COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF OVERSEAS MILITARY FACILITY STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

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HEARING

TUESDAY
NOVEMBER 9, 2004

The Hearing convened in the Senate Appropriations Committee Hearing Room, Room 138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., at 9:05 a.m., Al Cornella, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT:

AL CORNELLA                        Chairman
LEWIS CURTIS, Maj Gen, USAF (Ret)  Vice Chairman
ANTHONY LESS, VADM, USN (Ret)      Commissioner
KEITH MARTIN, BG, PA ARNG (Ret)    Commissioner
PETE TAYLOR, LTG, USA (Ret)        Commissioner
DR. JAMES THOMSON                  Commissioner

WITNESSES

THOMAS P. M. BARNETT, Prof., U.S. Naval War College
MARCUS CORBIN, Center for Defense Information
DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, President & CEO, Center for Strategic and International Studies
AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER, RAND Corp.
CHARLES A. HORNER, General, USAF (Ret)
MONTGOMERY S. MEIGS, General, USA (Ret)
MICHAEL P. NOONAN, Foreign Policy Research Institute
CHARLES "TONY" ROBERTSON, JR., General, USAF (Ret)
# Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel One:</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador Robert E. Hunter</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. John J. Hamre</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Two:</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Charles A. Horner</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Montgomery C. Meigs</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Charles T. &quot;Tony&quot; Robertson, Jr.</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Three:</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Thomas P. M. Barnett</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcus Corbin</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Noonan</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This hearing constitutes the third public meeting of the Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, more commonly known as the Overseas Basing Commission.

My name is Al Cornella, and I serve as the Commission's Chairman. Other Commissioners present today are, from my far right, the Commission Vice Chairman, Lewis Curtis, Major General, United States Air Force, Retired; Anthony Less, Vice Admiral, United States Navy, Retired; Pete Taylor, Lieutenant General, United States Army, Retired; Keith Martin, Brigadier General, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, Retired; and Dr. James Thomson.

I would also like to introduce the Commission's Executive Director, Ms. Patricia Walker.

The Overseas Basing Commission was established by Public Law in Fiscal Year 2004. The Commission's task is to independently assess whether
the current overseas basing structure is adequate to execute current missions and to assess the feasibility of closures, realignments, or establishment of new installations overseas to meet emerging defense requirements.

The Commission's work is not intended to preclude the Department of Defense's efforts toward developing an integrated global presence and basing strategy. Rather, the Commission report will assist Congressional committees in performing their oversight responsibilities for DoD's basing strategy, military construction appropriations, and the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission determinations.

This Commission has been active since May 2004, and has conducted a previous hearing where we received testimony from former military experts, defense analysts, and experts on military family issues. We have engaged in briefings from the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, and other entities.

The Commission has met with commanders and
received extensive briefings on the transformation plan for the European Command. We visited military installations in several countries, meeting with U.S. Forces, embassy representatives, foreign military officers, and local officials.

We ended our trip by meeting with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the European Combatant Commander, General James Jones. The Commissioners have received briefings from the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and most recently, U.S. Transportation Command.

A trip to Pacific Command and a return trip to European Command are also scheduled.

The composition of the Commission staff has been established. We have hired lead research analysts, a not-for-profit government consulting firm, administrative staff, and received six analysts detailed from the Department of Defense.

The Commission will provide Congress and the President with a preliminary report by March 31, 2005, and the final report by August 15, 2005.
At this point, I would like to describe the procedure for today's hearing. We have three panels, and we will introduce each panel as they appear. Each panelist will receive up to 10 minutes for an opening statement. At the conclusion of all opening statements, each Commissioner will have up to 10 minutes to question the panel.

We will use lights as a courtesy reminder. When the yellow light appears, you have two minutes remaining. When the red light appears, time has expired. However, I would ask the panelists to please take as much time as necessary to complete your comments.

On Panel One, it is my privilege to introduce Dr. John Hamre and Ambassador Robert Hunter. Ambassador Hunter is the former U.S. Ambassador to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and U.S. Representative to the Western European Union and currently is Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation in Washington and Senior International Consultant to Lockheed Martin Overseas Corporation.

Dr. John Hamre is a former Deputy
Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, and currently serves as the President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Welcome, gentlemen, and thank you for appearing before the Commission. Today we would appreciate your frank and professional views on: Suggested focus areas for the Commission to investigate in its review; potential unintended consequences of returning large numbers of troops stationed overseas to the United States from an overseas and U.S. perspective; your thoughts on concerns and issues surrounding DoD's integrated global presence and basing strategy; and any other issues that you think the Commission should consider.

So first I would call on Ambassador Hunter, if he has an opening statement, to go ahead and do so.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It would have been easier if John Hamre had gone first, because I could have said that I agreed.

I am honored to share with him, and
honored also -- I must say, we at RAND have loaded the
dock this morning, because Jim Thomson is one of your
distinguished Commissioners.

I should also say, Mr. Chairman, to begin
with that we need to settle a major issue here, which
is: what is the best part of South Dakota? You are
from Rapid City. This gentleman here to my right is
an easterner from Willow Lake, and my people are from
Belfouche. So we will gang up against the easterners.

It is an honor to be here. You have a
very daunting task in front of you, to try to predict
the future and predict what the United States should
do in that future to keep ourselves as secure as
possible with military force and other types of
American power and influence, and also to retain
America's position in the world and the position of
leadership that we have for so long occupied.

I recall sometime ago, it was exactly 15
years ago today, I was in a meeting with the good and
the great on European security policy.

We met for a whole morning. It was the
what was happening in Central Europe, and we talked
about every possibility there could have been except
for one. Nobody even suggested that the Berlin Wall
might open, and we were right -- for four hours.

Today is the 15th anniversary. Much has
changed since then. That was not predicted
adequately, the question. Your task is to try to
predict adequately for the next 15 years. It is a
daunting task, and I am pleased to be helping you with
it.

One recognizes that what you are doing has
to be balanced with requirements for U.S. basing with
regard to the next BRAC, which are difficult decisions
as well, and which require in looking at foreign
basing that there be a pretty compelling case to have
American bases and forces abroad rather than at home.

We have had the double shift in the last
15 years: First, the post-Cold War period and,
secondly, the period after 9-11 and related
requirements, plus our long term commitments in the
Middle East. We are going to be as a nation,
militarily and otherwise, in the Middle East for as
far into the future as we can say -- as we can see.

That doesn't necessarily mean deployments to any particular place. God help us that we will have an early end to the fighting in Iraq and enabling American forces to do their job, to be fully protected, and to come home. But we are going to be in the Middle East for as far ahead as we can see, and we are going to also have serious, significant deployments abroad. But they may be very different.

The kinds of bases and kinds of deployments will not be those of the Cold War, probably not of the kind that we had in the 13 years up until 9-11 and some that you have to judge for the future.

I think there are six main criteria, and three are military. One is the efficiency and effectiveness of military operations. How much can we project just from the Continental United States and from Alaska and Hawaii without actually having to have people on the ground or, if we have bases, bases of different kinds such as those being proposed now by the Secretary of Defense.
To say the word base, you now have to qualify it mightily before you know what you are talking about.

We have the importance of transit facilities, intelligence, communications, logistics and support for operations in other countries. These are growing in importance, these specialized basing requirements, with peacekeeping, peace support and what we now call nation building.

There is also the value of contingency basing in one form or another, facilitating access and promoting speed and effectiveness of power projection. That includes logistics and prepositioned stocks and facilities, and shortened time required to make arrangements with host governments when we want to project power into their countries.

Then, of course, there are the relative costs of forces deployed abroad as opposed to projecting power from the continental United States, both the costs of sustaining forces abroad, the costs of moving them from here to there, and the cost of transiting.
With the capacity to deploy vast amounts of power directly from the United States or from a limited number of principal bases overseas, by these criteria there can clearly be reduced need for large scale basing and force deployments, though with the military concepts developing, perhaps more smaller facilities of different types will be needed, as proposed by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, there are also criteria that are not strictly military that I am going to focus on for a couple of minutes: The geopolitics, the political military mission, and some political limitations.

The geopolitics: This is the value of having bases and forces abroad, showing the flag in terms of commitment, deterrence, preventing war and conflict in the first place. No doubt in circumstances where protecting U.S. interest has a military component, being abroad permanently can be of great importance -- this, in particular, (when) deterring adversaries and reassuring allies, as with Korea and Japan perhaps most obviously today; where
being in harm’s way is a critical part of both
deterrence and reassurance.

This also means facilities to support the
routine, crisis and combat roles for American sea
power, demonstrated capacities to come or to return in
force, and in showing post-conflict that the U.S. will
not leave friends and allies in the lurch.

Put very simply, bases and deployments
mean influence, and below some level influence drops
disproportionately. These are fine judgments, but
they help to set a baseline to overseas presence.

Forces that have a constabulary function
are still of great value if they prevent conflict, as
in Europe for 40 years, without having to fire a shot.

Second is the political military mission.
The role of the overseas presence, forces connected to
basing structure, to make the total mission of U.S.
power and influence, which is increasing a political
military mission, as we are seeing especially with the
global war in terrorism.

I call this “the total mission concept”,
which is not just the total force concept of the
standing military and the Guard and Reserves. This is where the interaction of the military and the non-military is critical to achieve our objectives.

We see this now in particular in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is the interaction, the working together of the military and the civilian. This will mean more, rather than fewer, overall personnel in some places, bases of the right kind in some places, as nation building goes up.

Not only does this mean having forces abroad help with access to territory in a crisis, patterns of relationships with people in other countries that must be created in advance, but they can have a positive effect on their own, promoting democratic control of forces, national guard type civilian actions, reform of institutions, and the role, not just of civilian personnel of the United States, but of the day to day, person to person building of relations and trust in the United States.

A great example: The stunning success of the U.S.-led Partnership for Peace which I helped to create, which is now extending even beyond Euro-Asia.
The role of U.S. personnel in PACOM where sometimes the force commander has been called the Mayor of the Pacific; SOUTHCOM's role in Latin America -- the anti-drug role -- but also projecting American assistance and American values, one of our greatest exports and where the American military are in a very real sense ambassadors of the United States of America; the extraordinary reach and role of EUCOM now all the way across Eurasia and south as far as the Cape of Good Hope, taking to a great extent the lead for the United States policy in west Africa now being done by EUCOM; and on and on.

I can attest from personal experience in Europe and elsewhere in dealing with combatant commanders, present and past, and with allies and friends across the continent, U.S. forces abroad, U.S. bases abroad, properly configured, properly utilized, are a total mission multiplier.

It is also clear that retaining significant forces in Europe is important, not just for purposes of power projection from closer distances, from here to there, calculations that can
be made, but also to demonstrate to the Europeans, as we ask them to be more fully engaged out of area, especially in the Middle East -- as we ask them to provide more military capabilities -- we are not losing interest in Europe, bypassing it, treating NATO like a toolbox.

Today we bear the lion's share of Middle East and Southwest Asia military tasks, but at the same time, I regret to say, we are playing little role either in the NATO response force or the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. These are "penny wise, pound foolish" actions which reduce our influence within NATO.

Let's also be clear. Relationships, once severed because too many bases are closed and people have come home, are relationships that are very hard to build later. That, too, is a cost, though it has no calculable price tag.

The fact that more than 12 million Americans have lived in Europe because of U.S. military deployments is a coin of invaluable worth. That won't happen again, but something else needs to
be in place. You can't project this from CONUS (Continental U.S.).

Finally and very briefly, we have to understand that there are some limitations we have to accept. This is particularly important in places where the presence of U.S. bases can be seized upon by those who do not wish us well.

This has sometimes happened in the Middle East. That is why we used to have an over-the-horizon strategy that, when I was in the Carter NSC (National Security Council) in charge of the Middle East, I helped to manage and implement. It is why I opposed keeping major visible U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 war which had, I believe, highly disastrous consequences in terms of serving as a lightning rod for the Islamists.

We have to be sensitive to the signals we send by basing structure. In particular today, in regard to the Russian Federation, I support NATO enlargement, but I am also sensitive to the need for the United States to develop a basing concept in a way that takes Russia's and others' interests into account.
Mr. Chairman, in sum, as you consider overseas basing along with force deployments, it is critical to see the deployment of U.S. strategy in terms of our overall interests in the combined mission. This requires judgments encompassing a broad definition of your mandate, deployments as well as bases, a hedge for flexibility in political, military -- as well as military -- terms, and deferring some judgments in base closures until there is a clearer sense of just what will face us out there in the years ahead.

I salute you for your service, and I am glad you are making the decisions and not me. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.

Dr. Hamre?

DR. HAMRE: Chairman Cornella, and to all of the Commissioners, thank you. Thank you for inviting me. Thank you for inviting me to be here with my fellow South Dakotan, Robert Hunter, but especially thank you for doing this.
This is a very big issue: how the United States bases its forces overseas. It is hard to think of a bigger issue, frankly, for the long time -- long term -- national security of the country, and we have not had a national debate. The Congress has not done its job. They should have been holding this debate for all of us to decide what is needed for our country, but they did at least create you and ask you to do this.

So, frankly, you are carrying a very large responsibility on behalf of the country, to hold this debate about what we are doing in re-basing our forces, that we should be having at the national level. We have not had it. So I really do want to echo what Ambassador Dr. Hunter said, a sincere thanks to all of you for taking time from your personal lives to dedicate genuine attention to this very critical issue.

The serious advantage of following Ambassador Hunter is that he has said everything, and I have very little left to say, and I did provide a statement, and I don't want to repeat that. So let me
make just a few very cursory observations.

When we position troops overseas, we have both tactical objectives and strategic objectives. Obviously, we have the tactical objective of putting them someplace where they are better positioned for a fight we think we may need to undertake.

They also, as Ambassador Hunter said, have a strategic role. They are normative in shaping the international security environment over time. That is exactly why we left troops in Europe after World War II, because we wanted to keep a place in the world that would be free, so that the rest of Europe, when it finally could reunite, had that to fall into, and we knew we were in a very adverse posture to win a tactical fight, but the strategic victory was guaranteed if we had the stamina to stay there.

So it had this large normative quality. Now that normative quality works so long as there is a shared consensus between us and the host country. We all know why we are doing this together. We knew why we were in Germany. We knew why we were in Japan and Korea, and we knew it and shared that vision with the
people who were the hosts of our troops.

    I think my reservation about what we are
doing now -- I really think it's good that Secretary
Rumsfeld has opened this debate, the Department is
holding this debate. But far too much of the thinking
is just about the tactical nature of our basing, not
the strategic dimension of our basing.

    What is the normative quality for how we
want to shape the international environment over the
next 30 years by where we put our forces? I think we
are spending far too much of our time simply looking
for the tactical advantage that DoD could have in
using those forces, not the strategic dimension of
where we are putting them.

    Now there is a problem here, two problems
actually. Our interests in re-basing is largely to
enhance our flexibility to use the forces. We want
them in a place where it is easier to use them. The
host country is, frankly, looking for stability: I'm
willing to have them here if they represent an
enduring commitment to me in my region. And there is
an inherent tension between our desire to use it as a
platform for something else and their desire for it to be a binding and lasting commitment for them.

That's intention, to be candid, and I think it is going to be a long term problem as we are trying to work out the very detailed engineering details of where you base troops.

The second issue is: Is there really a strategic framework that we and our host countries share? Now we are quite convinced that the so called global war on terrorism is that strategic framework but, frankly, the rest of the world doesn't see it that way.

My colleague, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, has said frequently that this is like declaring a war on a tactic. This is like saying World War II was the war against blitzkrieg. You know, World War II was a war against Fascism, not against a military tactic on the battlefield, and global war against terrorism is really declaring our war against a tactic, not the cause of these problems.

The rest of the world doesn't see it the way we do. They don't see this in the same dimension.
If we don't have that shared durable framework where we and our host countries see the world the same way, a basing agreement doesn't have durability, frankly, and I think we have to be very concerned about that.

We need to spend this time really building that strategic framework so that, when we do move our bases -- and I think we should, by the way. I'm not opposed to moving the bases. I am far more confident on how we should do it in Europe than I am in Asia, to be candid.

I have more reservations about what we are doing in Asia, but we should do it. But we have to base it on a very lengthy and open dialogue with these host countries to develop that durable framework of national interests that are in theirs and ours so that it has this lasting, normative quality that you want for when you are making a major commitment as a country to put your troops overseas.

I think we should put our troops overseas. I think it is far better, because I am interested in shaping the global environment over time, and I think this is the one of the best ways to do it, as
Ambassador Hunter said.

It certainly has its costs, and it certainly does entail burdens, but it is certainly worth it in the long run, if we build it on a strong foundation of shared perceptions.

I thank you for what you are doing. I think this is extraordinarily important work. I do hope that you will think as a Commission about how you will take your views and carry them for implementation.

Please don't just end when you -- or stop when you finish your report. You've got to think about how you are going to take this back to the Congress, force them to consider and have that debate.

They should be doing it, at least you are doing it, and I'm grateful that you are. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Dr. Hamre. At this time I will call on Commissioner Less to begin questioning.

COMMISSIONER LESS: I appreciate your comments on taking -- for the repositioning of forces to take on the tactic. That is a very interesting
concept.

Talk about a risk, if you would. We are talking in terms of taking on the tactic when we start talking about moving forces, and the way this thing comes across is that we are talking about bringing forces home. So there are risks involved. I think you are talking more in terms of repositioning.

Would you be so kind as to cover what you see in the way of risk associated with bringing forces back, as this debate unfolds and we get into that particular part of it? I think that's where we are.

DR. HAMRE: Admiral Less, there are many ways that the United States projects its presence around the world, and it doesn't always have to be on fixed bases. You know quite well from your personal experience that the role of the Navy in providing presence is both a strategic symbol of our commitment as well as our tactical capacity to move quickly. These are all part of it.

We do this now increasingly with the Air Force. We do it with Special Operations Forces. We do it with the Army. So it doesn't mean that there
have to always be large, fixed American-style cities overseas in order to sustain our strategic commitment.

There are probably some places where that makes a difference, a positive difference, and there are probably some places where, frankly, it has some real burdens, and it is counterproductive.

I don't think, in the long run, that we are going to be in a safer world if we just have the United States as a safe mothership and then we launch expeditionary parties from this mothership. I think we very much want to have a network of bases around the world.

I think we want to operate from them. We want to routinely be there. We want to be seen. We want to be forced to understand our host partners and our host countries. If we simply are trying to base our national security and our force projection capabilities from a home platform, we are going to lose consciousness about how the other world operates and thinks and sees and how to work with them.

So being overseas -- The greatest risk I see of pulling back into a continental platform is the
texture and the context of knowing how to work with others, and we are going to want to work with others.

We will want to work with others extensively. It will make it harder to do that, and there is going to be a growing gap between our tactical operation with others and our strategic commitment to working with other countries.

So I think, for those reasons, we really need to have a -- I personally would favor a very serious basing commitment in the long run overseas. And as the Secretary said, that doesn't mean it has to be of the same character of the past. It doesn't have to mean having 130,000 people living in the Kaiserslautern-Ramstein area.

I completely agree with that. But it probably needs to be something more than a lily pad, you know, where you are just jumping around from feeder to feeder or kind of, you know, beaming yourself in and out of a region. You know, that doesn't have the durable nature that creates the normative conditions over time that help shape the environment in a way that is favorable to our
So it isn't clean. It isn't neat. But there clearly is an overwhelming need for us to have an enduring presence overseas that represents a lasting commitment of our interests to their security as well as ours.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: May I defer to that, agreeing with everything Dr. Hamre said.

The relationships that we build on a day to day basis with other militaries and other countries is an incredible mission multiplier. You can't calculate it. You know it when you lose it, but you don't know the point at which you are going to lose it.

It is like pulling the bricks out of a child's pile of blocks, and you don't know which block you pull out that is going to cause the whole thing to collapse.

It is also, I guess, technically strategically important, because it shows American commitment and interest in engagement. It is a visible expression more than any political rhetoric or
anything else that America is there, and particularly
when a record of American forces abroad is
extraordinary in the interaction with other societies.

We could all who work on policy and
diplomacy learn an awful lot from our military people.

That says quite a bit. In fact, part of it is how
you change. It is clear we have to change
deployments. The ones we had in the Cold War just
don't make any sense in the future, except, I think,
in Korea where I do have some reservations about
moving troops south from Seoul in terms of appearing
to be taking less of a risk than the South Korean
people themselves, and I think that that is probably a
mistake in trying to deter a war and to reassure an
ally.

Part of it is how you do it. For example,
if you are working closely with allies and in the
process of working with them showing them that you
continue to be committed, as in Europe, then they are
reasonable people. It's if they hear something in the
newspaper one day, America is going to change, that
makes them nervous and, frankly, you begin to lose
some of this shaping function which Dr. Hamre, I think, underscored which, in some ways, other than the actual combat in places like Iraq or the Special Forces functions in the war on terrorism, is going to be the most important function of American deployments abroad, and you don't do that by just appearing one day over the horizon.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You touched a bit, Dr. Hunter, on NATO and maintaining a seat at the table. What sort of capabilities do we need overseas in order to be able to do that?

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Mr. Chairman, I think that is a critical question. The most important thing is America's continuing commitment abroad in our interest and the shared interest we have with allies. That is the fundament.

If you don't have that, you could have a million people deployed abroad, and it's not going to be worth anything. We used to say during the Cold War where we had 326,272 troops by Congressional mandate abroad that you could cut it in half, and it wouldn't matter. You could double it. It would matter very
much, depending on how the United States was positioning itself, what we were saying, what we were doing.

Having said that, I think there is a very good case for looking to Europe as a platform for projecting power elsewhere where that is not outrageously silly in terms of costs that are involved, because that engages the Europeans. It is an incentive for them to be involved with us.

It gives us an opportunity to push them on doing their own work in the military aspect and, in another area, it helps to create a platform of engagement for training, for common doctrine, for the ability to increase the level of military force if we do face something in a major way, and also to do something which has not yet been touched upon but, where bases are only a secondary issue but still not a nugatory issue, which is the ability to be interoperable with other countries.

We are fast losing that ability. The United States races ahead with technology. Many of the Europeans, practically all, lag behind. There are
ways in which they can plug and play with what we are
doing, but we have to be prepared to share high
technology.

They have to be prepared to protect the
technology, and we have to be enough in place so they
will say working with the United States, seeing our
destiny within NATO and the American leadership,
that's the way to go rather than trying something
else, and ultimately abdicating shared responsibility.

Our leadership and our commitment -- and
nobody wants us to leave Europe -- is what, more than
anything else, keeps these people working with us
militarily and politically.

DR. HAMRE: Mr. Chairman, could I -- just
to reinforce something that Ambassador Hunter said,
our military is considered the gold standard in the
world. I mean, every military in the world looks to
the United States as really -- It's the gold standard.
It is what you want to be. It is how you want to be
measured.

