's that we might find ourselves confronted with an adversary in 25 years who will not allow us to move things into theater without being blown up. So we have to increase our capability to fight from longer distances, which I guess is not the same sort of strategic lift you would normally associate with that, but it's how you get a bomb on a target.

But to answer your question more specifically more in the near term, again, that's part of the whole evolution we see happening right now. A lot of the problems with future combat system is with weight. A lot of the problems with -- one of the problems with Stryker is with weight.

The problems with these systems is that they are too heavy to move over long distances. The problem always is with our European allies. Yes, they have three million troops, only one percent of which can move outside of the European Theater. So they
need to invest in that.

The entire burden of strategic lift I don't think can continue to fall on our shoulders. That's one of the things that we need to impress upon our friends and allies that they need to make investments in. So it's a problem, it has been a problem, and it will be a problem. But it's one that we need to recognize, and that's why we need to be lighter. That's why we need to gain these efficiencies.

DR. KORB: Mike was kind enough to mention I've been doing this a long time, and I have never seen a time where we didn't say we were short of lift. That is -- it used to drive me up the wall when I was in the building and saying, "Okay. We're short. What are we going to do about it?" And so I think that all other things being equal, if you don't have as many bases around the globe, you're going to need more lift. I think it's -- you know, just as you're not -- I think Jack is right. We don't know where we're going to go.

But the fact of the matter is if you're more in the United States than you used to be, you're going to need more lift. And I think it's something that should be part of your analysis, and then
national strategy and the national military strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review to see how this all fits together, because if you can't get where you want to go, you're not going to be able to put the power that you need.

So I think that we should be doing more, and if we withdraw from overseas you're going to have to do even more in lift.

MR. O'HANLON: A couple of quick thoughts, sir. One is that I think we need to worry about replacing any Marine Corps capabilities on Okinawa with more prepositioned equipment. It's been a very good news story, as I'm sure you're aware.

The last 25 years, the American military doctrine, ever since the rapid deployment force was created in the late '70s/early '80s, we've really increased our lift a lot, including prepositioning, fast sealift and airlift. And so to take each of those three, I think that we need more prepositioning, especially if we're going to replace the Marines on Okinawa with a smaller number and a smaller footprint.

I think we need perhaps still more fast sealift, but what has concerned me looking at the issue is, as you know, our current fast sealift is the SL-7s and the LMSRs. These are huge ships. They may
find themselves unable to get into some of the ports. We may have to fight it in the future.

I know back in the Mogadishu experience, for example, in the early '90s, we could only fit one of those ships into the harbor at a time. Of course, we didn't need more than one at a time. But what if that harbor had somehow been bottled up by some kind of a ship sinking just before we needed to get there? I think we want more flexibility in our fast sealift to go with somewhat smaller roll-on/roll-off capable ships. That's my one observation on fast sealift.

And then, on airlift what I would simply say is that I think the general direction of adding more is the right way to go. Airlift is the part of the Air Force that is still working awfully hard from what I can tell.

I know there are other aspects to Air Force capabilities that are being stressed right now in general, but if you look at the Air Force and the Navy, the end of the Saddam Hussein threat has actually made their lives, to some extent, a little bit easier, while the Army and Marine Corps are working harder because of the occupation and then subsequent stabilization mission.

But the Air Force is still working very
hard, as I'm sure you're aware, on refueling and airlift into the Central Asian Theater. And we have to assume that kind of thing may continue. So I think more airlift capacity, especially with airplanes that are capable, as the C-17 is, of operating from austere runways, continues to be a priority. And I would put somewhat more resources into that part of the defense budget.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you. A related -- none of the panel mentioned sea-basing. Would you touch on sea-basing if you have thoughts on the subject?

MR. SPENCER: Tell me what sea-basing is. And that is the serious question, because a lot of people talk about sea-basing, and sea-basing could be any number of 100 different things. I was at a panel discussion the other day where this was the specific topic. And at the end of the day, the conclusion was, well, it seems like a good idea, but, really, what is it?

But let's just work from the concept of basing something from the sea. I think it's an important element, an important capability to pursue until we find that it doesn't work or that it's not really the way to go. Again, my fear is that today
fighting terrorists, fighting rogue leaders, yes, if you can come up with a means by which to project power from the sea, that might work, especially with an Afghanistan-type situation where you don't have any prepositioned friends and allies.

My fear is the future adversary that's throwing things other than old Soviet weapons and, you know, a more capable future adversary. And in that case, although when you hear Navy people and Army people speak of it, they are relatively sure that they can defend it adequately. My fear is that they can't. And when you hear people talk about whatever the platform is, they can always defend it adequately.

Again, my fear is that perhaps they can't, and that is why I think that sea-basing is a good idea. It can help perhaps, if it all works the way they think it will. I mean, it gives us more of that added flexibility. That's what it's all about. But the idea has not been examined enough, the technologies have not been developed enough to know whether or not this is something that can be pursued beyond the theoretical at this point.

DR. KORB: Well, I noticed on the panel we have Air Force and Army people, no Navy people, so I'm sure that they might have a different answer. And as
I say, I did spend some time in the Navy.

I think it's a good thing to the extent that you can defend it, because you can't always be sure that you're going to get the basis in the area. We were fortunate, at least eventually in Afghanistan, that we were able to get some of those -- the countries there to allow us to put forces in, and, in fact, we still have people there.

But you've got to remember that we've made a lot of what I would call compromises with unsavory governments to get that. So there is a loss for it. So I think if you can defend it, you really ought to emphasize it, because it gives you more flexibility and it keeps you from having to make sometimes these horrible compromises.

I cringe when I see leaders from our country going around in these countries, you know, standing next to some of these characters that are running some of these places, and, you know, the message that it's sending.

MR. O'HANLON: I think these two summed it up very well. I wouldn't mind the idea. I'm skeptical that we have the technology to do it very effectively, but there may be a case for a two-mile long runway that's survivable and we can use for...
airlift and refueling, and what have you, let's say, in the Arabian Sea.

    But I need to -- I'm skeptical because people tend to be so vague about what they are proposing that it makes you wonder if they are almost asking too much of a concept that really isn't as far along as I think it may be at this moment.

    COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you.

    I have one final question. Part of the global posture proposal increases our military engagement in areas that are non-traditional for our military -- Africa, Central Asia. We have had very limited military involvement there, and the movement south and east gives us -- out of Europe gives us a lot more engagement.

    I'd appreciate your comments on what you see are both the risks and the benefits of increased engagement in these areas.

    MR. O'HANLON: I'll start and go quickly.

    I think that, in summary, I'll go in broad brush. In Central Asia, we're not really looking to work with allies. As Larry points out, these are not countries that share our values. We don't really think of them as security partners. The bases are because we need places to put our stuff down and refuel and stage, not
for any other reason. And so they are very functional bases. They're not engagement-oriented bases, and we should be clear-eyed about that.

That's true in most of the Persian Gulf as well. There we're a little more optimistic about seeing some political progress in some countries like Kuwait in recent years, but for the most part we run into a lot of dangers with our troops being in that region, and I want to minimize our footprint. I'm delighted we managed to pull a lot of forces out of Saudi Arabia in recent times.

In Africa, I don't think we're likely to put a big military footprint ourselves, but this is actually a place where I think we need to help the Africans get a lot better themselves. And the training and equipping programs that we've been initiating in the last few years should be expanded quite a bit in my judgment, so they can handle more of the Darfur, Rwanda, Congo-style scenarios that keep coming up.

That doesn't require a big military footprint on our part, however, so I'm not sure it has to be a major concern of the Commission.

DR. KORB: I read an astounding figure recently. I'd like to get more details on it. It
said the Army is deployed to 130 countries. That's practically every country in the world. You'd like to know, what are they doing there, what are the facilities, what are the arrangements? And I think this is something we need to be, you know, very careful about. Do we really need to be there? Are we stretching the forces? What kind of deals have been made?

So I go back to the point I made before. I think to the extent that you can, you have to be careful because sending the American forces sends a lot of other signals and many times get you to do things that underline some of your other goals, like if you're trying to spread democracy in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East region, but then you are making deals someplace else. This is going to send mixed messages to the world.

MR. SPENCER: Let me start by saying that I think that I'm very skeptical of using military force for anything that's not a very important interest to this country. So I'm not for sending U.S. troops to Africa, for example, for humanitarian operations, things of that nature.

That said, when I look at Africa, I think this country is missing a very significant opportunity
to create a lot of friends and a lot of allies. You have a lot of countries in Africa that aren't anti-American. They very much look to the United States as a friend, as a potential friend. We have a lot of cultural and historical relations with the people of that continent, some not good, granted, but there is still those links there.

And there's a lot of problems in Africa that could very quickly become our problems. And while I don't support setting up bases in Africa in order to get rid of AIDS or to do anything like that, I think that it is important to increase our relations with those countries, primarily from a military perspective, to do what Mike was talking about, because these are problems that if they're not taken care of that they will flood beyond the borders of Africa and become our problems quickly.

So we need to help the Africans be able to help themselves, and I think that the Liberia model serves to show us what we can do by taking a leadership position. We didn't invest a lot of resources in doing that, and we helped the Africans come up with a solution to an African problem. And if we do that over time, I think we're going to find a lot of friends and a lot of allies in a resource-rich
continent. And if we don't, we're missing a great opportunity.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Commissioner Martin?

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I don't think there's anyone who would disagree there's a lot of shifting sand out there, and not all of it is in Afghanistan and Iraq, meaning the geopolitical situation at the present time.

