COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF OVERSEAS MILITARY FACILITY STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

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PUBLIC HEARING

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TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 2005

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The hearing convened in Room 138 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, 1st and C Streets, N.E., Washington, D.C., pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m., Al Cornella, Chairman, presiding.

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

AL CORNELLA  Chairman
LEWIS CURTIS, III  Vice Chairman
ANTHONY LESS  Commissioner
KEITH MARTIN  Commissioner
H.G. TAYLOR  Commissioner

PANELISTS:

DOUGLAS J. FEITH  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
VADM ROBERT F. WILLARD  Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J8), Joint Chiefs of Staff
AMB. ROSE M. LIKINS  Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
9:00 a.m.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. This hearing constitutes the fourth public meeting of the Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, more commonly known as the Overseas Basing Commission.

My name is Al Cornella, and I serve as the Commission’s Chairman. Other Commissioners present today are, from my far right, the Commission Vice-Chairman, Lewis Curtis, Major General, United States Air Force, retired; Anthony Less, Vice Admiral, United States Navy, retired; Pete Taylor, Lieutenant General, United States Army, retired; and Keith Martin, Brigadier General, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, retired.

And I would also like to introduce the Commission’s Executive Director, Ms. Patricia Walker. The Overseas Basing Commission was established by Public Law in fiscal year 2004.

The Commission’s task is to independently
assess whether the current overseas basing structure
is adequate to execute current missions and to
assess the feasibility of closures, realignments or
establishment of new installations overseas to meet
emerging defense requirements.

The Commission’s work is not intended to
preclude the Department of Defense’s effort toward
establishing the -- an Integrated Global Presence
and Basing Strategy; rather, the Commission report
will assist congressional committees in performing
their oversight responsibility for DOD's (Department
of Defense’s) basing strategy, military
construction, and appropriations in the 2005 Base
Closure and Realignment Commission determinations.

This commission has been active since May
2004 and has conducted previous hearings where we
received testimony from former military experts,
defense analysts, and experts on military family
issues.

We have engaged in briefings from the
Department of Defense, State Department, the
Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional
Research Service, and other entities.

The Commission has met with commanders and received extensive briefings on the transformation plan for the European Command and the repositioning of forces in the Pacific Command.

We’ve visited military installations in several countries meeting with U.S. forces, subject matter experts, embassy representatives, foreign military officers, and local officials.

The Commissioners have also received briefings from the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Transportation Command.

In addition, a briefing was provided by the Commission to the Combatant Commanders Conference and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Commission will provide Congress and the President with an interim report by March 31st, 2005, and the final report no later than August 15th, 2005.

At this point I would like to describe the procedure for today’s hearing. We have two panels, and I will introduce each panel as they appear.
Each panelist will receive up to ten minutes for an opening statement.

At the conclusion of all opening statements, each Commissioner will have up to ten minutes to question the panel. At the end of that round each Commissioner will have an opportunity to address an additional question to the witness.

We will use lights as a courtesy reminder. When the yellow light appears you have two minutes remaining. When the red light appears, time has expired. However, I would ask the panelists to please take the time necessary to complete your comments.

Joining us today on our first panel are two distinguished members of the Department of Defense.

Douglas Feith is the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. His responsibilities include the formulation of Defense planning, guidance, and forces policy, Department of Defense relations with foreign relations and the Department’s role in the U.S. Government inter-agency policy making. From
March 1984 until September 1986, Mr. Feith served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy.

Also with us is Vice Admiral Robert Willard, the Director of Force Structure, Resources and Assessment at the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We had requested the Service Chiefs to testify before us, but understand that Vice Admiral Willard is representing their interests. Some of our questions may require detailed information.

The Commission respectfully asks that the information be provided for the record within 15 days of these questions -- those that cannot be adequately answered here today.

Now, it’s my understanding Mr. Feith will need to depart around 11:00 or shortly before 11:00. Okay. So, the Commissioners would first then like to address our questions to Mr. Feith and reserve the questions for Admiral Willard until such time as Mr. Feith departs or all questions to Mr. Feith have been addressed.

At this point I will begin the
questioning. Excuse me, I’m going to first call on you for your opening statement, Secretary Feith.

SECRETARY FEITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission. It’s good to have this opportunity to talk with you. I thought it would be useful to review for the Commission the strategic ideas that guided the work in our defense posture realignment.

When various ideas about realignment came to Secretary Rumsfeld, he said that he wanted to approach the subject strategically. He wanted to know what were the main thoughts that we should all have in our heads as we think about the numerous specific decisions that have to be made regarding realignment.

And I can summarize those main thoughts as follows:

First, we are interested in having a posture that expands allied roles and builds new partnerships with other countries.

The network of alliances and partnerships that we have around the world is one of our
principal strategic assets. And our ability to work with other countries is crucial to the accomplishment of many of our national security missions, including, in particular, prosecuting the war on terrorism.

And so, we wanted to have a posture that put us in a position where we can ensure that we are fulfilling our obligations to our allies and have the opportunity to work effectively with allies and partners around the world.

Second, develop flexibility to contend with uncertainty.

In some ways it may be the single most important or the most seminal strategic thought, this whole exercise, that we cannot predict the future.

As we have seen over and over again in the last dozen years and more that we have had to operate militarily -- whether it’s in combat or in humanitarian interventions or otherwise -- we have had to operate militarily in places that even a few weeks before we didn’t anticipate having to operate.
in.

The clearest examples from the recent period are Iraq back in 1990-91 and the Balkans. Certainly nobody expected to be at war in Afghanistan even a few hours before 9/11.

And we do not believe now, as we did during the Cold War, that we have a clear sense of where we’re going to have to operate. One of the principal ideas of the Cold War was that we were going to base our forces where we believed they were going to be needed to fight.

Now the concept is that we have to be flexible to be able to operate anywhere on short notice and that we’re going to have to, as it were, move to the fight.

I say fight, but I do want to emphasize that when we’re talking about military operations we’re not talking only about combat. We’re also talking about the kind of relief operation that was just done for the tsunami in South Asia or the kinds of interventions we’ve had in Haiti or Liberia recently.
In any event, the thought is we’re going to have to move to be able to operate, rather than assume that we’re based near the theater of operations.

Third, we no longer have the idea that the forces are regional. We no longer use the terminology that was popular that combatant commanders own certain forces.

One of the points that Secretary Rumsfeld makes is none of our commanders own forces. We have a single force. It is owned by the American people. It can be used anywhere in the world.

And we have to manage our force globally. And so, there will be forces in a region. But those forces don't belong to that region. And they have to be able to move anywhere in the world that’s required.

Fourth is the emphasis on rapidly deployable capabilities which, of course, ties into the point about flexibility to deal with uncertainty.

And, when we talk about rapidly deployable
capabilities there’s, of course, a lot in that concept. The emphasis on deployability means that there’s a premium on lightness.

And, for lighter forces to have greater effects than in the past, it’s important that those forces be precise. And, to be able to take advantage of the precision, we need better intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities. So, there is a lot that flows from this concept of flexibility and rapid deployability.

And then fifth, we’re focused on capabilities -- not numbers.

When we look at our -- the force posture that we had around the world at the beginning of this administration, what we saw was that it was largely the legacy of World War II and the Korean War, as you know.

And, after the Cold War, there were substantial reductions made, but they were basically reductions in place. And we wound up with about 100,000 forces in Europe and 100,000 in Asia.

And the figure 100,000 became something of
a totem. And people ascribed to that 100,000 number
great significance of the sign of our commitment to
our obligations, our allies in the area.

We have worked very hard to explain to
people that the key concept and the sign of our
commitment is the capabilities that we have in an
area or that we can bring into an area quickly.

And this idea of making a special fetish
of a number is a strategic mistake in light of the -
- of all the changes that have occurred in the
capabilities of forces over recent years.

Now, when we talk about our Global
Posture, we mean a lot more than basing. And one of
the things I -- you, Mr. Chairman, made the point
that your Commission is referred to as a base
commission. And this exercise of our Global Posture
realignment is often referred to as a change in
basing. But I think it’s important for me to stress
that, when we think about posture, and when we use
the term posture, we have more concepts in mind than
simply facilities.

Facilities is certainly one aspect of
posture. And, as you know, when we discuss facilities, we have three basic types of facilities in mind.

One is main operating bases; second is what we call forward operating sites, which involve less infrastructure, and they’re basically warm facilities that can be used for contingencies; and the third is what we call a cooperative security location, which is not necessarily any permanent U.S. presence with personnel, but perhaps just an upgrade of infrastructure that would allow us to operate through an area or to do combined exercises or combined operations with the host country.

So, the first aspect of posture is facilities. The second is activities. Here we believe that the work that we do exercising with other countries, training other countries, is a crucial part of our posture in an area.

The third aspect is relationships. When we want to operate in the world and the President and his top advisors sit around to decide which partners do we want to ask to cooperate with us on a
particular effort.

It turns out that the relationships that we have are really crucial, and the relationships come from things like regular meetings of top leaders, the kinds of meetings that we recently had here in Washington where the Japanese foreign and defense ministers came to meet with Secretary Rice and Secretary Rumsfeld. The military-to-military relationships that get created, those are all a key element of posture.

The fourth element is legal arrangements. One of the things that -- one of the lessons that we learned right after 9/11 was, when we were generously given facilities in Pakistan to support our operations in Afghanistan, we did not have the legal arrangements in place in the form of an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement that would allow us to reimburse the Pakistanis for the support they were providing us.

And we wound up running up hundreds of millions of dollars of bills. It was a terrible embarrassment and strain on the relationship. And
the Pakistanis were very nice and indulgent about it. But it was very uncomfortable from our point of view to owe them those sums and not be able to reimburse them. We finally got the acquisition of cross-servicing agreement in place.

But one of the things it drove home was how important it is to have in place in advance acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, status of forces agreements, Article 98 agreements under the -- that relate to the International Criminal Court Treaty and other types of protections and assurances of freedom of action, the whole range of legal arrangements so that we can operate with friends and partners as required.

And part of our posture realignment is getting that legal infrastructure in place around the world.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Mr. Feith, I need to interrupt you at this point because, in order to have time for a round of questions, I would like to take the remainder of your opening statement and enter it into the transcript of the hearing.
We do have it here. And, Admiral Willard, I’d like you to wait with your opening statement until the time that we question you. So, if we could proceed at this point with the questioning, if you agree please.

SECRETARY FEITH: Go ahead.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: I guess my first question would be in regard to the person that has the over-arching responsibility in regard to planning and implementation of IGPBS (Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy).

I take it that is your position, is that correct?

SECRETARY FEITH: I would say it’s the Secretary. But, we advise the Secretary on the posture realignment. And it’s actually a process that involves a lot of players, in particular including the combatant commanders.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Okay, next to the Secretary then, I assume that you would be the person most knowledgeable within the Department of Defense in regard to IGPBS as we ask our questions.
That’s really what I’m trying to determine.

SECRETARY FEITH: Well, I think I’m reasonably knowledgeable about the effort. But, as I said, it’s an effort that cuts across the whole department.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: My first question is in regard to the global basing or re-basing effort. You know, there’s not much question that gives us a posture to overcome the threats posed by the global war on terrorism. But how does this posture that’s currently envisioned enhance our capabilities to support a protracted conflict, our treaty and security commitments, and a challenge by near-peer competitors?

SECRETARY FEITH: You talked about protracted conflict, peer competitor, and what was the second item?

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Well, I think what I’m asking is in regard to a traditional threat. It seems that this alignment, some people think, is more to fight a global war on terrorism rather than to deal with traditional threats. So, that’s the
basis of my question.

SECRETARY FEITH: I see. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is not the way we see it. The concept behind the realignment is to be able to move forces effectively.

So, we want to have the kind of posture around the world that allows us to do the movement, support, sustaining of forces anywhere that they might have to operate, whether it’s for an operation in the war on terrorism or a -- as you put it -- a more conventional kind of conflict with a peer competitor.

And the other thought, as I said before, is that our view is -- however we might have to operate, in whatever type of conflict -- we are likely to want the ability to operate with allies and partners in coalition warfare.

And what we are doing with this posture realignment is aiming to increase our capability to work with other countries. And part of the reason we’re talking about creating the kinds of facilities that we have in mind is precisely to be able to
increase our ability to do training exercises, develop the relationships with other countries so that we make the opportunities for coalition warfare greater.

And I think all of that serves not just the purposes of the war on terrorism but the other purposes that you outlined.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: A public release of the list of overseas bases to be closed or vacated has not been made. And we can understand the reasons why.

When do you anticipate that an unclassified list of overseas base closings will be made available to this Commission?

SECRETARY FEITH: This gets into the important question of the process by which decisions about the posture realignment are being made. And I’m glad for the opportunity to point out that there is a -- evidently -- a rather widespread idea that the posture realignment at some point is going to reach the stage where a comprehensive set of decisions in effect gets handed down from an
Olympus. That’s not going to happen.

What we are doing is we have a number of ideas on how we want to move -- realign forces and change facilities. Each of those ideas requires engaging with the host countries.

And, depending on how the talks with those host countries go on a whole range of issues -- real estate issues and co-station support issues and freedom of action issues and this legal infrastructure that I was referring to -- and a whole set of considerations. Depending on how those talks go, we may not be able to do what we consider to be our first choice, in which case we’re going to have to be making adjustments.

And, since a lot of this, as you can imagine, is interconnected, if you adjust in one area, it’s going to cost us to have to make adjustments in another area.

So, what the Secretary has set up here is a rolling process where there will be -- and that’s why I don't think that there will be a time when we will be able to say to the Commission, okay, here is
the complete set of facilities that we’re changing, because different decisions and different areas depend on negotiations that are yet to occur with countries in other areas.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Well, in that regard, then would it be fair to say that there’s not really a cohesive plan, that there’s more of an over-arching outline of what you want to accomplish, and that the plan is still in flux? Or how would you state that?

SECRETARY FEITH: No, I would say that there is a plan. But the plan takes into account that key decisions are going to be affected by what other governments do.

And so -- we can't impose ourselves on other countries. And the plan is to pursue certain ideas that we think are workable. Whether they’re ultimately implementable will hinge on the negotiations, the consultations that we have with other countries.

By the way, we have had very extensive consultations in every theater around the world,
every region around the world -- with countries -- on the strategic concepts behind the realignment and the specific interest that we have in those countries in changing our posture.