This is an unbelievable attribute of
national power to have that capacity. Frankly, we are
eroding it by how poorly we are handling the post-
conflict situation. I guess it's not really post-
conflict, but our failure to follow through and win a
durable peace in Iraq has frankly eroded our military
capability. But that is another issue.

It still is the gold standard. Now you
want to leverage that capacity, for the rest of the
world's militaries to want to emulate you. But that
means you've got to be with them. You've got to be
out there. You've got to be interacting with them.

It does not have to be, as I said, great
big American cities in foreign countries. It doesn't
have to be that, but it has to be a durable and
enduring commitment of interaction with them that is
grounded on their needs, not just ours. Huge
opportunity in east Europe right now.

The entire east European military
establishment is looking for guidance. They very much
would be shaped by their capacity to work with us, if
we had a very good and positive posture in working
with them.

What a tremendous asset it's been for us
to have had 45 years where every single officer in west Europe at some point in time has served under an American officer. The most incredible thing, when you think about that, and we have that opportunity in the future, not of the same dimension because NATO is changing, but to help use this remarkable institution and have it to become the lead agent for integrating a very positive dimension for our national security with allies, and we really ought to be designing this rebasing around that idea.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: We could not have stabilized Europe in the post-Cold War era and enlarged NATO if it had not been for Partnership for Peace which had a lot to do with average American Joes going into these countries, teaching them the democratization of the military, teaching them the skills, teaching them all the things they needed so they could begin to be producers and not just consumers of security.

When I was Ambassador, I remember on a typical year the United States Air Forces in Europe, people there, officers and enlisted, spent more than
50 percent of their time away from home, mostly in eastern Europe, central Europe, helping these people develop the skills and the relationships with us which are absolutely golden for the future.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I know there are some that question the relevancy of NATO, and I think you have kind of negated some of that. But as you see the emergence of the European Union and NATO, how does all that fit together?

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: I will pick up on something Dr. Hamre said. The United States military is the gold standard. The United States is the 800-pound gorilla. It is our leadership, our commitment to which others look, including all the Europeans.

The European Union is developing its own fledgling foreign policy, its own fledgling military forces, but if we were to say one day, thank you, you have yours, we are coming home, they would panic. They really see this as ancillary and supportive of what we are doing, not as something that is fundamentally competitive.

I think we have sometimes in this town
gotten a little too excited about what they have been
doing, in part because it is extremely difficult to
understand it, the common foreign and security policy
and the European security and defense policy. It is
already 37 syllables, I think. But in general, what
we do together with the Europeans is going to be the
future.

You know, I think one thing we learn --
and I'll see if Dr. Hamre agrees -- in the last three
years, we can do an awful lot by ourselves. We have
unprecedented power in the world. But the American
people, I think, would like us to do it with others,
and when it comes to shaping events, an awful lot of
other people have skills that can be extremely useful
to them and to us.

I personally believe we should develop a
new U.S.-European Union strategic partnership, which
is mostly non-military. It is in health. It is in
education. It is in development. It is using the
fantastic capacities of the United States and European
Union nations to transform and to shape environments
in order to reduce the possibility of having to use
There is a major military component in this, but provided we demonstrate to the allies that we are prepared to share influence and decision as well as risk and responsibility, I believe we can build this relationship effectively for the next 50 years as it worked for the past 50.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Dr. Hamre, a kind of a follow-on to some things that both of you have discussed here.

Of course, the current global basing plan that OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) has put out -- there's a lot of involvement in some areas where we have traditionally not had a large involvement before, at least the discussions, in Africa, Central Asia.

What are the pros and cons of this, risks, challenges? What would be your comments about that?

DR. HAMRE: Well, first of all, I think that there are great opportunities of our working in a much more engaged way in Africa and Central Asia. I think it is a positive thing for us to be working on.
And indeed, in Africa very modest investments could have enormous implications in the years ahead -- very modest investments by historic standards.

When President Bush issued his national security strategy about two and a half years ago, you know, all the attention was devoted to the preemption doctrine. That actually was only about three paragraphs, you know, in the third chapter. Frankly, they were more interested in that than they were the rest of the strategy. Nonetheless, it was -- The document really was really quite a composite. It was really quite good.

It talked about the imperative of helping to build competent governments around the world. I think the role of the military, and especially in Africa, could be enormously influential in this regard, to help bring functioning structures to a part of the world that, frankly, struggles quite a bit.

Again, with a military that is deeply committed to civilian control, that would be a very positive symbol to send as well in Africa, because it is a country that's torn by a lot of coups.
So I think it is different from Central Asia. Central Asia has probably got a different quality to it. Central Asia, of course, is inextricably tied to a much more turbulent space and one that has more strategic moment to it.

It is less clear to me what the strategic design is for all of the bases through this region. Right now, I think they are largely there for tactical support they can give to operations, for example, in Afghanistan. But there isn't such a large strategy, and I do worry that we are in a period where American bases -- I mean our attitude now about American bases, we more think about force protection and how to cocoon them from the rest of society than how to use them as a platform in the country for spreading western values.

I'd want to look pretty closely at what that broad plan is for how you use the bases through the Central Asian region as a platform to expand democratic values, stability in the region, economic growth, leadership development in society, all of that. Frankly, I don't see as much of that as I think
we should, given that we are going to make a commitment to be in that region.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Two points, Commissioner, on that. We are looking at the U.S. European Command is now doing in Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and elsewhere, which is an all-service effort. We sometimes think when we shape environment the U.S. Navy has less to do, but it's not true.

The role of the U.S. Navy in its relations with other navies and the like is of extraordinary value, and it has an added value that it sails away afterwards. It doesn't look to people like here come the Americans, they are going to come and take over the country. They came and helped. They worked with us, but then they go home at night. Great virtue in this.

It also helps what it is being done, because it increases the chances that NATO and European Union countries will work with us. I know that General Jones, the European Commander there -- you might want to chat with him about some of the things he is doing.
Let me say, I do share also Dr. Hamre's concerns about bases to have bases. You always look and say do we get to a point where just having it there is the objective itself rather than what is it going to do for us.

Now sometimes you say, okay, we are going to need one there for the long term, because we may have to come back, need the relationships, want to preposition. Then you also have to say, are we perhaps getting ourselves in bed with some people we don't want to be in bed with.

I would say, for example, in Uzbekistan, right now it is useful to be there, because of Afghanistan and the like. But I would hate to see our relationship with Mr. Karimov, who is somebody right out of Stalinist central casting, become our good friend just because somehow we want to keep a base there.

We have to look very, very carefully at that. Also, as I indicated before, this region, the Caucasus and Central Asia, is one where the Russians do not yet have a settled perspective. It is very
important, I think, as we did in Europe, as we balanced enlargement with Partnership for Peace, with what is now called the NATO-Russia Council, with all of those things, to reassure the Russians that what we were doing to stabilize Europe was not against their long term interests.

What happens down the road when the Russians get back to the point where they are feeling their oats, not necessarily in an aggressive way but just saying we have felt humiliated, how do we strike back? What is the United States doing to push us in the direction of humiliation?

What happened after the Second World War in Europe as the United States led with a great lesson? After World War I, Germany was totally humiliated, and it helped produce Hitler. After World War II, we lifted Germany up, brought it into our community of nations, and we haven't faced that not that Germany is totally sovereign.

We want to make sure with Russia that we don't take too much advantage where it is not something that is immediately useful to us, so that
down the road they say, what is America doing in our backyard? In fact, there are a lot of things we could do together with them when it comes just to stabilization, but not bases just to have bases.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Just to add that we had a marvelous visit with General Jones in his Command and two or three hours talking with him, and went into great detail over just what you have been talking. So that was -- I appreciate you bringing that up.

Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Commissioner Martin.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am hearing that, as we would all like to think that we would make our decisions from the high ground and the long view, the bases of our forces in placement and relationships, I want to take this down to the weeds a little bit with a specific question; because it will come up. It will come out of the weeds. It will come out of this country and other
countries.

Do you believe that factors such as property values, environmental issues, and other issues of that nature have a place when deciding where bases will be placed or consolidation, expansion, reductions? That is a weeds question, and I don't know how we can avoid it, but I'm interested in your opinions. Dr. Hamre?

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: You used to be Comptroller. You talk about it.

DR. HAMRE: They are very important points of view that you have to bring into the calculus. First of all, we have to -- When we make our decision to base overseas, we have to have a fairly clear understanding of the legal framework that is going to govern problems that come up that we can't foresee.

We anticipated that when we had status of forces agreements, when we based troops after World War II, and I think we are going to have a lot of difficulty getting SOFA agreements with new countries, because we have had a tendency over the last 50 years to project our extra-territorial view of our own legal
structure, and there is a lot of resistance to that. But we do need to have predictable legal arrangements so that we can protect both our property as well as our people.

Similarly, we have to -- When we base, I think we have to understand, we have to be good neighbors, and I used to say when I was in the Department, we can't possibly pretend that we can behave in a way different in a foreign country than we would in our own neighborhood back home.

You know, the notion that we would train in a way that keeps people awake at two o'clock in the morning is not tolerable in the United States. Why do we think it is perfectly acceptable for foreigners? We've got to be seen as a thoughtful and good neighbor, both at home and abroad.

That means being sensitive to those issues. So you want to pick a location that gives you flexibility because of the geography. Frankly, that is what we are trying to do it here. That's one of the great reasons why we want to move our installations in Europe is that, because of the
conservation of western Europe, it's very difficult to
do realistic training anyplace in west Europe.

We are looking for places where we can do
realistic training, but you are not going to go into
an area that's just so poor and so desperate thinking
that you are going to weigh past their interests,
their social interests in the community as well, and
we have to be sensitive to that.

I think those are all issues you can work,
and every one of them is crucial. That's why it is
going to take a long time to get this stuff worked
out, and I would be -- We got to start right now
working on SOFA agreements, if we think they are going
to be in place in five years. And I think we need to
have them, by the way.

They are not going to be of the same
nature as they were 50 years ago. They are going to
be different. But we do have to have them, and that
has to be a priority in getting it settled fairly
early.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: You know, in the
United States there's sometimes economic impact
problems. You put in a place; you have to build more schools, and who pays for them. In many countries, particularly in the less affluent world, having an American base means more money coming in.

The base in Hungary that we had for operations in Bosnia and Taszar we are in the process of closing. The Hungarians want us to have it as a permanent base, not just because of friendship for us but because it is economically useful.

I myself don't see much military utility of putting a large part of our basic structure in Europe in Bulgaria and Romania, but you can train there, and you can fly there, where you can't in western Germany without having -- fearing all your noise abatement laws like closing National Airport, you know, at ten o'clock at night, a good reason to be there.

The downside, of course, is can you get American service people to volunteer for these jobs if their families are going to be not going into Munich to shop but to Sofia? These are very real considerations.
One reason the Koreans have been ambivalent about the way in which we are positioned with our headquarters is that the U.S. military owns some of the finest, most expensive real estate in the entire world in downtown Seoul. It used to be about $7 billion worth. I don't know what it is now. It's probably a good deal more.

So these are considerations to be reached.

I would start, however, with what are the military rationale? What are the broad political military, and then work onward from there.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: The second question -- I think we may just have a brief answer, because I'll try to put it this way. Hidden, is there anything hidden that we should be looking out for that is not obvious to us as a nation as we look to transform, restructure, expand, relocate? Is there anything in the woodpile that has not been getting appropriate attention that you would, from your experience, encourage us and the nation to be looking at?

DR. HAMRE: Well, boy, I'll tell you, that
is an interesting question, and I don't know that I thought adequately about it. I guess, as you pose it, one of the things that, to my mind, especially in the Central Asia region -- It seems to me that these installations are going to become magnets for insurgency attacks over time.

So having very close collaborative working relationships with domestic law enforcement and intelligence, I think, becomes a pretty important factor. As I said, there was a time when our bases were great symbols of stability, and now they are becoming islands of force protection.

I think we have to -- You know, if we are going to make that work, we have to have very, very close working relations with law enforcement and intelligence services in those host countries. In the past we have always had military to military, but we probably haven't had a strong -- you know, the intelligence connection was through Washington, you know, and we probably need to have a better working arrangement at the local level for understanding these ties to domestic law enforcement and intelligence.
AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Let me underscore that even more with regard to the Middle East where already we have seen that the presence of outsiders -- it just happens to be us at the moment -- fits within attitudes toward colonial powers going a long way back, and having the capacity to work with the locals, to project power in the region can be very useful, but it can sometimes have downsides, especially if we are visibly seen to be allied with regimes seen by their people as repressive, as part of the problem and not part of the solution.

I indicated earlier my concern that we kept troops in Saudi Arabia after 1991. Life isn't fair. It was used by a lot of people to stoke the fires of terrorism against us. That is one reason, prior to that, we used to have over the horizon a presence to come in when we had to. People knew we would come in. The cavalry would come to the rescue, but we weren't sitting around there causing problems for people in the interim, not because of who people are, but because anybody who is an outsider, especially anybody from western countries, there are
added calculations.

So I think we need to think very carefully about that. Incidentally, you can't separate out basing structure from overall security structure. My personal preference is to see created a new Middle East security organization made up of locals that we support largely from outside. I think that ought to be our goal rather than staying there forever.

One final point, Mr. Chairman, I think that what both Dr. Hamre and I are grappling for: In some ways, one of your most useful contributions will be to lay out a series of principles for making the detailed judgments. Watch out for this, watch out for that, here's a checklist of seven or eight or nine different things. That would be a huge contribution to the national debate.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Dr. Thomson?

COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Thanks. First a question for Secretary Hamre. As I -- Actually, it is
for both of you.

As I listened to each of you speak, except for a few exceptions, you have given a lot of reasons why it is important that we have our forces and bases overseas, tactical reasons, strategic reasons, the importance of people interacting with our existing allies, the possibility of building new relationships with others, new places, Africa, caution regarding central Asia, new alliances and so forth.

As I listened to all of that, I am wondering why you are not advocating we don't have more forces overseas. I mean, you have basically laid out a case for us to increase our basing structure and our military presence.

When you have alluded to the reasons to come home, you have basically made a historical argument, which is, well, they were Cold War and, therefore, they must not be good. But you could say, well, there's some of that already; so why not add some more. So what is your reasoning for why we should cut back?

DR. HAMRE: Well, I probably share a bit
of Secretary Rumsfeld's feeling in this, which is I
don't want to -- I probably differ with him in that I
don't want to cut back, but I don't know that we need
to do it the way we have been doing it with a large
footprint that is a big administrative burden.

I think very active, forward presence,
engagement by our military forces is a very good
thing. If the best way to do that is on a rotational
basis -- and a deployment basis, as with the Navy --
great. If it is better to do that by actually having
boots on the ground, great. I mean, I think there
isn't a uniform solution to it.

Much more active engagement of our
military around the world is, I think, a very positive
attribute. Now what you -- You now have the very
difficult engineering detail of how do you take a
person's commitment when they are overseas and still
keep it in the context of a full career where they
have to go to schools, they have to go to training
programs, they have to hit basic key spots in their
professional development? This gets to be very
complicated.
I frankly think we are way overdue on taking a very fresh look at how we manage our officers and NCOs anyway. I mean, we have a kind of a "stations of the cross" approach to personnel. You know, you hit these things in order, you know. I think, frankly, it is way overdue that we take a look at that, and I think we are running our people just ragged.

You know, they come off a deployment and then they come back home, and they spend 80 percent of their time going off to schools and training and everything else to get back up on the queue, so that they can stay on a career path, as though that two-year deployment wasn't the best training in the world they could get.

So I mean, we really do need to take a fresh look at it. In our current approach, it is very burdensome on the military personnel, in the current way we manage them, to do overseas deployments and then come home, because you got to fit everything else into the time when you are back home.

So the dimension of complexity really is
that. It is really, in my view, not the decision to have them overseas or have them at home, but it is embedded in the way in which they are connected with the rest of what they have to do in military life. And I would start with that.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: That would be a problem wherever they are, absolutely, here or abroad. Maybe in one of your recommendations, to go back to kind of a zero based deployment approach, look at the other way around.

If we didn't have anybody abroad, what would we want to do? There are a number of functions. One is forces abroad for deterrence, Korea, for example, and elsewhere. War fighting: Is it better to project from here to there or to be there in order to -- all the things we have talked about and others have talked about. The kind of peacekeeping or other kinds of things pre-conflict, post-conflict in which the American military has, to a great extent, a large part of it transformed itself from something that 30 years ago would have been almost unheard of, and you farm that out to other countries with more experience,
until today where the average American fighting man and woman is just as good as just about anybody else.

Then the diplomacy or shaping function, what I call the mission multipliers. If you add all those up, what the number would be, I have no idea. It might be more. It might be less. But it certainly would be different.

The Secretary of Defense has correctly thrown a big rock into a big pool, and the ripples fortunately are going to touch a lot of things, and I hope we get that right. But that is something I think very much to put on your agenda. It's got to be seen in this corporate way, what are we trying to achieve and how the military do it.

COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Mr. Chairman, I have a couple more, one for Secretary Hamre, one for Dr. Hunter.

I have a question, Secretary, about timing. You outlined what you see as many difficulties lying in front of us as we go through this global reposturing and rebasing, with defined -- We've talked about new places. We may need
You have stressed and, I think quite rightly, the importance of agreements, access agreements, status of forces agreements and the like, which may even be the long pole in the tent. There is also hardware transport in particular, in order to have the infrastructure for making a new posture work.

As you said, this is going to take a long time. The BRAC is coming soon after us, and people are thinking about what's happening overseas in terms of the BRAC. How are we going to balance out the nearer term demands of the BRAC with these longer term problems of getting this job done?

DR. HAMRE: Well, that is --

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: With great difficulty.

Now he will answer it.

DR. HAMRE: That is the central problem here, and this is part of the reason why we have not had the debate, the honest debate, up here in Congress that we should have, is that this is seen in the backdrop against saving bases, saving vulnerable bases.
I'm absolutely with the Secretary on this. We need to close excess base structure. We got a lot of bases here that, frankly, aren't terribly useful, for the same reason that they are not useful in West Germany. You know, you can't do much at them. But the domestic politics is absolutely fierce, and there are a lot of people that are hoping that they can grab things from overseas, pull it back home, and save a base.

Here's where I think we have to -- By the way, I don't criticize a member of Congress for fighting for his base. For crying out loud, that's why you elected him. I mean, how would you feel about your member of Congress if he came to Washington and said, well, I don't care about back home, you know; they elected me, but I don't care? Of course, you wouldn't want that guy.

So I do not fault them at all for being highly parochial about their interests back home. But our institution has to balance national need and parochial need, and we need to have the structures here that put the national issues before us, not just
the parochial issues of back home.

That is really what the base closure process -- I mean, Commissioner Cornella was on it. I mean, he knows what that is like. That was his mob when he was on it, and we set up a process where, frankly, you could keep in balance those parochial needs and those national needs.

I am very worried that we are in an environment right now where the parochial needs dominate. We don't have enough of a national voice on the importance of basing overseas, and that's why I am so disappointed that the Congress has not held numerous, multiple, manifold hearings on this issue during the last two years. It should have, because that is what is at stake because the parochial pressures are overwhelming, and they will be there; and by the way, they should be there. I have no problem with them being there, but I do fault them for not putting the national imperative in front of the country. And that is, frankly, what you have to do.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: We also need -- it doesn't relate to what you are doing -- a look at the
overall national mission requirements, a lot of which are nonmilitary and are underfunded and, hence, increase the chances that we may have to fight certain places.

COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Mr. Chairman, one last question for Ambassador Hunter about Germany.

There is an old rule maybe, and I'm beginning to see in military basing, that you are more wanted where you already are than you are where you are planning to go.

This goes to the issue of reductions in Germany. Ambassador, are you aware of any difficulties during the Iraq war of any movement through Germany?

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Commissioner, I think that is an important question. We had a lot of trouble with our allies, the administration did, in terms of the Iraq war and what could be done and couldn't be done. But even with a country like Germany, when the rubber hit the road, the U.S. military, as far as I know, had no problems whatsoever.
It's what allies do. In fact, you get an awful lot of forbearance and a lot of latitude for doing things people may not like and totally agree with, as Dr. Hamre was saying earlier, if you have longstanding relationships. They work. These longstanding relationships, as all of you in your experience know, can smooth over a lot of problems.

The Germans may not be with us on certain things, but you go down into the practicing people, and particularly in the military, and you have an incredible amount of friends there and people will do whatever they can to support us.

The danger, of course, as Dr. Thomson knows, is that increasingly people in Europe aren't serving with the American military anymore, because we don't have a lot of folks there.

So I would argue that, given that these are the countries who are going to be most able to do things with us and most willing to do things with us, the more we are able to keep our folks who are abroad there or the more it is cost effective and everything else, can keep them there, that is going to be of
tremendous value to us when push comes to shove.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Can I tell one quick anecdote on that?

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Please.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: When the Cold War came to an end, I visited with a German member of Parliament for one of his surgeries, as they call them, I guess, you know, with his constituents on a Sunday night. His constituency had more U.S. American military personnel in it than anywhere else in Germany.

There were two people there who were extremely unhappy that we might go. One was the head of military intelligence for the region. The other guy was a Peacenik who had twice been arrested for lying down in front of the base at Kaiserslautern, you know, against it. He said, please don't go; what are we going to do in terms of our economy, what are we going to do -- Maybe we won't be protected if you go.

I think it illustrates the point.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.
Commissioner Curtis?

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: I would like to bring the conversation back to the administration's and DoD's public proposal that they have discussed. I would like your opinion, Dr. Hamre and Ambassador Hunter, on the impact of it.

Basically, do the numbers of troops coming back and being replaced by rotational troops feel in the right range to you? And what message are those changes sending to our allies on our strategy and the impacts it may have upon our relationships?

For example, do they endanger an American SACEUR position or the involvement of the Americans in the multi-national staffs that we sit in? Dr. Hamre?

DR. HAMRE: Well, and Ambassador Hunter having been at NATO really should speak to this question of the impact it has on our role and our functional responsibilities in NATO.

I would start, first of all, with a little bit of a different starting point, which is to say I personally think that we have not yet stabilized the security environment in east Europe and that I would
want to base my troops in a way that help solidify the political evolution of eastern Europe into the European community.

My sense is that that is going to be a larger standing presence over time than the administration anticipates. I think they see this very much in small rotational units into very austere bases, just for training purposes, and I frankly personally think -- this is just me personally -- that we ought to be engineering our basing with a more strategic focus about needing to solidify the liberation of Europe.

I am frankly quite worried about what is happening in Russia right now, and you look to see what is happening in the Ukraine and Belorussia and, you know, you got to be concerned about this.