My question to you all is: how do we strike the balance of building something that is definitive in terms of meeting our base structure needs to serve the interests of this nation, and yet be flexible enough that we don't paint ourselves into a corner fighting the last war again? Your thoughts?

MR. SPENCER: Well, I think that's why -- I think it's important to build a number of smaller, more spartan bases, that you're able to use as surge capacity, to surge capability into the region when needed. And that's why I think it also needs to be based on capability. You can have a small base that, if you can then surge, you can bring an immense amount of military power to bear, if need be, without having that investment of a large sprawling base that
includes families and everything else.

That's not to say that there's necessarily anything wrong with those large bases. But the fact of the matter remains that if you have the -- if you have that basing infrastructure, like what we have in Germany, it becomes very difficult to move beyond that basing infrastructure as the rest of the world changes.

And that's why we're here right now doing what we're doing. The rest of the world is changing, but we have these old bases. They're fine bases. It's not tough -- or, you know, I don't want to say it's not tough on the people to be there. They're good bases, they're technologically advanced bases, it's easy to get things in and out of there. That's all true.

But it's also true the rest of the world is changing, and that -- I think that we can demonstrate our commitment by having a small presence in these countries, by demonstrating -- by evolving our military capability in a way that allows us to bring large amounts of military force to bear on short order through these smaller bases that are set up around the world.

And they don't all need to be the same.
You know, that's one thing that I think that is a problem in this debate. People act like they all need to be the same kind of bases. I mean, there are a couple of good models. You have the Bosnia model that's out there right now where you have -- we're maintaining about 3,000 troops, and they rotate in and out every six months. Their equipment stays.

You have the South Korean model, where they come in and out on year rotations. Then you have the larger base model. And another quick point -- people say, "Well, the families -- it's tough on the families when they're rotating in and out for six months or for a year," and that kind of thing. Yes, it is tough on families. The same thing with Reserves and National Guard troops. It's tough whenever they're deployed all the time.

That's all true, but that's because the system was set up this way, and we're trying to use the system to do something it was never set up to do. If you change the system, and everyone knows that's what it is coming in, then you don't have those same detrimental effects ripple out as time goes forward.

DR. KORB: I think if we were starting with a blank slate, we might do things differently, but you never do. We are where we are, and I think we
ought to step back and talk about a lot of the changes that have been made.

You might get the impression from listening to the President or other people that we hadn't done a darn thing since the end of the Cold War, for example, in Europe. But the fact of the matter is when the Cold War ended, we had over 300,000 troops in Europe, and we're now down well below 100,000. We had a lot more troops in Asia. We've taken them home.

And if you were to take, for example, the situation in Germany with the two large divisions there, the fact of the matter is both of them have gone to Iraq and have done quite well. So you have adapted I think already -- the whole military idea is, you know, you hope for the best but you plan for the worst.

So I think when you talk about any of these things, I think it's -- or to make your decisions, it's important to keep in mind that you're not quite sure what things are going to be. Let's hedge your bets. And if you said to me, "You've got a terrific base in Germany," the burden of proof would be on you to tell me why you want to leave there and go someplace else, because having that there does give
you flexibility to do a lot of other things.

And that's why I think we need to -- the point I made in the beginning. We need to go back and say, "Well, what is the national security strategy?"

I mean, Jack is right, we don't know. But this is why we elect people to office, and they're supposed to tell us, they're supposed to make decisions, and then once you do that then, of course, a lot of these things will fall.

And then, finally, the idea -- you know, you also get the impression from listening to a lot of the debate that the U.S. military has been hide bound for a number of years, and you had a great group of people, the military transformation, the revolution of military affairs. The question has always not been: do you transform the military? The question is: at what pace? And I think that's really the issue.

MR. O'HANLON: Not a lot to add, sir, but a couple of points. Even though, again, I generally support where Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Bush want to go, I do think Larry's point is very valid -- that before you give up something, you've got to have a good reason to give it up, if it's a very effective functioning base.

And on balance, the facilities in Germany
are quite good. And for the most part, they're not a bad place to be. On the other hand, there are also places in the United States that aren't bad to be, and so I'm glad you're doing this in the context of getting ready for a BRAC and doing this all in one broader strategic review. In one period of time we're focused on both these questions.

But I think we should be reluctant to give up good infrastructure overseas unless we're really sure we have a better alternative and are prepared to pay for it. Another point is -- and, again, I agree with most of what Jack has been saying, but I think we can overestimate the value of spartan bases.

You know, they're good for joint exercises, they're good for a place to touch down your airplane if you need to refuel and you can have some fuel prestationed there, but if it's really spartan you're not going to have very much fuel there. And if it's really spartan, you're not going to have a lot of spare parts and a lot of repair technicians.

And you're not going to necessarily be able to build up quickly. And so it may serve some political benefit to have already done the consultation you need to then ramp up in wartime or in a major crisis. But while I do agree with Jack, these
things are more useful for smaller, quicker operations, and they shouldn't be viewed as anything close to the big major hubs that we've had.

So I really value facilities like the Kadena Airfield in Okinawa. These sorts of things are huge national assets, very important allied assets. And we've got to be very careful about protecting them as we rethink the overall force structure and base structure.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you.

My second question has -- strikes to the contract that we have with the men and women who serve, the contract of implication that we will support them through whatever it takes, with whatever they need to discharge their duty to the country, and, secondly, by implication to their families and loved ones.

Are we taking enough of a look at the questions of our families and dependents as we look at the broader -- if you include global posturing and BRAC at the same time? Should we be taking more of a look at it, or should we be taking less of a look at it as we do our due diligence here?

DR. KORB: The late General Maxwell Taylor had a saying. He said, "We sent the Army to Vietnam
to save Vietnam. We took it out to save the Army."

We are in I think a very precarious position right now with the all-volunteer Army, and I emphasize Army as opposed to the other services, because the other services I think are doing pretty well with recruiting and retention.

And one of the things you need to recognize -- that if you have a volunteer military, you're going to have a higher percentage of people who have families than you did in a mixed military. And to the extent that you don't pay attention to those things, you risk undermining the quality of the people that you get and keep in the military.

And so I think you've got to pay attention to that. That has to be as important as anything, because if you don't take care of that and you don't get the good people, it doesn't matter how much you spend on equipment, or where you base them or anything else like that, I mean, that has got to be front and center.

MR. O'HANLON: Let me just say one thing about Germany in this context. And it's sort of a nuanced argument because I very much agree with the point Larry made earlier that our troops, as best I can tell, and you probably have greater insight into
this, sir, than I do. But our troops really don't
mind being in Germany. It's not an unpleasant place
to be.

On the other hand, at the margin I still
support the idea of bringing the people home, to the
extent we can, because, as we all know, many spouses
are now working in the military. It's easier I think
-- I think -- for most of them to get jobs back here
than to get jobs in Germany. It's also easier if,
like the Marines, the Army can begin to have
concentrations of bases in one part of the country.

You can hope to spend a good part of your
career in that general area. I think the Marines
benefit in terms of their morale, in terms of their
families, from knowing that they are often going to
wind up either around Camp Lejeune or Camp Pendleton,
or somewhere in those vicinities of North Carolina and
Southern California.

The Army obviously can never be quite that
consolidated, but I still think that model is not bad.
And as we all know, the Army is moving in this
direction already, hoping to give people the ability
to stay in one general base vicinity for six or seven
years. I think that's a good idea, and I think
bringing some forces home from Germany may contribute
to that effort at the margin. But only at the margin, because, again, people in Germany are really not unhappy to be there.

And so it has less to do with the troops being happy and less to do with the troops being with their families. They are already doing just fine in Germany on those scores, but the spouses may have an easier time getting jobs back home, and it may be easier to keep people in one part of the country for six, seven, eight years at a stretch, which I think is a good part of General Schoomaker's current quality of life initiative in the Army that your plan has to somehow try to support if possible.

MR. SPENCER: I would just add that it's obviously very important that you -- the families come with the soldiers, and airmen, marines, and sailors. That said, I think it -- because it's politically popular, because it's the right thing to do, generally speaking these initiatives can go far.

Now, it's important that we keep talking about it, because if we quit talking about it they can recede. But I think the balance is pretty good right now that the politicians and the policymakers tend to put quality of life issues, especially because of some of the readiness problems from the '90s, these quality
of life issues remain -- continue to be a rather high priority.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Commissioner Taylor?

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Mr. O'Hanlon, you -- and we have talked a good deal about the problems with rotational forces and the impact it might have on families and other aspects, and especially -- and I'm speaking primarily about Europe right now.

And let's turn to the military value of the forces in Europe. Could you and others talk about the plan, as you understand it right now, and the forces that -- and we'll use what you outlined there a few moments ago -- the Stryker brigade there, and the two divisions coming home, and an Airborne brigade in Italy, and possibly a rotation of forces in Eastern Europe. Is that adequate to deal with regional threats in that area or where they might deploy to?

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, sir. I would say the following. In terms of the new bases in Eastern Europe, I see them primarily for two reasons. One is as airfield staging bases to get to Central Asia or perhaps other regions, and then, secondly, to
bring in the new NATO members into a more full membership, higher NATO standards of interoperability, to let them work with our military and bring them up.

And we all know Poland is contributing a great deal now in Iraq, and other new members have really tried to help out. And we should try to encourage that, not as punishment for the old members, but as encouragement to the new members, and I think we have an opportunity.

So I don't think bases in these parts of the world are going to be all that useful for most purposes. But as staging airfields and as joint exercise training grounds, I think they can help.