And so, at this point, I think we have a general idea of the receptiveness of countries to our basic ideas. But there are always details to be worked out.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Well, I notice that most of the actions, at least sizeable, that are going to take place within IGPBS have been announced in regard to the President’s announcements and other notices that we have noticed in the press.

So, I guess I’m in a little bit of a quandary to understand if -- as you remove forces from a place with the idea that you may not be able to relocate there, that we’re implementing actions at this point, are we in some cases doing it ahead of those agreements that you mentioned being made?

SECRETARY FEITH: Any action we take is going to be based on having what we considered to be our minimum requirements in a given place. Let me
see if I can give you an example or two.

In some cases, we’ve talked with countries about their willingness to take perhaps a deployment of some forces into their territory. And they’ve said, yes, in principal, they’re happy to do it.

But then we get into legal discussions with them about our ability to deploy out of the country under different circumstances. As you know, we have arrangements with some countries that put limits on our ability to deploy.

In some cases -- in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries, for example -- there are limits that, if it’s a NATO mission, then the countries can deploy freely. But if it’s not a NATO mission, then there are certain governmental permissions that are required before we can deploy.

We need clarification on circumstances like that, because we don't want to be in a position where we have forces forward deployed and then we can't use them in a contingency.

If we’ve decided that we want forces in an area and it just depends on working out these legal
arrangements, then, once the legal arrangements get made, we can go forward.

If they don't get made, then the unit that we were planning to put in is going to have to go elsewhere, and we will have to talk to other countries.

It is clear to us that we have a lot of options. There are lots of countries that are very eager to cooperate with us on the posture realignment.

In fact -- I mean, one of the more interesting aspects, as we’ve gone around the world in the very extensive consultations that we’ve had, is how countries in many cases are pressing us to do a lot more in their country than we are currently contemplating doing.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Why are force movements being accomplished now before BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) has decided the final destination of CONUS (Continental United States)-bound forces?

SECRETARY FEITH: On the issue of BRAC --
and Admiral Willard may want to jump in here and add a point -- the BRAC process, as you know, is moving forward according to the statute.

What was necessary to support the BRAC process, with regard to this Global Posture realignment, was our providing last summer the -- what we believed was going to be the gross number of forces, family members, and contractors that we anticipated would be coming from overseas to back to the United States as a result of the realignment.

And, while a lot of the details, as I said, remain to be worked out, we did have a sense of -- we think -- a pretty good sense of what that gross number was.

And it’s about 70,000 military members coming back, and approximately 100,000 family members and contractors coming back. That is what was necessary to feed into the BRAC process to allow the BRAC process to proceed, you know, according to its rules.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Okay, thank you. What I’m going to do at this time is I’m going to cease
my questioning. I want to increase the time for
Commissioners to 12 minutes, Mr. Timer.

And I want to go to Commissioner Curtis to
question.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Mr. Feith, we’re
looking at some pretty lean budget years ahead of
us. You know that better than I do. We’ve been
through those before.

And there’s always great pressure on O&M
(Operations and Maintenance) funds in lean budget
years because that’s where the closest payback comes
from. The idea of rotational forces depends heavily
upon O&M funds to accomplish the rotation.

And they seem to me to be one of the
potential big target in future years as that portion
of the budget goes. And particularly so since the
supported commander, the customer, if you will, of
the rotational forces -- it’s not necessarily the
guy who funds them, as I understand the process.

Will you share with us your thoughts on
how we’ll be able to consistently support the
rotational requirements of IGPBS and these tight
budget years? And also, your ideas on how we will allow these rotational -- the funds to support rotational forces to compete effectively within the budget process.

I understand they can’t be protected. But, you know, their ability to compete is important.

SECRETARY FEITH: General Curtis, your point about rotational forces is correct. There is a -- one of the themes of the realignment is that we are going to have, generally, a lighter footprint around the world.

And this is part of the strategic idea of being able to work more effectively with our friends and partners. We have found that, as eager as many of our partners are to work with us, there are problems, irritations that come into the relationship from having an excessively heavy footprint.

So there has been a stress on removing those irritations and lightening the footprint. And so there is a greater emphasis on rotational forces.
That’s also -- the ability to reach, touch many of our partners around the world is increased if we have more rotations.

And so there is a, I think, strong strategic rationale for the idea of rotations. Now, as to the specific point on how the O&M money connects to that, I think I’ll ask Admiral Willard to address that.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Thank you, sir. I think when you describe lean and O&M: I think our O&M accounts across the Services have been pretty well protected in these budget years.

And I think this current President’s budget is a good illustration of that. So -- from an O&M account, readiness account concern -- the Services are in pretty good shape.

When we talk about rotational forces overseas, we’re really talking competition among the COCOMs (Combatant Commanders) and priorities around the world. And the COCOMs get a vote in this.

Through their Service components, they are actually employing their rotational forces. And
their priorities, and certainly the Department’s priorities around the world, pretty much dictate where the rotational forces may ebb and flow over time.

So, from a budgetary standpoint, I think our readiness accounts are pretty secure. From a rotational force standpoint, I think the combatant commanders are very much interested in the exercise requirements and the presence requirements that they desire be maintained.

They articulate those, I think, pretty soundly to the Secretary. And, by and large, those requirements are being met, or will attempt to be met in the future current operations.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Okay, thank you. A second question that’s related, and that deals with mobility -- clearly more rotational forces implies more strategic lift.

And although we clearly -- they’re referenced to lighten the forces. Things like armor on support vehicles makes both the Army and Marine forces potentially heavier than they’ve been in the
past, rather than lighter.

And, I’d like your comments on whether the 10-30-30 requirements, you know, for two successive activities, and the other impacts on strategic lift, are being adequately addressed.

And the Mobility Capability Study that’s underway -- and, assuming they are, your assessment of the likelihood of funding those strategic airlift capabilities in the future.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The Mobility Capability Study is due to readout within the Department at the end of March. And, indeed, it does view into the capability of our strategic lift forces to accommodate both major combat operations, as well as deployments around the world in peace time and contingency, as well.

So, that study is indeed going to inform, as you suggest, the program with regard to strategic lift. I’m not sure that IGPBS, the Global Posture strategy, is necessarily placing more demand on strategic lift and mobility than we currently experience.
There is, in fact, shaping going on among the Services to make themselves lighter, more rapidly deployable. While there are some forces returning to CONUS, in particular Army from Europe, they are going to be modularized into brigade combat teams that should be -- meet our deployability requirements.

So I think, on the whole, our ability to take the future force -- which is really the modular and future forces of our ground components, the fleet response plan, postured maritime component, and the air expeditionary force air component -- I think we will have a force that will be accommodated by what is programmed -- and what will be informed by the Mobility Capability Study to be programmed in the future -- with regard to meeting those speed constructs, 10-30-30, as you described.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Right. And -- I’ve watched the strategic lift process for many years. And frequently it doesn't work out as planned for a whole lot of reasons.

Will the re-basing of our forces, the
IGPBS, be paced by the availability of strategic
lift as it actually comes on line rather than as
currently programmed?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Paced by it? I
don't think so. When you view into the Global
Posture construct, which has elements of forward
operating sites and our cooperative security
locations around the world, those are accesses and
partnerships that we desire regardless of the state
of play, necessarily, of our strategic lift forces.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: I understand.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: They are certainly
the sites in which our strategic lift forces may
access and where our rotational forces may, in fact,
go. But, in terms of the program -- strategic lift
program necessarily pacing IGPBS, I don't think so.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Okay. Thank you.

SECRETARY FEITH: There's also -- when we
think about lift -- there's also the plans that have
-- we've worked on incorporating into the re-
posturing, to have facilities along what we consider
to be likely major transport routes so that we can
service our aircraft, our ships so that we can pre-
position wisely.

One element of what we’re doing is looking
seriously at the whole pre-positioning issue and
getting the pre-positioning done in the right places
and in the right configurations.

And, you know, all of that is with the
overall concept of lift capability in mind.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Less?

COMMISSIONER LESS: Moving to a Pol-Mil
(Political-Military) geopolitical-type question, I
guess, more along those lines: clearly the Global
Posture Review is a work in progress, a mechanism,
as you point out very nicely in your opening
statement, to do what we need to do with
relationships and so forth.

Do you see a need for increasing or
additional U.S. presence in different areas of the
world, from a geopolitical perspective, and why?

SECRETARY FEITH: The -- you use the term
“presence,” which I think is a good, rich term. It
has all the same facets, I think, as the concept of
“posture” that I was talking about before.

I think we do need to have a presence, in one way or another, all over the world. That doesn't mean having facilities all over the world. It doesn't mean having our forces stationed all over the world.

But, the idea that we are present, either through the relationships that we have -- the bilateral defense meetings, the Mil-to-Mil exchanges -- or we’re doing operations or combined exercises, for example, in an area.

Or we’re doing -- to take on a recent initiative that the -- of the President, the Global Peace Operations Initiative, where we’re talking about training forces in various parts of the world to do peace operations.

All of those are part of presence. And I would add: one additional element of posture, of presence is surge capability. And we believe that when we talk about the key concept being capabilities -- not numbers -- one of the things we have in mind is we have an effective presence in an
area if we have the ability to surge rapidly the
capabilities required into that area.

And I think the tsunami relief is an
element of a very successful surge capability being
used for humanitarian purposes. And we need to have
that kind of surge capability for the whole range of
military operations up through combat.

COMMISSIONER LESS: About, okay, permanent
presence in certain areas -- I specifically talk to
the CENTCOM AOR -- do you think it’s necessary for
stability in that region? And, if so, why?

SECRETARY FEITH: The -- I mean, as you
know, we have recently gone the opposite way in some
cases. In Saudi Arabia we -- after the main combat
in Iraq, we lightened our footprint and moved out of
Prince Sultan Air Base.

In some places, a permanent presence, and
especially a substantial permanent presence, can do
more harm than good to the relationship. In other
places, a proper degree of presence can be very
helpful.

I don't feel comfortable answering it for
an entire region. It kind of depends, you know, place by place. You make calculations about what is welcome, what is best suited to serve common interests between us and our partners, and it varies.

COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you. In Europe then -- I understand your not wanting to take it on as an entire region, but let’s switch to NATO. Participation in NATO -- at the troop level -- with the current plans, I think, will have a tendency to perhaps degrade the status of NATO.

As NATO attempts to transform to meet the challenge of the post-Cold War, will our U.S. presence and leadership and participation be sufficient in numbers to ensure that NATO does remain relevant or a relevant alliance?

And is there any way -- as, I guess, a follow-on sort of thing -- any metric or any way that you can come up with to measure that?

SECRETARY FEITH: Well, Admiral, the point that you raise was very much at the fore of our minds as we were doing our work on the realignment.
We understood that there was a danger that people would see the kinds of adjustments that we’re making in Europe, in particular, as a retrenchment, as a degrading of the status of NATO, as you put it.

That is emphatically not our intention. And I do not believe it will be the effect of what it is we’re doing. And we’ve worked very hard in the way we have thought about the realignment, and the way we’ve conducted our consultations with our European allies to ensure that we avoid the pitfalls that I think you rightly warn about.

We consider NATO enormously important. I would say that, in fact, it is one of the major motivations for the whole posture realignment: that we were concerned that if we did not make the kinds of changes that we’re talking about, it could endanger the alliance because the alliance -- we had a posture in Europe that was based on a different era, and it’s expensive to maintain. It caused various problems. I’ll give you an example of one immediate problem that related to the quality of life of our forces.
Germany is a wonderful, hospitable place for our forces. It has been for decades. People liked being stationed there. And they liked having their families there.

Lately we find that, when families moved to Germany and then the servicemember deploys to Afghanistan or Iraq or some other place, the family is not so delighted now being separated from its extended family in the United States.

And it’s basically a double separation. They’re separated from the servicemember and they’re separated from their extended family. And this is quite a hardship for our forces and their families.

The adjustments that we are making in Europe are going to put NATO in a position where it has more relevant capabilities because we’re taking the forces that are less relevant to the contingencies of the future, we believe, and the heavier forces out.

We’re going to be putting forward more deployable, more technologically capable, more militarily relevant forces. When I personally
conducted some of the consultations with the Germans on the changes that we’re making, and the German Government officials were not merely resigned to the changes we were making: they were enthusiastically supporting changes that we were making because they understood that it represented a commitment to the bilateral relationship with Germany and to the broader relationship with NATO.

I mean, it is interesting that Prime Minister (German Chancellor) Schroeder’s advisor, Karsten Voigt -- when the issue of posture came up and was asked, is the United States undermining the relationship with Germany and NATO by the posture realignment -- said, this is positive.

Let’s not make a crisis out of something that is, in reality, a success story. It’s an expression of the fact that the Cold War is over and that Europe’s division has been eliminated.

And, as I said, I think, at the end of the day, when we make the kinds of changes that we’re making in the posture -- together with the kinds of changes that we’re making in NATO, with the reform
of NATO and the streamlining of NATO’s command structure, the creation of the NATO response force, and other kinds of really useful changes that we’ve made over the last few years -- we are going to be in a position to ensure that NATO remains capable and sustainable and relevant for the future.

Because we value the alliance enormously, and we do not want to see it become a white elephant.

COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you, sir. I knew that, throwing a softball like that, you would pick up on it quite happily. I appreciate that. I have no further questions.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Taylor?

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I’d like to return to resources for a moment. But, as you know better than most, the Department and the Services are extremely busy with a number of things right now: the Base Realignment and Closure coming up, the Mobility Capabilities Study, which you already mentioned, QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review), this Global Reposturing, the Service transformations that
are all ongoing, rebalancing and resetting the forces that are coming back and going back and forth to the war, the overall global war on terrorism, and -- as well as what’s happening in OIF (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) and OEF (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM).

Some people would say that the resources required to do all that may be a bit difficult to obtain -- especially the people we represent that have to produce those resources.

What are you prepared to give up in order to meet all these competing resource demands? Or do you plan on giving up anything?

(No verbal response.)

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: And I would just add one other thing. As you know, although we’re not involved in it, as you bring forces -- those 70,000 -- back, they have to go some place.

And these places may not be prepared to take them. And there’s got to be money set aside for that. And, as we’ve been told, that all comes out of the Service’s budget right now.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Well, there
actually has been a resource in place to cover some
of the BRAC expenses for some time over the FYDP
(Future Years Defense Plan). So, in fact, where
those forces that are redeploying back to CONUS will
go is part of the ongoing BRAC study.

And, as you’re very familiar, BRAC always
has a cost associated with it. But, more
importantly, in the out-years there’s a considerable
savings that the Department hopes to then gain, as
well.