I think our allies and friends in east Europe are worried, and I thin we ought to be thinking about our basing as representing a strategic commitment on our part to make sure that the end of the Cold War really represents an end and a durable strategic framework for the future, and I think that...
is going to take more troops, frankly, on the ground than we have, so that we reassure and we also provide the integrative focus for the political and military establishments in eastern Europe that, in this interoperability sense, build on the foundation of Partnership for Peace, but make it much deeper and much more functional at the military level, the same thing that we did in west Europe and the great accomplishment of NATO, which was to build this interoperability, which is the code word, you know -- this interoperability which does not yet exist in eastern Europe.

    We should be making that the strategic focus, in my mind, and I think that is a larger presence on the ground than we are planning to have, personally.

    In Asia, I think it makes sense to consolidate our footprint along the DMZ. I think that makes a lot of sense. I think strategically pulling numbers out and making it appear that we are minimizing our vulnerability in a dangerous theater is not a good thing to do right now, personally.
The great problem for me in Korea is needing to create a durable consensus with a population that no longer has the consciousness that the generation had that lived through the Korean War, and we now have a political leadership in South Korea that does not have that consciousness.

Sixty percent of the Koreans think the United States divided Korea. It wasn't the Communists, you know, in the north. It was, they think, we did it, for crying out loud.

Well, if that's the consciousness among a lot of them, the last thing you want to do is to reinforce their prejudices, which are wrong, with movements and actions which haven't been adequately explained.

So I think we ought to really be careful, very careful, in Korea on what we are doing. I think we also have to have a very clear vision about what our strategic imperative is in Asia.

It seems to me our strategic imperative is to provide that stabilizing presence as China rises, and that it is not an intimidating presence or force.
as it relates to our allies, Korea and Japan.

A precipitous change in that for tactics would be quite counterproductive, in my view. So I think we ought to be very careful about how we change our posture in Asia, and I don't think that is all engineered as well as it ought to be. I think we ought to be very careful about what we are doing.

So I think this first phase in Korea makes sense, the first phase which is to lower our footprint in Seoul and to reposition our forces along the DMZ into a more modern posture. I think that all makes a lot of sense.

Other steps, it seems to me, have a much larger strategic dimension to it, and we had better think our way pretty carefully before we go down that road. That's where I am personally.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: I am most worried about Korea. We are now -- Whether we are in the middle of the game or the end game with North Korea, nobody is going to be able to tell until it's over, but we certainly don't want to send signals to the Koreans, to the Japanese or the Chinese that somehow
we are less resolute or that we are somehow confused about what we see our strategic goals there.

That relates, among other things, to giving enough reassurance to the Japanese so they will not exercise at some point a nuclear option. So I think we have to be extremely careful about that. This is not an engineering question. This is an American will and commitment problem.

In regard to Europe, I think the number of forces we have is somewhat flexible as long as we don't reduce them too far, that the task we have to perform in central Europe is less about mass than it is about talent and the engagement.

I must say, I do share with Dr. Hamre concern right now that, as Mr. Putin goes through his internal gyrations, that the people he has to deal with or he himself don't have any misunderstandings about our continued concern with stability in that region.

The current election process, which they are halfway through right now, in Ukraine is very ominous in terms of the potential backsliding of that
country and of the inroads being made by Russians to
try to tilt it in a way that will increase their
influence.

What is happening in Belarus? There are
some people in Russia who would like to see a soft
empire, which could later become a reestablishment of
a harder empire. The Russians have to understand what
the limits are, but one way is to get on with the
business of integrating people within NATO and
bringing them into the full corpus of western
standards, which the Russians themselves should one
day aspire to.

The word came up, SACEUR -- striking for
our European allies. When they renamed the Commands,
Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk projecting
American technological power, and Allied Command
Operations in Europe, the Europeans asked, one, keep
an American as SACEUR.

We always used to say -- Commissioner
Thomson will understand this -- one to two divisions
by having the American commitment in the form of
SACEUR, and they insisted on keeping the name. They
wanted Strategic Allied Commander -- Supreme Allied Commander Europe, demonstrating an American commitment to Europe, and said you've got to have an American still in that position.

The question comes down to timing in part. The United States is going through a radical reorientation, a rethink of what we are going to do abroad. There's no question about it. It would have happened, no matter who was President, whether we had a war in Iraq or not following 9-11, or maybe even if we hadn't had 9-11 -- increased concerns strategically with the Middle East with projection "out of area," as they say in NATO terms. It was coming ineluctably. Probably came faster than it might otherwise have come.

At this point Europeans, who we need to work with us, want reassurance that, as the United States goes through that, we are thinking clearly about the broader strategic posture, about the overall circumstance we are going to be in, and they want to do it with us and do it effectively.

In fact, in some ways this is the worst
time in the last several years for a BRAC to come up
and for talking about changing things in Europe.
Timing is bad. If you do it right, timing can be less
important.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Well,
gentlemen, thank you for being here today. You
brought up the subject of South Dakota. So I do have
to say something in that regard.

I think the two of you, through your
meaningful and distinguished careers, make South
Dakota proud, and our nation. And I know that what I
am comfortable in is that you will continue doing that
for the rest of your lives. I think you will always
make meaningful contributions to this nation.

So we sincerely thank you for your time
away from your busy schedule to join us today. Your
insight will be invaluable to this Commission as we
move forward.

I would like to reserve the right that we
might come back to you as we have questions and get
your feelings on those questions. So thank you very
much for your participation.
DR. HAMRE: Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: At this time, we are going to take a five-minute break, and then we will proceed with the next panel.

(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record at 10:24 a.m. and went back on the record at 10:35 a.m.)

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I would like to describe the procedure we have been following, and then I will introduce the panel. Each panelist will receive up to 10 minutes for an opening statement. At the conclusion of all opening statements, each Commissioner will have up to 10 minutes to ask questions.

We will use lights as a courtesy reminder. When the yellow light appears, you have two minutes remaining. When the red light appears, time has expired. However, I would ask the panelists to take all the time necessary to answer any questions. Please continue your comments.

Joining us today on our second panel are
three distinguished former military leaders:


   General Montgomery Meigs, United States Army, Retired. General Meigs is the former Commanding General, U.S. Army, Europe and 7th Army. General Meigs also served as Commander of the Multinational Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

   General Charles Robertson, United States Air Force, Retired. General Robertson is the former Combatant Commander for U.S. Transportation Command and Air Mobility Command.

It should be noted that General John Tilelli was also announced as a witness, but was called away unexpectedly.

Gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for appearing before the Commission today. We are pleased
and honored to have such a distinguished panel.

    My fellow Commissioners and I would appreciate hearing your frank and professional views on suggested focus areas for the Commission to investigate in its review of overseas basing, potential unintended consequences of returning large numbers of troops stationed overseas to the United States, and, from an overseas and U.S. perspective, your thoughts on issues and concerns surrounding DoD's integrated global presence and basing strategy, and any other issues or alternatives that the Commission should consider.

    So at this time I would call on each panelist to make an opening statement, if they would like, and I will start with General Horner.

    GENERAL HORNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'm not particularly good at flowery language. So don't expect great compliments about your service, but I understand the difficulties of your task and the great remuneration you are gaining from this work.

    My experience in this area is colored by my being stationed overseas and then deploying on a
temporary basis frequently overseas. My judgments are subjective, but I think the kinds of things that you will agree with, resonate with, in making your determinations and decisions.

First of all, we can't ignore the change in our threats to our national security from the Cold War to where we are today. Well understood. I'm sure it's been brought forward to you many times. I won't go into detail. But it does mean that we have to focus on things like weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and areas of the world of instability like Africa, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and the rim of South America.

With regard to our strategies, we have to change fundamentally. We require flexibility of our forces that's never been needed before. Before, we had forces of sufficient size and sufficient orientation that we could dedicate them to one particular area, one particular task, one particular threat. We no longer enjoy that. So any decisions we make with regard to basing must consider those changes.
Also, while you are looking at overseas bases, there is an impact, obviously, on what happens under BRAC and the United States in CONUS and Hawaii. The only thing I would say there was it was my last experience as NORAD, and then also I had the training responsibility and equipping for the ballistic missile force, and I was always appalled of the fact that we had located our forces in the center of the United States because of the threat of the subtrajectory missiles being launched from submarines, and in this new world, certainly during Desert Storm, deployment must be the consideration.

So I have been arguing that we need to deploy our CONUS based forces in such a way that they are very rapid in being able to reach both South America, Africa, Europe and the Pacific Rim. That would be what I like to call the four corner strategy, trying to steal one from North Carolina, and also Hawaii and Alaska become very important.

We have another thing we have to do, and it is very difficult, but it is rebalancing our forces. I think Operation Iraqi Freedom shows that we
have a mix that is inappropriate with a lot of forces that are involved in stabilization -- the Reserve forces -- and a lot of heavy fighting forces in the Guard or in the Active forces, when in fact we are finding that our forces nowadays need to be very good at both, but with particular stabilization or Phase IV, some call it, being vital. So that has to be a consideration.

We also have a growing impact of unique forces. I think here, for example, of the intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, which is vital to anticipating crises and being able to act before war, if you are successful.

Here now, we no longer have the huge denied areas that we had in the Cold War. We have things like Global Hawk that are replacing space assets because they are more flexible and more responsive, and we have things like Special Operations which emphasize the need for access to overseas seaports and airports, but not necessarily large overseas basings.

We also have a requirement for our
littoral forces, as the Navy changed its doctrine very well after it became apparent the Cold War was over in 1990, and those must be taken into consideration.

One of the things that was brought up in the session before this one was the need to train. Our forces no longer -- We still have service-unique training that is fundamental, but more and more and more, our training has to be in conjunction with our total forces and our allies.

That is going to require very large areas with adjacent sea and air and land forces spaces, and those areas, with some exceptions, are becoming fewer and fewer overseas. No longer can an army afford only Grafenwoehr or Hoensfeld. They need to have areas like we find at the National Training Center. No longer can air forces that fly supersonic airplanes have very small air training ranges. They need the ranges we find in places like the Gulf or the Atlantic.

We have some areas, obviously, in the former USSR, Africa, and Australia that might be very accommodating to these kinds of training air spaces.
and land and sea spaces.

We need to build this highly specialized force, because we have found that technology does have an impact on warfare. Certainly, the Joint STARS (Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) and the JDAMs (Joint Direct Attack Munitions) during the Third Division drive toward Baghdad was fundamental. The integration of those three forces was the key to success in that battle.

So I think we need to make sure that we have the kind of capability to test and train with these advanced systems and, obviously, we may have reluctance to put the heavy investment, say, in time, space, positioning equipment on the ranges overseas. So that's only something to crank into your thinking.

Obviously, force protection was brought up, and I think that is self-explanatory.

Proximity to coalition capability: I had the unusual experience of being in a job as the functional commander in Central Command for over five and a half years, and the length of tour there was most unusual, but actually it was very useful because
it gave me a chance to work a model that was different than, say, our European model or our model that we use in Korea with regard to how we work with our allies.

We had, really, no forces. We had the Middle East force, which is a destroyer and a command ship in the Arabian Gulf, and it was very successful because it was very low profile, but it was present, and it gave us a way of communicating with the locals with port visits and ship visits and things of this nature.

I would routinely go to the area, and we would conduct classes in the local professional military education. We would teach in Pakistan. We would teach in Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE (United Arab Emirates), Kuwait. That gave us a kind of a professional relationship without the baggage that goes from heaving large forces in a region, and particularly when the region has such cultural differences as we do, say, with Islamic countries.

So we were able to maintain a relationship and, yes, we could go there when they needed us -- for example, the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control
System) during the Iran-Iraq war and then later on the escort operations -- and we were welcomed. But also I had a relationship with the -- inside Arabia that, when the escort operations was over with, I could withdraw those forces immediately, and I did so.

Turns around, several months later, I show back up in the door and say, I'm here to help, and there was great reluctance on many of the senior leaders in Saudi Arabia to have the foreigners on their soil. Nonetheless, because of my personal relationship with these people, keeping my word just a few months before, I got all the support we needed, and we very rapidly built up the huge 500,000-man force that eventually prosecuted Desert Storm.

So we can do it through training teams. We can do it through exercises, and we can do it through things like naval forces offshore.

Finally, with regard to the rotation base, we have to consider the fact that our military forces has been drawn down drastically. It started in 1986. It's not a political issue. It is an issue of funds. It is an issue that we need fewer people, because we
have more lethality in our precision weapons, our ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), our SATCOMs (Satellite Communications), all the capabilities we bring to war. But the smaller force and the increased tempo they face today means that we must somehow accommodate the rotation base that will support an overseas force. So that is something that is imperative in everything you do, in all the other considerations.

Finally, I would say the thing that characterizes modern warfare is rapidity, speed, to be able to get there and get the job done very quickly. Since we no longer face the massive forces of the Soviet Union and it is unlikely for the foreseeable future we will face a significant Chinese land force -- and we certainly need to work that -- then we need to really look at how we get our forces around the world: prepositioning, sealift, fast sealift, fast airlift.

So we need to be able to keep those ports and airports open, but we don't need to have large footprints on the ground.
Finally, I would say your task is most
difficult because it is going to advocate change, and
if I've found one thing -- the only thing -- that is
harder to change than the military services is the
Catholic church.

I believe we must change, and I think the
problem that makes it difficult is people raising the
threat of risk from that change, and I believe we can
afford to take that risk. So you have an opportunity
to bring about needed change. That window may never
open again for the near future.

So I ask that you be bold and perhaps go
too far in your recommendations.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.

General Meigs.

GENERAL MEIGS: Thank you very much for
inviting me to testify today. It is indeed an honor
for a muddy boots soldier like myself who spent no
time as a flag officer in Washington, though was happy
to, to be here in front of you today.

I think you are going to find that my
input will reflect a certain amount of inside baseball
that you haven't seen yet this morning. You will find that General Horner and I differ significantly on a number of these factors.

For instance, training quality in Europe is every bit the same, if not better, than in the United States for Army forces, and I'd be happy to go into that in detail with you.

The idea that somehow the forward forces, at least in Europe, are not totally integrated with both the host nation governments in the countries in which they are stationed and the countries in which they train is just not correct, and I'd be happy to go into that for you in questioning.

The thing that used to and continues to bother me the most about U.S. European Command and, in particular, its Army component, is the idea that somehow it is still caught in a Cold War trap in terms of doctrine, training, and its ability to be strategically flexible.

I note that was in the Secretary of Defense's comments yesterday and the campaign rhetoric. It's just not true, and I would be happy to
pursue that in questioning.

In addition, one of the things that one needs to understand is that early in operations a lot of the work is done FOGO (Flag Officers/General Officers). It's not done as a result of a complex, integrated planning process.

For instance, when United States Army Europe was asked to prepare a contingency operation to extract NATO personnel from Sepra Gorach in Srebrenica in 1995, it was done based on a verbal commitment and instruction by the Secretary of Defense to General Crouch in Naples, and a significant amount of planning, work, staging and other things occurred as a result of that.

You can only do that with in-place forces.
You can't do that with forces in the United States. But in order to try to help you with your deliberations, in addition to helping to try to correct some of the factual bases that you ought to consider, I believe, in your deliberations, if we are going to talk about a strategic platform, it seems to me you ought to have a set of criteria that one agrees
on to which we hold the services' feet to the fire, and I am going to give you some criteria that I would have invited you to hold my feet to the fire as a MACOM (Major Army Command) Commander for U.S. European Command.

The forces prepositioned must be the entering wedge, and a very flexible one, for any kind of operation in that theater and in adjacent theaters. Those forces must have tremendous strategic and operational agility. They must make a difference in the engagement strategy of the nation and the countries involved in that area of operations as well as adjacent area of operations.

Their training must be as good as or better than that training available to forces in the Continental United States, and they must be efficient in terms of their cost, environmental exposure, and quality of life. And as Dr. Hamre mentioned, of course, you've got to have the appropriate SOFA agreements, and they must not inordinately contribute to the operational tempo for service units and families.
Now in order to sort of kick this off, let me explain to you what United States Army Europe did in Iraqi Freedom, as forward based forces positioned to respond to the needs of one or two combatant commanders.

Fifth Corps Headquarters, which is the Corps Headquarters in Europe, did the planning for and provided the early forces who were pre-stationed for and then conducted the operation that got us to Baghdad in 16 1/2 days, as well as a very large portion of what we generally call in the planning community “below-the-line” forces: combat support, combat service support forces.

In fact, attack aviation elements of Fifth Corps were prepositioned in Iraq very early -- or in Kuwait very early on. And the command and control equipment, the suite of C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) in Fifth United States Corps was, at the time, the most modern in the United States Army. The Blue Force tracking system that was used by V Corps and by IMEF (First Marine Expeditionary Force)
was developed in U.S. Army Europe.

The First Armored Division was the, if I'm not mistaken, the third division in the deployment sequence into Iraq. The First Infantry Division reformed itself and was the headquarters and provided the forces for the joint rear area that was going to be established in Turkey and, in fact, they had already prepositioned and were preparing that operation when the Turkish government decided not to go forward.

The 173rd Airborne Brigade jumped into northern Iraq and played a very large role in stabilizing Kirkuk and Mosul, and was followed by an immediate reaction force of heavy armor that provided a reserve backbone for that force up in the north. It was the only heavy equipment that was there, and it was flown in from Ramstein on wide body aircraft.

At the same time, the Southeast European Task Force, which is a two-star headquarters in Italy under which the 173rd operates, was taken by General Jones and provided the Joint Task Force that worked with ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African
States) off Nigeria to bring forces or -- sorry, perform a NEO (Non-combatant Evacuation Operation) operation bringing civilians out of Nigeria.

I suspect very few of you understand that level of commitment and contribution, not only to Iraqi Freedom but to another operation that was very delicate and difficult, and was a joint operation; because SETAF (U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (Airborne)) every year gets an annual exercise in which it is certified as a joint capable headquarters by Joint Forces Command.

Interesting enough, when the 173rd returned from its tour in Iraq, several months later it conducted Torgau 2004, a brigade-level exercise, in Russia with Russian forces from Russian ground forces, with the SETAF Commander and the brigade commander involved in that exercise.

I would submit to you that that satisfies most of the criteria that I gave you that I think you should be fairly rigorous about.

Now there is no question that we need to reshape our forces that are forward based. There is
no question that we need to make them leaner, more
strategically agile, and to some extent, we need to
re-station them and perhaps reduce where necessary.
In fact, we were giving those kinds of plans to
members of OSD informally since 1998.

   Sadly, the Army in its own wisdom decided
never to offer OSD an alternative to the plans that
were forwarded as part of the QDR (Quadrennial Defense
Review), and which still it on the table. That was an
unfortunate mistake in deciding to opt out of the
dialogue.

   The other misapprehension I'd like you to
consider is this idea of expeditionary. The Army
agreed with the Commandant of the Marine Corps in 2002
never to use the word expeditionary for its own
forces, and the quid pro quo was the Commandant would
support the Army in shared ground force issues.

   So when an Army officer hears that it is
now becoming expeditionary, it is somewhat of a not
bittersweet irony. If you look at -- and I encourage
you to do this -- look at days away from home on
exercises and commitments like Bosnia and Kosovo for
Army units forward deployed in Europe, and compare
them to any other part of the force structure, and I
think you will see what I mean.

I look forward to your questions.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.

General Robertson.

GENERAL ROBERTSON: Mr. Chairman and
members of the Commission, thanks for having me here
today. I am not from South Dakota, but perhaps we can
trade "South" stories. South Carolina will have to
do. Did have a great base in South Dakota a few years
ago. Still there, Grand Forks, one of our major air
refueling bases, and truly a great, great capability
that we have.

It is interesting as I look at the group
you have invited here today -- General Horner and
General Meigs and me, and General Tilelli,
unfortunately, couldn't be here -- it would be
interesting to trade war stories. You have an
interesting mix.

As I had listened to General Horner, as a
military officer, former military officer, and Air
Force officer, I would say basically, “Me, too” to everything he said, and I won't reiterate those except to say that the concern about rotation base is something that needs to be high on your agenda of things to consider, and rebalancing of the forces is something that has concerned me since my time in the mobility business.

Given the fact that 55 percent, nearly 60 percent of our air refueling forces are in the Guard and Reserve, nearly 80 percent of our theater air lift forces, C-130s, are in the Guard and Reserve, and well over 90 percent of our air medical evacuation forces -- and I'm doing this off the top of my head, so forgive me if my percentages are a little off -- 90 percent of the air medical evacuation forces are in the Guard and Reserve, and the posture that we put those forces in since 9-11, in my humble view, is stressing them to a level that we will see the consequences someday if we don't provide them some relief. But I will say, “Me, too” to everything General Horner said.

General Meigs and I -- Interestingly, in the mobility business I crossed paths with lots of
folks. I came into the job as the Commander of TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command with the painful lessons of deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo, and bound to try to help the other forces -- well, all forces, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps -- streamline their processes, streamline their deployment procedures to make it easier in the future.

Little did I know that General Meigs in Europe had already launched off from a three-point stance to do that with European forces, and everything that he said about the deployment to Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom is exactly right and the result of the work that he did to streamline the Army’s processes to deploy out of Europe into whatever AOR (Area of Responsibility) they were directed to respond to.

You introduced me -- My remarks, and I did have a little intro, a couple of page paper that I put together to frame my thoughts -- almost uniquely transportation, mobility, deployment, distribution related -- because, echoing Dr. Hamre’s comments about the importance of what you do, the importance of
transforming the Cold War global basing posture -- and
I have to be careful not to just say global mobility
basing posture but the global basing posture -- into
something that will respond to the national security
requirements of the post-9-11 world is very, very
important, and you have taken on a very important
task.

You must tie it into the Base Realignment
and Closure Commission to create for U.S. forces a web
of bases through which and out of which -- through
which they can deploy and out of which they can
operate in whatever environment they are thrown into
the future.

Okay. So a half a dozen comments, and I
will be quiet. I won't read my statement, but I would
like to extract a couple of comments.

First, whatever you do -- Dr. Hamre and
Ambassador Hunter said it very eloquently -- should
come out of a broader posture overview, national
security strategy overview or whatever. We have to
have a strategic direction, not just a tactical
direction, a strategic direction around which we base
the decisions you are about to make.

The last Base Realignment and Closure Commission was in '95. I would say that all of the BRACs up to '95, although very emotional at the time, really had an easy job of it because the excess basing structure that we had they could salami slice across the world and not do a lot of -- not have a lot of impact on our operational abilities, capabilities.

As the balance between basing structure globally and forces and manning globally becomes more in balance, where we peel back -- and there is still, I believe, room to peel back -- becomes a little more critical. So the decisions are important and should be based on some kind of overarching strategy.

Everyone has used the word flexibility. General Meigs used the word agility. It is critical to all military commanders. I won't say it is more critical to the mobility commander, but he has to have it. As we worked our way in the early years of my tenure in the mobility business around crises such as earthquakes in China and floods in Africa; as we worked our way through the multiple incursions of
Saddam Hussein into the no-fly zone; as we worked our way into Bosnia and Kosovo, the fog of war is always there for the mobility commander, just as it is for every other commander, and the flexibility of basing, the flexibility of forces, and the flexibility offered by highly trained professionals is critical to work around access issues, to work around diplomatic clearance issues, to work around construction issues, you name it. They are all there.