In terms of Central and -- Germany, in particular, but also Britain and Italy and Spain, I tend to think that we're right to leave most of the airfields alone. I don't think we have so much excessive airfield capacity in Europe that we want to bring a lot of it home. There might be an argument for bringing a squadron or two of TAC fighters; I'm not sure. Because the main argument for having that capability is really not to defend against the threat to Europe, I think it's really to do, again, joint exercises and training with our major allies.

So I would evaluate the proposals mostly
in those terms, but then the big airfields in Germany
of course are useful ways to get supplies to the
Middle East region. And we should definitely want to
protect those assets, so that I feel strongly about
keeping.

In terms of the Army ground forces, I
think I agree with General Meigs' point that I --
again, I saw it quoted in the paper. I didn't see him
write a longer essay, so I'd be curious to know
exactly what his more detailed argument is. But the
basic point being, again, joint exercises and joint
training require people, and they require people in
the vicinity all the time, because to bring people
from the States is a huge effort.

You can do it here and then, now and
again, but if you want to do a lot of joint exercises
with these very important allies, you do need to have
some capability permanently in Europe I think. And so
General Meigs did make me think perhaps there's an
argument to keep one heavy brigade still in Germany,
not because of any threat to Germany, but because of
this interoperability transformation, joint exercise,
joint training issue.

And the Stryker brigade -- I like that
idea, because it gives our European allies the message
we've got to keep getting more expeditionary as an alliance. As Jack pointed out, they haven't done enough of this themselves. They've got a huge standing set of armies and very little ability to deploy. Part of the reason is lack of strategic lift. Part of the reason is the wrong mind-set. Part of the reason may be somewhat wrong forces.

And I think the Stryker brigade can help push them a little bit, at the margin at least, to a more expeditionary philosophy. But that's the way I would evaluate each of these things, somewhat different philosophies for the air bases in Eastern Europe, for the air bases in Central Europe, for the TAC air in Central Europe, for the Army forces.

For every one I think you need a separate set of arguments, but the overlapping point is it's not the threat to Europe itself that really motivates any of this. It's issues like staging, joint exercises, interoperability, and keeping the alliance a cohesive fighting force for operations outside of Europe.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Right. And that's what I was referring to. Other comments from you, Mr. Korb? Dr. Korb?

DR. KORB: I can see no strategic,
economic reason for bringing home the two divisions in Europe. I'm on record of saying that, in fact, in the summer of 2003. I wrote an editorial in The New York Times exactly about that. In fact, I know it must have gotten General Jones' attention, because his public affairs guy called me as I was checking out at the Giant. And I'm trying to, you know, see my bill there, and the guy is calling all the way from Europe. I said, "Oh, no, no, we're not going to do anything like that." Well, I think we did.

I have not seen -- and the point I'd like to make is the burden of proof is on those who want to change what seems to be working well, and I would also point out some of the writings of Professor Kagan at West Point -- and I urge you to take a look at that -- has made a lot of these similar arguments that I have made.

In fact, I've -- I mean, I haven't been influenced by a General, but just, you know, somebody at the Social Science Department at West Point, because I really think in terms of the threats to our security, where you want to go, the overall good of our relations with Europe as well as cost considerations, it doesn't make any sense.

Now, if you want to put a Stryker brigade
and, you know, change that or change the composition
of one of those divisions, that's another issue. But
I really don't -- and one of the things that I think
to me is very concerned -- when I went to Iraq in
November as part of one of these trips that Secretary
Rumsfeld had -- I think Mike went on one as well --
when I was eating with the troops from the 1st Armored
Division, their main concern is, "Where are we going?
Are we going back to Europe? We're reading all of
this stuff."

I wonder what in the heck is happening to
the 1st ID now when they're over there and they read
this type of thing, because in the fine print of 2006
is when I understand this starts. So I think that
that's just sort of something somebody should have
considered before making this announcement.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Mr. Spencer?

MR. SPENCER: There's one thing to keep in
mind I think is that in Western Europe you have a lot
of the same growing environmental regulation problems,
a lot of the same growing population problems. That's
putting limits on the ability to train. You can't do
-- there's a lot of limits on live fire training,
nighttime helicopter flying, tracked vehicle training,
and what is happening is that European countries are
now going to Eastern Europe.

The Western European countries are also going to Eastern Europe to train. So you have a lot more training opportunities in Eastern Europe, and you have the seas, the mountains. You have a lot of different terrain. You have more flexibility in training, joint training because the -- like I said, the Western countries are coming over there.

So I think that, operationally, military value-wise, it does make sense to create an infrastructure in place for that training. And why not just stay there in some capacity if it's in everyone's interest to do so.

I also would suggest that if we see these trends around the world, different kinds of threats, we're talking about the need for flexibility. It's true that we've not run into a situation that we've not been able to respond to yet. So it seems like it's working well.

I would argue that you don't wait until it's not working well to make the change, that as you see these trends emerging if we think we're going to need more spartan bases, if we think we're going to have to have an infrastructure that supports a long-range force, why don't we start implementing some of
those things now rather than wait until maybe it's too late.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Okay. As a follow-on to a comment you made earlier about a capabilities-based force located in Kansas that could maybe be as effective in projecting power as it would be forward station, as long as it possibly wasn't in the right place, I didn't quite understand your strategy for getting it there.

When you were asked about strategic lift, I didn't hear you talking about a drastic increase in that. How do you get that capability? How do you get the capabilities in the right place to do the job that's expected?

MR. SPENCER: Sure. Well, first, let me preface what I'm saying with, it's not a matter of just having the ability to project power globally because you can. It's a matter of you might be faced with the instance that you have to, that you're not able to use your TAC air, you're not able to put in your aircraft carriers. So you have to have some alternative to that.

How do you get it there? Well, that depends on what you're getting there. Bombers are -- we are not investing any money in bombers in this
country right now, yet it's bombers that put the vast majority of bombs on targets in any of the wars that we fight. We're going to invest something on the order of $300 billion in tactical air over the next 30 years to buy 4,000 tactical fighters.

During that same timeframe, we're going to be flying the same B-52 bombers that Slim Pickens got down on in Dr. Strangelove. So I think that's a problem, whenever you look at evolving technologies, when you look at what we're using.

Another point is that technology allows us to project far greater power with far less mass. So it's a whole lot easier to apply that larger amount of military power. At least hopefully it will be at that future point than it is today. So you need less strategic lift to get that same number of -- that same amount of power into a theater somewhere.

Now, specifically, how do you do that? I don't know all the answers on how to do that. I think that we need to invest greater amounts of money in bombers. I think we need to invest greater amounts of money in space-based sensing, things like space-based radar, these sorts of things, which will allow us to hit targets from far away.

I think that we need to look into the sea-
basing issue. That's another way to do this. These rotational -- these bases that we're here talking about today that are more spartan and more spread out in nature is a way to do that that -- you move your forces into there, then surge them and move forward from that point.

So it's any combination of these things.

I don't have the answer. I'm not saying we need 100 of this certain plane to carry this many brigades to that point. It's got to be different than that. That's what transformation is about. It's about bringing in new capabilities using information technology to allow you to apply that military technology over long distances.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Dr. Korb, did you have another comment?

DR. KORB: Well, I think if you're taking a look at where we spend our money in defense, one of the things that I am concerned about is this rush to deploy a national missile defense system and spend over $10 billion a year on it. We were spending more on that than the entire Coast Guard, and I'm more worried about something coming in in a container than I am somebody shooting a missile with a return address.
And I do think -- and Michael and I have said already -- you need more ground troops if you're going to continue what you're doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. We haven't gotten to it yet, but you've got to change the active/reserve mix in the Army. You've got far too many capabilities in the Guard and the Reserve that you use an awful lot.

And as General Helmly, though, as the head of the Army Reserves says, "You should not call up somebody for more than one year out of every four or five if you want to keep that man or woman in the Guard and Reserves." So I think that that's a critical thing that you've got to take a look at, because you've got things like military police, civil affairs, engineers. The majority of these are in the Guard and Reserve, and you can't keep calling them up and keep them on for long periods of time.

So, I mean, those are the things I think that you need to take a look at. I think with the -- if you're looking at building aircraft, the F-22 is a terrific plane, but I don't think you're going to need that many of them, given the fact that we already have got a very good air superiority as it is. And I think the Joint Strike Fighter, which you can get at a more reasonable cost, will enable us to maintain that air
superiority.

Now, to go back to the point I made before, I think you need to keep transforming, and, yes, make it lighter, more flexible, particularly with your projection forces. But don't forget that at some point you're going to need boots on the ground, because it's not just Iraq and Afghanistan, if you don't want to have failed states in other parts of the world that could become a haven for terrorists, at some point you may have to put forces in the ground on there to prevent that from happening.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Go ahead.

MR. O'HANLON: My colleagues have covered it pretty well. I was going to talk specifically about the nuance differences between Kansas and Germany for ground troops. But you're very familiar with that. I think that they are actually both pretty good places from which to deploy. We can spend a lot of time talking about the slight advantages of one over the other, but bottom line we have a nice position to be in.

Those are both good places to be if you're trying to deploy ground forces, especially if you have the infrastructure that both Kansas and Germany have to get to the ports, and if you have the fast sealift
that we have in increasing amounts today.

    COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you.

    COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Gentlemen, I thank you. I want to say that I think -- and I know I speak for all the Commissioners when I say that your contributions are invaluable to this Commission. I think we're about halfway through our questions. What we'd like to do is have you back again, if you'd consider that. We'd love to have this panel back again at a future hearing, and I think at that time we'll have more questions in addition to some that we've already prepared.

    So I know Dr. Korb has got a commitment, so I -- I really appreciate your participation on this Commission.