So, your point is taken. The comment
regarding choices that will have to be made in order
to resource the many things that are ongoing in the
Department right now is, obviously, a valid one.

And part of the Defense Review that has
commenced -- and will be completed in a year, or so
-- is intended to inform that. The Global Posture
will come with a cost. I mean, there’s obviously
resources that have to be put into this.

And we recognize that. And, while there
are amounts associated with BRAC, there are
estimates right now that are going right now that
may vary and change as the negotiations flow over the coming year and years.

The off-sets for those will have to be competed across the Department and across, as you say, the Services. The purpose of the Defense Review -- which is probably central to answering your question -- is intended to look at a variety of different things.

But central to it is a capability mix study that’s intended to attempt to reshape the Department -- the military forces -- to be more adaptable to both the traditional and less traditional challenges that we’re going to face in the future.

And this includes adapting that force to the Global Posture that we’re discussing here today. In addition, the Quadrennial Defense Review is intended to account for the trades that have to be made to accomplish that capability mix in the future.

And I think it will be successful in doing that. And captured in that are all of the moving
SECRETARY FEITH: If I may, General: you make a point that the Secretary makes all the time. And it’s an important point. I’m glad you raised it. I mean, everything involves choices.

And if you’re going to take on new missions, it’s important to think about how -- what are the things that you’re doing that aren’t as important, that you can stop?

Or, what are the things that you’re doing that are important but you can get other people to do? And, in some cases, we know that other people can do things that fall now to the U.S. military to do.

And other people can do them, in some cases, much better or more efficiently. And, to give you an example of how we’re thinking along those lines, the President has just created in the State Department an Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization.

And part of the idea behind that office is to get the U.S. Government organized, government-
wide, to be able to handle reconstruction and stabilization missions, and to have the people lined up, to have plans to be able to deploy civilians, to be able to do crucial missions: getting water systems going or electrical systems going in places, or setting up municipal administration or law enforcement apparatus somewhere.

Right now many of those missions fall to the military. But the military is not best suited to do them. And it would be an excellent thing for the U.S. Government to get much better organization to do them.

That office is being created at the State Department. I think it has great promise. We are supporting it and there are ideas that it’s studying: for example, the concept of possibly a civilian reserve that can come in to assist in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

I do not know if that’s practical. I do not know if it’s affordable. But, if it existed, one imagines it could relieve stress on our force -- on our military forces.
So there’s a way of looking inter-agency at how we can get certain missions that are now ours -- for the military -- done elsewhere and better. And then there’s also the idea of doing it internationally.

And the President’s Global Peace Operations Initiative is a -- an example of an effort to build international capacity to do peace operations -- and, in particular, those that are on the higher end: what are called peace enforcement, as opposed to just mere peacekeeping.

Right now, as you know, if there’s a peacekeeping-type operation that’s required to be done somewhere in the world -- and you need a few thousand forces to go in in four weeks -- how many countries in the world can do that? Very, very few.

There is a real premium in moving quickly, in some of these international crises, to prevent the crisis from becoming a war. But that creates a bind for us because we understand the importance of moving quickly.

But, if you have to move quickly -- and
we’re just about the only country in the world that can move quickly -- then everything falls on us.

Well, one of the ways we’re trying to deal with that is we’re talking about a plan that the President has laid out and has talked about doing jointly with the other G-8 countries: to get, over then next five years, 75,000 peacekeeping troops from various countries around the world trained up so that they have the capability and rapid deployment capability so that we’re not the only country in the world that you can call on when you need that kind of a job done.

So, I want to re-emphasize how important the point you raised is and how we’re trying to think it through from many angles, including the way we can get better organized -- inter-agency and internationally -- to handle the kinds of missions that are necessary for our country.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: To follow on with that -- and also to come back to a comment you made earlier about this being more of a process rather than us coming down with the answer -- it would seem
there are a number of unknowns out there.

The MCS (Mobility Capability Study) that you’ve talked about -- we’ve received a little different timeline than what you just told us. We’re glad to know that it’s going to be out in March. But that -- a number of other studies that are ongoing -- QDR -- would seem to have some impact on what you finally decide to do.

How critical is timing on this, from your standpoint? How quickly? As we travel around the world, we have different timelines that are posited for us there, you know.

But how quickly does this all have to happen? And what would be the impact of slowing it down and waiting for some answers to appear before irrevocable decisions are made?

SECRETARY FEITH: I’m sure that Admiral Willard would want to comment on this also. I would simply say that there are so many parts to this realignment that I don't think we can say that they are all urgent or none is urgent.

Some are more urgent than others. And
there are certain things that we’re interested in doing now -- that we believe are within the art of the possible now, for which the resources exist now -- that we would like to get moving on.

There are other things that we know, for any one of a number of reasons, are going to take many years to get underway. I think that certain things that we want to do promptly we will want to move out on, even before the QDR gets done.

But it is quite clear that, for the items that are longer lead-time items, the QDR will be able to inform our work on those longer lead-time items and may cause us to rethink or adjust our plans.

So it’s not that everything is going to go without reference to the QDR, and it’s not that everything’s going to have to wait on the QDR.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Yes, that’s actually well-stated. There are some imperatives out there that the combatant commanders are highly interested in seeing advanced faster than others.

There are other longer term plans
associated with the Global Posture that will occur across the FYDP. And, when we look at QDR and MCS and the other studies that you allude to, those are intended to inform the program.

So, those are intended to kind of take us from FY (Fiscal Year) 07 through the out-years. And the QDR is, I think, typically a 20-year look. The Secretary has asked the Department to view into -- five to 20 years into the future.

And so there’s already pretty good alignment, I think, between the IGPBS initiative -- which the combatant commanders played very heavily in in order to have their needs met in view of our future strategies -- and the ongoing studies and the future program.

I mean, it’s all designed to come together, I think, pretty well.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Mr. Chairman, I have one more that will take just a second, just for the record, on this business about what will come down from another.

If you read the paper, some say that on
the 16th of May the Secretary will give his recommendations where all the forces from the overseas IGPBS will be going.

I take from your comment that that will not happen.

SECRETARY FEITH: I believe you may be referring to the BRAC.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Sir, there’s -- a part of the BRAC submission will be a force structure submission that is due on the 15th of March.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: You know better than we.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The force structure is BRAC-related. So, to align that with IGPBS -- the larger Global Posture -- I think, would be incorrect. That is intended to provide a view of the planned force structure across the Services, across the Future Years Defense Plan, which BRAC must accommodate, which is the alignment between the two.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Martin?
COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Admiral: You both stressed flexibility in your comments as a goal of the posture view and system.

And, as we understand it, there is a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, and a National Military Strategy, the latter of which we have not seen yet.

We understand it was to be published, and then it was withdrawn and has not yet been fielded. How -- in your view, Mr. Secretary -- does global re-basing facilitate two particular elements, 1-4-2-1 and the 10-30-30, given the Iraq experience? I have some serious questions about those.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The 1-4-2-1 current strategy -- first of all, the strategies, across the board, that you allude to are extremely important to us and the combatant commanders in terms of planning and alignment with not only the future, in terms of defense planning, but the present as well.

The 1-4-2-1, which is our current force sizing construct, and the 10-30-30, which is our
current speed construct -- both intended, really, to inform how we plan for future warfights -- are being analyzed through a series of operational availability studies, the most recent of which is reading out this month, Operational Availability 05.

And we’re validating that, in fact, the future force structure and our future programs, that combine into our military capability, can meet those constructs.

I would also say that, while those strategies are currently informing the Defense Review that’s ongoing, one of the outcomes of the Defense Review is intended to be a validation of or a recommendation for changes to those constructs, as well.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: That was the follow-on question. Would there be the possibility of change in those strategies based on the outcomes of those views that are ongoing at OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) and within the National Security Council?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Before I turn it
over to Secretary Feith, I’d tell you that one of
the things that has been most impressive, I think,
in the Pentagon in the last several years has been
the flexibility, the willingness to see -- whether
it’s the world changing around us and current
operations, or the future challenges changing in
terms of our view of the future world -- the
willingness to look into our own strategies and our
own plans and change those, as well, and even adjust
our military capabilities across the board if that’s
what’s needed.

So, I would venture to say, yes, that the
Secretary, in particular, emphasizes the need to be
aware of what is changing and be willing to change
to adapt to it if need be.

SECRETARY FEITH: That is certainly
correct. I mean, this is a fine thing and it’s also
a major source of work for us that the Secretary,
whenever he adopts a set of strategic ideas on any
subject, is inclined to look at them -- often within
a few months.

And I’m not sure that in the four years
that I’ve been in this job that the Secretary has ever looked at a set of strategic concepts, key assumptions, courses of action -- that he approved, that’s a few months old -- and when he looks at them again, hasn’t decided that they need to be changed.

He’s a very big believer in updating everything -- and especially anything that’s called a strategy -- on a rolling basis.

And so, I think that you could be confident that every piece of work that we do that creates a new thought, brings in a new concept, is going to be used as a way of reexamining all the other major pieces of work within the Department. It’s just the way the Secretary operates.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: My second question probably presages my Reserve Component background. There’s such a thing as a pyrrhic victory where you win a battle and lose the war because there’s nobody left to fight afterwards.

How much emphasis has been placed -- and this is both policy and a uniform question -- has been placed on really understanding the recruiting
and retention dynamic across the Services -- AC and RC, Active Component and Reserve Component -- particularly when we begin the process and lean forward toward using rotational forces that are posited to include Reserve Components.

We’ve heard from everyone we talk to that stability and predictability are two components of what it takes to maintain a strong, trained, ready force.

And we’re wondering if that’s cracking around the edges right now.

SECRETARY FEITH: It’s a very important question. As you know, I’m not the personnel guy. But I know that as we’ve been doing our work on the posture realignment, we have been focused on how the changes we are making are going to affect quality of life for the forces.

I alluded earlier to this point that I think is not often focused on: When people talk about rotational presence, what I think they frequently are thinking about is, we’re taking servicemembers away from their families.
And, as I was pointing out, what we’ve noticed is the kinds of deployments that we have sometimes aggravate that problem with these so-called permanent stationing of people with their families in places that are abroad but not where the servicemembers have to operate.

And the work that is being done on the posture realignment, as Admiral Willard was alluding to before, is connected to the work that General Schoomaker (Chief of Staff Army) is doing in the reorganization of the Army.

The overall affect of changing the -- you know, this concept of unit of deployment, the modularity concept -- the overall affect of those changes and the posture realignment changes should be and is intended to be -- and General Schoomacher says it will be -- more predictability and more stability for forces than has existed to date.

There will be fewer permanent changes of station over the course of a career. And there will be a, just in general, greater stability for the servicemembers and their families.
And that’s been very much at the fore of the Secretary’s mind as we’ve been making the changes. As I said, these pieces fit together; the posture realignment, the Army re-organization changes are of a piece.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The Active force’s retention and recruitment right now appears to be very healthy. In the Reserve Component, there are some challenges.

And we’re watching it very carefully. It’s being trended. There are adjustments in the active Reserve mix that are being made and have been made. Tens of thousands of Reservist -- Reserve and Active adjustments being made to try to accommodate the force rotations in the current environment that are most stressing on the Reserve force.

So, there have been some transfers of responsibility we’ve taken in the course of some of the lesser-demand Reserve forces and shifted those into greater-demand areas.

So it is being reviewed, and recruitment and retention are also being incentivised. So, I
mean, there are a lot of initiatives in play. And we’re watching, again, particularly our Reserve and Guard components carefully, mainly driven by the current op tempo.

But the AC/RC mix -- the Active and Reserve mix, and getting that right -- is one of the important ingredients of the upcoming Defense Review. And, as I stated, it’s already being adjusted, as we see the need to adjust it, based on current operations.

The modularity concept is intended to reduce the stress on, particularly, the ground force -- to include the Reserves in the ground force -- whenever they’re in a rotational environment, like the one they’re in now, and not garrisoned during peacetime.

And by that -- by transitioning from that division-centric Army to a more brigade combat teams-centric force and increasing the number of brigade combat teams significantly across the Army, the force rotation ratio is predicted to improve.

And I think the (rotation ratio) numbers
are 1:2 to 1:5 -- I’m sorry, one to two (1:2) to one to five (1:5), over time, Active and Reserve -- so there’s a lot of concern to stay on top of exactly where we are with regard to recruitment or retention across the force.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much, Admiral Willard. I’ll yield the basis and balance of my time so the other commissioners can maybe get a follow-up to Mr. Feith.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Well, I would ask, in the interest of time, rather than going around the table individually, just -- Is there a commissioner who has a follow-up question that is pressing?

(No verbal response.)

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Okay. What I’d like to do then is close the --

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Just one additional one on how we care for the forces that are returning to the United States. Well, I understand your point about military forces being deployed and leaving their families on foreign soil and their extended family here at home.
Some of them, due to great work by folks like yourself, are living in some pretty nice places. They’re going to have to come back to some places in the United States that may not be adequately prepared for them, both in terms of the infrastructure that is located within the fences of the base where they’re going or the community in which they are going to go.

I would hope there’s some type of plan not to bring them back to those communities until they are ready to take care of them. Can you assure us that there is such a plan?

(No verbal response.)

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Because -- since the Congress doesn't know where they’re going and the people who are going to be receiving them don't know they’re coming, there can be little program and then planning and budgeting for that, at this time.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Yes, again, because it’s part of the BRAC process and it’s on -- you know -- the decisions are ongoing and the resource decisions are linked very closely to that, and those
resource decisions will affect timing, I can't give you an exact answer.

But I would tell you that the Army, in particular, because of the returning divisions from Europe, is very focused on where those divisions will be accommodated and the necessary improvements to the infrastructures around those.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Really, the question I'm asking you is about timing. Can we be assured that we'll not bring them back until the facilities are available for them -- adequate facilities are available for them?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think I'd prefer to get an answer from the Army on that particular question. If what you're alluding to is --

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I'm asking about all Services, not just the Army.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Yes.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I know the Army makes up the majority of the force coming back. But it affects more than just the Army. Okay, thank you.
CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Mr. Secretary, I understand you’ve announced your departure from the Department this summer. And, before I thank you for your service, I would like to ask one question about the replacement, the individual that would be overseeing IGPBS after your departure.

Evidently -- you’ve probably identified someone that has the knowledge that you do of the process that will be taking your position.

SECRETARY FEITH: My principal deputy, Ryan Henry, is thoroughly knowledgeable about the subject, and he will help provide continuity. And then -- one would hope that somebody will actually be confirmed in this job before I leave.