So flexibility is critical, and it is critical not just in wartime, but it also critical to the mobility commander in peacetime because, as he tries to support forces in one AOR while transiting multiple AORs, things like 24-hour operations can significantly -- or the lack of 24-hour operations -- can significantly hamper the flow of forces into an AOR.

So access to rail, runways -- access to transportation networks, working in synergy with each other -- all of those together contribute to a much smoother flow and increased flexibility for the mobility commander and should be taken into account in
whatever decisions you make.

Prepositioning has already been mentioned. The more robust our prepositioned stocks, in my view, the more effective their basing, the quicker then that the forces that are planned to fall in on those prepositioned stocks will be able to respond.

I think that, as we work our global basing posture from a mobility perspective, what you do will allow another examination of the basing of our prepositioned forces and prepositioned stocks either to fragment those into more combat loaded and more widely distributed areas so that the speed of response can be increased proportionately.

Fourth point: All of the elements of a successful overseas basing posture have to be pursued in synergy and with equal vigor: not just construction on the bases that we identify, not just the prepositioning of fuels which are inherently a military function, but the establishment of government to government relationships -- as Dr. Hamre and Ambassador Hunter pointed out -- SOFA agreements -- as has already been pointed out -- legal agreements need
to lead to site surveys by trained mobility professionals, usage rights, basing rights, exercise rights, et cetera, to allow the forces to operate through those bases, maybe on a very infrequent basis, but in times of crisis.

Then the appropriate combatant commander for that region needs to build a reasonably robust exercise program or some kind of joint/combined activities through that structure, so that they don't forget that we are there and that we will need them in some time of crisis.

I remember the days, my early days, when we sat down and tried to figure out how to get into central Africa to respond to -- heck, to respond to Somalia, to respond to flooding, to respond to Rwanda's crisis or how to get into -- how someday we might have to get into the "-stans."

As we worked our way through Bosnia and Kosovo, we used to sit in our quiet time in the middle of the night trying to decide, if we ever had to get into the "-stans", from a mobility perspective, that would really be a challenge, and it was.
As we worked Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the availability of basing structure was not there. Access rights became a problem, and all of the problems that we have encountered over and over again were aggregated to cause me and John Handy, my successor, to really get innovative in the fog of war to try to move forces in.

What you do should facilitate an easier way for commanders that follow in the mobility business.

I would say that, as you reach your conclusions, you shouldn't ignore all the previous mobility studies that have -- and mobility basing studies -- that have gone before. In the aftermath of the 1995 BRAC, we sat down in the mobility business and looked at the global basing structure and said, okay, we are drawing down, what is the minimum that we need, from a mobility perspective, to operate at least through to whatever place the national command authority would like to send us in the future.

We selected six bases in Europe and seven in the Pacific and said, those will be the lily pads...
through which we will operate, and we will invest -- I can't remember the numbers, somewhere between $500 million and $1 billion -- to robust those bases up to serve as the throughput basing structure that we would operate from in the future, and it has served us well. We may need to do another study for the second part of the lands through which the mobility machine operates, but what you do should take into account the work that has gone before.

Finally, as the work of OSD's recent global basing study suggests, it will allow, I think, some redistribution of forces around the world. It portends to suggest that it will allow some withdrawal of forces, and you've had an interesting debate this morning as to whether that is a good idea or a bad idea. I will only talk about moving those forces right now back to the Continental United States from their forward deployed locations.

The only thing that I would remind as that happens is that the mobility requirement will change as you do that. I would stand here today -- I said it three years ago when I was sitting in John Handy's
seat -- we don't have enough strategic mobility forces to move them the way they are postured today. That will likely further increase the requirement for strategic airlift forces.

Recapitalization of those forces has started with the procurement of C-17s, the modernization of C-5s and C-130s. That will likely need to continue to be examined in light of the changing environment.

There are dozens of mobility studies underway right now. I sit on the DSB (Defense Science Board) Task Force on Mobility, and I have been exposed to them. They need to come together, but the recapitalization of air assets -- strategic air refueling, theater airlifts, C-130s -- and, lest we forget, what is becoming an aging and inherently slower strategic sealift fleet need to be kept on the front burner as we consider how to more rapidly respond with today's forces into tomorrow's environment.

So I look forward to your questions.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir,
and I would ask Commissioner Taylor to begin the questioning.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Sir, you answered the first question I was going to ask in your statement: Do we have the forces necessary to put them back where they need to be if we do move them?

The current plan kind of presupposes that we do, because it talks about capability and then that we can move the forces back to the Continental United States, and we have the capability to insert them back wherever we need to. You gave a very clear answer to that.

What are the other options? What can we do through prepositioning of equipment for some of our heavy forces? And I would ask both you and General Meigs to comment about that, some of the rotational plans that they have talked about. Of course, that takes lift as well. What are some of the other options to be able to execute a plan similar to the one that's been proposed, or some alternatives to it?

GENERAL ROBERTSON: Prepositioning is reviewed on a cyclical basis. I don't know that it is
predictably cyclical, but it is reviewed. The services, especially in the last half dozen or so years, have come to realize the critical importance of prepositioned assets.

I would say that what we did wrong initially -- that is being corrected, and I can't tell you the degree to which -- is we put a lot of prepositioned assets out there, and I won't talk about forces as much as I will stocks, and then didn't take care of them. So they sat out there and aged, and when we had to draw them out periodically for use, we discovered that they required ready attention.

I don't want to put words in the mouth of the modern Army, but we also learned that packing ships to the gunnels with equipment without regard for rapid offload, what is popularly called "combat loading" now, would be a better way to do business, although it may require more assets to do that.

The assets are not there. Therefore, they are not to the optimum posture yet, I don't think; but there are people looking at improving the efficiency of the ships that we are loading, the capacity to
which we load them, fragmenting the loads so that we can put them in more places and not have to deploy over such long distances, onloading offload troops while the ships are en route.

All of these are great ideas, anything to meet the new strategic timing requirements that are coming out of OSD -- properly coming out of OSD -- and then more. But more means more money, and so you have to make those balanced decisions of how much you can sustain from a forward deployed perspective, especially as you modernize your forces.

The Future Combat System for the Army is going to have some folks trained, I think, on new systems and new ways of doing business, but having to fall in on old equipment that they really maybe have not trained on as well as some of the new stuff.

I give you the transportation mobility perspective. I would let General Meigs talk about the operational requirement.

GENERAL MEIGS: The first thing we ought to do is fill out the proposed sets and, as Tony said, if you have an old ship and you've got to use that for
prepo because that is all that is available, and you
don't have a ship that you can get the appropriated
funds for, that you can build optimized combat loading
and fast roll-on/roll-off, you ought to fix that.

Clearly, the prepo equipment that is in
Belgium and Luxembourg needs to be put somewhere else.
We tried. We did the studies to see how that could
come out, and the Belgiques and the Dutch were very
upset with us for breaking agreements that had been
made previously; but that gear shouldn't be sitting in
the BENELUX (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg). That
needs to be put to better use somewhere else, and that
is going to be a political issue to back up SACEUR as
he goes in and tries to wedge those out.

Let me make two pleas for what services
can do to help TRANSCOM. One, service capabilities
need to be harmonized with the allocation of scarce
resources that go on when a combatant commander begins
an operation.

To that effect, after Task Force Hawk, we
took a Corps headquarters, the one that went to Iraq,
that took 55 wide bodies to move, and we reorganized
it so that it could move on 36 C-130s and two C-17s.

Now we did that in U.S. Army Europe, because the Task Force Hawk experience was not a very pleasant one, and through the use of CONOPS (Concept of Operations) funding to support Bosia and Kosovo, I could do that legally. But service chiefs need to understand that they must not develop capabilities in exclusion of the transportation requirement to get them where they need to go.

I suggest that one of the things you could do is take a couple of big operations -- for instance, Iraqi Freedom or perhaps the original deployment to Bosnia -- and look at the TPFDDL (Time Phased Force and Deployment Data List), not the TPFDD. Look at lists of how the forces were deployed and see who takes up most of the wide-bodied aircraft early in the flow. I think you would be surprised.

You ought to do that as a matter of record, because -- in my view -- because if a service can streamline its packaging to make the sorting of scarce resources that TRANSCOM has to do in supporting the combat commanders more efficient, they should do
that.

Secondly, we don't have enough wide-body aircraft. I mean, if we are going to pull a lot of forces back from overseas and we are going to have to go twice as far to get to where they have to fight from where they are now, that has an impact on your capability for ton miles.

If we are going to do that, we should pay the bill for the extra air frames up front as part of that strategic plan. I suggest to you that -- if you look at the reshaping of TRANSCOM and the added resources that ought to go to it to support a strategy to withdraw from Korea and Germany -- that the money is not there.

GENERAL ROBERTSON: One more small point, if I could, on the -- from a shipping standpoint. One of the things that I have seen in the global basing posture study out of OSD is a move toward potentially making available smaller ports for offload of prepositioned and sustainment stocks for the war fighting commander.

That is important, but it is only useful
if you have smaller ships to use those smaller ports and -- Hence, my comments about breaking down the huge loads that we have on the prepositioned ships that we have now that can only access a small number of strategic ports, which could not be available in time of crisis, as we have seen very recently.

So it is an important factor as you work through port spaces and facilities that we understand that the posture of war fighting has changed, and we don't need these huge offloads of stocks sometimes as much as just need packaged forces that can go in, brigade size versus huger Army formations, to work the problems that we will face in this global war on terrorism.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: One additional question to General Meigs. You mentioned in your opening comment about -- that the U.S. Army Europe and the Army had another alternative, at one point in these discussions, that was -- at least you implied that it might have been quite different than the current alternative that is being discussed. Would you care to share that with us?
GENERAL MEIGS: I can, to a certain extent, from memory. At the time I left the service, it was only a U.S. Army Europe position that had been brought up a number of times and been quietly put in the dustbin, and we were told never to mention it again.

We did the work to look at the level at which you go -- the level at which the force is no longer sufficiently sustainable overseas; and, in terms of the training base you need to maintain the facilities, if you go below three brigades the cost per brigade per unit becomes inordinate.

There is a good case that says that there is no question that you can bring some stuff home from Europe. We were looking at the -- Well, let me start over again.

The way U.S. Army Europe is designed today is to be the front portion of a major campaign like Iraqi Freedom. You have a -- as General Taylor can go into in detail, if you want to go into other discussions on this -- you have a Corps headquarters with all of the combat support, combat service support
a Corps needs. It's a very robust, below-the-line force contingent that does not require RC (Reserve Component) augmentation to get moving.

In addition, it's got a very heavy Army aviation package. So the whole idea that -- when General Maddox set this up -- was to give two CINCs (Commanders-in-Chief; i.e., Combatant Commanders), not just one, the ability to put this force on the ground very quickly and have an operational capability at the Corps level, and then add other forces to it from the United States.

Now the mission has changed. You don't need all of those below-the-line forces that far forward. What you do need is an entering wedge force that has a range of capabilities so that, if you need a heavy wedge, you can do that. If you need an airborne force that's backed up with civil affairs, you can do that.

So you could put together a composite force under a Corps or Corps Forward matrix with three Brigades. I was going to have a Division headquarters remain, because Headquarters are very, very important
in terms of any kind of operation, especially if they are Joint certified, and I can go into that in more detail if you like.

So that you had three levels. You had three Brigades: a light brigade, a heavy brigade, and a Stryker brigade. You had a Division headquarters that you can push forward as a forward for the Joint Task Forces following behind and sufficient combat support forces to open the theater.

Remember, it is not TRANSCOM that opens the theater. If you want ports opened, the port opening was done in the European Theater by U.S. Army Europe. So if you have those forces back in the 7th Transportation Battalion at Fort Eustis, it's the old tyranny. You are twice as far away. It takes you twice the ton miles to get there.

If they are in Europe, a lot of times they can move by rail. You are not requisitioning airplanes from TRANSCOM in order to do the mission; because remember: if you are on the European land mass, the rail networks are very good. You don't need airplanes.
So if I can deploy to the Caucasus by rail with a sufficient force, and the combatant commander is trying to bring other things from the United States, it is not a zero sum game. But if they are all back in the United States, you have to go to the TRANSCOM Commander and say, okay, we got to fly all this stuff.

So that was the strategy that we had in our proposal and, unfortunately, it never got off the ground.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: General Horner, I don't want to be ignoring you. You obviously have been very much involved in deploying forces in an earlier war. Would you care to comment?

GENERAL HORNER: Well, my experience with preposition is that it was excellent, but we worked hard to maintain it. I had people on site, and they did all the inspections and all the counting and changing time, and not only was it better than we thought -- because we thought we would use it once and throw it away -- but it's been used over and over and over again. It gets redone and restored and put back
in storage and pulled out again because of the turbulence in the Middle East.

With regard to deployment of force: it was interesting in Desert Storm, for whatever reason. The 18th Airborne Corps was the one we came to rely on to be there on time, and then when we had time, the 7th Corps out of Europe deployed down.

So each situation is going to be different. It is going to be a function of geography. It's a function of what kind of forces are required.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Commissioner Martin?

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Meigs, you had made some previous comments -- I spent 32 years behind a microphone; I don't think I need them now, but we'll try anyway.

You had made some previous comments regarding the wisdom of drawing down or turning our back on the existing alliances, friendships in the military contact and basing structure in favor of new friends who might be more transitory and not necessarily there when we need them.
I'd like to hear that for the record, sir.

GENERAL MEIGS: Okay. In Iraqi Freedom, if you dig into the role the Germans played in the deployment of European based forces, and the Italians -- By the way, you will find that they were extremely supportive. And remember, the Germans weren't necessarily thrilled about the whole issue. In fact, their Chancellor was elected on a platform of no participation in the war, but they assisted tremendously in the deployment of V Corps and other forces out of Germany to Iraq.

Hungary would not allow overflight or movement of forces through Hungary to Turkey. Now I worked a lot with the Hungarians. I don't mean this as a criticism. But the constituent politics for Hungary were much, much more difficult than in Germany, even given the presence of the Green Party and the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) Coalition and the fact that the Foreign Minister of Germany is a Green. He is a member of the Green Party, now SPD, but originally he was a Green Party member.
So the rules, the procedures, the consensus behind what U.S. forces do out of Germany and Italy is a given, in a sense. I mean, it's never completely a given, but I mean it's all understood. It is consensus.

In the new European nations, it can be less so -- not necessarily as a function of the position of the Prime Minister in terms of what he would like to do, or his service chiefs, but his constituent politics and the weakness of his coalition in these new democracies.

I note for the record that some of the new European countries that have come with us to Iraq are now starting to have to pull out, and I suspect that is due to a combination of up-tempo and constituent politics. However, when people used to ask me whether we are going to re-station a brigade farther east, my answer was always, absolutely, makes a lot of sense to me; if you guys will write me the check, I'll start doing that tomorrow.

If I could, I would just make a quick comment about training bases. General Horner
correctly underlines that this is an issue. There are four training bases in the Czech Republic that are over ____? square kilometers.

There are four training bases in Poland that are of larger size; and, in fact, Drasco Pomorskie, the training base we used for Victory Strike, is over 400 square kilometers. That is a big training area, and it is in an air space that is relatively uncluttered -- much less cluttered than the air space in western Europe -- and you can maneuver off-post in Germany as well as in Poland and the Czech Republic, with appropriate permission.

So there is a tension here. You want to make sure that wherever you put your forces, you can get them to go do whatever the nation's business is. That's very important. If you leave forces in Europe, you certainly want to be able to take advantage of these very, very large, relatively empty training areas that are just there for the using.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: My second question is to all, and I'll be interested in the joint service comments on this.
If we have a great map, a great plan, but a force that is too stressed or not adequately configured to man that map and support that plan, what do we have? My question is the pressure of rotations, the recruiting. And I used the term R&R, and I didn't mean rest and relaxation; I meant recruiting and retention in some comments the other day.

Let me start with you, General Horner. Your sense and experience of where do we stand, and how seriously do we need to take those considerations as we go about our thinking?

GENERAL HORNER: Well, obviously, there is no doubt about it, our force is stressed because of the high tempo. We were that way in the mid-Sixties. We are not going to get bigger. We can't afford the forces we have, and I would expect in the next rounds we will see cuts in our forces in terms of manpower. But we have also changed how we fight war.

For example, in Iraqi Freedom we saw us needing a -- stating a need for a very large force, then a smaller force, and then even that smaller force couldn't all deploy to be in the battle, and yet the
battle was very quick. Now that may have had ramifications in the post-conflict operation.

So it isn't all clear what the needs are, but I think we tend to use historic battles to figure what it takes to do something, and we've got to learn to live with this more lethal, fast, more knowledgeable force, and take advantage of those, and also we must have room for our coalition partners, because without it, it is American arrogance, and we can't afford that.

In fact, we were talking about the coalitions. I was thinking about in Desert Storm. I had people in my coalition command who I never had worked with before: the French, the Syrians. Yet it went fine. In the case of the French, we had the Minister of Defense fired, Chevenement. He hated Americans. But they got Jacques in there, and then that -- Once he got that cleared up, the military to military worked fine.

Now all those forces depended upon the United States for their command and control, their intelligence, their reconnaissance, all the high tech
stuff that we bring to the battle. But in terms of being able to shoot and fight and work with us, we got along just fine.

So I think our smaller forces are going to be smaller. They are going to be more lethal, and we have to figure out ways to build those kinds of relationships on an either ad hoc business or a continuing basis to make sure that we put a field of force out that is not only joint but coalition.

GENERAL MEIGS: Let me give you a couple of data points about, again, Europe -- because that is where I spent most of my career, and almost all of my career as a flag officer -- to give you a sense for the type of commitment that has to be made to do what General Horner is talking about.

I am not sure that you understand the role of the Patriots in Europe in terms of the capabilities that they provide to other countries in the AOR and in the CENTCOM AOR. If you put those Patriots at Ft. Bliss, then every time you want to run an exercise in Israel or Southwest Asia, you are going to pay an extra price.
Secondly -- and I can't get into this in too much detail in an open session; if you go into closed session, you can get the information on that. Secondly, every year EUCOM would come to me with a bill of about 70 to 80 exercises for the European Command and inside of NATO, and I would go to the combatant commander and say, “Look, with the Army training requirements that I have for our battalions, I can only do about 45.”

Now some of those exercises required cadres; some of them required units. That bill is not going to go down. That bill is going to go up as the eastern European armies want more of our time, which is one of the reasons I mentioned Torgau 2004 to you.

Imagine the 173rd coming home from Iraq to the United States and then having to go to Russia for its exercise, and all of the preplanning conferences that occur, because an exercise starts in the planning cycle a year to six months ahead of time. Those of you that have participated in that on the Commission can explain that to the Commissioners.

So that the way I see it, if you are
seriously interested in engagement, look at the engagement bill to support the strategy and then see the most efficient way of resourcing it as a function of operational tempo, which right now is at a premium.

General Taylor, I don't know if you know this, but all the Op Force are in the deployment cycle, which gives a sense -- I mean, to an Army person, again they can explain to you what that means for the way the Army does its business, and that bill is not going to go.

GENERAL ROBERTSON: I partially answered this question when I started, and I will only -- I will let General Horner and General Meigs' comments stand for themselves. But I do want to go back and readdress the Active/Reserve mix as a gut concern, and this is only personal gut concern. Modern -- or today's -- commanders, I think, are not as concerned about it as I am or was.

I was -- When the Berlin wall came down, I was in the old Strategic Air Command. We owned the KC-135 fleet. We thought this was an optimum time to change the posture of the fleet, because the Cold War
was over, and we could take a significant portion of
that force and put it in the Air National Guard and
Air Force Reserve; and we did, nearly 60 percent, and
they are still that way today.

The same was true with other forces as we
drew down the Active force, as General Horner
mentioned, and put a lot of those assets in the Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve, from an Air
Force perspective.

The air war over Kosovo was, for the most
part, an air refueling exercise, and we not only used
almost every Active asset that we had, short of taking
down the schoolhouses, but we had to do my first
selective recall of the Guard and Reserves to have
enough air refueling assets to do that operation.

That was a traumatic experience, and I
have long held that it is unfair for us to call the
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, the reserve
components, to active duty for very, very long periods
of time when that is not exactly what they signed up
for at peacetime jobs and peacetime lives, and we
should have enough -- We should relook the structure
of our forces to accommodate that.

Now the world is changing, and I acknowledge that we are in another world war that may have changed that paradigm. I think we probably need to look at changing the make-up of the forces because I don't know how much longer -- I've watched the recruiting numbers. They seem to be doing okay. I just am not sure how much longer we will be able to sustain this.

I say that in light of the fact that, when we did Kosovo, as my example, we were at a time of robust airline hiring and a lot of folks trying to get off of Active duty and get those high paying jobs in the airlines. So it was a stressful time for the Active force, and it was a stressful time for the Guard and Reserve to pull those into Active Duty for a long period of time.

Now that sine curve has bottomed out, and folks are more than eager, who don't have airline jobs now, to serve time in the Guard and Reserve so they can get a full time paycheck.

I suspect that cycle is going to swing
again someday and, if we don't do something about the mix and stay in the posture that we are in, a massive forward deployment, that we are going to have a challenge on our hands with recruiting in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.

So that's a long way of describing it, weaving in economics and the world posture, but it causes me concern.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Commissioner Thopson.

COMMISSIONER THOMSON: General Meigs, you made an interesting set of comments about the role of the V Corps and Iraqi Freedom, which I thought -- laying out for us all of that.

A simple question: Why weren't -- Why choose the forces from Europe to do this? Why not forces from within CONUS?

GENERAL MEIGS: We had exercised with CENTCOM in Egypt, and I mean V Corps was exceptionally well trained. It had the best trained aviation component of any of the U.S. Corps except for -- elements, except for Army Special Operations Command,
and it was General Franks' call, and it gets there quicker, you know, because of the time/distance factors. That's about the best I can give you. Those are the major parameters of the decision.

COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Thanks. General Robertson, in your job, your last job before you retired at TRANSCOM, you were in a job which I now realize, having been out there now, is a highly political job, and there is a lot of politics. What I mean is there is a lot of international politics that has to be done at TRANSCOM and a lot of diplomacy involving access and moving through places and so forth.

In the global posture that is being proposed by the Pentagon, and in extrapolating from some of the bones and trying to put some flesh on it, that is going to require access to some places where we are not all that used to going through and some places where we are but has been infrequent, and now it will be more frequent, places in Africa, Southeast Asia. I don't need to mention these places, but they are just the regions, southeast Europe, South Asia.
How do you -- and we have to work out agreements that we are going to be happy with. Presumably, we will be able to work those out. Two questions. How long will this take us, and how would you feel as -- the first question -- as a commander about relying on places where, let's call it, the adherence to the rule of law is not as strong as the American tradition?