    We're going to adjourn now until about 1:30, and I thank you all very much.

    (Whereupon, the proceedings in the foregoing matter went off the record at 12:46 p.m. and went back on the record at 1:35 p.m.)

    COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Good afternoon.

    Before I introduce you, I would just -- I keep putting my book over my button here, turning my microphone off, so excuse me.
I'd like to describe the procedure for today's hearing, and each panelist will receive up to 10 minutes for an opening statement. And at the conclusion of those statements, then the Commissioners will each have up to 10 minutes to ask questions.

We'll use the lights only as a courtesy reminder. So when the yellow light comes on, you have two minutes remaining. And when the red light appears, time has expired, but please finish any thoughts or statements that you are making.

Our third panel will focus on family issues. From the National Military Family Association, we will hear from Joyce Wessel Raezer, Director of Government Relations. And from the Military Child Education Coalition, Dr. Mary Keller, Executive Director.

So if one of you would want to start with an opening statement, please.

MS. RAEZER: It looks like I'm elected.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, National Military Family Association thanks you for this opportunity to provide some input concerning potential changes in the basing of U.S. forces overseas and their effect on the quality of life of military service members and families.
I do have to state that NMFA does not have a position on whether or not downsizing should occur, or how or where troops should be based. Our interest in this discussion is in raising awareness of the imperative that military family and quality of life issues must be considered by policymakers early in the decision-making process and the implementation of any rebasing or transformation plans.

Our written statement, which we have submitted for the record, highlights some of those concerns. It is based on our Association's long-time close observation of military quality of life issues and on put we receive from military family members, family support providers, and from our worldwide network of volunteer NMFA representatives, most of whom are military spouses.

Today I'm going to highlight a few key points based on our observations, and also based on some of this morning's discussion about how best to ease the disruptions to families during any rebasing initiative.

The first point is quality of life issues that affect service members and families must be brought to the table early in the planning process and considered on an equal basis with other mission-
related tasks. And I thank you for allowing this opportunity to discuss this issue so early in your process.

The quality of life infrastructure needed to support families includes housing, quality schools, child and youth programs, morale welfare, recreation facilities and programs, family centers, chaplains programs, and medical care. Policymakers must understand that sustaining this infrastructure, which includes people, programs, and facilities, cannot be done as an afterthought.

Point number two -- look both ways. Planning must include the preservation of quality of life programs, services, and facilities at closing installations, as long as families remain, and the development of a robust quality of life infrastructure at the receiving installation. And this infrastructure must be in place before the new families and service members arrive.

Number three, don't expect you can take care of families on the cheap. Ensuring availability of quality of life programs, services, and facilities at both closing and receiving installations, and easing families' transition from one to another, will take additional funding, personnel, and facilities.
DoD must program in the costs of family support and quality of life as part of its calculations from the beginning, ask for the resources it needs, and then allocate them. Don't just program in the cost of a new runway or tank maintenance facility. Also add the cost of a new child development center or possibly new schools.

Number four, planning must be coordinated. Many offices, commands, activities, and agencies have a piece of the quality of life puzzle. No one owns the whole thing. They must work together to ensure there are no gaps in the provision of essential services. The need for coordination and partnerships was a key lesson learned from earlier downsizing efforts in Europe.

NMFA's written statement discusses the problems that emerged when key military medical and mental health personnel were removed from European communities, leaving school nurses as the first option for medical care and high school guidance counselors as the only counseling resource in many small communities.

Number five, information is key. Families must be assured that the quality of life programs and facilities will remain in place and be adequately
staffed and resourced for as long as families remain at installations to be closed. They also need to know the timeline for closure, and any other changes.

European communities have been dealing with rumors about base closure for several years -- rumors that installations would be closing fast or that families of deployed service members would be moved back to CONUS installations while the service members were still deployed.

NMFA is now concerned by reports from families that several communities in Europe are experiencing decline in the participation in community activities, because family members and family support providers seem so resigned to the eventual closing of the installation that they say, "What's the use?"

Says one spouse that talked to us, "The one thing I would like to see is the leadership telling us what is going on and keep things in place. Just because we're leaving in two to four years does not mean we are leaving tomorrow, so programs shouldn't stop. If something is to go away, please have a plan on what is leaving and how you're going to phase it out. Work up to that date. Just don't stop because we're leaving."

Number six, in the eyes of today's family
force, school issues could make or break the success of rebasing initiatives. Our military force today is an educated force that cares deeply about the education of its children. Military members will be angry if they think their children's education is being short-changed in any effort to modernize the force structure.

As Dr. Keller of MCEC will note, there are many issues affecting whether or not a child and family has a successful transition from one school to another. NMFA's written statement contains a discussion of many of those issues as well, including school staffing, coordination between sending and receiving schools, parent information, maintaining strong partnerships between commanders, schools, and parents, identifying the financial impact on receiving schools, and ensuring that DoD does its part to mitigate that financial impact.

Relations between the DoD schools and their military communities hit a low after the last major downsizing in Europe. It took some stateside districts several years after the last overseas downsizing to complete necessary construction projects to eliminate the rows and rows of portable classrooms.

General Williams this morning referenced
school funding and capacity issues. That solving these issues can be difficult, costly, and contentious, is borne out by recent experiences at installations undergoing housing privatization and some of the early movements associated with Army transformation.

DoD must be prepared to supplement local resources if civilian schools cannot adequately prepare for the influx of new military children. It must work with the districts and with Congress to develop a comprehensive funding plan to ensure that all schools receiving additional students -- and that includes DoD schools -- have the resources they need to provide a quality education for both their current students and the new arrivals. The resources must be in place before the children arrive.

For the good of the families, we must ensure that the effective partnerships now existing in many military communities between commanders, school officials, and parents, and the spirit that created them, are nurtured during the downsizing, so that schools do not become a source of frustration for military families.

Number seven, overseas basing changes will not occur in a vacuum. While lessons learned in
previous overseas initiatives can guide many activities to support families this time around, we must remember that the world in which the American overseas downsizing occurred a decade ago no longer exists.

Troop movements and installation closings and realignments today occur against a backdrop of the ongoing war on terror and a heavy deployment schedule. Deployment and force protection issues have had a significant impact on the quality of life for families in Europe. Look for even more issues when folks -- when forces based in Korea deploy to Iraq soon.

Yes, living overseas can be enjoyable for families. But families tell us -- and most recently they told us as we prepared this document, the report on military family support since 9/11 -- families told us that having the service member deployed from overseas is more problematic than if they were stateside.

The management of permanent change of station moves into and out of overseas locations from -- and from one installation to another within those locations must be watched carefully as installations begin to close. Watching an installation empty out and shut down can be demoralizing, more so if their
experience is repeated at another location.

The experience is even more disheartening if it is coupled with a deployment or the threat of deployment. Supporting families during a deployment and easing the transitions that occur when an installation has to absorb families from elsewhere requires a great deal of focus. It is unfair to communities to have them to endure these challenges simultaneously without extra support.

Changes in military health care delivery and the construction and operation of military family housing will also have an impact on the ability of a CONUS installation to absorb large numbers of service members and families returning from overseas. Increasing visibility of issues such as the smooth transition of military children, and a military spouse's ability to pursue a career, mean that more family members will expect their leadership to provide additional support in these areas.

Army transformation is already having an impact at some CONUS installations. That impact on schools, housing, and health care could be devastating to the quality of life of the entire community if DoD sends families from overseas without first ensuring capacity still exists to absorb them.
For example, services must reevaluate their local housing surveys to determine if community can support service members’ and families’ housing needs. Their solution to an installation housing shortage should not be just to extend the acceptable drive time radius to the installation.

The services must ensure the medical infrastructure is in place at receiving installations to support the influx of service members and families and provide timely access to care for all beneficiaries, including retirees and their family members. That sufficient health care resources are available must be -- in a community must be confirmed before any decision is made to send more service members and families to that location.

Any move is disruptive to the family. Watch -- oh, I already did that. I'm sorry. Okay.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Please take the time you need. Don't be distracted by the red light.

MS. RAEZER: As the discussion happened this morning, I added some things, and that's why I have to get my story straight.

Okay. That was just -- that was the point I wanted to make. It's just there are a lot of things going on in the environment, and we have to be careful.
about how all of this plays together.

The last point is remember that every proposal on how to change the basing of forces overseas will have advantages and disadvantages, and, if implemented, unintended consequences. No good deed goes unpunished.

Keeping all of the affected parties informed, eliminating service and program stovepipes to create partnerships, identifying and allocating resources early, and accepting responsibility at the highest level for ensuring the quality of life of military personnel and their families, will pay off.

Whatever proposal is adopted, even if the decision is made to change nothing in the basing structure, there will be family support needs that will exist. And these family support needs will continue to change over time. Families are asking questions about the overseas basing and the idea of putting more bases in Eastern Europe. They are very concerned about this, and we can talk about that in the questions if you'd like.

The challenge with all of these proposals will be in understanding how different responses are needed to meet those family needs.

Thank you.
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Dr. Keller?

DR. KELLER: Mr. Chairman, Commissioners,
I'm so glad to be here today to talk about children on
behalf of the Military Child Education Coalition. We
are a private, nonprofit organization that serve as
advocates for the educational needs of military
children whose parents are devoting their talent,
skills, and lives to our nation.

The MCEC's goal is to level the
educational playing field for the military child
wherever they are located around the world, and as an
outgrowth develop effective models addressing the
educational needs of other mobile students.