But that’s out of the executive branch’s control completely. Anyway, we’ll hope that that gets done and the new person will be able to get up to speed quickly.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Okay. Well, I’d like to thank you for your leadership and your visionary planning while you’ve been at the Department. I’d like to thank you for being here today as a courtesy
to us, and also to express, you know, our great appreciation for the cooperation that we receive from Policy and from the Department and from the Combatant Commands.

Also, I am impressed by your expression of willingness to change or make course corrections as you go through this process. My earlier question about cohesive planning was not one which you would be so constricted to a plan that you would not make corrections. I thank you for that clarification.

Admiral Willard, I hope you can spend a few more minutes with us. We will provide transportation for you, if necessary.

So, Secretary Feith, thank you very much for appearing here today.

SECRETARY FEITH: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to commend the Commission for the seriousness that you bring to your work and the contribution that you’re making to this complex issue of our posture realignment. And it’s good to work with you. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Excuse me. I turned
my microphone off. One last thing on the threats. We would like to receive some more information in regard to threats.

We have received some. But we would like more in regard to the overall planning of IGPBS and relative to threats. Thank you. Admiral, would you mind if we just took a five minute break?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Not at all, sir.

Thanks.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 10:22 a.m. and went back on the record at 10:34 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Admiral, first of all, I’d like to thank you for your patience with our process today. With the other schedule we were trying to allow as much time as we could for Secretary Feith.

But I’d ask you at this point if you have an opening statement you’d like to make or submit.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Nothing formal, sir. I would just like to say that, having returned to the Pentagon from the Pacific theater six months
ago, and having been there when the IGPBS process was in play from the standpoint of the Pacific commander and his desires in terms of submission of requirements back to the building, I’m a fan.

I think the military value of what you’re overseeing in this process is exceedingly good. I think that the traditional, you know, future competitor is accommodated in this.

In fact, in many cases, this will improve our ability to flex to various, you know, contingency spots in the future. And the fact that it realigns partnerships and realigns or accommodates accesses for us may preclude the need that we’ve seen in the past to conduct hasty negotiations to gain access or to gain overflight rights when contingencies do, in fact, erupt.

So this, you know, there’s a great deal of goodness, I think, in what you’re overseeing here.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. I’m going to proceed to the far right to Commissioner Curtis to begin questioning.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Admiral, I was
delighted with your comments and the Secretary’s comments over the fact that IGPBS is more of an evolving process than a single plan.

And I’m pleased that it’s something clearly that will -- you envision as something that will change as it evolves. Since it’s posturing us right now for something after 2010, which is when the last pieces of it seem to fall in place, I’d ask you, how do you plan to institutionalize this process as something that continues over time rather than what we have seen before where we kind of just ignore the overseas basing structure in any fundamental way?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think I’d like to consider that it’s institutionalized now; that it’s, in fact, the solicitation of the combatant commanders’ requirements

And part of those requirements are where he seeks access or seeks to have the capability to work with a coalition partner. That is part of the ongoing submission from the Combatant Command to the Department.
And I would perhaps emphasize it this way.

We recently collected Integrated Priority List inputs from all the combatant commanders. The European commander specified in his IPLs -- is what they’re termed -- these requirements that have to do with European command, and specifically his desires with regard to a Global Posture and force rotations.

So he was identifying some of his needs -- if he sees that lacking an opportunity to access or partner with a coalition partner is a gap, is missing in his particular area of responsibility.

So, while I can't refer you to a document associated with the institutionalization of this, I think the fact that this has been ongoing now for a number of years and the combatant commanders feel a sense of ownership associated with the Global Posture laydown input that they have made and that has been identified for their AORs (Areas of Responsibility), that it will be ongoing.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Does that mean this essentially is institutionalized as part of the QDR process? Or will the QDR process move on
VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: In the portion of the QDR that will examine capability mix, part of that examination is intended to determine that the capability mix is accommodated in this process.

So, much as we’ve alluded to, you know, the fact that this is a process and it is subject to reconsideration -- subject to review, ongoing -- this is intended to help inform the current Defense Review process.

And the two are complimentary. I think they’ll play off of one another as we examine or redefine a capability mix for the armed force -- the fact that those rapidly deployable forces and the defense planning scenarios, the contingency planning guidance, that currently exists out there must be accommodated.

We’ll make a determination as to whether or not the force posture, the global laydown, can accommodate them. I would also say that in our ongoing analysis, the analytical agenda that you may or may not have heard, is fundamental to this
capabilities-based planning effort in the Department.

In the Operational Availability studies, they are viewing our capability to conduct operations in out-years beyond the program. And they take into account accesses that IGPBS have identified.

And if that access is shown to be lacking in some way, then that reads out as an output from the OA (Operational Availability) study. And it can go on to become the basis for a review of this particular initiative.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Okay. And one other quick question: When we saw General Jones (Commander, U.S. European Command), both he and his staff made a point of the importance of the CSLs (Cooperative Security Locations) in Africa.

When we take the overall map and look at it, the one place that jumps out at you is the lack of CSLs in the South American region. I’m not saying that’s bad, but I’m interested in your comments on the lack of CSLs in South America.
VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I guess I would only point out that they’re certainly part of the plan, and part of this process, and that the Southern Command commander has made his inputs with regard to where the basing and access and partnerships should be established throughout South America.

So, there have in, fact, been steps forward in Southern Command. And, while not as robust appearing right now as the European emphasis on the African continent, we see it as a step forward.

And the Southern Command commander right now is enthusiastic about what he gains in the way that he’s modified his accesses in South America.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Perhaps we have just not seen the extent of the CSLs that are planned down there. So, perhaps we’ll come back in and ask to see those.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Okay. We’d be happy to kind of share what those plans are.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you very much,
Admiral. That’s all I have.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Curtis?

(No verbal response.)

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Less?

COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, you’ve come a long way since you used to fly my wing and I used to try to run you out of fuel. But, I would like to get a couple of -- all your experience in the Pacific theater.

I would like to get you focused on a specific or two that has caused the Commission some concern during the course of our travels. And I cite a couple specific locations, like China and the Taiwan Straits and the Korean theater.

One question or one area, specifically, that I -- and it’s making the press even today when we’re talking about the SM3 (Standard Missile III) version of ballistic missile defense, and that sort of thing.

But -- it was a few years ago when I was on the Joint Staff, and I remember meeting in China at the Embassy with Ambassador Lord, back in those
days -- I guess that was mid-80s -- when he laid out the Chinese philosophy for the future.

    And the Chinese philosophy for the future was: Don't worry about anything other than the economy right now. And let’s get it squared away, and then we’ll get to other things.

    And they got their economy pretty well on track. And I don’t know. There are probably arguments that it’s not fully squared away. But they’ve sure come a long way.

    And, now they’re into some of those other things, looking at some of those other things. And there’s a threat there. In your Pacific experiences, and so forth, can you talk to us a little bit about what we’re -- one of our major concerns. And that is theater ballistic missile defense and deterrence factor, both in the Chinese-Taiwan Strait area as well as into the North Korean No-Dong threat, that sort of thing, and where we really are, and what IGPBS is doing to deter/prevent that threat on our forces and/or our nation?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The Pacific plan, I
think, took focus -- and rightly so -- out of
Northeast Asia, where it was almost expressly based
on the Korean Peninsula, and the ongoing armistice
in existence there and the threat that that posed south.

And the IGPBS initiative that Admiral
Fargo (Commander, U.S. Pacific Command) has espoused
-- and that is, you know, currently part of the
process -- is now focused on a broader view of
partnerships and accesses in the Pacific.

And, you know, we’ve obviously emphasized
our territory of Guam and even the Hawaiian Islands
and what Pearl Harbor bring. When we view
holistically the Pacific Global Posture portion,
it’s pretty robust and we believe is exactly the
focus necessary to be of deterrent value and attempt
to maintain the security environment status quo that
we seek in the Pacific.

So I’m very much, again, a fan of this
process. And I was very much committed to the
changes that we were making in the Pacific. And I
think we’ve got it about right.
With regard to missile defense, there are obviously a lot of missile defense initiatives ongoing. I would tell you that, as joint task force commanders or as component commanders within a joint task force, we have been examining our theater missile defense responsibilities now for several years.

And the technologies to manage and command and control missile defense are already deployed and part of our day-to-day business. And, as you’re well aware, we have some land based systems that have been in use in past conflicts and are available to us now.

And, as you allude to, the successes that we’re seeing with regard to some sea based systems and the ongoing testing of our land based systems is going to provide the country even more in terms of missile defense capacity and capability.

So, the combination of the two -- The Global Posture in the Pacific that I’m familiar with was developed and accommodates, I think, the advances that we’re making in missile defense and is
precisely the kind of laydown that we need to achieve the level of deterrence and stability that we tend to gain with our partners in Northeast Asia, in particular.

COMMISSIONER LESS: Good, thanks. And a follow-on in the Pacific area again -- or theater again: is what we’re doing with the Japanese Government and the laydown of our forces, as far as the posturing and our IGPBS in that particular arena -- is that sufficient to provide deterrence for the North Korean threat, if you will, as we bring troops out of North Korea?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think the Chinese -- the Chinese, excuse me. I think the Japanese are very satisfied with what is being negotiated with them.

COMMISSIONER LESS: By going a little bit slowly; probably, slower than they want?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Perhaps. But, in a typical fashion, I think. You know, we’ve progressed with them. But, I mean, they’re exceedingly supportive.
Having been homeported in Japan and worked very much around that archipelago and with my Japanese counterparts in the JMSDF (Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force), I would tell you that, not only with our military partnership, but with the relations that we’ve succeeded in maintaining with the Government of Japan -- their support for the United States presence there for purposes of regional security, their interest in missile defense relative to the peninsula and, you know, other potential regional issues -- I think the Japanese are most supportive of this initiative that you oversee.

And I think they are very satisfied with where we’re advancing as a partner in Northeast Asia with them.

As you know, for IGPBS purposes, Okinawa is certainly in focus and has been for a good amount of time. And we’re attempting to accommodate what we can there in terms of maintaining a solid relationship with our Japanese partners.

But, with regard to the Forward Deployed
Naval Forces and other forward deployed service forces in the Pacific, I think our relationship with Japan is vital.

And I think the Japanese are satisfied that their security requirements, as we contribute to them, are certainly being met.

COMMISSIONER LESS: Thanks. And that’s all the questions. Just one pat on the back, if you will: I applaud the Exercise (Operation) UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. You were instrumental in setting up an organization out there that was able to respond like it did. And you did us all proud.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Thank you very much, sir. And I enjoyed flying on your wing. You didn't run me out of gas.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Taylor?

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I’d like to follow-up on a question I asked you earlier. Maybe I wasn’t very clear in what I was asking. That would obviously reflect the lack of specificity in your answer.

And I'm talking about process in the way
that the IGPBS will be integrated into the BRAC process, not in any specifics. But, I know the BRAC Commission will start their work in earnest when the Secretary makes his recommendations to them in the middle of May. How would IGPBS be integrated into that?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: It’s a great question. And I’m sorry I didn't understand the focus of it when you asked previously. But there are really two elements to the BRAC submission, one of which is the force structure that I alluded to earlier that is across the Future Year Defense Plan.

The other are the recommendations for realignment and closure that obviously compliment that. And what has to be accommodated is the force laydown within the United States, to include territories and so forth.

So, when we say, will BRAC accommodate IGPBS? While the BRAC recommendations may not precisely define units that go to particular installations, it must account for the force structure that is in the United States, to include
those forces that, through IGPBS, either have returned or will return to the United States.

So, the answer is, yes, they will be accommodated. The services are keenly aware of what the global posture effects will be with regard to their installations in the United States and what they have to accommodate.

And both the force structure and the alignment and closure recommendations are intended to be balanced.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you. That clarifies it for me. I appreciate that.

I know a couple of questions I’m going to ask you now may be more appropriate for someone from the Services. But, you’ve been asked to represent the Services here today. So I’ll give them to you and maybe you can take them back to them.

And it gets into this entire issue of how we synchronize everything that’s ongoing with the return of forces from overseas, to include: the adequate funding that we addressed earlier, the military construction appropriate to develop the
infrastructure, the aid, if necessary, to the surrounding communities that will be impacted by it.

    And again, this is kind of a process question. But how do the Services or the Department plan to synchronize all this in a manner that can be accommodated in any town in the continental United States in a way that sustains the quality of life of our great servicemen and their families?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I would tell you that their quality of life is certainly foremost in our decision process. I think it’s well represented in the current President’s budget that has been unveiled.

    And I think in areas like housing, in particular, the advances that we made across Services, and will continue to make, have been remarkable. So, I think much of the investment that’s been made in quality of life -- and pay, and housing, and in accommodating our families -- will be represented in whatever comes out the other end of the BRAC process.

    In terms of coordinating all of this, as
you say, it’s a Service responsibility to do that. And you talk military construction, the resourcing issues.

As I mentioned earlier, there is, in fact, a program resource intended to accommodate the expense associated with BRAC at the onset before we start seeing the recovered resource that, you know, occurs in the out-years from BRAC.

So, we hope that we have that accommodated in terms of the resources that have been put away to cover that. And, likewise, those BRAC resources, the attend and aid to the communities, the involvement the communities have in whatever military construction projects are ongoing and in improving the base infrastructure, and so forth, are all intended to be captured in the cost of a BRAC.

And the Services must manage that along the way and -- without the specificity you are perhaps looking for, you know, I would assure you that -- with a focus on quality of life for their people, with the improvements that we’ve made in infrastructure and housing and communities across
the nation that are part of the BRAC realignment closure. In some cases those, you know, facilities, installations that have already been improved are perhaps the focus of some of the efforts to consolidate, you know, into those areas.

So, I think the Services will have the necessary focus -- have had the necessary focus -- and resources to accommodate an ever-improving quality of life for our soldiers and sailors, airmen and marines.

And I think they must and will manage properly the balance of these three things that you allude to.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you. My final question revolves around the timing issue. Once it becomes public knowledge, both here in the United States and overseas, which forces are leaving from where -- and a lot of that’s public right now -- I would surmise that pressure will build on both sides: a pull from here within the continental United States because -- from the Congress and the other people -- and a push from the overseas
commands.

Could you comment on how the Department will resist these pressures in making sure that we do this right and we do the timing right? Because I think you’ve agreed that the timing is very, very important on all this to do it correctly, both strategically and for quality of life reasons.