GENERAL ROBERTSON: Let me tell you how we did it. As I left and John Handy came in -- I'll start at the side and work my way in and back up again to your questions. When John came in after the challenges that we had had, and recognizing that what you said is exactly right, John brought in a high ranking State Department person to serve as his TRANSCOM ambassador and entree to the State Department for purposes of access, diplomatic clearance and those kinds of things, which was a good thing.

No one, like you, had ever recognized TRANSCOM's requirement for access being more of a State Department mission than anything else, and what I and my predecessors had done was basically rely on
the combatant commanders in the AOR to work those issues for us.

So I would get on the phone with Tommy Franks and say I can't get in. He would call somebody and call me back a couple of hours later and say, Okay, try it again. That is how we did business. It probably is much more effective and efficient today, being able to work those at a lower level.

How long is it going to take? It is going to take forever or, maybe better said, never in some of the places that we will try to get access. In some places, depending on the environment at the time, it will go fairly quickly.

The good news is in my quick scan of the areas that we are looking at expanding that posture into, certainly into the small, occasionally used places, it is broad enough that the flexibility that I mentioned when I started will allow General Handy and subsequent commanders the ability to work around, and that is exactly -- That is the nature of the mobility business. You work around walls, access issues, diplomatic clearances.
Peacetime is almost more of a problem than crisis, because the urgency and the adrenalin that is pumping through our own diplomatic structure and defense structure moves mountains a lot faster than they do in peacetime, and I remember many days trying to get into Southwest Asia to sustain forces when I was only given -- You can only have 50 diplomatic clearances a month and, if a minor crisis erupts and you have to use 25 of them in a spurt, then you've only got 25 left, and you got to sustain all the forces in that AOR, but you can only take 25 airplanes in and out. So figure out another way to do it.

That is a peacetime challenge that I hope that we take into account as part of this group, because as we work our way into that, peacetime is like wartime for the mobility business. You are moving 80 percent of your forces all the time into places that people don't even know exist.

The other issue that will need to be worked even after we establish these, and the constant problem, is making sure that you have the equipment prepositioned from a mobility perspective. You don't
need a lot: a couple of loaders and fuel -- clean fuel, which is a challenge in many parts of the world, and we had to ferry our own fuel or use precious ramp space to preposition tankers to provide the fuel that we need so we could go in, dump a load, take off, hit a tanker because the fuel on the ground was not adequate.

We have done a lot of that in the major mobility bases that I mentioned earlier -- prepositioned fuel in huge stocks to be able to move it. But in the forward locations where we will need to do that, we will have to work our way through those kinds of issues.

So how long is it going to take? It will take forever or never in some cases, and some will come quickly, and I hope the balance will provide TRANSCOM the flexibility that it needs.

You asked about comfort level operating into some of those locations, and I assume you are talking mostly security and those kinds of things. It is interesting. After the Cole was bombed, I had to come over -- I probably sat in this room -- and had to
testify with Vern Clark about the security of U.S. forces in foreign ports -- he from a Naval perspective and me from a person who moved forces through those ports on a regular basis.

I will tell you what I told the committee that I testified before then -- and I knock on wood when I say -- we had a fairly robust threat awareness group in U.S. Transportation Command and its components that monitored every mission that was being flown or sailed on a daily basis a day, week or month in advance, to make sure that we were adequately postured: either as that aircraft moved in with security forces, as that ship moved in with security forces or that the combatant commander was able to provide security forces for the movement of that asset in and out of the port.

I'm sure that system is even more robust today than it was when I established it, and I am fairly comfortable that, with defensive systems now being proliferated across the airlift fleet, with defensive systems now being made available even on some of the sealift fleet, with the increased
awareness provided by better intelligence and preplanning, that we will be okay.

COMMISSIONER THOMSON: We are moving into -- this is for any of you. We are moving into a period -- again, although some think it may be more than a sine wave situation -- where the issue of recruiting and retention is coming very much to the fore. Part of this thinking in our global reposturing involves a shift from fairly long accompanied tours to shorter, six-month rotation tours.

That inevitably raises some questions about the effects of these kinds of rotational tours on recruiting and retention. I wonder if any of you have any thoughts about that.

GENERAL HORNER: Well, my own experience was that rotation -- We used to pull rotational tours for nuclear alert, and the problem was you would be in Green Squadron and you would go -- and you would go back and Red Squadron was short of people. So you changed patches, and two days later you are back over there again.

So any rotational base has to be made in
the cold light of what can be supported, not what the
requirements are; because you will drive your force
into the ground.

GENERAL MEIGS: This is one of the major
problems I have with this lily pad idea. Forces in
U.S. Army Europe were in peacetime -- before Iraqi
Freedom -- spending somewhere between 200 and 250 days
away from home. Part of that is the annual Army
training schedule, especially when it included a six-
month tour in Bosnia or Kosovo.

The Army's training plan for a battalion --
in order for it to have the level of collective
ability that is needed for combat -- is fairly
rigorous. If you are going to do that and have six-
month tours in a bare bones facility, and some follow-
one presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, that is just not
going to wash.

What is going to happen is that the
European Command Commander is going to be told by the
Joint Forces Command Commander that he can't service
45 to 70 exercises a year out of the CONUS base and do
the CONUS base training and provide the forces for
other commitments around the world. It's just not going to work.

So, one, the engagement strategy is not going to be supported, whatever that strategy is. Secondly, if you try to do it, not only are you going to run the families ragged, you are going to put a bigger bill on TRANSCOM; because, remember, if you want to go to Bulgaria to run an exercise from Ft. Hood, it's a heck of a lot harder transportation-wise than putting a bunch of people on the train at Grafenwoehr and railing them down there.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. General, did you have something you wanted to add? Go ahead.

GENERAL ROBERTSON: Real quick. I tend to take a little bit more optimistic attitude. First, I would say current commanders are better able to answer that question probably than we are, because the force continues to transform.

When I left Active Duty, the Air Force had, for about a year or more, been in its new Air Expeditionary Force concept where we tried our best to
provide our troops predictability. In other words, you are going to be gone this much time over the course of your career, but we will let you know that you will be in this bucket, you will deploy at this time, and you can plan your family life around that.

I would say that, if we can ever get back to a semblance of predictability -- and I can't speak for the Army, Navy or Marine Corps -- but if we can maintain that predictability and tailor the forces in those modules to be able to have the flexibility to respond to crises wherever they may occur and have forces adequate to sustain that, that the troops will be able to handle it a lot better than, “Go now. We'll tell you when you come home when it is time to come home.”

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Commissioner Curtis?

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Both you and the previous panel were very articulate in the requirement for the overseas basing structure to be founded in a long term view and a long term strategic framework. But there is also the issue of getting there.
I would appreciate if each one of you would share with us what you view are the risks and considerations that we should take account of in moving to the overseas basing structure while we have active operations going on in both Afghanistan and Iraq. General Horner?

GENERAL HORNER: Well, everything is risk, particularly when you are in a draw-down of your forces.

We have to rethink how we are fighting. We are trying to fight World War II again, and we are not the force to do that. We are a different kind of force.

We need to have access, and we often cannot have assured access. But it has been my experience when there is a crisis, the neighborhood changes attitudes very quickly. And we certainly saw that in 1990 when we had great difficulty working with many of the Arab countries, and then suddenly -- divisions on the border of Saudi Arabia with an Arab country being occupied -- we had free reign. I could get in my F-16 and go anywhere in the AOR. Before
that, it would take months just to get the flight clearances.

So I think that sometimes we try to lock in the future rather than learn to live with uncertainty, and I think we are going to have to do that more and more because we are not spending the money on our defense that we have in the past, because the impetus of the Cold War is not present.

We always -- and we have to learn to rely on things more. I know the aircraft -- the fighter guys are always upset with the Navy, because the Navy is always pounding smoke about an acre of sovereignty. But I can tell you this, as an air component commander, I hope the Navy buys 100 carriers because air power is air power, and I don't care what's painted on the side of that airplane.

So those are all the kinds of considerations that we are reluctant to make, if we have a service bias or a functions bias or a regional bias, and we have to get over that.

GENERAL MEIGS: I take a little different view. Look at the family in the First Armored
Division which was sent to Iraq for 12 months and actually stayed 16, which is now preparing for yet another tour, as we speak; who knows that their Division is going to be redeployed, and who face the possibility of the unit going to Iraq with the redeployment of the families issue still up in the air.

That's likely to happen. And tying this whole process to BRAC, as was announced in the campaign rhetoric, makes this a very uncertain and debilitating problem for soldiers and their families, and it doesn't have to be that way.

Now I occasionally quiz buddies that I see about how the retention is holding up, because that is the crack in the armor for the Army. If you start to see mid-term noncommissioned officers not reenlisting, you see the promotion points for lieutenant colonels and colonels migrating to the left, you see captain retention going down, we have a very serious problem.

In the Active force, we haven't started to see that quite yet. I wonder how it is going to look after those families go through those second tour in
harm's way -- or second year-long tour in harm's way. And if the economy doesn't tank completely and the job market for the young captains stays fairly robust, that is a -- that becomes a very real problem for the Army.

So in terms of trying to -- I won't use the word "transform" because it's become one of these terms that has no referential index. I can't figure out what it means anymore. In order to restructure the Army, fight a war, and re-station the Army at the whole time, I think you have overloaded the horse. You know, that's the straw that could break the camel's back.

I know we ought to do this. Don't get me wrong. I mean, I know we ought to make some changes, but we've got to meter that very, very carefully, and tying it strictly to BRAC has two disadvantages.

One, uncertain timing; two, it is going to create tremendous pressure to bring the maximum amount of stuff home, to station it in bases which will then be more protected against closing them down. In fact, there is not a whole lot of room in Army posts right
now to put those units in.

GENERAL ROBERTSON: I was not part of the inner circle, this global basing posture study, and we are talking two things here: We are talking about repositioning of forward deployed troops, drawing down some, bringing some here, robusting here; and we are also talking about what I think is a robusting of our global basing posture to allow more flexibility to operations in this new environment we are in.

Regarding the first -- the repositioning and streamlining of our forces around the world to meet today's challenges, as opposed to yesterday's challenges: I trust the leadership that followed that -- if the service chiefs and Secretaries have studied this and given it their approval -- that -- if the CINCs have studied this along with the Chairman and given his blessing -- in my cursory glance at it, that it would probably relieve some of the tension, hopefully, that General Meigs suggests, that we ought to get on with it because we need to do what we can to repurpose ourselves and, if we can relieve tension in the process, then so be it.
Regarding the second half -- increasing the flexibility of operation of forces throughout the world by robusting our posture in a tiered way -- big bases, middle size bases and occasionally used bases: I'd say get on with that, too, because it is something we have needed to do for a long time.

COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you very much.

That's all I have.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Commissioner Less?

COMMISSIONER LESS: General Horner -- four and a half acres of sovereign U.S. territory on an aircraft carrier rather than that one acre, or whatever it is you are talking about there. For you, sir -- and for the other gentlemen, we'll get to it -- but I'd like to talk about host nation, if we could, and the price that you in your earlier comments talked about; the Middle East and where we are going to be handling the global war on terrorism, and we are not going back to fight wars that we fought in the past, and all of that sort of thing.

Will not the host nation pay a high price?
Or what is your take on how the host nation is going to react in providing access as we expand, as we move these 70,000 troops around, and/or whatever; and what do you see as the impacts, both beneficial and negative, in allowing U.S. access?

Then I'd like to get to General Meigs on the same thing in the European theater; but I'd like you, sir, to cover that area out there in the Middle East.

GENERAL HORNER: Well, you know, host nation access and support was always a concern in Central Command because of the cultural differences, because of the lack of longstanding relationships like we had in NATO or with Japan and Korea.

As it turned out, shared interests become very, very important. Quite frankly, our involvement in a conflict or a crisis in large measure should be driven by interests, not just because we want to be there, or things of this nature.

So in 1990 we met in Camp David with the President, and he turned and he asked Colin -- He asked Baker first, and he couldn't answer the
question. So he asked Colin, “Well, what do the Saudis think about all this, the invasion of Kuwait?”
And nobody could really answer the question.

So he sent Secretary Cheney and myself and Schwartzkopf and John Yosock, and we went out to Jedda and we went to the King and said, “What do you think we ought to do?” And there was discussion within the royal family, because they didn't know exactly what to do, but the King made a very courageous decision. He says, “I've seen my country come too far to have it destroyed; would you come help us?”

Right then, the doors opened in a way that I could have never imagined. I think we have to keep that kind of a practical view of the world; that if we are in an area where our interests are at risk, there are probably going to be like people who hold the same kinds of values, same kind of interests. They are in the global economy. They are not some isolated feudal state. They are going to have the same interests at risk.

So I have less concern. I think often the arguments about access are strictly inside the
Pentagon trying to squeeze another $10 million out of one budget into another, which never happens anyway. So I think we need to consider that.

In saying that, we also should do things -- like where we have bulk logistics like munitions, fuel -- we ought to put those on ships if we can, instead of ashore and keep them in various places -- Guam and Diego Garcia or wherever -- so that they can be cross-referenced into any theater, any area of the world, to the extent that we can make our military capabilities flexible across the board.

I recall when I worked for George Crist, Camp Zuma in Japan had all these empty munitions storage areas, and I had tons and tons of munitions, because we thought we were going to fight the Russians in Iran. So I suggested to George Crist that I put them in Camp Zuma, since it was empty, and he blew a stack. The reasons was, he says, well, if I put them in PACOM's AOR, I'll never get them. I'll never have access to them.

Well, that kind of thinking goes with, you know, Custer's last charge. We have reached the point
now where we can't afford a force for this theater or
that theater or that theater. We have to have a force
that can go wherever it's needed and whatever size
that's needed.

So I'm really not overly concerned about
host nation; because my experience is, when you need
it, it's there.

GENERAL MEIGS: Let me just give you a
couple of examples. If we were going to put a base
for the brigade I mentioned in Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary, they would love it. The only issue would be
the cost, and I think Speedy Martin -- I don't want to
speak for him -- but I watched him do the same thing,
looking at prospective airfields in Bulgaria and
Rumania, and it's basically the same.

The cost in fixing up an airfield to U.S.
standards can be -- You know, he can spend a pretty
penny for that. Then the host nation issues in terms
of legal issues, and Ambassador Hunter has fairly
eloquently laid that out for you.

I was involved in planning operations in
Bosnia that never went, and then the deployment to
Bosnia eventually under Dayton, and then the deployment to Kosovo. When you have a crisis area, it is normally a place -- Oh, by the way, in Rwanda -- it's normally a place where you never thought you were going to go.

I mean, if you had told me that we were going to put USAREUR (U.S. Army Europe) forces into GOA (Gulf of Aden) in order to get them into Rwanda, I mean, I would have, you know -- what cartoon did you get that out of? If you had told me we were going to deploy through Albania -- into Albania in order to provide a threat to the Serb army in Kosovo, you know, with an airfield of a MOG (Maximum Aircraft on the Ground) of one -- I mean, this is a little aside. The job that was done by USAFE in Air Mobility Command is absolutely astounding. But it wasn't the entrance, the access issues that were a problem. It was the capability issues that were a problem.

John Jumper, who was my counterpart at that time, used to say that that airfield was like the scene out of Star Wars. You know, the bar scene in Star Wars. It was crazy, but, you know, they made it
work. It was amazing.

So that's really not the issue, if you have a friendly country that wants your presence or things have all fallen down and you've got a total mess, and you are dealing with a country that is either willing to give up sovereignty or mitigate it or there is no sovereignty, as in the case of Bosnia.

GENERAL ROBERTSON: Just a quick add. I agree with everything that they said. The only difference I would take with General Horner is the peacetime versus wartime.

The King doesn't get involved in peacetime operations. Bureaucrats work peacetime operations, and unless someone pays attention to access agreements in peacetime, it is a challenge sustaining forces in peacetime through bureaucratic dip clearance, dislocations and the fog of war that exists in peacetime.

COMMISSIONER LESS: One more then, General Robertson, for you. And General Meigs has mentioned the lily pad strategy that -- and I've seen some articles that really don't speak overly favorably of
My question to you is on Vernon Clark's sea basing strategy. Will not that, with high speed connectors and getting into the ship arena, expand on your mobility capabilities study to the point that it should provide you to accommodate more ton miles with existing forces than would be without this particular sea basing strategy? And your thoughts or comments on the sea basing -- the Clark sea basing strategy.

GENERAL ROBERTSON: Sea basing, from the folks that I have talked to about it and the briefings that we have given, is -- It's like the blind man and the elephant: In many cases, it depends on what part he touches as to how he describes it.

So that is the -- I will leave that aside as a slight negative. But for the most part, the answer to your question, depending on how it is ultimately postured, I think the answer is yes. It will require some fragmentation of the -- "fragmentation" may not be the right word -- resizing of what we use to fit on what you describe as high speed response vessels.
They don't carry a lot, but they carry enough. They are not suited for bad weather, high seas, anything above sea state 2 probably. They are very hard on troops to go a long ways, as we have seen. Troops arrive dehydrated because of the trip. But the concept is attractive, and I think in some parts of the world, from a theater lift perspective, that it will certainly relieve some of the pressure on a very overstressed strategic airlift fleet.

COMMISSIONER LESS: General, thoughts or comments?

GENERAL MEIGS: No, I think General Robertson pretty well laid it out.

COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you. I have no further questions.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. I was looking through some notes yesterday from our visit to EUCOM, and one was on a question during a briefing that we were receiving in regard to how much input the command had had in regard to the plans that were being proposed in regard to global basing.

The briefer said, well, General Meigs
started this stuff five years ago. So I take it there
have been a few iterations since then, and I just
wanted you to know that your wisdom and input is still
appreciated over there.

I appreciate your patience, and I am just
going to close with one question, rather than the 10
that I have written down here, but I will just close
with one.

That is: Do any of you have any concern
about the global posture that is being proposed in
regard to it being geared more for a global war on
terrorism versus the ability to respond to a
traditional threat? That would be my question.

GENERAL HORNER: I'll start. You can have
the last word, Tony.

The global war on terrorism or terrorists
is what we have. So we have to respond to that.
Korea, as was pointed out, is an issue, but it is a
different kind of issue with the nuclear weapons
appearing in the north and the economic strength of
the south.

Even the whole focus of the world is
shifting to the east. It is shifting toward China because of the growing economic power, and I don't think there is any doubt about it. At some point in time, we will see either China become a firm nation in the world nation and growing in power or they could take a very aberrant turn to expansionism, military strength, all the rhetoric about Taiwan.

That's not been decided yet, but at some point in time it is going to happen, and we are seeing, for example, their R&D efforts, fielding systems beginning about 2006 that are going to be significant.

So that is, to me, the concern with regard to massive military operations, and that is primarily Taiwan being the focal point, and it is going to involve things like naval submarines, B-2 bombers, things of this nature, if we are going to deter conflict in that region. We can't afford conflict in the region. It would be an economic disaster for the world.

Other than that, we are stuck with this war that is really a civil war within Islam between
the radical and moderate Islamists, and they are using us to generate support for the radical cause. That is going to be a very difficult battle to win, and, in reality, it is going to have to be the moderate Islamists that win it. They just need to get off their rear and get going. And until now they have been on the sidelines, but they can't afford to be on the sidelines.

So the battles we are going to fight in the world are going to be very confusing and very complex, but not particularly live or die for our nation. Painful perhaps, but not necessarily national survival. But we always have to keep in mind there is a large problem out there during the Middle East, because of the uncertainty, not necessarily the intent.

GENERAL MEIGS: I don't see a clash there. And again my experience is primarily with U.S. Army Europe, but we were dealing with the major contingencies the nation had until Iraq. I mean, Bosnia, Kosovo, crazy things going on in Africa.

That -- In a region -- The fact that the
forces are in the bases that they occupied in 1950
when we reestablished NATO is not really relevant, if they are strategically agile. Admittedly, having below-the-line capability in Europe, we don't need (to be) that close to possible crisis spots. It's stuff that ought to be brought home.

What I worry about is, if you take too much of the command and control capability, the initial logistic capability needed in a campaign, and too much of the combat capability out of your forward based forces, that is a bigger problem. And that's what worries me about the lily pad strategy.

If you bring too much back to the CONUS base, and I am speaking particularly of ground forces, and you are not going to pay the bill to give the extra capability to TRANSCOM to get the forces where they need to go, you are making a huge mistake, not to mention the engagement issue that you are going to undermine.

Quite frankly, I think much of the shape of what we are seeing is the same as the shape of the curve we saw in the previous election, not this latest
one, and the rhetoric that was going around before the QDR process even started the last time.

I don't think that will do the job of doing the things we have to do in both the European Command and Southwest Asia. Now I am bucking the wind of two combatant commanders, but based on my experience, that's the way I see it.

GENERAL ROBERTSON: I think I already -- I have already made my position fairly clear. I think, if done correctly -- and I speak not for boots on the ground combat capability because I was sort of the itinerant farmer that went around from one location to another and never stayed in any place very long -- but from a mobility perspective, the more options available to the command to move forces in response to whatever, humanitarian crisis, natural disaster or shooting war, the better off we will be.

So, done correctly, maintaining the MOB (Main Operating Base) infrastructure as it exists, or in some form or format, and re-baselining that MOB format, perhaps forward in one or two selected locations, and then a lesser structure at a few other
bases in some concentric ring out from that point, and then, perhaps, probably, unmanned -- because mobility carries with it its own opening packages, certainly from an air perspective and from a sealift perspective, as required, but with appropriate ramps, prepositioned material, handling equipment and fuel -- it will certainly increase the flexibility of U.S. force -- or the U.S. transportation force -- to move U.S. forces wherever the country thinks they need to be moved. So I think, done properly, it is a good thing.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. My fellow Commissioners and I thank you, all of you, for your military service, and thank your family, as well, and not only for the sacrifices you have made but those that you continue to make. Your insight has been extremely valuable, and thank you for taking this time to be with us here today. We would hope that we could call on you again, if we have some questions that we would like your answer to. So please keep that in mind.

I might ask Pat, 1:30 is when we
reconvene? Okay. So this hearing is going to stand in recess until 1:30. (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record at 12:17 p.m.)
AFTERNOON SESSION

Time: 1:30 p.m.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I thank you gentlemen for appearing today. In a moment I will introduce you, but first I would like to describe the procedure for today's hearing.

Each panelist will receive up to 10 minutes for an opening statement, and at the conclusion of all opening statements each Commissioner will have up to 10 minutes to ask questions.

We will use lights as a courtesy reminder. When the yellow light appears, you have two minutes remaining. When the red appears, time has expired. However, I would ask all the panelists not to worry about the lights. Take as much time as you need to answer any questions.