On behalf of the leadership and the entire
community, thank you so much for the opportunity to
talk about military children and the serious discourse
that is surrounding your decisions. Though the
Military Child Education Coalition should not, and
does not, take a position on the efficacy of the
current overseas basing initiative, we recognize and
appreciate that there are many complexities that
require serious attention and deliberation.

The Military Child Education Coalition
does appreciate this opportunity to contribute,
especially to talk about how this impacts and
potentially impacts children and their educational experiences. Our views on the implication and potential consequences that might be forecast for school-age children as a result of the reorganization and repositioning of troops from overseas to CONUS are based on solid research, professional experience, and first-hand knowledge.

At MCEC, we start and end with a focus on the child. This truly is a tough time for the military parent. As Joyce said in her testimony, and we absolutely agree, that we need to take a look at the amplified issues that their very mobile children face because of the parents' career.

Precisely because their parents are serving our nation, the military child has a life of transition. It is punctuated by separation. Moving and changing schools every two to three years is a challenge at any grade, but especially for the students in high school.

A student from a military family is destined to face school transitions regardless of our current or future basing strategies. The question is how to prepare the systems and respond in a way that lessens the expected collateral effects of increased turbulence as a result of the force restructuring.
By the time the school bell rings this coming Tuesday, across our nation and across the world, military children, like their civilian classmates, will participate in a great gift in our American heritage, and this is the privilege of an education.

Seventy percent of school-age children from full-time active duty military families are attending public schools in the United States. This translates to a student population of about 600 children in classrooms that are located in over 600 public school districts here in the United States.

There are also other military children in areas that are isolated from installations, which brings the estimated school district numbers up to about 800. Of course, with the mobilization of the Guard and Reserve forces, the number rises exponentially. But their challenges, while very real, are somewhat different and not the subject of this discourse.

Less than 15 percent, or 100,000 students, attend the Department of Defense schools. The stateside DoDEA schools, or DoDDS, have a total K-12 population of about 30,000, where overseas there is about 70,000 students. The remaining 15 percent, or
100,000 students, are in private schools, parochial schools, host nation schools, and about six to nine percent -- it's actually a very hard number to get hold of -- are home-schooled.

Faced with a potential for significant changes for families, as well as the impact these changes will have on the child, the Military Child Education Coalition believes that decision-makers at the national, state, installation, and school levels should consider these fundamentals for the sake of each child.

Number one, communication is the key. Plan ahead and give notice as soon as possible to families and installations at both the sending and receiving school systems. Fast growth school systems are able to respond effectively to student needs when they have the time possible to assess and plan appropriately.

Partnerships become even more important. Military and school communities at the local level, at both sending and receiving locations, must establish effective and collaborative systems and set up working groups to address this, to organize actions and deal with challenges as they arise.

Changing student populations affect the
quality of life for everyone at both the sending and receiving side. So clear information is essential. Advanced notification and planning must include military youth and family programs and other installation youth and child services as well as community services, such as Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts, youth clubs, YMCAs, that respond to the needs of families and take care of children.

Given that this rebasing initiative will be disruptive for families, it is vital that they receive as much advance information as possible, resources as well as support. The message is that the vast majority of military parents, like all other parents, want to see their children do well.

Given the tools and the opportunity, a military parent can be the best partner throughout either the exit or the entry phase of the transition experience. In order to bridge this transition and transform it eventually into the promise of a more stable school experience for children, it must be a shared responsibility that includes parents, schools, and communities.

I can speak to this beyond a hypothetical. So let me share some personal and professional experience.
Both in my career as a public school educator and my service as the Executive Director of MCEC, I spent 21 years as a public school educator, 16 years as an Assistant Superintendent, the last eight years in the Killeen Independent School District in Texas that served the children of the Fort Hood area.

In 1992, we helped Fort Hood move a 13,000 strong division from Fort Polk. This meant that the Killeen schools brought thousands of additional students in in one year. In a strong partnership with Fort Hood and the community, we planned months in advance of the move. We connected frequently with Leesville, Louisiana schools and made personal visits to Fort Polk. We planned in a very large scale for classrooms, for school resources, and instructional materials.

We hired teachers and administrators. We shared information and planned for children with special needs. We answered family questions and concerns. We did everything that we possibly could do, as did Fort Hood, as did the sending school, and it was still not perfect. And 500 miles separate Fort Polk and Fort Hood, and it was not easy.

What happens when students come is that the plan gets the reality test. The real school
examples are that classrooms have to be shifted, teachers reassigned because one grade level is over projection and one under. Facilities have to be reevaluated. This requires precision and patience as well as creative problem-solving and compassion.

What I learned from my years as an Assistant Superintendent and an Area Superintendent, in a large fast growth school district, has now only been seasoned and reinforced on the global scale in my position as Executive Director of MCEC. In the past four years, I have been in these schools. I have worked with dedicated teachers and military commanders in communities all over this country.

Their professionalism and the sense of purpose are inspiring. In every situation, schools and military communities are working together to take care of children, given the natural challenges of the school year, and the amplified challenges and heartbreak of wartime.

Given the complexities and the stressors to people and systems, no matter what, all is possible if we never lose sight that this is about the kids. We know that this reorganization is unprecedented in scope, and it's a huge undertaking for the institutions. Yet it's personal for a family. "It's
my baby," says a mom.

What are some of the methods and means to ameliorate the challenges for the potential transition of the estimated over 35,000 to 45,000 K-12 students? In order to make this easier, it is important to identify as much as possible those receiving schools, those receiving areas. The use of technology can play a critical role. We talk more about this in the written statement.

With interactive technology, schools and families can immediately connect. Not only is it important for a child to get records, it is important for a family to know someone.

Secondly, there are proven tested programs that already exist that train school and military professionals to help military students with transitions. To give you one recent example is the Student-2-Student Program that the Army, in partnership with MCEC, has just launched.

Why is this important? Because if you're in high school and you're moving, you care who you're going to eat lunch with. You care if you're going to have friends. A student enters and leaves a high school and wants to know, does someone care about me? They also want to be successful academically.
In addition to planning for teachers' textbooks and resources, it's necessary to set up an environment that also takes care of the high stakes accountability systems that are in place. Even more than before, the No Child Left Behind requirements -- most states have served military children, have had high stakes testing.

What this means is that a student must pass an exam or a series of exams to get course credit or to promote or to graduate from high school. The DoDEA system has a well-articulated academic standards and accountability system, but like those of each state it is unique to that system. Students must learn how to move, understanding what the academic requirements are.

This will help it be less frustrating and confusing and the transition less overwhelming. Preparedness is our main message to you. This is a complex thing where you're moving from a single school system to a broad, diverse dispersion of U.S. public schools, and it will require a multi-phased and practical plan.

Given sufficient notice, states can also do their part. So what we're asking is for everyone to pay attention, that this is going to require
planning and planning together in a very large scale.

Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Just a couple of comments before we start our questioning. The first would be that I understand your sensitivity to forming an opinion on transformation and what might happen and might not happen. But I guess I would ask frankness in your answers in regard to how those changes will affect, you know, not just generally but little -- maybe a little more specifically.

The other thing I would add is that I don't think you'll speak to a group that probably is more supportive of what you're doing than this group. I mean, I believe everyone up here understands the importance of the family to the military.

And I'm sure that, you know, all of us have a history in regard to supporting military families and understand the importance of a soldier, sailor, or airmen being out there and not having to be concerned about how their family is being cared for. So we're here to help you in that regard.

The first question I would ask, and you both sort of touched on it in regard to education, but I would like to ask possibly other issues that might
have been learned from previous downsizing and restructuring that would affect families. I mean, was it lodging? There has to be other things that -- housing, other issues that you might want to address other than just education, not that education is not important, but I'm wondering what other issues are out there.

MS. RAEZER: Well, I'll start. I think that -- I referenced a couple of the big ones, housing and medical care, along with a whole family -- maintaining the whole family support structure as long as families are in a location and making sure that that structure is at capacity to handle the influx when they come to another installation.

In earlier downsizings, and BRAC as well, there was often a lag time between the provision of services -- between the arrival of families and the full provision of services. And reference two areas where I think this time around that's even more critical that we begin planning earlier because of the changes in the way the military now does housing and the way the military now does health care.

We didn't have TRICARE during the first big downsizing. We now have TRICARE. We have a military medical system that is stretched very, very
thin to take of all the deployment-related needs --
the deployment-related needs, and that's the
deployment of military medical personnel overseas with
the troops as well as mobilizing all of those Guard
and Reserve members.

So we have a system that depends on the
military health -- the direct care system, the
military hospitals, for the first line of care,
supplemented with civilian providers out in the
neighborhood. But that provider mix for a family
audience -- a family beneficiary pool is very
different from, say, a retiree beneficiary pool. You
need more OB/GYNs, you need more pediatricians, you
need more family practice folks.

It may take some time to get those either
at the military hospitals or in the civilian networks.
So the lesson learned is we've got to have those in
place first.

The other issue was housing. We had some
folks coming to some installations, being on very,
very long waiting lists, either told don't bring your
family, send your family to grandma until we can find
housing for you here at your new installation, or your
only option is to live very far away from the
installation and to commute. And then that makes it a
lot more difficult for the family to access support
services, like commissaries, family centers. So it
puts a lot of difficulty.

The housing pool on installations in a lot
of places is even smaller than it was then, because
what the military has done to its credit in the last
few years is tear down a lot of the old housing. They
are replacing it in a lot of places with newer, bigger
housing, but not always on a one-to-one basis.

So we are watching this very closely. We
see some problems already emerging with some of the
areas where the Army is changing its brigade
structure. We've been told by family support folks at
Fort Drum, New York, for example, that they're
expecting families and they're telling them they may
have to live in Syracuse, which is about 70 miles away
from New York, and not a real quality of life trip in
the cold in New York.