I know there’s not a specific answer to that. But I would be interested in your comments.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: There’s not a specific answer. But, having listened to the discussions with the Secretary that have occurred over time regarding this and similar issues, I would tell you that, you know, his answer would probably bet that we’re not going to move anybody anywhere until we’ve got a place to put them and it’s an adequate place to put them.

And, I’m not sure that the push and pull that you -- while there may very well be a pull from this side to accommodate the movement of force, you know, force structure back to the U.S. -- I’m not sure there’s necessarily a push from the COCOMs to,
you know, to accelerate that.

I think we’ll have to manage with the combatant commanders the timing of all this, the timing of the installation preparation that obviously has to go into this in order to meet what I believe would be the Secretary’s priorities: and that is to ensure that we have the installation prepared as we bring the families and military members back home.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Martin?

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, as we travel around the world, we’ve heard a lot about jointness and the importance of jointness to the flexibility and the maximization of the facilities that we do have and the expansion of the network that we’d like to have.

If you want a purple effort, it would seem that there needs to be purple money. And the lack thereof or the adequacy of the funding and the purple stream surfaces to us as an issue when we hear of resistance on the part of an individual’s
Service to join basing because they’re paying the
bill and they don’t want somebody else to use the
base who isn’t going to pay the bill. And we find
that in the training arena, as well.

What steps are being taken to rectify that
situation?

And the budget that I just saw does not
include a whole lot of new purple money. And it
certainly would seem it needs to if jointness is a
hallmark of IGPBS.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Yes. I would say
that we don’t do anything that is -- that lacks
jointness any longer, whether we’re overseas or, you
know, in our training at home.

If we’re not already training in a joint
or combined environment then, as a Service, we’re
training to enter into a joint or combined
environment.

And, as you state, part of the Base
Realignment and Closure initiative is going to be to
attempt to economize across the Services as well as
within the Services.
And both of those processes are ongoing. The -- it shouldn't be necessarily a lack of purple money that would cause, you know, would need to be on hand to initiate a joint project.

And, in the course of this process, without getting into the specifics because I can't, I have not seen the resistance that you allude to. There is a view on the part of the Services of their need to accommodate the efficiencies that they think they have to have.

There have been initiatives proposed by the Services that are consolidations of cross-Service functions. So, coming from the Services -- not coming from the Joint Staff or from the OSD side of the house -- that makes perfect sense and gains acceptance pretty rapidly.

So, again, I’m not convinced that the lack of resources within a joint account is necessary to accomplish the jointness and the joint efficiencies that base realignment, closure, or IGPBS is intended to achieve.

And, I’ve seen on occasion the opposite
from the Services. I’ve seen them team on some of these issues. And I think you’ll be pleased with the result.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: We’re going to continue to monitor that situation closely.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I’m sure you will.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Having something to do with the difficulty of transferring money, which is an interesting exercise, I think, we’ll be having some conversations with people about how that’s done.

My second question for you, sir, is the log (logistic) footprint to support and sustain our servicemen and women who are now carrying the nation’s banner -- Iraq, Afghanistan -- to do that at the same time as we’re rolling up some sidewalks or proposing to roll up some sidewalks.

My question is, have all the attendant costs of combat services and combat service support requirements to sustain this new modular force been identified to the Congress? And are they fully funded at this point?
VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think the short answer is, yes, in particular in this year’s supplemental request. There was a rigorous process that all the Services participated in, the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary (of Defense), in terms of attempting to identify the real current cost of ongoing operations.

And the cost of war, to include combat support and combat service support, is most definitely captured in the supplemental request that has been submitted.

And it was scrutinized to be within the framework of, you know, what the supplemental is intended to contain. And, likewise, the budget undergoes a similar review. So, the short answer -- the answer is yes.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: I guess my follow-up to that, if I might, Mr. Chairman, is simply: does that include identifying where that support is physically going to come from?

Right now Iraq and Afghanistan are open questions as to their resolution properly in the
hands of our National Command Authority. But the support and sustainment of the forces needed there has to come from -- are we going to be looking to close part of the log footprint that currently supports those operations as part of the BRAC and IGPBS?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: The priorities that have been placed on the decision making occurred -- particularly attendant to the budget this year, that I can assure you is in play in the other initiatives that are ongoing -- is that we will support the current operation, that we will retain the readiness of the force, and that we will protect the transformation of our forces to be able to accommodate future challenges.

Those three things have remained priorities. The combat support, combat service support requirement for current operations has been a challenge.

And it has been a challenge because we were not necessarily shaped just right for the current operation in terms of our Active
Component/Reserve Component mix.

And that was particularly true in the Army. Earlier I alluded to the adjustments that have been made, you know, over time in those areas to tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, you know, where we’ve attempted to re-shape that combat support, combat service support structure.

And, generally, that’s what’s been accommodated in those shifts of personnel. Likewise, modularity -- which is captured both in the Army’s baseline budget and for purpose of the modularity that is the urgent essential need for the current operation for this war -- that modularity attempts to relieve the stress on the combat support, combat service support forces by infusing those elements into the brigade combat teams from what was formerly division support.

So, where the brigade combat team in the past has been reliant on combat support, combat service support coming from the division, it’s now being embedded such that they are more self
sufficient in that regard.

And we are modularizing the Active forces that are going to theater. And we are modularizing the Reserve Component forces that are coming from theater in preparation for any future rotation.

But, when we ultimately have a reorganized Army, we will have alleviated much of the combat support, combat service support and AC/RC mix problems that we have, you know, encountered over the past several years.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much, Admiral. Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. Admiral, in the first session this morning either you or Secretary Feith mentioned that it was felt that the current mobility capabilities were adequate for what’s being proposed under IGPBS.

And we currently have 33 brigades, I believe, and moving to 43 to 48 brigades within the continental United States. And so it seems that the backbone of IGPBS is the ability to surge out of the United States.
And I again repose the question: is the strategic lift still adequate under that scenario?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think the answer that we gave this morning should have been the accurate one, that the Mobility Capability Study is intended to identify that.

And, frankly, the capabilities mix that results -- adjustments that result from the Defense Review will likewise affect that. So, the analytics associated with Mobility Capabilities Study and the analytics associated with the upcoming QDR will be ongoing for the next several months to answer the question that you’re asking regarding adequacy.

And we’ll make adjustments to the program, if necessary, to get the strategic mobility mix right. The advantage is that we’re looking at not only strategic lift to the theater. But we’re looking at intra-theater lift, as well. And it’s not confined to air mobility, but rather we’re on the sea and looking at rail and looking at road infrastructure, as well.

So, this is a view across the force
structure that we have for strategic mobility as
cell as intra-theater mobility. And it doesn't stop
when we report out the results of the study at the
end of the -- end of March, rather, it plays into
the Defense Review.

And, in the end, we’ll have the answer
that you seek.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Now, this morning you
also indicated that the study, the MCS study --
Mobility Capability Study -- was due in March. Will
it be finished in March?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: It’s intended to be
finished at the end of March. And I provide the
analytic support for it. And I am concerned that
we’re still taking it through some data calls here
in the final throws, you know, our final several
weeks.

But, thus far, we believe we’re going to
make our deadline. So we have stated in a number of
forums that the MCS report is out at the end of
March.

And I’m confident it will be. We’ll have
a status certainly then. And portions of it are actually being out-briefed now. So it’s just segments of the Mobility Capability Study, some of the intra-theater lift analysis, and so forth, that’s still ongoing.

Typically we analyze this, give it back to the warfighters, and let them do kind of a rough order of magnitude sanity check of what has been analyzed.

And, if necessary, we take it back through quantitative analysis tools to do it again, if they don't like -- you know -- if they think the outcome is less than realistic.

So, we’re working that and the excursions to finalize the result output at the end of March.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: That’s rather important to us. So, when that is completed, do you have an idea of when we might have access to that report?

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I believe -- and I’m not an expert in this -- but I believe the MCS is currently internal to DOD and intended to help us
in the Defense Review. So, I’ll have to get you an answer to that.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. I thought you might have to get an answer on that one. But I would like to pose a question. The next one you should be able to answer, I hope, because it’s right up your alley.

And that’s the Pacific. We’ve had a lot of changes around the world, significant reductions in the European command; in the Pacific, more realignments, possibly, other than moving some troops out of Korea.

So there have been some comments about whether or not the basing in the Pacific will be adequate to address emerging challenges in the Pacific Rim.

So, if you have any comment on that, I’d appreciate it.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: I think the answer is yes. I mean, I think the combatant commanders’ initiatives, the Secretary’s initiatives that view into the Pacific are viewing into the future
challenges across -- you’ve probably seen the quadrant chart that’s been used in the Pentagon that attempts to capture traditional as well as irregular and disruptive and catastrophic -- the different challenges that we think the future holds for us.

The traditional challenge has not been undermined by this. Rather, you know, we’re attempting to fill, in terms of capability of the future force, all those challenges.

And my personal opinion is that the global basing that has been structured around the Pacific, specifically, that retained our presence in Northeast Asia and is gaining further accesses and capabilities and partnerships down in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Australia, is not only adequate but essential to the future challenges that we may face.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: I’d ask if any of the Commissioners have another question.

(No verbal response.)

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: I have one last request of you. And that’s in regard to what was
mentioned earlier, in regard to SOUTHCOM and CSLs and also that if we might have a complete briefing on CENTCOM IGPBS plans and timing within the next two weeks.

If we could receive that, we would appreciate it. And Admiral, again, I’d like to express my appreciation for your patience in the way we handle this hearing and for working with us.

We appreciate it very much. We appreciate your service to our country. And we thank you for being here today.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLARD: Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, thank you for the opportunity to do this. I’ll look forward to getting these answers back to you on several of these questions.

And we would also look forward to informal discussions or perhaps classified discussions when you see the need. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: The Commission will now take a lunch break and reconvene at 1:30 p.m. with a representative of the Department of State.

(Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m. the above-
entitled matter recessed for lunch.)
A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N  S-E-S-S-I-O-N

1:30 p.m.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: It’s my privilege to introduce the second panel. Joining us today is Ambassador Rose Likins, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Ambassador Likins is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service.

She joined the Foreign Service in June, 1981, and has served in Mexico, Paraguay, Bulgaria, and as Ambassador to the Republic of El Salvador. In Washington Ms. Likins has served in a number of leadership positions, and in the Department of State most recently as Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department. Welcome, Ambassador. And we thank you for appearing before the Commission.

We can appreciate the immense responsibility of the State Department in the unsettled world of today. And we asked you here today to better understand the State Department’s view and position on our national strategy, regional stability, alliance relationships, and the
relationship to DOD's Global Posture Review.

So, at this time I'd call on you if you have any opening remarks.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to address the Department of State’s role in the U.S. Global Defense Posture Review.

I’m pleased to be able to compliment the statements made earlier today by my esteemed colleagues at the Department of Defense with the State Department’s perspective on the process and progress of this review.

The transformation of our overseas defense posture will affect many partners around the world and reflect the United States’ commitment as a global security partner.

The purpose of the review is to strengthen the ability of U.S. military forces to carry out worldwide commitments while taking into account the new defense technologies and the new international security environment.
The Cold War era threats facing our nation 50 years ago have given way to the less predictable dangers associated with rogue nations, global terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.

The Department is proud to assist the transformation of our military’s forward presence, which serves to underscore our country’s commitment to effectively address these challenges to our global security.

Since the President first announced this review in November of 2003, the State Department has worked closely with our colleagues at the Department of Defense to review the political implications of proposed changes to our posture, to balance military objectives with political and strategic necessities, and to ensure that our friends and allies are thoroughly consulted.

As has been previously stated, the review was guided, first and foremost, by the requirement to strengthen allied roles and build new partnerships. The State Department’s role is the build the political and diplomatic framework on
which our overseas military presence depends.

We want to ensure that our friends and allies understand and support the realignment of U.S. forces and, as importantly, work with us to achieve our common objectives.

The State Department will also negotiate any agreements to implement changes with host governments, including base access agreements. From the first days of this review, we have stressed what we consider meaningful consultations with friends and allies to be one of the most important elements to this process.

Our discussions on Japan and Korea have proceeded on a separate track, which the Administration began before the 2003 public announcement.

In our consultations in Europe, Asia and elsewhere, we have consistently addressed that we value and carefully consider the feedback from our friends and allies.

And, in several instances, we have adjusted our proposals to meet their concerns.
These consultations are ongoing, and in some cases where there exists political agreement, we have already embarked on detailed negotiations to implement changes.

Extensive consultations with allies at NATO and with Russia have helped address concerns and manage expectations in Europe. Europeans agree that the U.S. military presence must be updated to address the new security realities and that all changes will be consistent with our treaty and political commitments.

In fact, many of them, as I’m sure you’re aware by now from your own travels, are in the midst of transforming their own militaries. There remains no doubt as we move forward that NATO remains one of our most important strategic military partnerships.

The United States will continue to work together with our NATO allies to face common global challenges. The transformation of our military presence in Europe will help our NATO allies and partners to be more capable and response -- and reinforces NATO’s own transformational agenda.
Our European partners understand that Europe will not likely be the stage for a large conventional ground war. As Italy’s foreign minister stated, in reaction to the President’s August 16th speech, the Cold War is a thing of the past.

There is no longer a strategic need for heavy forces as the central feature of the U.S. defense posture in Europe. The United States can no longer expect that our forward forces will fight in place.

For example, most U.S. forces based in Europe have rotated through Iraq. And European counterparts understand that what we need now in Europe is lighter, more deployable, ground capabilities, a leaner command and support structure, and an increasingly strategic role for Special Forces.

Our intent to station a Stryker brigade in Germany in place of Cold War era heavy ground forces is an important statement supporting this transformational theme, and demonstrates our
continued commitment to NATO and the trans-Atlantic relationship.

We have focused closely on the impacts of our proposals not only on bilateral relations with host governments, but also on the impact on local communities.

In this regard we have closely consulted with the Government of Germany, including at the state and local levels, utilizing public diplomacy and German media outlets to help ease to the maximum extent possible the natural tensions associated with anticipated reductions.

Germany is undergoing its own base closure process. And our consultations have been synchronized with Berlin’s own internal realignments of German military facilities throughout the country.

In Korea, we seek to improve robust U.S.-Korean deterrence by realigning forward based U.S. forces. We passed significant milestones in 2004, including the Korean National Assembly’s approval of funding for the U.S. to vacate the Youngsan base in
the center of Seoul.

We have also agreed to a schedule for redeployments off peninsula through the year 2008 and to move virtually all U.S. forces south of the Han River through a two phase process.