On our third panel we will hear from three leading defense policy experts. From the U.S. Naval War College, Senior Strategic Researcher, Professor Thomas Barnett; from the Center for Defense Information, Senior Analyst Marcus Corbin; and from the Policy Research Center Institute -- excuse me, I
put Center in there; let me rephrase that -- From the
Foreign Policy Research Institute, research fellow and
National Security Program Director Michael Noonan.

Gentlemen, each of you have broad
experience in analyzing defense issues, and we look
forward to your frank and professional views on
suggested focus areas for the Commission to
investigate in its review of overseas basing,
potential unintended consequences of returning large
numbers of troops to the United States, and those
consequences both for the U.S. and nations overseas,
your thoughts on issues and concerns surrounding DoD's
integrated global presence and basing strategy, and
any other issues or alternatives that you think the
Commission should consider.

So at this time, I will start with
Professor Barnett; if you would please begin with your
opening statement, if you have one, and we will move
across the table.

PROFESSOR BARNETT: Thank you. First, let
me thank the Commission for inviting me to testify
here today. Second, let me emphasize right at the
start that I am not an expert per se on the U.S.
military's global basing structure.

I am essentially a grand strategist who
spends his time contemplating the long term objectives
of U.S. foreign policy with a particular focus on how
the employment of military forces around the world can
bring about not just increased security for our
country, but improve the global security environment
as a whole.

I have written extensively on this
subject, and I know that it is primarily on the basis
of my recent book, "The Pentagon's New Map," that I
was asked to testify today. So many of my comments
here will involve describing how I think this new map
informs future planning for U.S. overseas basing
realignment.

The concept of the new map began with a
simple geographic display of where America sent its
military forces since the end of the Cold War. In my
view, this distribution represents the natural demand
pattern for U.S. security exports since the Soviet
Union departed the scene.
By the exporting of security, I refer to the time and attention spent by the U.S. military on any particular region’s actual or potential for incidences of armed conflict or mass violence, either between states or within them.

By my calculation, U.S. military crisis response activity over the past 15 years represents a roughly fourfold increase compared to the 15 following the end of the Vietnam War. I come to that conclusion by adding up the combined total of the four major services' cumulative days of operations in these responses.

It was not only that America conducted more operations over the last decade and a half, but also that these operations grew tremendously in length and complexity.

How did America deal with this tremendous growth, especially as the Pentagon itself was engaged in the long term downward glide path in terms of personnel and resources? We essentially mounted five major responses.

One, we denied the existence of this rise
in demand by adhering as strictly as possible to the
tenets of the Powell doctrine which said, in effect,
pull out of any situation as quickly as feasible.

Two, we denigrated the importance and
utility of the bulk of these responses, dubbing them
military operations other than war, thereby justifying
the Pentagon's well-demonstrated tendency to
underfund, underprioritize, and underman the skill
sets associated with post-conflict stabilization
operations.

Three, we tried to technologize the
problem away, but unfortunately, we spent the vast
bulk of our money on the war fighting side of the
house, effectively providing to America what it has
today, a first-half team that plays in the league but
insists on keeping score until the end of the game.

Four, we outsourced as many noncombat
functions as possible, pushing them on to both allied
militaries and private contractors.

Fifth, we ran significant portions of the
Reserve Component ragged by turning them into *de facto*
Active Duty.
In my opinion, the Defense Department has effectively run out the string on all of these responses. The Powell doctrine has been overtaken by the events of this global war on terrorism. Military operations other than war can no longer be counted upon to remain in the category of lesser includeds unless drive-by regime change is considered enough to constitute mission accomplished.

The occupation of Iraq will invariably transform transformation, shifting its focus from the first half of war fighting portion of the force to the second half or peacekeeping and nation building portions of the force.

This global war has clearly strained the ability of our traditional allies to mount sustained operations in support of U.S.-led interventions, and there is already credible discussion of the possibility of reinstituting a draft in order to meet the pressing needs of rotating our ground forces into and out of the current theaters of operation.

In short, we have picked all the low hanging fruit in our increasingly desperate responses.
to this burgeoning demand curve, to include our relatively understated draw-down of military installations across the United States in the 1990s.

If America is going to pursue a global war on terrorism that many experts have logically argued will extend not just for years but decades, then we must be willing to dramatically reshape both the structure of our forces, rebalancing them extensively, and the direction of military operations other than war and their positioning around the planet, the subject of this Commission.

I believe these two changes are highly interrelated, and here I present what I think are the clarifying strategic concepts embedded within this new map for the Pentagon.

Included in my submitted testimony is a graphic of a global map whose shaded portions encompass what I have dubbed globalization's "non-integrating Gap" or those regions that are both least connected to the global economy in a broadband fashion and have accounted for approximately 95 percent of the crisis responses by the U.S. military since the end of
the Cold War.

That swath of territory includes the Caribbean Rim, the Andes portion of South America, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and much of Southeast Asia.

Within this non-integrating Gap I can locate basically all the wars, all the civil wars, all the ethnic cleansing, all the genocide, all the incidences of mass rape as a tool of terror, all the situations where children are lured or forced into combat units, all the active U.N. peacekeeping missions, and the centers of gravity for all the transnational terrorist networks we are targeting in this global war on terrorism.

This non-integrating Gap marks both the effective limits of the spread of globalization in terms of deep social, political and economic connectivity, as well as the spread of stable governance that defines the lack of mass violence and armed conflict throughout what I call the “functioning Core” of globalization or those countries and regions.
not shaded on this map that have enjoyed both
collective peace and the rapid integration of their
national economies since the end of the Cold War.

This group includes North America, Europe,
Russia, China, Japan, India, industrialized Asia,
South Africa, and in South America, Argentina, Brazil,
Chile.

It should come as no surprise to this
Commission that the U.S. military has closed over 150
major bases across the Core since the end of the Cold
War, while adding more than two dozen and counting
inside the Gap.

The U.S. military is the world's largest
security consulting force and, like any consultancy,
it needs to be as close to the client as possible.
Since the end of the Cold War, our clients are found
almost exclusively inside the Gap and, hence, our
Defense Department has slowly but surely adjusted to
that defining strategic reality of our age.

Now the current and future administration
proposes a further and far more dramatic overhauling
of that global basing structure. If you check the
contours of my non-integrating Gap, you will see that
this plan greatly conforms to the strategic security
environment depicted here.

    In effect, all this administration is
proposing is to move as many fixed bases as possible
closer in toward the Gap, while experimenting with a
host of smaller temporary style installations, the so
called lily pads, sprinkled throughout the deeper
interior reaches of this Gap, most specifically in
sub-Saharan Africa.

    As a whole, I heartily approve of all of
these moves to relocate the U.S. military's fixed
presence and operational centers of gravity away from
the past successes of the Cold War and nearer to the
future challenges of this global war on terrorism,
because I see this geographic rebalancing of the force
to be a prime prerequisite for my declared strategy of
shrinking the Gap by exporting security to the worst
pockets of instability and rogue regime activity found
therein.

    Without such a long term commitment on our
part, I would find it impossible to contemplate how
many of these disconnected countries and regions would someday enjoy sufficient stability to count themselves members of a deeply integrating and secured global economy, and in my mind that is what America's grand strategy for this century should be all about, making globalization truly global and ending the disconnectedness that defines the world's chronic sources of mass violence and armed conflicts which, in turn, breed transnational terrorists.

If there is to be a finish line in this global war on terrorism, our progress toward it will be marked by a succession of basing realignments in the decades ahead.

That last statement constitutes the first of my caveats regarding this administration's current plans for realigning base structure globally, because I do not believe this historic round of proposed realignments will be our last.

I caution national security planners to think as flexibly as possible about the nature of the new, seemingly long term relationships we are currently building as we move bases from western
Europe to eastern Europe, from east Asia to west Asia.

Let me explain why I think such flexibility in planning is in order, and by doing so, describe what I believe is truly flawed about the U.S. military's current unified command plan. Specifically, let me describe what I think are the three key boundary conditions that limit Central Command's ability to conduct its share of the operations in this global war on terrorism.

First, CENTCOM's tactical scene lies to its south; meaning that, as the U.S. and its coalition partners are successful in driving transnational terrorism out of the Middle East, that fight -- fueled as it is by a fundamentalist Islamic response to the (quote/unquote) "West-toxification" imposed upon traditional societies by globalization's creeping embrace -- that fight will head out of the Persian Gulf and into sub-Saharan Africa where we already see the beginnings of such violent conflicts being repeated.

So whatever realignments we pursue in the coming years must take into account the possibility of
that success in order to take advantage of its unfolding. In my mind, that means that, when we construct bases, both around and inside the region of the Persian Gulf, we should view those facilities less as a permanent feature of the strategic landscape and more as the first step in what will be a long term progression of military fronts deeper inside the Gap.

What complicates this likely scenario pathway is, of course, the reality that CENTCOM's area of responsibility does not encompass sub-Saharan Africa, at least at this time.

Second, CENTCOM's operational scene lies to its north; meaning that a key indicator of our success in going on the offensive in this global war on terrorism is seen in the return of today of the same pattern of operational reach for Middle Eastern terror networks that we once witnessed in the 1970s and early 1980s.

Namely, they can strike at will across the Middle East and extend themselves with significant effort into the southern reaches of the European continent, expanding now to include the near-abroad of
the former Soviet Union, to Russia's significant
distress.

   As in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, it
can be said that CENTCOM simply does not talk nearly
enough with those affected countries lying outside its
area of responsibility. But, of course, many of these
same countries are the ones the U.S. is counting upon
to supply it the close-in bases of the future.

   Over time, CENTCOM's area of
responsibility will become the near-abroad of
virtually all of what I call the functioning Core of
globalization. So this war will be far less distant
than we might imagine, even as we continue to be
successful in our efforts to keep it far from our own
shores.

   Thus, in our efforts to move bases closer
in to the action of the Middle East, we need to be
careful to avoid the impression that we are luring
unsuspecting new partners into the fray, in effect
causing them to draw fire.

   Finally, CENTCOM's strategic scene clearly
lies to its east. Already, Asia as a whole takes the
lion's share of the energy coming out of the Persian Gulf, dwarfing what this country imports from the region.

Our energy requirements will rise by less than a third over the next two decades, whereas Asia's will roughly double over the same time frame. In short, we can expect India, China, a united Korea, and Japan to all come militarily to the Middle East in a much bigger way than their minuscule efforts today.

They will come either to join the growing security alliances our current efforts in the region will, hopefully, someday beget or they will come to salvage what security relationships they can out of the strategic disaster we have generated by our mistakes. Either way, these Asian powers will be coming, because their economic interests will eventually compel it.

My point is this: Nothing we should do in this realignment process should be construed by any of these states as constituting a zero sum strategy on our part to deny them military, much less economic, access to the region.
If anything, our base realignment process should not only encourage stronger military ties with all these states, but do so in such a way as to facilitate their eventual entry into the region under the conditions most conducive to our long range objectives of transforming states there into stable members of a larger security community that will be, by definition of both geography and economic transactions, more Asian in character than western.

Let me end with two final caveats, one general and one specific. In my book, I argue for a back to the future outcome in U.S. force structure planning, one that admits that we already have a transformed war fighting force without peer, or what I call a Leviathan force, but also seize the need to invest in and transform what I call the everything else force or a major portion of the U.S. military that is optimized progressively to conduct peacekeeping, low level crisis response, humanitarian and disaster relief, nation building and other post-conflict stabilization operations.

I dub this latter force the System
Administrator force. Shorthanding these two forces in terms of service components, I would describe the Leviathan force as coming primarily from the Air Force and Navy, our fundamental hedges against the resurrected possibility of a great power war, and the Sys Admin force coming primarily from the Army and Marines.

My caveat regarding this natural bifurcation of the U.S. military is this: the bases we position around the Gap but still inside the Core should be optimized for the projection of war fighting power. In effect, they should serve the needs of the Leviathan force.

Conversely, the bases we generate within the Gap should be optimized for the long term presence of largely ground troops whose main activity will be centered around peacekeeping and nation building. This is an important point, in my mind, because it is counterintuitive to most analysts, who would prefer to see our bases circling the Gap, serve as permanent forward deployments of massed combat force; whereas, any bases we generate inside the Gap would remain
largely empty storefronts or Spartan style facilities
designed merely to enable the throughput of
overwhelming force that would be employed only
sporadically and always leave the scene as quickly as
possible.

In effect, I am arguing for the complete
opposite. I think our forward bases surrounding the
Gap should be the empty shell's design for the rapid
throughput of war fighting assets; whereas, the bases
we build inside the Gap should get give off the
impression that we are in it for the long haul.

In my vernacular, the Leviathan force
comes and goes as required, but the Sys Admin force
represents those boys who will never come home. If we
are serious in committing ourselves to the long term
defeat of transnational terrorism, these are the
strategic signals we should send in our global basing
realignment process.

Finally, a more specific caveat: Any
efforts to move our forces closer in toward the Gap
will necessarily remain geographically uneven so long
as the two great insecurities grip east Asia --
namely, the continued existence of the Kim Jung Il regime in North Korea and the potential for conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan's potential moves toward independence from the mainland.

There is a huge Cold War victory to be advantaged in Europe, basically represented by the existence of NATO. No similar peace dividend exists in Asia; meaning that the Achilles heel of any realignment plan, and especially this one, is, in my mind, that at least far too much strategic decision making power in the hands of actors in both Pyongyang and Taipei, neither of which should be trusted to act rationally regarding their own interests, much less ours.

I'll end my comments on that note, leaving any others for the Q and A.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Corbin.

MR. CORBIN: Thanks. Thanks for having me here. It is a pleasure. I believe you are playing a vital role in assisting in the military's transformation. That's where I come at this from. I
have looked at these issues from the perspective of broader national security strategy, military strategy, and force structure.

I think that your process, to the extent possible, should be part of the broad national security strategy assessment as well as what has been mentioned before, looking at it at the same time as domestic base closures. In other words, I think these issues are so broad that it is difficult to look at some of them just from the perspective of the narrower perspective of bases and base structure.

So I will step back a little bit and provide just some concepts and how those might be applied in looking at bases. A lot of my perspective does deliberately not look at cost issues, and that is a luxury I have, you don't have, because those are so present in this morning's talk. We heard a lot about costs for this and costs for that, and you can't get away from it. But what I will try to do is just provide a couple of strategic, maybe, touchstones that can allow you to serve as a lens through which to look at some of the more detailed issues, including cost
issues.

I often try to look at things from the perspective of a couple of great military strategists: the ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu and the much more recent Air Force Colonel John Boyd who echoed and built a lot on the themes from several thousand years ago.

It might seem a little divorced from the nuts and bolts of military bases, but I think it is, in general, made most relevant just because our enemies are using these strategies and approaches. September 11 was perhaps the greatest example of it; today in Iraq and probably increasingly so in the future.

If I can describe the -- One of the basic thrusts of their thinking, in a nutshell -- which, of course, does a disservice to it -- I would say the approach is to out-think and out-maneuver your enemy so quickly and so disorientingly that they are subject to an environment of chaos, and they become paralyzed.

The ultimate ideal, which is exceedingly difficult to achieve in practice, of course, is to win
without fighting. And the buzzword that sums up a lot of these elements and ties them together -- something we have heard this morning -- which is agility. That is what a lot of it comes down to, and you can see how that is relevant to some basing issues.

This is in contrast to a lot of the thinking of another great military thinker, Karl von Clausewitz, who is quite popular in military circles, and he was focused more on sort of climactic battles and getting all of your groups in one place at one time to decisively defeat the enemy. But I think Twenty-first Century warfare is going to be quite different.

Another important element that particularly John Boyd talked about a lot is really the fight for allies. This is to win allies to one's own side -- allies in the broader sense of people willing to sympathize and support you in various ways, and, in parallel, to subtract allies from the enemy's side.

This came out a lot, of course, in the probably exaggerated differences between the
candidates -- the Presidential candidates -- on unilateralism versus multilateralism, but I think it does become an important issue. If you just look at Iraq, NATO has 1.5 million troops in its ground forces, active duty alone. That's just an enormous pool. That might have been very useful in an Iraq situation.

Now everybody immediately points out, well, very few of those are able to actually go anywhere and do anything, but I would suggest that that is a matter that should be addressed and changed, because otherwise having 1.5 million people in uniform and not doing anything with them is a real waste of everybody's time.

Another element of allies in the Iraq scenario that might have made a big difference -- imagine if we had many Muslim troops on the ground in the first days after the fall of Baghdad. That would have had not so much a military effect, but political impact.

So those are just a couple of things that illustrate the importance, to me, in looking at
broader national security strategy about getting things lined up right.

What are a couple of general preferences that those two concepts -- and they are just two; there are many more one could go into -- for basing? Well, these elements favor certain forces and, of course, these are not absolutes, and I don't mean to suggest that you can drop every other force or do everything to an extreme. But they do provide some directions that, if you buy the general strategic concepts, tell you where to go.

Agility is favored by fast, small, dispersed and decentralized forces in general. One immediate caveat, of course, is that peacekeeping can often require very large numbers of troops, not necessarily heavy armored troops -- sometimes, yes, but not necessarily -- but still large numbers.

Those forces are in general favored by bases that are flexible and adaptable and expandable and, as a general principle, having many nodes, small nodes rather than just a few large ones. They give you options. They ease your ability to deal with the
unplanned and the unforeseen.

Also -- and this almost gets to the philosophical basis -- large bases are, to some extent, sort of defensive, and by definition sort of slow, cumbersome, less easy to readjust and, of course, to the extent they are fixed and large, are more tempting terrorist targets.

This almost philosophical element extends to the degree that -- We have heard a lot about how difficult it is to do things from greater distances or with less facilities in place forward, and while I fully recognize these problems, there is a fringe benefit that this is -- If you develop the skills to handle that better, because you have to, because that's what your structure is, you are better preparing your entire institutions and organizations to deal with that kind of flexible, agile warfare that we are likely to see more.

Again, these are mindsets and not iron laws, and the assumption behind it all is that there will be an increase in unconventional war.

The relevance of the fight for allies to
bases is both local and global, and I think you probably heard a lot about the local issues. But I would want to emphasize the global dimension.

Any base plan and proposals must make sure that the base presence in various countries around the world does not excessively irritate relations with the United States.

On the global basis, I think now the United States is suffering a crisis of leadership in the world, and I don't think we really know the full extent of this yet. But I am concerned. I think, certainly, citizenries around the world are really questioning the United States' motives and what they plan to do.

I think this is because of an awful lot of misinformation and rumor mongering and a general attitude that the United States is a lot more powerful than it is, in fact. But regardless of the merits of the claims and the views, I think it is something that really needs to be addressed.

To the extent that bases affect that, I think that is an issue that should be taken into
consideration as much as, you know, how much it costs to fly them from here to there and so on.

In the Middle East, our bases, obviously, have played a contributing role in generating some of this antipathy to us that the radicals, al Qaeda and others, exploit to try to turn their part of the world against us.

There can also be problems from withdrawing from bases, and I'm sure you have heard commentators suggesting that, if we pull out of Europe, for example, in some degree, or South Korea or somewhere, that our relations can be damaged politically.

I think that is not too much of a problem. I think the key underlying issue is really whether the United States is abandoning these countries, and I tend to think that, if they are reassured that we are not abandoning them, that this is being done for certain specific reasons, that most of their concerns can become sort of secondary issues like the economic effects and joint training opportunity issues and so on.
What do just those two basic strategic touchstones suggest for specific cases? Well, in Europe, agility suggests taking out the heavy brigades. If they are not going to be used in Europe, then a central location is probably more advantageous, recognizing, of course, that they can still go from Europe to elsewhere, and that is presumably their main role now.

Now this isn't necessarily to take out the equipment. I mean, I think a lot of the transportation issues that were discussed this morning were in light of taking out all the equipment, too. If you are going to do a training exercise and you are just flying in the people, not the equipment, then you don't have some of the greater transportation difficulties and costs that were mentioned before.

Agility would suggest absolutely keeping the transportation facilities in Germany, elsewhere in Europe, the headquarters to maintain these joint relations with foreign officers.

In the Pacific, the greater distances do lead to less suggestion of pulling forces back, but
there are bigger political problems there with the presence of U.S. forces that might suggest spreading out, diversifying a bit, to the extent possible, to new countries, new locations.

These concepts suggest a network of access as much as a network of fixed, large bases, and I think you have probably heard a lot about that already. The Afghanistan deployment was surprisingly successful for something that hadn't been worked out ahead of time. So imagine what would be possible if a network of accesses is actually established ahead of time.

Rotating troops in for exercises is also an important concept to again keep the training and personal relationships alive, and you don't suffer any of the drawbacks of political permanent large basing.

Prepositioning: I think everybody loves that. The only problem is cost, of course. And airlift and sealift: I would support increases in those -- substantial -- because it broadens your options so much.

This gets back to the issues of, “Well,
where are all the resources going to come from?"

Looking at things from a broader perspective than just bases, I'll close with just saying that I hope, to the extent possible, you can address that at least notionally by suggesting that maybe there are some other areas in the military force that can be cut. You know, everybody has their own list, but I would just lead off with some of the more expensive legacy weapon platforms that are going to cost tens and hundreds of billions over the next years.

In answer to the question, "Well, where are you going to get all the money from?", I would just suggest that we do need to take a broad view, and I would prioritize addressing basing and transportation issues as a very important priority that should be, in fact, raised higher, so that resources can be transferred to address some of these issues.

Thanks very much for hearing me out, and I look forward to questions.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Mr. Noonan.
MR. NOONAN: Thank you very much to all the Commissioners for having me here today, and also for the service that you are doing, and I also hope that as the new Quadrennial Defense Review stands up that you will have a chance to brief that effort about this very important topic and subject matter.

I have a very tough act to follow here. Obviously, two very good presentations, but I'll try to hopefully add something substantive to today's discussion.

As we all know, President Bush announced — basically outlined his plans for the global posture review at the Veterans of Foreign War convention on the 16th of August in Cincinnati, and basically called for the movement of 60-70,000 troops and about 100,000 civilians and dependents from Europe and also from East Asia.

I think this was absolutely the right thing to do, and perhaps probably took a little bit too long in the coming. I think the shift is very important for cultural across a force as well as for geostrategic reasons, for American national security.
and also international security writ large.

Culturally, this needed to happen to get out of the Cold War mindset, and it is kind of sad that in 2004 we still have to preface sentences by saying post-Cold War. I know it wasn't very long ago, but the world has changed quite a bit and, as Professor Barnett talked, he sees it as sort of a disconnected part of the world and a connected part of the world.