So I think the lesson was have these
services in place, and we need to make sure we learn
-- we've learned that lesson.

DR. KELLER: Fifty percent of the kids are
below age 7, and so what that means is there is a huge
issue about child care, quality child care. That is
absolutely essentially important for families.
So that, you know, really ripples out into the community, and I'm talking about between infant care and also child care after school. The bases do not have enough spaces in their youth centers to handle the child care or the after school care. So that is a huge issue of itself. That does also affect spouse employment and many of the things that I know NMFA is very, very concerned about, and we're very, very concerned about the quality of child care.

What we know about the experiences that young children have in pre-kindergarten program, and really even before that in day care programs and child care programs, is that it does have a positive effect on their experiences when they start school, if that child care program is quality. So I'd say that number one is quality child care.

The second thing that is very important is quality community services, respite care, and medical care for students that are the most handicapped students, that families really need extra support. And that is sometimes not available in some communities, and I can tell you a story from an installation where they did bring in a lot of people the last time and there was a family that had a very, very needy child.
And the school district was not able to handle that child's very, very involved handicapping conditions, and they also had to then look at transporting the child an hour each way on a bus to a school system that could handle it. But it isn't even just during the day. I mean, some of these families need respite care. So that is a huge issue, sir, that really does affect the whole family.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: What about -- and I know in some cases there may be extended families that would help with this situation. But what about instances where either both members are deployed, or they are single-parent families, what kind of experiences have you had with that in regard to rotations and mobilizations?

MS. RAEZER: The single-parent issue complicates the family dynamic. Every dual military couple and single parents have to have a family care plan approved by their commander that, you know, is supposed to be workable, that outlines where -- who is going to take care of the child.

There are various ways to handle that, and I know Mary has dealt with some of these cases where that maybe hasn't worked as well or just has been rough for the child, because sometimes the family care
plan is that the child leaves that safe nest of the installation and the school where they're used to -- where they have that comfort zone, and they have to move with -- far away to live with grandma or Aunt Susie or whoever.

So, but a lot of the issues facing that dual military and the single parent are the same as any families. Where I think we're going to see some concerns as I look at some of the proposals would be the proposal to have that extra deployment to those -- what people have called lily pad bases today.

Adding that extra deployment, that's just one more time of family separation, which in the case of single parents and dual military may be one more time a child is pulled away from home to go stay with someone else.

DR. KELLER: Just to get the scope, there is 6.4 percent of the activity duty that are single parents, and 2.5 percent of active duty are dual military family members. Now, what we see are the issues of when the child is with someone else, with a family care plan, that that child also experiences some extra challenges in getting that person who is the caregiver involved in the school as appropriately as their parent would have been involved in the
school.

And also, the whole issue of making sure that -- again, that you're taking care of special needs children, we have found that to be the most amplified challenge when you have a single parent or dual military parents deployed, because who understands the individualized education plan if that child has to go live with a grandmother or an aunt or something -- someone else out of town.

That also sometimes means the child has to move to a location that is not close to a base, and that means that whoever is taking that child in doesn't have the support of the family support groups and other things that would help. So it is absolutely a challenge for both dual military families and single parents.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Commissioner Martin?

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly want to thank you both for being here to give us a perspective on things that we're concerned about but may not necessarily know all we need to know about.

My first question is kind of general, and it's in the current tempo, high op tempo, intensity
uncertainty world, let me first ask you on the active component side, what are you seeing in general about the pressure of deployment that has surprised you? Even given your career's work that is -- something that has surprised you or things that have not been obvious about the pressure on the military family due to the current op tempo.

MS. RAEZER: I think the first thing that surprised me is we talk a lot about how resilient families are. It has surprised me that they really are as resilient as we've always said. They are doing phenomenal things under very difficult circumstances.

So, but they are being stretched very, very thin. And that doesn't surprise me. I read the papers. I look at where the units are going. And, you know, it's -- they are very -- they are wearing down.

I think the families in overseas areas dealing with the deployment are wearing down faster than the families at stateside installations.

The other thing that surprised a lot of folks in the deployment-related arena is the need by the non-ID car holder or family members, the parents of service members, the grandparents of the military children, for information and for a connection with the unit and the family support structure. That has
overwhelmed some family readiness group folks.

It has overwhelmed some commands, because they have been getting these very, very tough questions from grandparents who now have children, from parents of single service members who are managing the finances, taking care of the house or the car or whatever, or just as long as -- just basic questions about information. And that has been an issue -- I think on the active side, those are some of the surprises.

DR. KELLER: I think some of the surprises that I've seen is I was actually in Washington State when they turned one of the aircraft carriers around and the families were waiting for the aircraft carrier to come in. And the students were very excited about their parents coming home, and then they went back out again.

And I say that to highlight the redeployments have been pretty tough on kids and families. That has been a surprise. I think it's because it's hard for them to see -- you know, kids have a now and not now sense of time. When that seat is empty at the dinner table every single night, you know, it's really hard if you're six or you're eight or you're 16, to see that this is going to get better.
over time. And that's -- the parent that's left behind is having kind of a tough time keeping that up.

Parents have told us that when they're by themselves during deployment and a school issue arises -- and I can think of, as a parent myself, you know, is it good for parents to be able to double-team those school issues? They don't have a backup. You know, they don't have somebody to talk to to say, you know, the 13-year-old is going through some things, and, you know, I need a break from that, so can you take it for a while and deal with it?

The other thing that I've been surprised with is we deal with educators and train educators around the world on working with military families. Most educators have not had experience in the military. Actually, very few, compared to the overall population. They're really struggling with trying to learn how to do the right things and help in a meaningful way, I mean, beyond putting red, white, and blue dixie cups in the -- you know, the chain link fence. They want to do something meaningful.

So I've been surprised that as we've worked with them and given them more information on how to take care of the kids that they've gone even beyond and done some fabulous things.
The next surprise has been when they get a deployment and a move connected, so you've got a school transition and a move, I've talked to a lot of parents that, you know, said, "You know, I could handle one or the other, but these have come at the very same time. So we moved to this installation at the very same time my spouse left. Matter of fact, the boxes weren't even unpacked. Matter of fact, we hadn't even enrolled in school yet." And sometimes that's been extremely difficult for families.

But bottom line, I am so impressed with the courage of children and the way that people are encouraging the courage of children, from moms and dads around the world that are hanging together, from dads and moms that are deployed that are e-mailing back, that are staying involved, that are working hard, to those that are home.

But I'm also impressed with the way that kids are encouraging each other. So those have been my surprises.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Let me just add now the dimension of the reserve component for you. And not exactly knowing your -- where your boundary line is drawn, I'd just add the dimension of reserve component deployments and potential use on rotational
basis, just some brief thoughts on specifically what we might -- should be concerned about or worried about.

MS. RAEZER: Well, I think for both of us -- I know it happened with us, and I imagine it happened with MCEC as well -- because we have military family or military child in our names, when those Guard or Reserve members become activated, and their family members have questions, they go on the website and look for military family, military child, so both of us are dealing with Guard and Reserve issues, and treat that they are military families.

And so we do a lot of work with them. Our association has had to kind of -- we have had to add some extra staff just to handle Guard and Reserve family issues. And so they do have special challenges, and a lot of the challenges come from what Mary said. A lot of those educators, a lot of the people in the community, have no concept about what being in the military means.

A lot of the families don't have the concept what our -- our team of volunteers who researched our project noted when they talked to Guard and Reserve families is that the service member may think of themselves as active duty now, because they
have been mobilized. The family still thinks of themselves as Guard or Reserve. That's something you kind of handle on the weekend and you don't really think about, but now we have to. And they don't know how to.

DR. KELLER: We also take care of the Guard and Reserve families. There is 500,000 school-age children that are the children in the Guard and Reserve that are involved in all of the challenges that Joyce mentioned. We call them the suddenly military child, because they -- all of a sudden they have to think of themselves as that.

The demographic is slightly older with this population of students, so you have many more middle school students and high school students. So what we found is that you add the team transitions or middle school transitions along with now you're coping because a parent is deployed.

Joyce is exactly right. Communities are struggling, schools are struggling, and we have been training -- a specific type of training for communities that are taking care of the Guard and Reserve. Interestingly enough, sir, many teachers, principals, coaches, have also been called up because they are members of the Guard and Reserve.
In that sense, we help whole schools who suddenly are also affected by a key leader in their community being called up. And maybe none of the children in the school are military children, but the favorite coach has been called up, brothers and sisters as well. So siblings have been an interesting and new aspect as we take care of children in the Guard and Reserve.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: You've led me to my last question, which is the distinction, for the benefit of us on the Commission, between child care and child development, and what that difference means on the demands on school systems, families, and the entire family support, and should DoD consider legislation to adapt and adopt child development requirements.

DR. KELLER: When I speak about -- talk here, I'm talking about usually, you know, a day care center, a child care center, a program or a place that parents can go to, or homes that parents know have been certified that, you know, it's safe to take your child there, so that they have a support system or someone that can take care of their child after school or maybe even all-day programs.

The child development is absolutely
critical, so that -- the child development is the scaffolding that good child care centers are built on, so that you know that they understand about taking care of kids and they're not warehousing children, that they -- I mean, that is why DoD standards about what is appropriate child care is absolutely essential. And I so appreciate you saying that.

And sometimes it's the transportation that kids also need. So here you have a family -- you know, a single parent, now she or he has to work and you've got all these children, you have to go to work, they also need to go to the child care center, and people are overtaxed. So it can be, how do I even get my child there and get them home again in an appropriate time?