With respect to Japan, on September 21st President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi agreed that our common goal in the Defense Posture Review is to strengthen deterrence and the effectiveness of the U.S. military presence while addressing the concerns of our Japanese hosts in the community surrounding our forces.

This has been the basis of our ongoing talks. We have dedicated time and effort to ensure that other interested parties remain informed on the themes and objectives of our Posture Review and to maintain an open dialogue on the process of the review.

We have had conversations with our Russian and Chinese counterparts on the general aims of our Posture Review, and have provided them with assurances that this review is not aimed at any
specific country, but rather at the reality of 21st Century security threats and the unpredictable nature of those threats.

Further, we have worked to ensure that any regions where we have not yet had formal consultations, friends and allies have been briefed at least conceptually on the strategic vision of this review.

Beyond Europe and Asia, our proposals seek to establish a network of U.S. locations and facilities to support and conduct the global war on terrorism, increase our ability to respond to contingencies, help our partners build their own capabilities, facilitate practical security cooperation, and improve access.

Changes to our overseas posture will be implemented over many years. As we work through issues collaboratively with allies and partners, as well as with the Congress, we look forward to continuing to advance these important discussions with our counterparts around the globe, and to ensure that any changes made to our defense posture
fully support U.S. foreign policy.

Thank you for hearing my statement. And I’m happy to answer your questions at this point.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you, Ambassador. I ask Commissioner Taylor to open the questioning, please.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you for your statement, Ambassador. I appreciate you being here. My first question revolves around the deterrence value of overseas forces and whether or not this IGPBS -- as it has been laid out by the Department of Defense -- what it does to deterrence.

Is there a danger that actions related to the deployment of forces from CONUS would be sending an escalatory signal in a crisis, requiring a buildup of overseas capability?

Obviously if we had most of our forces back here and we had a contingency, we’d have to deploy them. What impact does that have?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, as we’ve considered our need to be able to respond to any crisis anywhere, I mean world events of our
generation have certainly demonstrated that we have needed to use our military in the Balkans.

In my year and a half in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, and since I left El Salvador, we’ve had to ask our military forces to deploy to Liberia to help stabilize a situation there, to deploy to Haiti to stabilize a very explosive situation there.

And what we are attempting to achieve is in fact an ability to quickly operate in a wide range of places and to plan for the unplanned, if you will. I think the deterrence value of having an ability to go anywhere you need to on relatively short notice and have facilities in place enhances our deterrence capability, to demonstrate -- as we have demonstrated in the past, and I’m sure we’ll demonstrate in the future -- that we really are a country with the ability to have a military force that has a truly global reach.

The tsunami response, I think, is just a phenomenal example of our ability to be where we were needed in record time. I mean, I do not know
that any of us would have planned for a tsunami event like the one we experienced in December. But the fact that PACOM and Admiral Fargo were able to move all of those resources so quickly to be so responsive has done amazing things for our diplomacy.

The fact that we were on the scenes so quickly with the needed relief changed our image in a country like Indonesia that’s so influential in that neighborhood and in the Muslim world.

I mean, it truly has opened doors for us that were closed just a few months ago. So, I think that our current capabilities with the addition of the system and the network we’re seeking to put in place give us very strong deterrence values, sure.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: You might also say that in the tsunami incident that you mentioned, that proved the value of forward basing, too.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: It sure did.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: They happened to be based in the right place for that.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: And the tremendous
value of those resources. I mean, we all know the tremendous -- the hundreds of billions of dollars that are invested by taxpayers every year in defense resources.

When we all talked about the millions of dollars of commitments that President Bush was making to the response, those millions of dollars of commitment don't include the cost of the asset and the fact that we had men and women trained, capable, and ready of doing that mission, in addition to the cost of the infrastructure.

So, it was an exceptional thing to do on such short notice. And, as always, our forces did a phenomenal job.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: From a diplomatic sense, if you compare the value of having forces in place as opposed to rotational forces --

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: -- the neighbor versus the visitor concept. How would you assess that in terms of the way we might be viewed by other nations?
AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, I actually have practical experience in this matter in El Salvador. El Salvador is the host of one of the forward operating locations, which are a model for what is now called the CSL in the current plan.

And the relationship that we had with El Salvador -- I was fortunate enough to implement the FOL when I arrived there in August of 2000. And we went very carefully, like everybody.

You want to be careful of local sensitivities and not inflame people. But the fact of the matter was we went about building relationships in that community.

And even though the permanent party of people who were implementing the FOL was eight people, we were able to do -- use maximum advantage. We had P-3 (Orion patrol aircraft) crews that rotated in, not just from Puerto Rico -- within Puerto Rico, Rosy Roads (Roosevelt Roads Naval Base) -- but then from all over the United States. We had Georgia National Guard. We had folks from New England. We had folks -- we had Coast Guard out of
Sacramento, California. But we always knew in advance when those folk were coming.

And so we took the opportunity, working very closely together with our FOL colleagues. For example, at Christmas -- we almost always had somebody before Christmas.

And so very often the units who were coming knew far in advance they were coming. They'd take up a donation drive, whether it was medical supplies or stuffed toys, for the orphanage.

And so, while we were there, we always made sure to do an event to have the folks reach out to the community and not just be flying our P-3 around gathering the intel (intelligence) that we wanted to.

The other thing that we did in El Salvador was to improve the facilities. As we improved facilities that we were going to use we also improved facilities that the El Salvadorians were going to use.

To the extent that we had excess capacity, as we very often do with some of the equipment that
we put in, whether it’s to wash the planes or the stands for the engines repair, allowing them to use that equipment was a neighborly thing to do.

The most important thing we did was, after the earthquake -- you may recall in January 2001 there was a horrible earthquake in El Salvador -- and what our folks did at that point was become the command and control for the ramp.

Ramp space was at a premium. Planes were flying in from all over the world -- from Taiwan, from Mexico, from Singapore -- and El Salvadorians were quickly stretched in kind of their ability to handle the scheduling and the off-loading and the ramp space and the parking.

And we said, You know what? We know how to do that; let us do that. And so we stopped flying the P-3 missions. We waived off the planes, and we became the command and control for about three weeks of all those flights coming in bringing relief deliveries.

All of those things -- seeing how we operated, our outreach to the community, the
improvements that were made to the facilities that were shared by us and by the El Salvadorians: we improved the roads, we improved the lighting, we put in a better fence for security. All of those things the El Salvadorians saw as benefits.

And then finally the *extremis* case of the earthquake built that relationship even though we had only eight guys there.

So I would tell you that yes, it requires everybody working altogether and planning to make maximum use, but I think visitors can have the same kind of effect.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: If we assume for a moment that IGBBS is implemented as has been laid out by the OSD -- the President indicated that it would probably happen over the next five to ten years -- how important is sticking to that schedule, again from the geopolitical sense?

Does this have to be -- there are a lot of things that have to be done in bringing 70,000 military personnel back from overseas and bedding them down someplace within the continental United
And there are many questions to be answered yet about exactly how that is to be done, many of them to be answered in this building. But highly important from a geopolitical standpoint is that this be done according to a rigid timeline.

Or is this something that can become a process we work over a period of time?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, I think from a variety of perspectives it is going to be a period of five to ten years. And you know, when we’ve talked with allies and partners, we’ve talked about a ten year timeframe as kind of the outside parameter for doing this.

I do think it’s important for, you know -- all of you will understand the reliability factor, I call it -- for folks being able to know what’s coming and when it’s coming.

In a country like Germany, for example, where there’s a well-established process for closing down facilities or changing facilities, that’s roughly a two year process from our past experience.
And so, you know, the Germans have their own process that they have to go through and so we are going to have to work very carefully with them. So being on a timeline in that arena is going to be very important because we’re affecting thousands of people.

With our Asian partners there, as you know, is also, in the case of Japan, a time constraint in the terms of political pressure. There are lots of folks living in the vicinity of our facilities who feel an awful lot of urgency about reducing the burden.

And so I do think that the timeline will be very important. Obviously, as you all know better than I, a lot of this is going to be driven by resources and DOD’s, you know, having the resources to do all the things that need to be done.

But we’ll be working closely with them on the timeline. It’s something that we’re watching carefully and working with our partners on.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: If I understand you correctly, it is your opinion once this is announced
-- of course, a lot of it’s been announced already -
- that there will be pressures from within the host
country for it to go ahead and be executed.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure. They’re going
to want to be able to tell local populations with
some degree of certainty what’s coming and when it’s
coming.

So I do think, yes, that it will be
important to have a timeline and to give people a
realistic timeline and something that they can work
with.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Regardless of
whether or not we’re ready to receive them back here
in the United States?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: I think that’s part of
the process that DOD will go through in making the
determinations. And obviously I don’t speak for DOD
and I wouldn’t, you know, venture into their arena,
but it will be important for them to know what the
timing is.

I don't know that our partners will say,

you know, here is your deadline. I think what they
want from us is just a realistic sense of what we’re going to do and when we’re going to do it.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you, ma’am, Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Thank you, General.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Martin.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, I want to baseline something to begin with. And that is in the coordination of the IGBBS process, which by my estimation is a three legged stool.

It’s State Department, OSD, and the National Security Council. How frequently and how directly do you meet with all three agencies together to discuss this, and what metrics or graphics or method of measurement do you use to gauge the progress of individual elements of IGBBS?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: First of all, thank you very much for the question, General. Let me say that from our perspective at the State Department, and particular in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, that the coordination on this effort that
we have done since the inception has really been outstanding.

All of us in Washington are familiar with the interagency process and, you know, it’s vagary. Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t work as well.

I would be very comfortable holding this up as a model of how the interagency process has worked and has worked exceptionally well. We have been -- we, the State Department, were involved from the very beginning, recognizing that a lot of these decisions are quintessentially military decisions to be made, Department of Defense decisions to be made.

They, at the same time, recognize that the decisions they’re making are going to have profound impacts on our partners. And it is our responsibility to ensure that we get the feedback from the partners and that it’s fed into the process and given the weight that it needs to have in our process.

So that whole process of working together, first in the interagency and then working together
to consult our partners to bring back their
information and their view and their perspectives,
has really been a model process.

As someone with now 24 years in the
Foreign Service, I can tell you I’ve seldom been
involved in a process that has worked in that
respect as well as this one has.

We have met -- you know, depending on
where we were in the process -- we have met several
times a week. At least once a week there is some
sort of -- at some level in the chain -- there is
some exchange about, okay, where are we on the next
steps?

We have maintained a couple of things.
One has been a calendar. You know, we started off
with a calendar of benchmarks and, you know, from
the roll out, to the consultations, to the next
steps.

We have also -- we are in the process now
of doing -- have done a lot of our homework in terms
of the agreements and the legal status of, you know,
where are the countries where we think we’re going
to want to make changes or do things, making sure, you know, what is the menu of legal arrangements we have or might want to have, and doing -- we’re kind of doing that homework at the current moment as the commands have been doing more in depth consultations.

So I would tell you we have kind of a matrix of tasks to do as kind of our metric as we go through and how far have we come and who’s up next and who are the most ripe to go to the next stage of implementation.

But we have a very regular interagency consultation on that. It’s a very collegial group. And obviously when you’re working on a project like this you kind of develop relationships of confidence in one another as everybody takes on their role and becomes the master of their particular aspect.

So I think it’s been, you know, a fine example of how to do things correctly.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Is your office at State the office at State --

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: The --
COMMISSIONER MARTIN: And do you have direct and regular interaction with the National Security Council?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: We do, sir.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Single point of contact?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: We do, sir.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Very good. Threat -- the data and intelligence information that’s developed through your resources, through the Department of Defense resources -- can you give us a sense of how much, of what is being done in terms of posture, in terms of presence, that you can be confident is based on a realistic and very current assessment of the threat looking forward?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Obviously, as you all know from your government experience, I mean, that is a perpetually evolving analysis that we all have to do everyday.

And the lesson in 9/11 is that we all have to do it very well in coordination everyday, that it’s not enough for each of us to do our own but to
be talking to each other effectively.

So, first of all, I would tell you that that has to be a dynamic and ongoing process. And it is. I think that the entire plan is a response to our perception and our belief that the threat is going to come from anyplace, literally anyplace.

And we have to be prepared to respond anyplace. And I think that is the underlying belief in all this that we are all very -- that we all share. That none of us differ from that belief that we have to be prepared for anything, anywhere.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: General Taylor alluded in his question to something that I wanted to follow up on. And that is whether you get any sense anywhere that what we’re proposing to do is, quote, stirring the pot as opposed to being provocative, as opposed to being deterrent or assuring to countries in a particular region?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: I don't think that anyplace where we have done consultations we have heard, no, no, no, don’t do that. Obviously, Russia -- to take the most obvious example that comes to
mind -- is very interested in what it is we have planned for reasons that we all understand from history.

At the same time, you know, we have a whole host of relationships with independent countries, and the United States is going to pursue those relationships with lots of different countries in that region.

But we have assured the Russians that this is not in any way designed to ring them or to in any way intrude unnecessarily. We have had very good conversations with the Russians.

We will continue to have those conversations. They’ve expressed strong interest in continuing that engagement and we are committed to doing that.

We are really looking for places where we believe we’re going to need to be able to have access. That’s fundamentally what we’re doing. Nowhere do we have plans for a major new base anywhere near Russia or the former Soviet Union.

What we are really talking about is
access, as you know. So I think that we will continue to be responsive and to be alert to signs of concern, but I think that comes closest to, kind of, your definition of whether we’re being provocative or in some way stirring the pot.

Obviously China is a major force in Asia and in the Pacific. The United States has a very well-articulated policy of engaging China to become an international -- a member of the international community and engaging in all of the international institutions.

We, again, went to Beijing -- Under Secretary Feith and former Assistant Secretary Bloomfield -- went to Beijing to have a conversation about this plan precisely because we didn’t want people to have misperceptions about what we were doing.

And we heard nothing there that made us in any way believe that they were alarmed by what we were doing. They appreciated the fact that we sought them out to tell them what we were doing.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: We’ve spent a fair
amount of time in the Pacific region and are well aware of the sensitive and high level negotiations going on with the Government of Japan.

We’re very well-aware of the concerns of the people of Okinawa, as expressed by the governor and others, about elements the U.S. presence there. How important, from the State Department’s standpoint, is it to bring these concerns to a conclusion?

We can understand from a military standpoint, but what about from the State Department perspective, how important is it to wrap that up?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, we’ve been, as you know, involved in the conversations with the Government of Japan since 2002 as a part of DPRI (Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University). The State Department is an active participant in that dialog.