I think there is also some -- Below that, there is also some cultural things that kind of cut it up a little bit more finely than that, as well. I like to think that there are kind of a -- In sort of geostrategic terms, there is kind of one large arc of instability going from Morocco to Indonesia and from Kazakhstan down to Kenya, and basically there is a cultural area, and Islam is a large part of it, that is not to say that this is sort of a Huntingtonian clash of civilizations, but at the same time if al Qaeda is a global insurgency, then obviously they are going to find most willing allies in that fight amongst the sea of the people in this region.
There is also sort of the East Asian littoral region which is kind of its own distinct area, sub-Saharan Africa below the Sahel, and then the Andean ridge and Caribbean Basin -- aside from sort of what I call sort of an arc periphery area from Spain up across to Russia, minus sort of the Maritime Provinces.

To sort of -- The empirics for this: IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) said about -- there are about 57 ongoing conflicts in the world. Only four of these are armed international conflicts. So, obviously, there is not -- The current security environment is not really sort of a pure competitor environment. It is more sort of low level threats that the previous panelist discussed.

So the infrastructure that is in Germany and South Korea, for instance -- where they are talking about moving perhaps as many as three brigades, three heavy brigades out of Germany, perhaps a brigade out of South Korea -- there is a large infrastructure there.

Military Times in the latest issue just
had a supplement about military installations worldwide, and I can leave this with the Commission. But in Germany there are 30 installations of various different sizes. In South Korea there are 40 different installations of various sizes, and this is just -- It just seems to me that this is too much infrastructure based upon sort of missions.

You are always going to have a presence in both of those locations, but it obviously needs to be much different, particularly in the case of South Korea where they recently shifted one of their brigades to Iraq.

One of the second and third order consequences of shifting forces like that is that the 2d Infantry Division's two brigades in Korea are individual replacement system brigades that are unaccompanied tours.

So if you deploy a brigade from the Peninsula, that means their family members could be spread out from Bangor, Maine to San Diego, California. It is not coalesced to a single location in the Continental United States or outside the
Continental United States where a family support network, et cetera, can be set up.

But also, as the previous panel discussed, just for geostrategic reasons, it makes a lot more sense to move toward the areas closer to where the most likely future operations are, not only of a military variety but also presence, operations, humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense, training missions, et cetera.

Across a force, culturally, there needs to be sort of ingrained expeditionary ethos, which I think the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, has moved to make the Army a lot more modular with the units of action and units of execution, and really ingraining sort of an expeditionary ethos that, not only for war fighting's sake but also to take care of some of the things like General Krulak, former Marine Corps Commandant, said about the three-block war and being prepared to be engaged in high intensity conflict on one block, sort of constabulary duties on the next block, and then also to be able to hand out Band-Aids and rations on
the next block.

Our forces really need to sort of get into the mental mindset that, when the shooting fires, the war is not over; and, obviously, Iraq is proving that today, that across a force -- I don't think there is going to be simply enough money in the defense budget to split up the force into various constabulary portions vice war fighting.

I think that, even across a force, I think many of the forces will have to be much more SOF (Special Operations Force)-like in the sense that they are much more comfortable dealing with indigenous forces, with coalition forces. They just won't have to be able to do a lot of the high-end skill set missions that our special operations forces can bring to the table.

Looking at sort of the global posture in our basing structure, I wrote an e-note back in August after the President's speech. Basically, the way I split it up was that I sort of conceive of a three-tiered system of basing.

On the one hand, you have -- This is --
Pardon the Naval metaphor here. But you have sort of boathouses on one level which are sort of the large, heavy infrastructure locations, places like Camp Lejeune or Ft. Bragg or Ft. Campbell or Camp Pendleton, which have either port or air facilities close by, that are able to shift forces from the Continental United States out overseas.

An intermediary step you have is what I call docks, which are places like Guam and Diego Garcia where you have an infrastructure in place that is able to support forces overseas, and you can store things like prepositioned stocks, like the maritime prepositioning ships that were in Diego Garcia and that are at Guam.

Then you have the lily pads, places like Djibouti and Uzbekistan and in the Pan Sahel Initiative we had Special Forces. Then we have Marines working with governments of Niger and Mauritania and Chad, working with their forces in order to -- on foreign and internal defense missions to take care of some of the al Qaeda sympathizer groups that are operating in North Africa.
Sort of getting back to the cultural issues here -- it just makes a lot more sense. If doctrine is moving toward more distributed operations, it makes a lot more sense to move to sort of these more austere lily pad locations.

I would agree with Professor Barnett that they can't be sort of just throughput locations, but at the same time I think it sends a wrong message if you start setting up permanent large facilities, particularly with all the discussion of empire and imperium today.

It reminds me of a joke from the Nineties in the Balkans when somebody would say, you know, there's only two man-made items visible by the human eye from the moon. One is the Great Wall of China; the other is Camp Bonsteel.

So you want to avoid, I think, building sort of large permanent structures that sort of send a message that the United States is there and we are not going anywhere.

Now at the same time, when you have these more austere locations, obviously, you want to do
things like civic works and other things that spread
goodwill and our values, but also help out the local
populous and sort of build sort of noncombat
multiplier, diplomatic effect.

For instance, with our task force working
out of Djibouti, they have been doing a lot of civil
affairs projects in places like off Eritrea and Kenya
and places like that, which is building goodwill and
which is allowing people to sort of be more friendly
and give more advice about smuggling and other
movements of people and equipment, particularly from
places like Yemen, et cetera.

Also you want more dispersement of
autonomous places, because large locations -- and I'll
get back to this in my concluding remarks, too. If
you produce sort of large targets, then that just
opens you up to more sort of spectacular attacks. So
it just becomes a larger target.

To get back to our alliances and our
coalition partners, perhaps it is time to -- A lot of
discussion has come out about how this will affect
Germany, et cetera, if we pull out a lot of our
forces. Well, one way or one idea may be -- to help this process along -- is maybe bring back Reforger or bring back Team Spirit and do sort of coalition operations that are valuable coalition operations that also exercise our capabilities, exercise the capabilities of our allies, but also sort of bring -- sort of foster goodwill and foster our ability to work overseas.

I think one of the benefits -- one of the other benefits of these smaller locations is that it gives you more initiative as well. You don't have incidents like the 1987 bombing of Libya where you are denied airspace. If you have more bases -- more austere bases -- that you don't have a lot of fixed costs sunk into, then you are much more agile strategically to move around the map and use space as is necessary.

To wrap up and to conclude, some caveats here, caveats and opportunities. I don't want to bring up a bad word -- a four-letter word -- but I'll use an acronym here, BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure). I think this is going to be -- obviously,
probably, touches on, tangentially, at least -- some of this Commission's work.

I think one of the warning signs, though, is if we do reduce this overseas infrastructure, we should be very careful about consolidating too much inside the Continental United States, consolidating too many units at too many posts, because I think that there is a good geostrategic rationale for having more dispersed bases, obviously more joint in nature; but you also don't want to present large targets for either chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attacks inside the United States and creating huge installations here and centralizing too much of the training resources, I think, could be a downside of getting rid of some of the overseas base infrastructure.

Now, that being said, I think there are some very positive retention issues for families, for careers of dependents in the military, of having more forces in the United States or other locations and then deploying them out to the docks and lily pad locations.
Finally, it's just a matter of training as you fight. If we move toward a more expeditionary ethos, it just makes more sense that -- if you are going to use these more dispersed locations -- that, in itself, is a training opportunity for our forces as they move forward to other locations, exercises the same skill sets they will need for a large scale contingency, no matter what type of operations they are undertaking.

With that, I'll wrap it up. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, and we look forward to the next period where we will ask you some questions, and I would ask Commissioner Thomson to begin.

COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Thanks, Chairman. I apologize to the panel. I am going to have to leave in about 40 minutes. So if I walk out in the middle of one of your answers, it is not a statement of any sort.

You have all spoken about going to the small locations and increasing numbers of places while we reduce the main infrastructure that we have in
Europe and northeast Asia. But when we go to --

Whenever we think -- We haven't really opened all that many bases in the last 60 years, or locations.

When you think about it, though, there is a quid pro quo. It's their sovereign territory. They have to -- They, whichever specific nation we are talking about, have to give something up. So they demand something in return.

Historically, what we have given in return has been security. We've provided a security guarantee, and that's a big step to provide security guarantee. Usually, people want these -- They don't like hedges on the guarantee. So they want an unlimited security guarantee.

Now, clearly, these can be modified. These are case specific. But I wonder, in your thinking about this, how you think about that whole nest of issues that flows from guaranteeing somebody else's security, especially if it is somebody with whom we have not previously been involved.

PROF. BARNETT: I guess I don't see the problem with that. I see that as a plus when we go
into any country. I think, because we no longer face any sort of superpower rivalry in underdeveloped parts of the world, there is not much risk at all of escalation; and because state-on-state war has effectively disappeared from across the system over the last 10 to 15 years, when we go into a situation in these underdeveloped regions, we are not typically going to involve ourselves with a country that faces a significant threat from a neighbor.

Typically, what we are going to end up, I would argue, guaranteeing is internal stability. So I would see the utility of our access there largely being fairly specific to the country itself. That is what I mean by don't put up empty storefronts that say, all we're interested in your country for is the ability to go somewhere else and do some mischief.

Instead, it should be a clear commitment that we value this country, that we value its future, and I don't think the presence we need to put in there requires us to create large bases. I think, in many instances, what we want to do is, as much as possible, work side by side with the existing military forces.
When we have success in terms of training and in terms of subsequent operations by forces that we have trained, it has typically come about when we are highly integrated -- meaning we live, sleep, and eat with these guys. That's when it works.

So I guess I don't see the problem you are raising there in grand terms. I don't see -- As it was noted by others, the regions that we are concerned about, roughly 100 countries at any one time. There's about three dozen experienced in some level of mass violence. Typically, we are involved in seven or eight at any one time.

So I think the ability for us to migrate from incident to incident has been fairly well demonstrated over the post-Cold War era. We haven't typically gotten too bogged down, although, of course, with the great commitment we have made in Iraq and the rather spiteful attitude we took toward our allies with regard to their participation in the war versus their participation in the peacekeeping, clearly, there you see the risk of a long term investment that may go awry yet. That's what I'd say.
MR. CORBIN: I think I would think it was a slightly different model that can be pursued. I mean, in the Cold War we sort of made a huge commitment to defend the host country and established formal bases and had lots of status of forces agreements, and it was really a big production.

I'm not sure that we necessarily have to keep doing that. Obviously, the legal issues are very important, and you want to try to get as much clarity on that as possible, but if it is less a formal base with large numbers of permanent personnel and it is more a model of rotating in for exercises, establishing facilities that are really not under the United States' sway or really are host nation facilities and the focus of the agreement is on how we can use them, and just using them in peacetime.

So if you do that, I think you get away from some of the how much we have to give them. I think that a lot of the countries we have in mind, I think, would be pretty happy to get even this modest type of U.S. participation, attention.

I think that, in the absence of any kind
of quid pro quo or security guarantees, that building them a brand new airport or something goes a long way to improving our access. In terms of subsidies, you know, again it's a cost issue, but we can help them out in various ways.

I think we can, to some degree, buy our way in without insulting them. You know, as long as the basis of the relationship is clear, I don't see huge negative consequences from having a less "you and we are in step, democratic nations and wedded to each other" but more a practical relationship can work. And, obviously, it is case by case.

There is even the negative, of course. You really don't want to give guarantees to, I think, a lot of places where you might want to have bases, because they are not democratic, and you don't necessarily want to tie yourself too closely to the government in place.

MR. NOONAN: Yes. I think that it depends on the nature of the guarantee, of course. One of the disconnects here, I think, we have to be careful about is that State really approaches things from the
embassy level, and the military really from the Combatant Command level. So there are some -- There is a seam there that sometimes can cause some problems.

That being said, I think that one of the lessons of 9-11 is that -- if we see territory and sort of allow al Qaeda or another group to sort of use it as a training or as an R&R location or as a command and control node -- that there are serious consequences that could be paid down the road from there.

So I'm not quite -- Like I said, depending on the type of guarantee that we give, I think that is probably a better alternative than allowing a place to become sort of a training facility. So that's what I would say about that.

COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Could I ask you maybe just briefly: If you think about the -- Looking out many decades, because I think our basing structures last a long time. I mean, basing postures. The one we've got now lasted since the end of World War II and the Korea War. So not just the end of the
Cold War.

In thinking about threats to vital interests. If you could set aside the issue of the Islamic Jihadists and terrorism from them or their possible access to weapons of mass destruction, what is next after that? What should we be thinking about after that?

PROF. BARNETT: I guess first I'd say the reason why the basing structure lasted for so long across the Cold War that stretched for many decades is because it was essentially a static front.

The strategy with the Soviets, which we felt were a competitive economic threat, and because there was the overhang of the mutual destruction with nuclear weapons, our strategic assumption was simply that we would wait them out, and that no real geographic victories were required, simply to maintain a certain correlation of forces over the long haul.

I don't think that's the situation we face. As I described that non-integrating Gap, there is a major tendency to say, Let's put a fence around it; let's let these people kill each other; we don't
understand them. They are not connected to the global economy except in very narrow fashion. It's like the Middle East, exporting oil, and that's it. So let's just cut our losses with the players there. They will always be willing to sell us certain things, and let's just firewall ourselves off from these horrible experiences and these horrible ideologies and this behavior that we find reprehensible, that we can't imagine ever engaging in ourselves, even though our history is littered with such things.

So my sense, in terms of the long term, is that we can't let these regions kind of sit. So we can't allow our basing structure to solidify in the way that it did across the Cold War. We need to have an active, fairly aggressive forward moving agenda in effect to shrink that Gap over time.

Beyond that effort, I think the key aspects that we face in terms of security will tend to revolve around environmental degradation. There is a strong genre of thinking in international relations that says that competition for resources is going to get you a lot of violence and war in the future.
Historically, there is not a great record for it, especially over things like water. Typically, when people run short on resources, they don't tend to fight. They tend to cooperate. So I'm fairly sanguine on that score.

I think long term, again I would cite the thing I worry about most is a confluence of interests between a Middle East that has much energy and needs to sell it and a developing Asia over time which requires tremendous amounts of energy and may, based on our foreign policy/national security strategies, feel that it doesn't fit particularly well in a western defined globalization process and, hence, seeks to cut its own separate deal, in effect, with the Middle East.

That's why I argue we should be very open in terms of how we couch our positions in the Middle East, in terms of understanding that fundamentally. Whether we like it or not, it is largely their oil and natural gas, and we want them to have it in a safe manner.

So I worry about the movement of all that
energy along sea routes in Southeast Asia, and we make certain efforts in that direction. But I am, again, over time, relatively sanguine, because to the extent that one venue is more frightening for the Chinese or the Indians, then they tend to go in the other venue, which tends to be pipelines. And by and large, pipelines make good neighbors. They require good neighbors.

So I guess I don't foresee anything beyond what we are dealing with for several decades. I just caution the notion that it is going to be a rolling problem. It is going to be a geographically sensitive and moving problem. Hence, we have to avoid getting set in any sort of permanent fashion.

MR. CORBIN: I would add, for what comes after the jihad, the danger of regional conflicts or maybe even just bilateral conflicts, which, although they may not affect our national -- our vital national interests, we might still feel obliged to get involved and might want to -- Most obviously, of course, Taiwan. I think that is really just a land mine that can really derail a lot of forward progress.
India-Pakistan: also a big long running issue which, I think, we really have very little preordained interest one way or the other; but it is so important, so many people involved, weapons of mass destruction involved, our historical role, we may feel obliged to be included.

I would also maybe triangulate that by saying India, China -- because there is a lot of attention to China as a growing superpower, but I believe India's population is projected to be larger than China's in the not too distant future.

So India and China, I think, will have to have good relations and, if not, that is going to be something very concerning to us.

MR. NOONAN: The only things I would add to that maybe are the spread of some sort of pandemic, whether it be HIV, something that is not fully known about at this time; demographic shifts -- whether that would be large refugee flows -- demographic shifts in Russia or in Europe that could change policy; narcotics flow, global organized crime, and the East Asian littoral region, whether it be Taiwan or the
Korean Peninsula, and whatever ideology might come next.

I mean, we have to remember that a lot of people thought that Islam was a dead-end back in the Sixties. People who studied it were kind of lambasted, saying why are you looking into that, and it just sort of came around. So it could just be something else that is out there that could be the next -- sort of the next big thing.

PROF. BARNETT: I would second Mr. Noonan's comments to the extent that I think there is a future thing that we worry about. It tends to have to do with the sheer rise in connectivity in the global economy or networks themselves. It's the complexity of that.

I think pandemics is a great example of that. If you look at where SARS spread out of China, it basically formed an outline of that non-integrating Gap that I described, and why that was true is because -- Think about who does international business with China. It's other, as I call them, Core nations.

So when it left China, it leapfrogged, and
you didn't really see cases anywhere inside those non-integrating regions. You saw them spread dramatically and rather quickly to other very connected parts of the global economy, which was stunning.

I think the region and the World Health Organization and health officials generally across the world took huge lessons from that kind of experience -- which I think we got a first glimpse of with the run-up to Y2K -- but I think we are going to see it again and again and again, which creates huge requirements for public/private cooperation.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Commissioner Less?

COMMISSIONER LESS: For all three of our distinguished participants, all three seem to be in favor of the transformation plan as we have understood it from the President on down through the combatant commanders and so forth: Bring 70,000 plus or minus troops home, and redistribute the remainder for influence, for relationships, for exercises and all of those sort of things.

My question -- and I'll ask all three of
you to respond -- is -- and Mr. Noonan, you brought up
that four-letter word -- when we talked about BRAC in
days past, and when BRAC was those BRACs that we have
exercised and instituted, there were significant
financial aspects of the BRAC part of it, and I think
that there have been some thoughts about the financial
viability of bringing home 70,000 troops.

So I would ask you to discuss the
financial aspects of where we might be on this thing.

Are we going to realize savings? Is savings an
issue? Is costing significant? I just wonder if you
would touch that or give us your thoughts or comments
on the financial aspects of what is going on here.

MR. NOONAN: I will just preface this by
saying I'm not a defense economist. So I don't know
the financial details.

From what I've read, I think it is --
Probably in the short to near term, it is about a wash
on the financial side on strict finances of shifting
people over.

Now that being said, you have a situation
wherein, for the peacetime military, you had 60-75,000
people per day either in schools or traveling or moving from one post to another. I think by consolidating some forces at installations in the Continental United States, or in places like Hawaii or in Alaska, that you may affect retention, particularly if spouses can find meaningful employment in the community, and people can stay at an installation longer.

So in the long term that might feed into - - and like I said, I don't have the empirics to back this up, but it just seems to follow that -- if people can stay at a place longer and people can have more meaningful connectivity to their community and the area, and their spouses and families can as well, then that is going to be a plus on the retention side, which is, obviously, a huge issue today.

MR. CORBIN: I think there have been a lot of studies on this, the CBO one recently -- very useful. I think a lot of the data is all well and good, and their issues are short term versus long term, and what your various assumptions are. But one powerful thing for me is, you know, if these bases
really don't provide so much benefit to where they are, why is it that Germany, say, is so desperate to keep them?

There is actually a representative of the local communities in Germany who is here in Washington to encourage the Congress to keep the bases in Germany. So you know, the studies are nice, but I use that as one thing to go by.

You know, the people there want them, and there is a question as to why the people in Germany should get those benefits that they perceive rather than the people here in the United States.

PROF. BARNETT: I would just add to that sort of tangentially. I do think it is largely a wash when you close bases, when you move stuff, what you save versus what you spend over the long term. I don't think that is really the issue.

I think it is more a question of rebalancing the forces in terms of people and associating them correctly with the assets and the facilities that you want them associated with, because it's the people in the end that cost the most.
In terms of the reality of the costs involved with shifting the focus of transformation away from the war fighting side more to what I call the System Administrator side, I think the answer on that one is the budget is plenty big enough, and the number of people we have are plenty big enough.

We have been promised for years by the revolution of military affairs crowd that they can deliver a more lethal, more maneuverable, smaller, cheaper force, and by and large they have delivered on that, and we have seen that force displayed with great skill, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

What they have shortchanged is the forces that have to deal with the aftermath. So to resource this second-half force, as I call it, the force that will focus more on peacekeeping and nation building, I think that largely comes out of the hide of that war fighting force, and it is not a matter so much of denying them particular weapons or platforms, but simply buying those in smaller numbers, because we don't face the kind of great power war threat that we have been focused on since the beginning of the
Defense Department back in 1947.

The movement in the direction of more peacekeeping and nation building will not come about because it is cheaper or because it is desired by the forces. It will come about purely in terms of failure.

So the predictions I make in terms of the bifurcation of the military -- which is, frankly, proceeding apace and it's been going on for years -- it is not going to come about because anybody wants it. It is going to come about inevitably, because the system simply demands that type of service more and more from us.

If we don't do it well, we will fail, and the American public will become upset with those failures, as will our allies, and we will be shut out of opportunities to improve the world that we would otherwise have if we had those assets.

COMMISSIONER LESS: So then my follow-on would be: We had the former Transportation commander here this morning, and we visited TRANSCOM recently as well. From all three of you then, again, an
assessment on -- I realize in your strategic thinking and so forth, and we are probably getting off into a bit more of the technical. But your assessment of whether or not, when we bring these forces back and redistribute forces, is our logistics base, logistic support effort capable of taking care of the potential that exists with problems that we might have with Taiwan, China, problems that might come up in different areas that you have already talked about or addressed here earlier? From a logistics perspective, your thoughts or ideas on that, starting with Professor Barnett.

PROF. BARNETT: I think it is a huge issue, and it is worth looking at in great detail.

The first thing I would say is that we spent a lot of money across the Nineties on what I call strategic speed, and I think a lot of that money, frankly, was wasted because I don't think we engage in war at the drop of a hat.

Frankly, we took months to deal with Iraq the first time around. We took, conceivably, depending on how you want to count it, 12 years to
deal with Iraq the second time around. We don't do anything that rapidly.

So I don't think transportation needs to be thought of in terms of this sort of absolute speed that requires us, by circumstances that we define on our own, to reverse acts of violence or reverse acts of aggression instantaneously on the other side of the earth. To wit: the tendency inside the Pentagon to prefer the China-Taiwan Straits scenario -- basically, to justify all sorts of strategic speed acquisitions, as I would call them.

I think the key thing on transportation for us is simply our ability to deliver things safely. I think what our strategic tempo should be all about is highlighting inevitability -- that if we decide to do something, we can move. It can be done safely. It can be done without challenge.

So I think in terms of air transportation, we are fairly well-endowed. I think in terms of the Navy -- I think you are going to see sea basing become the preeminent legacy of the current CNO, Vern Clark. I think that is the direction that the Navy will take,
in terms of the war fighting force largely acting as a
force enabler, to move a Leviathan force that is going
to be built primarily around rapid insertion of ground
troops and strategic bombing.

I think in terms of the peacekeeping, the
transportation issue is also huge because, if the
United States doesn't show up with its transportation
assets, basically nobody shows up.