So how I interpret it is child care is a program or a place, and then child development is the fundamentals.

MS. RAEZER: One the biggest disparities that exists today between the military family benefits enjoyed by that active duty family who lives on the installation and the active duty family who lives away from the installation, or the Guard or Reserve family who is now active duty family who lives away from installation, is there access to high quality,
subsidized child care?

If you're lucky enough to live near the installation, and it has room in its child development center for your child, you have access to nationally accredited care at a subsidized price based on your family income. If you don't, you're out on your own trying to do the best you can, and you're going to pick up the full tab for it.

Now, recent appropriations have added funding for the services to help -- to start to meet the needs -- the child care needs of those Guard and Reserve families. It's not enough. We hear from Guard and Reserve family spouses who have tremendous difficulty in finding quality child care to fit around their work schedules or, you know, maybe they were both students and the service member and the spouse traded off on child care duties. Now the spouse has to take up the whole burden, spouse has to change shiftwork and hope that their employer goes along with it, because there is no USARA protection for military spouses.

So this is a real -- this is I think the biggest disparity. I think in a lot of ways the child care access and funding issue is a bigger disparity than health care, because at least those Guard and
Reserve members have TRICARE. Sometimes it's hard to find that civilian provider, but they -- you know, there are people who will take TRICARE, and we work that. The child care issue is a lot tougher, I think.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much to both of you.

Mr. Chairman?

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Taylor?

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I think while the overseas basing initiative -- or rebasing -- and the stabilization initiative that the Army started are not necessarily directly connected, the stabilization initiative cannot work unless -- probably cannot work unless there is some rebasing. Just the numbers don't work out.

But that is a major institutional change.

Five, seven years, and at the same place. What's the feedback that -- and impact on families that you're hearing on both -- from a general sense and then from an educational sense?

MS. RAEZER: The general sense first. I'm hearing a lot of excitement about -- a lot of questions. I think most families have picked up on the same piece you have, General Taylor, that this
stabilization proposal cannot work unless we bring families back from overseas, and service members back from overseas.

And then you have the questions, well, this would be -- five to seven years in one place would be wonderful for -- in terms of the stability, especially if you have a high school senior, but, you know, they're not sure how it's going to work at the level -- the level of the service member who has high school students, because they're talking about -- the first tour is the guarantee, so -- but it would allow a military spouse to stay in one place long enough to get a college degree without having to move in the middle of that college career, which would be wonderful, have a spouse get established in career, for example.

Families do say, "Well, it's wonderful if we could have five to seven years in a place that has nice weather and good schools and lots of job opportunities for spouses. It would not be so wonderful if we had to spend five to seven years at an installation that's in a rural area, no job opportunities for spouses, and the schools have a questionable reputation." So a lot of it is where you're going to spend it.
The other piece along with that is the families still understand that the service member will continue to be deployed. While the family will be able to stay, put down some roots, and have a little better support structure because they have those roots in the community, the service member is still going to be gone.

And families are looking at those deployment schedules and they're saying, "We don't want any more time. We don't want any more family separation time. We -- if it's the choice between stabilizing and going overseas for a couple years, even if you have to move more often, we'd rather move overseas with the service member a couple years and be together than have a family separation."

The other issue that comes up in terms of the stabilization is, yes, you stay at one place for five, six, seven years, establish roots, build connections in the community. It may be more difficult to move, because you've established those roots. So we will still need a family support -- we will still need family support. It will just be a different kind of family support.

DR. KELLER: The educational impact --
and just really great things that have been done on mobile students in general, and also the work that I am submitting -- a secondary education transition study -- is that mobility does impact the continuity of the educational process.

And that can be just, for example, in mathematics, because math is sequential, you can move and miss multiplication. I mean, you can move and miss an essential skill along the way. And then the other school district doesn't -- you know, it's out of sequence a little bit, and it's very hard for kids to catch up.

It actually is in mathematics where kids have had the problems. We've done pretty careful analysis of which classes. So the plus on the academic side is the promise of stabilization could minimize the adverse impact of mobility on academic achievement and continuity.

However, the research also shows with strong parents that mitigates some of the problems with mobility, which also I think is a benefit of the stabilization. If parents stay in one place, they begin to get a relationship with the school. It makes them more confident as an involved parent. So if they get good at being an involved parent in one location,
they are much more likely to be involved in PTAs, in school volunteering at the next location.

Because of the time, if they move after the first seven years, and just doing some assumptions -- and we know most of the kids are very young kids -- we've also done some research on how old you have to be to go to kindergarten. And you would think that would be pretty consistent.

And what we've discovered -- and I'm submitting this as part of the research -- is looking at 31 states and the Department of Defense schools that there is very little consistency on how old you have to be to go to kindergarten. So it can mean that you stay in one place, you make some assumptions, so you have a young child -- a baby that maybe gets to be a young child.

This is also an effect of them coming back from Europe, because DoDEA has more -- you can be actually younger and start kindergarten in DoDEA than you can in a few of the states. And so you plan for your child to go to kindergarten, and then it doesn't happen.

So there are some challenges there, but all in all I think the positives really, really outweigh the challenges for the family as they get
some roots in one place. And then they have to make
those roots portable when they go to the next
location.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you.

You obviously know about the -- part of
the overseas basing plan would be an extensive
rotational plan that would take forces unaccompanied
to rotate into possible bases in Eastern Europe,
possibly in Korea, possibly elsewhere.

What is the -- and I'm sure the families
have heard about this, too. What is the reaction
you're hearing from the families?

And, Dr. Keller, then if you want to
comment on any of the educational impacts.

MS. RAEZER: Families are still learning
about this and are kind of all over the map on this
one. But some of the things that have been referenced
-- that were alluded to in some of the discussions
this morning. Family concerns that we're going to
have Eastern Europe just become another Korea. We've
dealt with those unaccompanied tours to Korea for
years. We haven't liked them, but we've dealt with
them.

And now we're going to add another
unaccompanied tour type option. And do we really need
Eastern Europe to become another Korea?

Concern that it's one thing to say the service member is being deployed to a war zone, I can't go, we're going to gut it out and accept this as time away, because the service member has that war-related mission. It's another thing to say we're going to be happy about the family separation when the service member is just going over somewhere to wait and train and sit, because I think you will have some families who will want to do that, fly -- let's fly over to Romania for spring break.

Or I'm hoping we won't have the folks in the numbers that we do in Korea who want to go as, you know, non-command sponsored, to find a place out, you know, in the countryside, wherever, just to be with the service member. But I think we're going to have to watch it, because people do it in Korea. I think they're going to try to do it in some of these Eastern European locations.

So families are very wary of that additional separation. They are still evaluating whether additional family separations is a fair price to pay for not having to move.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Okay.

DR. KELLER: Sir, on the educational side,
we have also been concerned about the unaccompanied assignments, where they would go over there and the family just lives on the economy, because what we know is when kids go sometimes to these schools in host nations, it's iffy as to whether or not they get an education in a school that is translatable back into the American school system.

And we know that from experience from the non-DoDDS program as well as other programs, that sometimes that's a rough transition.

Overall, the separation from a parent is hard on the student. So I think if that happens that we're going to just have to figure out a lot of other ways that schools can help support the families during that deployment and keep that parent involved during the deployment, which means that it could be another great way to use technology, because technology would keep that parent immediately connected.

By having those remote locations fixed locations, there could be ways that parents can come in, you know, as we're doing in a lot of other locations, where parents can come in and still conference back to the school and talk to other things.

I think it's going to require some
creative problem-solving. But I also have confidence, again, if everyone stays focused on the kids that we can do the right thing.

MS. RAEZER: The other question that does come up is, if you're having these new installations in Eastern Europe, are you going to have any permanent party at all? And if you're going to have -- we do -- we have some two-year accompanied tours in Korea. Are you going to have any permanent party? Are there going to be any accompanied tours for anyone? And if there are going to be accompanied tours for some, how are you going to deal with the family issues that will arise with those folks?

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman?

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Curtis?

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: I'd like to add my thanks for the two of you taking your time to be here with us today. It's a critically important subject.

Dr. Raezer -- I'm sorry, Ms. Raezer, early on you said that having members deployed from overseas locations was more problematic than having the same deployment requirements from a stateside base. Will you amplify on that and give us a better feel for the
kind of issues involved from your perspective, and the challenges?

And, Dr. Keller, would you then comment upon the child development issues associated with that?

MS. RAEZER: What families have told us is that there are not the range of support options available for them when they're overseas that you would find in the States. A lot of military communities back here in the States have done -- have had -- made wonderful partnerships with community organizations, community service entities, schools.

There's a much bigger support network available for families in the States in many communities than there is overseas where almost everything has to be supplied by the American military. So you have a very small group of family support providers, rear detachment command, child youth programs, schools, you know, trying to deal with the day-to-day operation and provide that extra support for the deployment.

So you have an entire community that is stressed out, and no one -- you know, no VFW, no American Legion, no Lions Club, to kind of say, "You guys are doing a great job." You know, it's Families
Eat Free Night at Wendy's. You know, that -- so they miss that bigger community support.

The other piece that has been very problematic in some European communities is the whole security and force protection issue. These are -- yes, Europe is wonderful when you can tour and travel and experience it all. But if it's just Mom and the kids, it's a little -- and you're constantly getting force protection issues about keeping a low profile, and a lot more of our spouses don't feel comfortable driving in Europe, you get isolated on the installation. And so that takes an emotional toll.

DR. KELLER: Commissioner Curtis, if I could, I'd like to tell you a story. We deal with -- specifically with children and families about the educational issues. And I have a really compelling story to tell you.