Again, we and our Department of Defense colleagues have been joined at the hip. We have been through all the meetings together, through all of the consultations together, and we feel very
comfortable that we’re all working together on this effort.

The two plus two ministerial that Secretary Rice and Secretary Rumsfeld held several weeks ago with their counterparts -- I was at the table precisely because this is an issue that is important to our relationship.

We are -- we’ve had an excellent relationship with the Japanese as we’ve talked about these issues. Some of these issues, as you know, are very tough ones, tough ones for us and tough ones for the Japanese.

But the fact that the Japanese have themselves announced their own new defense strategy and are going through their own evaluation and the need to transform the Self Defense Forces again coincides very nicely, just as it does with Germany and what we’re going to do in Germany.

Japan is going through the same process of evaluating their future defense posture, but also what they need to do to make the Self Defense Forces a modern, capable, professional force.
So we are very much involved in that process. It is very important, from our perspective, to finish the process that we’ve had ongoing for several years.

We’ve made good progress. Most recently we have agreed on what we call the common strategic objectives, which is a very important piece as we go about getting to the details and the specifics that everybody wants to get to, but we all wanted to be certain that we were operating from the same foundations and the same principles.

So I think that it is important -- from many perspectives, not just a diplomatic one, but also Japan’s perspective -- to finish the process that we’ve been engaged in for some years.

And I think we are getting there. It has been long, but it has necessarily taken into consideration a wide range of things. The other thing that I would mention, just because it will come up in 2006, which is the Special Measures Agreement.

We at the State Department are responsible for...
for renegotiating the Special Measures arrangement, which is the support that the Government of Japan provides for the U.S. presence in Japan.

And we are responsible for leading those negotiations. We are just beginning now our preliminary contacts with the Japanese. And typically it’s a multiple year arrangement, but we’re just starting to make arrangements.

We’ll have our first consultations in the next two months or so with the Japanese on that.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: And to use the last 45 seconds of my time, are those two things somewhat related: the DPRI negotiations and Special Measures? Is there a sense of linkage there at all?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: I mean, they’ll be influenced by one another, but there’s no formal linkage.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Linkage, okay. And I’ll yield the balance of my time. I believe one of my fellow commissioners will ask you about Bulgaria at some point here, so --

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Curtis.
COMMISSIONER CURTIS: The IGPBS schedule is clearly intended to be implemented -- fully implemented -- in the 2010 timeframe and is obviously targeted to that period after 2020 and beyond.

As part of the IGPBS planning process, has the State Department provided the Department of Defense with a formal geopolitical assessment out in that timeframe as an input?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: No, sir, we have not talked about a formal document. We have not provided that. It has been more kind of a changed interagency strategic concept that we all agree to.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you. The -- Mr. Feith, this morning as he was talking to us, talked about the importance of establishing the proper legal framework, particularly for our forward operating sites and our CSLs.

We’re putting them in a lot of places where we haven’t been before or haven’t been on any kind of permanent basis. Would you give us your perspective on what the status is of putting in
those SOFAs (Status of Forces Agreements), the flexibility and access agreements, and the other agreements for forced protection in these locations, and also your assessment of how well we would do as we move into some of the less traditional areas where we’re putting these?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, I would have to tell you that where we are right now on particularly the CSLs is incipient. I described a few minutes ago the process we’ve been doing -- of doing our homework, you know, going down and determining the exact status of the agreements we have with which countries.

Obviously, the big pieces -- the pieces in Europe and the pieces in Asia -- have necessarily consumed a lot of time and effort. Particularly in Latin America and Asia and Africa, we have less firm definition, certainly, with DOD and in the interagency, about exactly where CSLs might best be located.

That said, I can tell you that in the area of the Non-surrender agreements, Article 98 -- the
so-called Article 98 agreements -- our goal, independent of global defense posture, is to have as many of those agreements as we can around the world.

We are currently at 99 agreements signed, 89 agreements ratified with a wide range of countries around the world. And we will keep going after those, independent of this process.

So the Non-surrender agreements -- or the Article 98 agreements -- will support this process, but they are not only linked to this process. Similarly, SOFAs have been long-standing on the part of the Department of State and our military colleagues to ensure that we have as many SOFAs in place as we can.

We have recently asked our posts in Latin America to make a new run at Status of Forces Agreements where we have, typically, in most of the Latin American countries, exercise-specific SOFAs. That if we’re going down -- right now we’re doing New Horizons in Nicaragua -- that we do -- we have a SOFA that applies to that particular event but not a long-term, in-place SOFA. And so we will look to
see how much progress we can make on SOFAs, again, independent of this process, just because it’s a good idea to have them.

The -- those are the primary arrangements we need to have in place. I think, from my experience, the -- it’s so country-specific that it’s hard to generalize.

What works in country A may not work in country B. What worked in El Salvador wouldn’t work in Costa Rica, for example. So it’s a little hard to generalize.

I would tell you that there are a couple factors that will be important in our consideration. One of them is the host country’s experience with the United States, their experience with the U.S. military.

Obviously, the political situation is always a factor, but also the state of development or undevelopment of their respective judiciary systems and the rule of law systems and whether or not their courts and their legal system is comfortable with the instruments we’re proposing.
Sometimes, particularly in the case of the Article 98 agreement, it has been so dramatically different from something that a local legal system has been comfortable with that we’ve had to do a lot of persuading and showing people how this is consistent with their own law because it is a new concept for them.

So the status of development of the legal system and the court system can sometimes also be a factor. But that’s helpful.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: When we were in Europe we were shown what appeared to be a fairly definitive list of the CSLs and FOSs in Africa. And some of those were associated with the African Fuels Initiative and other ideas.

You give me the impression that perhaps that list is not as firm as perhaps we assumed it to be when we looked at those briefings.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Yes. I think that everybody working in good faith has kind of put forward a lot of proposals, but as time goes on, I mean, I have certainly watched this process over the
last year and a half kind of evolve from stuff that we thought we knew for certain at the beginning.

A year and a half later we thought, oh, boy, that didn’t really make much sense, did it? And so the CSLs, I would tell you, are the piece that is still, in my -- from my perspective, most in flux.

And that is particularly true, I think, in Latin American and Africa.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Well, that’s a great lead-in because the charts that I have seen, as I mentioned, show CSLs scattered throughout -- and some FOSs -- scattered throughout Africa.

The Latin American CSLs seem to be limited to Central America, with nothing on the chart I saw -- essentially, very little -- in South America. Is that what you have seen and is that a -- what led us to that position?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, I would tell you, yes, that is the chart I have seen. I would also tell you that General Craddock, who took over in SOUTHCOM in the last couple months, is taking a
new look at that and has not finished and has not
made his final recommendations back to the Pentagon,
to the best of my knowledge.

I was down there with him last week and I
know that he is still actively engaged in having a
look at that. I honestly think it was not, you
know, kind of -- it was something that people had
more as a target.

You know, we have to take a look at Latin
America. They looked at the places where we already
were, and so that accounts for at least half of
what’s already on that map.

And I think after that there is a -- there
was a certain concern about receptiveness.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Sure.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: You know, if you have
so many countries in Latin America who are not
willing to sign Article 98 agreements with us
because they feel very committed to the
International Criminal Court, and, you know, if you
can’t get an Article 98 with a country, how secure
are we going to be and how secure is Congress going
to be in asking, you know, in wanting to establish something?

But I do think there’s more to be heard on that subject.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Okay, great. And one final question.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: And this deals with Europe. You know, put your European political hat on. As we draw down, in some people’s perspective, our forces associated with NATO, are we opening up the specter of more EU (European Union) military activity in lieu of NATO?

What do you see -- how do you see the IGPBS affecting the thrust that some NATO countries have to establish an EU military outside of the NATO structure: positive, negative?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, I don't think this particular effort is going to influence that. I think that they, as you well know, are a corps of countries who are very committed to an independent European defense identity.
And the United States’ position, I think, is the right -- to say, obviously, you should do what you think is important, but we all have a common commitment to NATO.

NATO is the organization that we’ve all invested five decades and billions of dollars in. It’s been a successful effort for all of us. And so we want to continue to see NATO develop.

Obviously, there are transformation issues with NATO that we’ve all talked about, that we continue to work with NATO. We think that’s an important effort to be ready for the future.

But if you look at Afghanistan, where we have gone out of area with NATO, with NATO lead and NATO taking on increasing responsibility for PRTs -- the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, beyond the immediate environs of Kabul. NATO is evolving.

NATO is, I think, as someone who -- as I’ve said, who’s been in the service for 24 years -- NATO will always be, you know, an important relationship for the United States.

And it has just been a successful one and
it is, in today’s world, continuing to be relevant and to be successful. The fact that the NATO training mission in Iraq has been established -- that the number of countries who have committed troops to support the NATO training mission in Iraq -- is also an important sign of NATO’s continued importance to the United States.

So I think that everything we’re going to do will continue to evolve with NATO. The fact that we intend to put the Stryker in Germany, again, I think, sends exactly the right signal to NATO and to the Germans that this is still an important area for us, that we are putting our cutting edge technology right there in the heart of NATO because we believe that this alliance is important to us.

So, I think that it doesn’t take away from NATO. I think the European defense identity will continue on its path. The NATO Rapid Reaction Force is another important feature that we think will be increasingly important to us in the future.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you very much, Ambassador.
AMBASSADOR LIKINS: You’re very welcome.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Chairman, that’s all I have.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Less.

COMMISSIONER LESS: Ambassador, thank you for your time. When you’re down this far down the list on the pecking order, the questions may overlap just a tad, I guess.

But I do have a couple. And one involves the -- I mean, it’s related somewhat to what Commissioner Curtis talked about, regards the relationship in the European theater.

But I would talk to this one in terms of leadership, if you will, and put it on a worldwide basis. We are probably the last remaining superpower. And I know that doesn’t -- using that term doesn’t go over well in some areas.

But if we start withdrawing troops, like we’re talking about, withdrawing to bring back to CONUS, and the wrong people get the wrong look at the wrong thing, there is some potential that leadership suffers, leadership for our nation.
And I would ask your indulgence to give us a worldwide perspective on how you think we will appear as a leader if we back away from maintaining troops forward?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Admiral, I think that -- to the contrary, that what Global Defense Posture is about is in fact being a global leader, to be prepared to be responsive anywhere we need to be.

I don't think that there is any doubt in anybody’s mind of our President’s commitment to the fact that the United States has a unique international role to play, and we are playing it all over the world -- whether it’s Iraq, whether it’s Afghanistan, whether it’s Columbia, whether it’s tsunami.

And so I believe that this statement that is inherent in Global Defense Posture is one of our willingness through the future to plan to be a world leader for the indefinite future.

It is something that we, the United States, must do. We cannot afford to pretend that there are parts of the world that don’t matter to us
anymore.

   Every part of the world has to matter to us, and we have to be prepared to respond anyplace. So I think that this is about, in fact, consolidating and bolstering our capability to project.

   I think -- or certainly the reaction that we have had from allies and partners around the world has not been, you’re running away from us. Please, please, please stay.

   Our allies and our partners entirely understand that transformation is not about numbers and boots on the ground. Transformation is about our political will to do what we need to do when and where we need to do it, and our willingness to commit resources to have the capabilities to do what we need to do.

   And so I think that our allies have entirely understood that, whether it’s our Asian allies, our European allies, our allies in the Middle East and Central Asia.

   So I don’t -- that doesn’t worry me. I do
think that we are preparing to continue to project a leadership role and our allies see it exactly the same way.

If you look at the reaction in Australia to Defense Posture Review where the Minister of Defense says, you know, yes, this makes sense. This is exactly what we are also thinking about.

I don't think that that’s our intent, nor is it the way our allies are perceiving it.

COMMISSIONER LESS: I appreciate that answer; that’s responsive. Next one then. Again, I have to pick up on something that was addressed here this morning by Secretary Feith.

He pointed out that the President has pointed the finger in the sternum of the State Department and said, establish a Reconstruction and Stabilization Office.

And that’s sort of the first time that I had heard of this, and I think probably the first time the Commission has heard of that. I would imagine that the relationship with IGPBS would be one of not just countering threats and risks and
things like that.

I would imagine it would encompass a lot more than that -- like UNIFIED ASSISTANCE or the tsunami -- fantastic effort, if you will, that the military supported, that our nation provided.

But clearly -- would you help us as a commission here to understand a little bit about what this Reconstruction and Stabilization Office is really designed to do and how it affects or gets into the IGPBS business?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure. Secretary Powell -- in response to obvious urging from the President, but also working with Senator Luger and Senator Hagel -- spent a fair amount of time thinking about what we have now created as the Secretary’s Office of Stability and Reconstruction.

Ambassador Carlos Pasqual, who was our former Ambassador to Ukraine and who is a development specialist, was asked to take on this mission.

And he is heading up a staff now of folks from the Pentagon, from AID (U.S. Agency for
International Development), from the State Department, from all areas of regional expertise, and they are putting together a variety of tools.

The first is what you would expect: the more analytical kind of predictive tool, trying to see if across the U.S. Government is there information that we have that we know that helps us predict where problems might be coming so that we’re not -- we don’t have to try to be ready for 180 countries, but that we are able to know with some certainty -- or at least a little bit of predictability -- where problems are likely to occur.

And those are indicators from economic indicators to political stability indicators to corruption indicators -- what are all of the things that should go into that mix.

And so they’ve worked with the intelligence community, they’ve worked with DOD, they’ve worked with AID, and they’ve put together, you know, their -- and they are still elaborating.

This is an effort that has been underway,
I would say, for about seven months now. They -- Ambassador Pasqual has visited all of the combatant commanders.

He has been down to Norfolk several times with Admiral Giambastiani down at the Joint Forces Command, and Admiral Giambastiani has been very supportive and has actually sent some staff up to participate in the exercises and in the construction of exercises.

They’ve moved on from creating that analytical tool now to starting to think about exercises. How do, you know -- the military, obviously, does important business in exercises.

Honestly, we in the State Department have not historically done exercises except for crisis management that -- every embassy does a crisis management exercise to be ready for bad things that happen, might happen, in that country.

But across the political board we have not typically done our own exercises. Ambassador Pasqual is now fully engaged in trying to adapt exercise methodology to the particular State
Department set of issues. And that has just begun.

   His vision -- and, again, I’m speaking for
him and he is obviously -- could articulate this far
better than I could -- but his idea and the ideas
that he has talked about with the DOD is that
whatever the contingency might be, that we should
all be in at the beginning rather than having a
situation like Haiti -- where it was primarily a
military lead which then handed off quickly to State
and the U.N. and the interagency community -- that
we ought to plan from the very beginning to have an
interagency presence.

   Even though one particular agency might be
in the lead at the beginning and hand off to
civilian agencies later, we should all be in at the
beginning.

   And then we have a kind of -- have a
method or a plan for how we’re going to transition
from crisis to post-crisis to reconstruction.

   Obviously, there are lessons to be learned
from Iraq. The Secretary has said very clearly that
she wants to be sure that we harvest all of the
lessons of Iraq as part of Ambassador Pasqual’s effort.

And I know he has been -- he’s has been to Afghanistan, for example, to look at what are the many things that have gone right, what are the mistakes that were made there that we can harvest, and he’s doing the same with Iraq.

So, it is an important and exciting effort for us at the State Department to put together this capability. It is something that Secretary Rice is every bit as committed to as Secretary Powell was when he created it.

And I think that it will in the future enable us to do a better job of managing that transition from a hot conflict, if you will, to the reconstruction piece.

COMMISSIONER LESS: Good. Any link or tie to that -- that’s the UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, looking at those countries like Malaysia and --

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure. We have -- I mean -- we’ve obviously briefed them about the Global Defense Posture Review. I think that it is
not intimately linked to what they’re doing.

They’re aware of it. But I don't think right now there’s any particular organic link. But there is clearly, you know, a link to all of our ongoing development assistance programs, to all of our ongoing efforts in all of the countries.

COMMISSIONER LESS: Let me take you, for my last question then, to the Pacific theater and the threat that exists in that particular arena from the ballistic missile proliferation that’s ongoing in the arena and how we’re handling it -- but from a State Department -- I would like you to comment on where we are.

I remember in 1986, in a meeting in the Chinese embassy, Ambassador Lord explained -- I was on the Joint Staff at that particular time, I guess -- and I remember Ambassador Lord talking about China’s program and the fact that they had, at that time, stated that, hey, the economy -- it’s the economy, stupid -- and that’s where it’s going to be and that’s what we’re going to look at and we’re not going to look at anything else for a long time. And
we’ll get around to someday looking at our military posture and that sort of thing.

And their predictions, or their plan, has sort of played out the way they talked about it, or at least the way Ambassador Lord talked about it back in those particular days.

And, of course, the threat from the North Korean peninsula, too, on the No-Dong threats that, again, probably are having the capability of reaching the United States.

Your State Department comments on and your thoughts and ideas on that particular threat and where we are with countering that threat.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Obviously, it is something of tremendous concern to all of us. And it’s something that we talk with our allies and partners about.

Obviously the Japanese care very much about this. This is why the Japanese, for their part, for example, have decided to collaborate with us in the missile defense program.

So it is -- we have the same perception of
the threat that you do, Admiral. We are very worried about it. We work against the problem both, as I said, with our allies, like the Australians, but also in the entire non-proliferation arena.

Proliferation Security Initiative, we think, is important in being able to work with partners and allies to get at the threat.

COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you. Someone rang the buzzer on me again.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: I know, I saw the red light. I thought I better stop talking, the red light’s on.

COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you, ma'am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. One of the common themes that we’ve heard is that base changes resulting from Global Posture Review seem to satisfy military operational expediency rather than being based on a sound assessment of national security needs for the long term, and I want to take this back to the question -- I think that was asked by Commissioner Curtis - regarding, kind of, what came
first: the chicken of the egg, in regard to State Department and DOD’s interaction?

It would seem that the way foreign policy strategy should be developed is at the White House. And the State Department would develop that strategy and then military basing would support that strategy.

But what I heard you answer is that the State Department was basically trying to accommodate the requirements of DOD in regard to the IGPBS. So can you explain that for me?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: I’m sorry if I’ve given that misimpression, Mr. Chairman. Clearly, the President’s directive to all of us was to be prepared to be responsive wherever the threat comes from.

And so both DOD and we are responding to our instruction from the President based on the White House’s determination of where we should be going.

So I apologize for giving you a mistaken impression. We are not, you know, kind of just
accommodating, you know, kind of an idea that sprang from DOD.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: So there may be areas then where the Department of Defense has made suggestions that State Department doesn’t necessarily agree with?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: And would there be any countries where they made a recommendation? I don't need you to mention them by name now, but are you aware of countries where State Department has said don’t make this change there, or --

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: It’s been a very collegial process, where as we talk about whatever the idea might be. And our viewS have been welcome where we know that something will be particularly, politically difficult, we’ve said that.

Where we have said, well, a CSL there might be seen as threatening by a neighbor; well, okay, let’s look at that again. So, I mean, it has been a very collegial interactive process.

And at no time, you know, have we felt
like our views haven’t been taken fully into consideration.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Good. Now I heard you say -- and you repeated it twice -- that the threat from any place, anywhere. And I know we’ve heard that many times from the Department of Defense, as well, and I can understand that to a degree -- that, if we’re dealing with terrorist type actions, that’s acceptable.

When we start talking about traditional threats -- or near-peer or peer competitors -- then it would seem like we can identify certain threats and have an idea of where those threats might materialize.

Would you want to address that at all? Is there anything that I could have you add to that --

(No verbal response, only head-shaking.)

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: At a later time then?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Yes, in this forum, it’s a little --

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Okay. All right. We would appreciate the opportunity to visit with you
then in that regard.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: I’m going to read a question, so bear with me, but I do want to ask this last question. The presence of forces overseas is, ideally, designed to meet U.S. security needs; expanding the influence of the U.S. Government with foreign governments and people overseas and maintaining regional and global stability.

How would you describe the ways that the re-basing concepts currently planned support the State Department view of the National Security Strategy over the next several decades?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Particularly as we look to do things in new areas with nontraditional partners, particularly the new NATO members, the opportunity to kind of have -- to take a relationship to the next level of partnership, to interact with host nation militaries, to create military-to-military relationships that, you know, have military value in and of themselves, reinforce the concept of civilian control of the military, of
the role of a professional military in a democracy.

All of those things are important foreign policy and national security goals. And so I think that the effort to -- as we work with new and different countries than we have traditionally -- that those very much advance and forward our foreign policies and national security goals.

If you look to Asia -- where we have some excellent security partners -- but, again, we will be looking in new areas, potentially, of cooperation where we can deepen existing relationships and friendships, but also, you know, be a force for stability in areas that perhaps are interested in looking to us to provide, with even a minimal presence, an expression of interest and commitment by the United States to a particular region.

So I think, again, that certainly advances our foreign polity goals. In the case -- going back to the case I know best -- in the case of El Salvador when, you know, the decision to put a forward operating location in El Salvador was somewhat controversial domestically.
The former guerrillas that we all remember from the ‘80s are in the legislature now and have a plurality of the seats in the legislature. And we’re quite critical of President Flores for doing that.

And he was asked by Jim Lehrer on the MacNeil/Lehrer show, why are you getting involved in what appears to be a U.S. effort in Columbia? Why are you getting involved in this? What is your, you know, motivation for this?

And President Flores was very honest in answering him and said, look, I’m a small country with limited resources. And the resources that I have available to me need to be spent on the health and economic development of my people and educating the young people.

I can’t take on the Columbian narco-traffickers by myself. I need a big strategic partner. Who better as my big strategic partner than the United States?

And so putting that forward operating location in El Salvador says to the traffickers,
you’re not welcome here. Don’t bother. I think messages like that are very useful in places like Central America where the government resources are, in fact, limited.

And it does assist them to have whatever presence we have there and to reinforce what they’re trying to do domestically. So I think, from a variety of perspectives, United States foreign policy goals and national security goals are being advanced by this process.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. I’m going to turn my page so I make sure that I don’t miss anything. And I’ve got Bulgaria question written here in big letters.

Did anyone have a Bulgaria question? I guess I’ll ask one then in regard to possibly basing in Eastern Europe or at least having rotational forces.

And I’ll address it to both Bulgaria and Romania. That -- and I can pose particular questions: I guess I’d like you to just kind of respond in what you think the possibilities are
there because of your history in that region.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Thank you. Well, clearly our, you know, having Bulgaria -- and Romania, for that matter -- as NATO members, when I served there, was a distant dream and it was something that we were talking about.

The current Foreign Minister, Solomon Pasi, was the President of the Atlantic Club, which is about the only forum in Bulgaria where American speakers were welcome.

And so everybody from Stu Eisenstat to members of Congress spoke in front of the Atlantic Club because they were the only people willing to give us a forum to get our views out in Bulgaria at what was a pretty critical time.

So, personally, I cannot say, you know, how delighted I am -- I can’t say enough about how delighted I am that Bulgaria and Romania are new NATO members.

They’ve embraced their NATO responsibilities wholeheartedly. Both countries are participating with us on Iraq. They’ve lost members
of their armed forces in the effort in Iraq.

But they are quite enthusiastic NATO members. They are both eager to work with us at Global Defense Posture. I think one of the opportunities that the European Command and our Department of Defense colleagues have identified as promising from both perspectives is, particularly, in the area of training. Being able to make use of facilities that they might wish to make available to us for training, the possibility of doing joint training with those countries -- again, reinforcing their NATO proficiency, their being able to operate with us to NATO standards, NATO rules of operation -- will be good for us and good for them.

So I think that, particularly in the area of Bulgaria and Romania, our initial thought is in the area of training. But you know, we are at the beginning of a conversation with them about how best to develop that.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Do any of the Commissioners have a follow-up question they’d like to ask? Commissioner Martin.
COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of clarifications, Ambassador, if I might. Is the Department of Defense not specifying completely what it needs when it talks about wanting to locate a CSL in a particular country or region?

Maybe I misheard because I thought there was some disconnect that -- maybe they were telling you everything you needed other (than to) know.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: No, I think it’s more a process of change that has gone on from where we started as we’ve thought through the process. I would tell you that we have most certainty about the so-called big pieces -- about, you know, Asia, about Europe.

The CSLs, because there will be so many of them and they will be in far-flung locations and they’ll have to be treated kind of one at a time, have been the ones that we have not addressed in the level of detail that we have the other bigger pieces.

It is not that there has been any lack of
sharing of information, but rather a lack of final
definition of our end plans.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: My second and final
question was that you mentioned that some locations
or arrangements with countries were actually being
undertaken by State because of State Department
reasons that were not particularly requested or
specifically requested by DOD.

Do you keep DOD informed of where you are
in that process?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Absolutely.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: So they know what
the menu might be?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Absolutely. In fact,
obviously, in the Article 98 agreements, for
example, as we negotiate them, they’re almost always
a part of the team.

If we have to send a team to a capital, we
try to do as much of it in Washington as we can to
be cost-effective. But when we have to go out to
capitals, they are always invited -- whether it’s a
Department of Defense attorney or somebody from the
military staff, they are always invited.

Sometimes they go, sometimes they don’t.

But it is not a lack of coordination. We are very tightly lashed up on that.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Curtis.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Ambassador, I would like to hear your opinions on where we’re going with Turkey. Clearly, I’ve watched our relation with Turkey over a lot of years, from my years in the Air Force, and it’s always been an evolving process. And it’s been in the news a good deal lately.

Will you share your perceptions on where we are with Turkey on the various legal arrangements that we’d like to put in place?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure. Turkey, as a NATO ally, as you know, throughout the Cold War, played a very critical role for all of us. Incirlik is, I’m sure, well known to everybody in the United States Air Force.

The generosity of the Government of Turkey
in working with us in the use of that facility has been important to us on any number of occasions. I remember in my days in Sophia wanting to, you know -- moving stuff through Turkey for the Balkans when, in those days, we couldn’t bring a train across Bulgaria because the Socialist-controlled legislature wouldn’t allow materials of war to cross the national territory to get to the Balkans coming from Turkey.

And so, you know, we had to be very creative in working with the Turks to find a way to get stuff to our troops. So, obviously, the relationship with Turkey is long and deep and starts from the fact that we’re NATO allies.

We will continue to consult closely with Turkey. There have, as yet, been no formal requests put to them. Obviously, events in their neighborhood have been of intense concern to the Turks.

Turkey, like many of the countries in the region, is also undergoing its own political transformation and development and we need to be
respectful of that, in my humble opinion.

So, I think that we have every expectation that we will continue to enjoy with Turkey the same degree of cooperation and close collaboration as allies that we have in the past.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you, Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: You’re very welcome.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Commissioner Taylor.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Ms. Ambassador, you’re obviously very familiar with the various permanent bases that we will be closing as we bring out approximately 70,000 in various places of the world.

What is the likelihood that we could move back into those same places or in those same countries again sometime, if we change our mind?

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: General, I think that really depends on what country and which base you’re talking about. Obviously, the place where the most -- the biggest numbers we’re talking about is Germany, where we’re going to, you know, reduce a
fairly large number of facilities.

The Germans, as I mentioned, are going through their own process of transformation and to the extent that there is a facility that we are no longer going to use and the Germans decide to use it, there might be a future ability to go back to a facility like that.

To the extent that a facility is completely closed and turned over to civilian use and becomes a university or an airport, obviously, practicalities tell you it’s a little tougher to go back with the same military footprint that we might have once had.

So, I’m sorry to say, I think it will be very dependent on which facilities and what host governments do with them after we move on.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I was talking about a little boarder perspective than individual installations or --

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Sure.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: -- facilities over there -- but just access, regaining access, at that
level in these countries.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Oh, oh, sure. I think that -- I don't know -- in all of these countries we have alliance relationships -- and I think in -- whether we’re talking about Germany or we’re talking about Japan and Korea, I mean, these are core alliances for the United States.

And in each case we are a core partner for that country. And I feel very confident that should the need arise that we would be able to have productive conversations with our allies.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Well, you’ve been a great witness.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: Well, thank you.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: It’s been a pleasure having you here and we thank you for your time away from your busy schedule. And your insight will be invaluable to us as we move forward with our deliberations.

We would like to follow up with a meeting over at State with you sometime in the next two or
three weeks to -- where we can address some of the other questions that we couldn’t address today.

AMBASSADOR LIKINS: IT would be my pleasure.

CHAIRMAN CORNELLA: Thank you. And to the members of the general public, press and others, we thank you for your attendance -- you for attending and for your interest in these important issues that affect the defense of our nation.

Future public meetings and hearings will be announced and appropriately published prior to their scheduled date. This concludes the March 1st, 2005, hearing of the Overseas Basing Commission.

(Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m. the above-entitled hearing was concluded.)