In Germany, the Mom -- a single mom was deployed to Iraq, and her five-year-old daughter, a bright, wonderful little girl, just really fabulous little girl, was doing wonderfully well in school. Unfortunately, she got meningitis, and it was a very bad case of meningitis. And what happened is because the hospitals and other things were really under stress, they had to reach out into the German
community to help.

Unfortunately, this little baby got brain damaged and became an exceptional family member. Suddenly, a mom is in Iraq, the child caregiver, the family care plan was working, everything was great until she got meningitis.

What happened, then, when Mom came back -- and I know this because I actually talked to the mother about it -- her mother and sisters that are her support system are back home, so now she's dealing with something that is devastating to any parent, and doesn't have -- and not that the German hospital wasn't good. I'm not saying that. What I'm saying is she didn't have the kinds of support that we would all want for our daughters to have if they were going through that kind of situation.

At the same time, now this child is in the exceptional family member program. Now, if she were in the States, what would have happened is she would have been picked up by what's called Child Find, and the school system would have also been there with other kinds of community support agencies like MHMR and other kinds of things that do help families.

And, sir, I can just tell you that that story is in my heart as the most compelling example of
the question that you raised.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you, Dr. Keller.

Clearly, as we attempt to move to a more deployment, expeditionary-oriented portions of the military that have not had that focus before with the long-term, you know, six-month deployments, there are going to be a number of family issues.

Do either one of you -- do your organizations, and do either one of you know of anybody who has tried to capture the lessons learned, the kind of things that you're talking about, Dr. Keller, or the initiatives that we should all consider is to support the families and the children as we evolve to this different approach?

MS. RAEZER: Well, we are -- both of us -- our organizations are, because -- and our organization has been watching these issues throughout our history. We're a little older than MCEC, so we are -- what I've provided to you is based on -- you know, I went back in our files and looked at what happened in some of those earlier basing moves.

I'm pleased to say that folks within the Department of Defense are also capturing this kind of information and sharing issues as they arise, so that
other providers can be aware of them. There is what's called a joint family readiness working group that's made up of folks in the family program arena in the Office of Secretary of Defense as well as the services, to include the National Guard Bureau and the Reserve commands, and also invite some associations to participate.

And we and a couple other associations -- NMFA and a couple of other associations participate in that, and we meet quarterly, and we just -- we share, what are the surprises, what are we doing that's working well, what are other issues that we need to address, how are folks doing, what is the deployment cycle that we're experiencing and some of the issues.

So I think as we get into some of these other troop movement issues, we will be talking -- they will be talking about that as well. But there are a lot of associations and others who are out there collecting this information. A lot of it starts as anecdotal, but you can pick up trends very quickly in some cases, and we are -- we just keep our ear to the ground.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: And I understand there are really two aspects of it it seems to me. One is the base closure and the realignment of forces,
which is the permanent move and movement into communities where you're not prepared that you addressed very articulately earlier.

But the second is the entire change in mind-set to become expeditionary and to move regularly and to have a set of families -- well, there will always be sets of families where the service members are gone a substantial portion of the time, more along the traditional Navy model.

That's really -- because that's the long-term situation we're going to be in, and I was wondering whether those -- those are important lessons to pick up. And is there anybody working a congressional agenda, a legislative agenda, in those areas?

MS. RAEZER: A lot of these issues don't require legislation. A lot of them just require people to work together, and some of those issues are starting to come up in the discussions with that joint working group, for example, where you have the Army folks learning from the Marine Corps model and the Navy model.

You know, the Navy folks are having to change some of their family support practices and ideas because the Navy is -- used to have a fairly
predictable deployment pattern, but that example that Dr. Keller told you about with the ship turning around, the CNO has said maybe we've been too predictable. The families know when we're going out and coming back, and so do the bad guys. So we may need to adjust how we deploy.

The Navy's family support system is going to have to change to meet that change, and so we are seeing more discussion now between the service folks who have to deal with these issues.

DR. KELLER: We capture a lot of research. We are a very serious research-based organization. And it just happens that we're doing some research for Admiral Fargo on the transitions in and out of Hawaii, and part of that research is looking at the effects of deployment. So it's looking at the school-based in and out, and Hawaii is a microcosm of precisely what you said.

That research will be published in about six weeks. It is very, very serious. We worked with Carnegie, we worked with several other groups to make sure that it gives some solid lessons learned. What's fascinating is how individuals have figured out to work around things, individual families or educators, schools, and, you know, people think everyone does
what they are doing.

I mean, they don't know that other people aren't doing this, so it's a great way to capture these ideas and the goodness that's happening at the local levels, and these tremendous partnerships that are happening between units in individual schools and other places. So, yes, we are capturing that.

Plus, we have a system in our organization, and we call it Ask Aunt Peggy. And we really have a person called Aunt Peggy, and families e-mail or call in for school transition issues, but then they tell her the whole range of stories. And it's kind of, you know, the Ann Landers/Hints from Heloise about schools, except she's a testing specialist or researcher. And we also capture that, put it into a solid research model, and we do work really hard, as has NMFA.

We do a great job referring people back and forth to each other, so that's also very helpful.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Well, thank you very much.

MS. RAEZER: May I add one point?

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Yes, please.

MS. RAEZER: Dr. Keller talked about the local initiatives and the state efforts, and that's
really critical when you come to family support. The Department of Defense, the Federal Government, cannot do everything for families, because our families are out all over the place. They're out in the civilian communities. Their spouses are employed by civilians. The kids go to civilian schools.

What has been very, very helpful is the increased visibility of how states and local communities can support military families. It has come a lot from the mobilizations of the Guard and Reserve. There are members of Congress who are focusing on this issue. There was a hearing recently in the Senate that focused on some initiatives coming out of the National Governors Conference to address some of these support issues.

What we need most from Congress at the DoD level I think is more resources to help families address these challenges.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you very much. Keep up the good work.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Do the Commissioners have any other questions?

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I have just one. You've talked a lot about things that are going on to ease the challenges of transition as our families move
back and forth. Planning has been a key factor in getting the word out to both the families and installations, the schools, so they can plan ahead and prepare for the numbers of people who will be arriving. And you talked a little bit about technology and those types of things.

What are some other things? In a perfect world -- both of you, in a perfect world, and you knew that the President's plan that he announced, 70,000 military personnel and the accompanying families coming back, what are the things you would do to, if you could make them happen, to ameliorate that impact on military families?

I know it's a broad question, but I want to be sure that we've -- we know about all these things we could do to make it easier. Something is going to happen. There is going to be a movement of some type, and we just don't know how many yet and where. But what could we do? What do you recommend?

MS. RAEZER: Don't move anybody until you have resources in place at the home installations. We are very, very concerned about health care in many communities. The military medical system is stretched thin.

We have -- the Department of Defense has
to do a better job of persuading civilian providers to
take TRICARE, to get them in the networks, to get them
to take military patients. We have -- the military
has access standards for its beneficiaries in TRICARE
Prime, which include active duty members. Many places
are not meeting them, because they don't have the
capacity.

They can't -- once in a while those
stories get in the press. We've seen a couple in --
over the last year or so from places. So we need to
have -- we need to make sure before anybody is moved
there is health care, there is housing, and there's
housing at a reasonable location from the installation
where folks can take advantage of it. And we need to
be -- and the education resources need to be available
-- identified and available, which means a lot of
folks have to be talking together and planning
together and identifying resources now.

DR. KELLER: I think that planning is
absolutely the key, and I'm not going to restate what
Joyce said. But I guess if you could say a perfect
world, that the students and the parents would know
which school district or school area that they would
be attending at the receiving end.

But also in the perfect world what we find
consistently in our research that the hand off is where the weak point is. From the parents and the educators at the sending school, things unravel at the exit. And it's because it's hard for people to think about the exit, because you're going from the known to the unknown.

So if we could wave a magic wand, in this perfect world I would want that the sending school was working with the receiving school, that the parents were preparing that child to leave both academically and emotionally, and that everyone realized that their job wasn't complete until the child was smoothly handed off, enrolled in the next location.

Then, once they're at the next location, that they got feedback from the receiving school to the sending school, letting them know what worked and what didn't work, because that helps the next child that's coming through the pipeline with that exit process.

So I think it's that time, that specific information about where the students are going, but really in all transitions is that exit is the very, very tough point. And that is that everyone is attending to the needs of the child as they go to the next place, as they come from someplace and go to
someplace.

MS. RAEZER: And the big thing that would fix -- make that exit piece easier is not to have it too closely associated with a deployment, either going or coming, watching the timing.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: My deepest appreciation to both of you for this very insightful view of the impact of what we're thinking about on families.

Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioners? Anything else?

Well, I thank the two of you for the remarkable work that you do on behalf of our military families. I've lived next door to an Air Force Base for the last 36 years, and I'm always amazed at the quality of military families. I've come to know literally hundreds of families and their children, and I am always amazed at the quality of the kids and their interest in school and discipline.

And I think your organizations and the two of you have a lot to do with that, and I think it's important, important to our country, important to our national defense. Be assured that your comments are going to be taken to heart as we move through this
process.

So thank you for appearing here today.

I just want to add that -- I want to thank Ms. Walker, and I want to thank Ms. Walker and our staff for the tremendous job that they have done in preparing for this hearing.

I'd again like to thank our witnesses, and there will be future hearings. There will be notices thereof in the Federal Register, and as they happen there will be future trips for the Commissioners as well. So this Commission is going to move forward, and it will provide a report to Congress as planned.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the proceedings in the foregoing matter were concluded.)