We have encouraged in the Sudan situation
the inflow of African peacekeepers. But, basically,
unless we provide that kind of C-130 support -- and
even that, in certain instances, can't be enough if
they don't -- Many times they are so under-resourced
that we not only have to provide them the
transportation, we have to give them the tents. We
have to set up their infrastructure.

So that capacity for the U.S. military to
provide the hub for peacekeeping operations is
enormous. Because without us, basically, no one else
is competent enough to show up. And frankly, that is
what the rest of the world's militaries are built to
do. They are not built to power project, frankly, at
any great distance or with any sustained amount of force.

They are built largely for internal and regional policing efforts. So for them to engage in any activity away from their shores requires that the U.S. basically provide the transportation.

So I think it is not so much again speed. I think under almost all circumstances that I can envision, our ability to access a theater of operations is going to be fairly benign, because the threats we are going to face are going to be very specific to the locality.

It is more a matter of just making sure that we have a sufficient mix of the right kind of transportation assets that allow us not only to get our people on site in a reasonably fast time, but enough assets so that they are available for the rest of the world, in effect, to use us in those peacekeeping efforts.

MR. CORBIN: Professor Barnett brings up a good point about the allies. They are just nowhere near where we are in terms of getting there and
sustaining once they are there.

I raised the manpower pool they have, but mentioned it is not particularly usable right now. One of the first things they need to do is increase their own transportation logistics capability.

I mention this in particular, because I noticed you are mandated to identify direct and other indirect payments and subsidies from foreign countries for the U.S. bases. I think the point should be made that there is an opportunity cost for those countries to the extent they are subsidizing our bases and helping out with our costs.

One place where potentially they could better put that money is into increasing their own capabilities to go places with us or instead of us. I mean, I don't think we should do it all when they are perfectly capable of it in terms of technology, building aircraft.

You know, we are doing the main role, but I think that is just because it's the way it's been, and I really think it is time for Europe and Japan to step up to the plate.
Japan, I think, is really moving toward having a much more interventionist approach and ability and the political ability to go places. Step by step, they are doing it more and more, and they, of course, have a large and powerful military, and those assets are not being used to the extent that they can't sustain them. The same goes for Europe.

MR. NOONAN: Again, just to amplify on the previous two statements -- Currently we are spending about 3.7 percent GDP on defense. The United States is. NATO as a whole is 2.8 percent GDP; subtract the United States from that, it's about 1.9 percent GDP.

So, obviously, there is -- Funding has to go forward from our NATO allies, particularly if they want to have more say in our operations. They have to kind of put their money where their mouth is or at least put money there to be able to do some of the second and third order things that have been discussed with the rapid reaction force, et cetera.

I do think that one of our core competencies is global power projection. There is no other country in the world today that can project as
many forces to different parts of the world that the United States can.

Now that being said, obviously, our strategic and our operational and our tactical lift -- be it airframes like the C-17, C-130 or fast sealift -- are obviously important things. I think they are important assets for us to have, especially in future conflict.

Presumably, any adversaries have come up with a sheet of lessons learned, and it is very long, over the past decade, about our capabilities, and I think forcible entry will certainly be a key mission essential task that we will have to conduct in the future. But there are some technologies out there that might be able to sort of carry us forward, things like Skycat and some of the lighter-than-air transport that are discussed.

We are talking about huge amounts of throughput that can be carried on them and have very good movement on ground capabilities for offloading assets. But, obviously, lift is a very important and serious issue, and as current operations are going on
in Iraq today, obviously, across the board we are kind of strained at the moment. But logistics, obviously, is the life blood of any type of military operation.

PROF. BARNETT: I'd like to follow up on that, just a quick note. I would disagree with Mr. Corbin in the sense that I am not eager to encourage allies, or really anybody, to invest in transportation assets.

I like the fact that they aren't able to go places without, in effect, our say-so and our help. I think that is one of the huge assets we have in terms of the investment that we have made in this military over time.

In many ways, it defines our Leviathan-like status. It is almost impossible to wage war successfully anywhere around this planet on a state-to-state basis unless the U.S., in effect, okays it or, even more to the point, enables it.

So I think it is a good thing for our allies, in effect, not to have much in terms of transportation assets. I'd rather see them focus on the kind of peacekeeping/nation building aspect. I
think it is politically better for them to do it. I think their historical record of doing it is better than ours.

So I think what we bring to the table is, largely, capital; and we should encourage them to stay, in effect, personnel heavy in their resource allocations because I think it keeps them relatively benign; and it keeps the disparity between our troops and theirs, which I think is a good thing.

I don't either want to encourage them to, in effect, spend more on defense -- sort of more to Mr. Noonan's point. I agree. I don't think we are spending a tremendous amount as a percentage of GDP, but I think there is no such thing, really, as free ridership in terms of global security.

I think people who believe in free ridership, meaning countries that are underpaying while the United States overpays, simply don't see the connectivity between the United States and the rest of the world economically.

For example: East Asia, Japan, China, the Europeans, in general, buy our debt. A much greater
proportion of our debt now is owned by overseas players. We floated $130 billion in U.S. Treasuries in the first quarter of 2003, ostensibly to pay for the Iraq war. Four-fifths of that was bought up by foreigners. Japan and China were the two biggest buyers.

That is, essentially, a transaction. You can say they did it for structural reasons. I'll say, I don't care. They basically bought a war. And I would prefer those sorts of assets to remain in our hands, and for those transactions to be forced upon us rather than to see those other countries expend efforts in similar fashions.

I would also point out the fact that we tend to underpay relative to the rest of the advanced world in terms of foreign aid. I don't think that's a bad thing for us. I think we tend to specialize more on the security side, and therefore, it is only natural for other allies who don't emphasize that to give more relative to us in terms of foreign aid.

So I think these are good things, by and large, as long as we understand the connectivity and
we understand the essential transactions that are occurring.

We export security, and the world -- despite the predictions of international relations theories over the last 15 years -- the world has not responded to that predominance of American military power by raising up peer competitors. It has not happened. It is not happening. So I think that's a good thing.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Commissioner Taylor.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I would like to follow up on Commissioner Thomson's question about the threats.

Your answers -- and he asked what comes next, and you answered, in somewhat of a chronological order, what comes after the global war on terrorism?

What comes while we are in the midst of the global war on terrorism, like today? And what are the threats? You know, how do you feel about the possibility of having to commit forces -- not because they directly threaten the United States, but
certainly threatened our interests in places like
North Korea or Tehran and other places? Any of you?

PROF. BARNETT: I think that, in terms of
the second Bush administration, the near term
questions revolve around, fundamentally, two
countries: What do we do with Iran? And in effect,
how do we lock in as cheaply as possible, as early as
possible, a strategic relationship with China, which
will fundamentally be about dealing with North Korea,
in a security realm?

I think in terms of Iran, we are going to
end up, frankly, accepting the fact that our decision
to go into Iraq basically pushed them in the direction
of the bomb, and that they are going to acquire it,
and we are going to have to live with that.

I think it offers some interesting
possibilities. For the first time, in terms of Middle
Eastern peace, to actually have somebody on the Arab
side who will find itself and see itself in relatively
similar stature to an Israel which, frankly, has had
the bomb for a long time. So I think that offers up
some interesting and good possibilities in terms of
generating local ownership for the security situation there.

I think one of the fundamental problems in the Middle East is that it is only the United States that seems to feel tremendous ownership of the security situations there, and in terms of finding any sort of long term solution to Israel and Palestine, there are no local sponsors on the Arab side or the Muslim side to deal with the security implications of a long term situation there.

So by taking down Afghanistan on Iran's right and taking down Iraq on Iran's left, I think we have, by definition, pushed Iran -- I think it was a good choice on both sides -- into a situation that we are going to have to learn to accept and try to turn to our advantage.

In terms of East Asia: if you look at the long term strategic overlap of interests between the United States and China, they are enormous. I would like to see us lock into a strategic relationship with China as well as with India, which comes about, really, with a rapprochement between us and Iran,
which India considers to be one of its best friends in the region.

To lock in on China, I think, requires us to create some sort of security alliance in East Asia that would bring us together -- us, a united Korea, Japan, a China, perhaps a Russia, as well. On that basis, I think you would see a rapid movement toward free trade agreements and other things that would really lock us into a long term situation there, and it would be quite beneficial to both economies and basically take great power of war off the table in Asia.

I think the key opportunity is, obviously, Kim Jung Il who has checked so many boxes in terms of rogue regime behavior, is arguably responsible for a good 3 million deaths in his own country through criminal negligence, and has built fundamentally a criminal enterprise which supports his regime.

I recently -- My wife and I, after having three children, adopted a baby in China, and when we went over there in August, I had to carry roughly $8,000 in uncirculated $100 U.S. bills. The reason
why I had to carry that to make various payments throughout the process was because China suffers such a huge amount of counterfeit currency. Where does a lot of this counterfeit currency come from? It comes from North Korea which funnels it into China, which has a huge demand for foreign currency.

That is one of the ways in which the amazingly cruel Kim Jung Il regime props itself up over time, in addition, frankly, to selling narcotics to about 24 different countries around that part of the world.

So I think, if there is a long term effort put in, if we are able to temporize in the Middle East, find some local ownership for some of the issues there -- and I think this is all possible -- then the next obvious target to go after is Kim Jung Il, and the reason to go after him is to build, in effect, an East Asian NATO over his grave.

MR. CORBIN: I would echo the comment that was made before about Africa's potential for getting tied into the Islamic problem -- North Africa, of course. I have lived in northern Nigeria, and I
think, you know, some of the feelings there make al Qaeda look pretty tame.

Just recently we saw entire states in northern Nigeria refusing to participate in polio vaccinations, because of a theory that it was some kind of Western plot to kill them off. Of course, the result was exactly opposite.

So I do think, given the number of failed states in the area, combined with the Islamic and anti-Western attitudes often, that that is a danger point.

MR. NOONAN: I will just be brief on this. I think that the situation in Korea largely will have to be undertaken diplomatically. I think that the South Korean forces there, plus our movement of different precision strike platforms into Guam, covers that scenario pretty well from a deterrent point of view.

Other areas: Pakistan, obviously, has a large stake in a peaceful and pro-Western regime, and in Pakistan particularly with its possession of nuclear weapons and also, as I said before and as Mr.
Corbin just said about the Sahel, in making sure that
there is no movement of sort of a free area there
where training can take place.

Finally, just the Andean Ridge area of
Columbia and Bolivia, and just making sure that narco-
terrorism doesn't destabilize the region.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: In all of your
answers, you -- at least most of you -- have spoken
primarily about dealing with these other threats,
doing it through diplomacy. Obviously, that would be
the optimum solution. But the military generally
likes to hedge their bets.

Do you see any -- In case diplomacy
doesn't work, what type of forces do we need, and
where should they be stationed in order to deal with
these other threats besides the global war on
terrorism?

MR. NOONAN: I'll go first. I think we
have -- I think an offshore balancing approach in East
Asia is probably the best bet. We have Third Marine
Division in Okinawa, and we have a battalion of First
Special Forces Group in Okinawa. We have our
facilities at Guam, plus we will have at least one
brigade on the Peninsula, preferably rotated in and
out. So you have a cohesive unit that will have more
combat capability, perhaps modular as well.

We have units, obviously, in Afghanistan
to keep an eye on. We have some personnel in
Pakistan. In the Sahel, we are using trainers as well
as in the Andean Ridge. I think that probably in some
of those locations, probably less is better, and then
you have other forces that are -- Obviously, Iraq
right now is using a lot of manpower and using a lot
of personnel, but I think there are -- You know, if
something big happens, I think that we could leverage
some of our -- depending on the contingency and
depending on the location -- we can leverage using a
lot of our high end stuff to -- at least in a
conventional setting -- to be able to put a lot of
hurt on whoever we are engaging.

MR. CORBIN: I think my approach would be
to make sure you have the flexibility in the base
structure so that you can go where you need to,
because we don't know if Taiwan will be a problem or
somewhere else entirely.

So that is really what is key to me, not predicting ahead of time which specific places there will be, but having the options to go places. I do think we have temporal depth to respond generally in weeks or months rather than in hours and days in terms of conventional -- large scale conventional fights such as Taiwan or something in Iran.

I think going after terrorists, that is an element where, you know, in certain scenarios, raids to seize or kill terrorists, that's where minutes and hours are more important. But I think for the larger conventional conflicts you do have more time flexibility.

PROF. BARNETT: When I think of East Asia, I don't see it as a long term requirement, really. I see a denouement between the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), Kim Jung Il's regime, and the rest of the region, probably coming within the next five years. So I don't see that one as a long term issue.

In terms of Taiwan, frankly, I think that our state of defense guarantee, which was given in
another time and another era, won't survive the first serious crisis. I think, as long as it remains in the realm of shadowboxing and name calling, I think we will maintain the pretense that that security guarantee is real and profound, and that we would be willing to go to the mat in order to pursue it. But I think the almost suicidal-like outcome for both China and America's economy in such a serious conflict between us and China would simply overrule whatever sense of outrage we might have with China's response to a Taiwanese effort to frankly do nothing more than declare rhetorically the impossibility of reunification over time.

So I think we tend to box ourselves into a situation on Taiwan that historians will look back upon in the post-Cold War situation and wonder why we got so wrapped around the axle on it, because in terms of (quote/unquote) "interests," in terms of international security and what-not, again the strategic overlap between us and China, as I look ahead over the next 20 years, is enormous compared to whatever costs we may incur with, in effect, giving up
that security guarantee.

I think Pakistan is the most interesting problem with regard to what you raise. There, I think we are really talking about a certain capacity load limit for the United States in that part of the world; that the only way we would be able to deal with a Pakistan is if we successfully internationalize or found local ownership for the Iraq and/or Palestinian-Israeli question.

Absent a break on one of those two, I don't see how we could do much more than we are doing in a Pakistan, and I think the really scary scenario there would be, you know, some weapon of mass destruction in the United States and the American public pretty much demanding a serious response to that, and our intelligence telling us in rather certain terms that the locus of this planning and the headquarters of these organizations in effect are located in northwest Pakistan. I think we would be impelled toward a scenario that would be extremely stressing for us.

So that's another good reason why I argue
a rapprochement with Iran, which I think was, frankly, well in the works prior to 9-11. It needs to be pursued for all sorts of serious and realistic reasons with regard to what we may much more likely be forced into with a Pakistan, because there is really only a very favorable and -- There is a very favorable Pakistan military, frankly, standing between us and outright declaring that situation a rogue regime.

I mean, they have exported, in effect, weapons of mass destruction. They are a tremendous drug exporter. They are a tremendous terrorism exporter. If it was anybody other than the Pakistani military maintaining a slim grip over portions of that country, this place would be number one with a bullet to the top of the list. We would be in Pakistan now. There is no question about it. So that's the one I worry about in terms of overload.

Africa: I think we wait for the fight to shift there in terms of our success of driving Islamic response to modernity and globalization out of the Middle East and we successfully integrate those parts of the world.
So I think, absent success there, moving that problem south, we are not going to make the effort in Africa. We are just not going to create the will for it.

In the Andean portion, you know, transnational criminals are fundamentally interested in profit. So they tend not to want to create macro instability. They want to keep moving the product and making the sales.

So absent our poking that situation and trying to correct it and forcing their hand, in effect, I think it continues in its current modality ad infinitum, because it is simply good business for the guys who can maintain a low enough profile, aren't really interested in taking over Columbia, for example, just want to have their neck of the woods.

COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: My last question: In consideration of what each of you have spoken about potential threats, are you comfortable that the current IGPBS, as put forth by the administration, adequately deals with each of those and, if not, what would you like to see changed?
All of you have spoken fairly positively about the current proposal, but are there any -- Are you comfortable that it addresses all these threats that you see?

MR. NOONAN: Yeah, for the most part I am comfortable with it. Perhaps it should engage more in sub-Saharan Africa. I think, building security bridges to the future there -- maybe places like Sao Tome, Principe or other places where we could really develop some positive relations moving forward.

Other than that, I think the general -- Obviously, hopefully, if things are done correctly, this global posture statement won't be just sort of a, you know, unchangeable map. Hopefully, it will be reevaluated on a continuous basis and we will be able to apportion resources as necessary.

That is one of the reasons I think it is critical that we don't put too much -- too many resources -- in places that might be very critical at this point in time, but may not be a problem a few years down the road. I think that -- More austere bases, I think, makes sense from that perspective as
well as from sort of the cultural implications there.

MR. CORBIN: I think it is -- You know, you can get into the details, but I think it is okay for a force structure. I think that there your question is, “What other force structure changes need to be made?” and what they want to see, and there's supposed to be a quadrennial defense review next year.

So you know, I would suggest that they might want to make sure that that doesn't have major implications for the base structure before they plow ahead too fast with changes, because these only come along every four years, and they can be pretty important. The last one was kind of a bust, the Quadrennial Defense Review, because it was right around September 11, but I think the next one will be -- or can be, at least -- important, and so (it) might have some force structure changes that we really didn't see last time.

So I think they need to take that into consideration.

PROF. BARNETT: I would agree with Mr. Noonan. I'd like to see us, in effect, prepare the
battlefield a bit more through military-to-military contacts throughout sub-Saharan Africa because, again, I think that's where the fight heads progressively over the next years and decades.

Along those lines, I do welcome the notion of a realigning of the Unified Command Plan to take Africa, in effect, out of the bailiwick of European Command, and probably either give it to CENTCOM or to create a separate command that is focused on that, because I think the combatant commanders are -- we call them the proconsuls.

I think they are your natural sort of System Administrator commanders. They are out there working the states on a day to day basis. They have the biggest foreign policy budgets of the U.S. government. I think we need to dedicate a bigger effort in Africa because, ultimately, I think it will pay in dividends over the long haul.

I also point to the Southeast Asia issue with all that energy moving through the waterways there. I think we are making a certain effort there. I think it has been plussed up recently. I think the
Navy is very aware of it and does good things along those lines. So I'm not too worried about that.

Again, to me, the big fly in the ointment is that, as you try to move everything in closer to what I call that non-integrating Gap, you are trying to take advantage of successes from the Cold War. Again, I think it is an easy decision in Europe. I think it is a harder one in Asia, fundamentally, because of Kim Jung Il and because of the situation we set up vis a vis Taiwan and China.

To reiterate what I said at the end of my statement, it disturbs me how much decision making power we have in effect ceded to Taipei and Pyongyang on those two issues; that, in effect, they are in the driver's seat; and if they decide to do certain things, we are forced, by the way we have defined our relationships there and by the way we have dealt with these issues over the past several decades, to respond.

I think that is the big thing that can screw up our efforts to relocate and refocus and put in this long term effort to transform the Middle East
which I believe in, which I believe is the natural next step in what we are doing. But I think we may be jerked right back to the past on those two issues if we are not careful.

I think a lot of it is self-inflicted for us. I think it is the policies we have, and the continuation of statements and postures that really harken to a different era. I don't think we should have a security guarantee for Taiwan that puts them in the driver's seat.

I think -- if you are dedicated to the notion that you are not going to put up with rogue regimes who check a number of boxes, like Kim Jung Il checks on a daily basis -- then I don't think you let that situation last, and you don't position yourself long term to put a missile shield in East Asia that is only going to alienate the Chinese and probably anger the South Koreans, as well, and probably not buy you much with the Japanese, who aren't going to feel particular safer with that.

Instead, you need to deal with the problem at its source, which is why I think, in effect, Kim
Jung Il is up next.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner Martin?

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: One question, three answers -- probably a value judgment would be indicated on your part.

We are working very hard to squeeze some particular numbers out of the analysis of the IGPBS process and the map that goes with it. I am just wondering, from your general sense -- senses -- of this and what you have already said, at the end of the day -- when we have taken into account deployments, redeployments, rotations, prepositions, sea basing and all those kinds of things and building of TRANSCOM assets -- will we end up with a net savings or a net cost out of this process?

There are a lot of dynamics in there, but from your sense and working in Washington and knowing what people expect of this, do you think individually that this will all end up as being a net cost, net savings, or a wash at the end of the day?

Don't fall over each other.
MR. NOONAN: I think, in the long run, there will be a marginal net savings down the road. Now there's a lot of hedging, probably, on there, and a lot of footnotes, but I think, in the long run, it will probably be a net savings. When you factor in human costs and the flexibility that it allows you to be able to sort of shift forces around the globe, I think it will be a marginal savings.

MR. CORBIN: Depending on what your baseline is in terms of your overall force posture, I think it might be a small net cost to the extent that -- at least what I have in mind -- is a more active U.S. involvement in the world.

I mean, going a lot of places, even if it's a lot of small places with small forces, adds up over time. You know, in the Cold War we were sort of -- We had the large forces, but they were in a routine, and we got pretty efficient at shipping families over to Germany and back; and this is really, you know, wide open and involves a lot more distances in terms of going places, joint exercises with other forces, maintaining forces overseas still while
bringing some back, nevertheless maintaining a capability.

    When you just step back and look at it from the perspective of maintaining an ability to go anywhere, anytime -- possibly at short notice -- to deal with a variety of unknown, unforeseen threats -- just coming at it from that perspective, you know, I would be delighted if we could get a net savings out of that.

    Having said that, I do think that it is close enough an issue that it shouldn't be the driver of the issue. I mean, the strategic needs and the logistic practical needs and so on really are paramount. If you are going to choose a strategy to be heavily engaged in the world, then we as a nation have to be ready to pay for it.

    PROF. BARNETT: I think, in terms of absolute dollar costs, it is going to be a slightly net cost. But I think it is going to be worth it, and I think it has a lot to do with our sense of perception of whether what we are taking on in this effort represents an accumulation of additional
responsibilities piled on top of everything else we plan for over the long haul, or whether we are really downshifting, which is the way I prefer to look at it.

When I got into this business 15 years ago, I started out as a strategic nuclear planner, planning system level or across the planet global nuclear Armageddon with the Soviet Union. That's gone, realistically, as a paradigm.

By the middle of my career in the mid-Nineties, the focus had downshifted to regional hegemons -- medium sized states -- and that was going to be our future. Of course, they were going to proliferate, and they were all going to get weapons of mass destruction, and it was going to be a never-ending effort, none of which has proven true, and their numbers are shrinking, and state-on-state war effectively disappears across the Nineties.

So we downshift even further, I would argue, in our success. Today, our focus is largely warfare against individuals. We went into Panama looking for one guy. We went into Somalia, decided it was one warlord and his lieutenants. We worked the
Yugoslavia issue for years, and then when we started
go ing specifically against Milosevic and his cronies
and his family, we found success. We went into Iraq
looking for a deck of cards.

We can't find a military that is willing
to fight us in a straight-up fashion. I met the last
U.S. Air Force officer who has ever shot anybody down
in a dogfight. He's a one-star now. That's how
distant we are from that reality.

So, do I see the world going to hell in a
handbasket? Do I see global policing? Do I see a
huge accumulation of responsibility and effort? No.
I see a success trajectory that we are having a hard
time adjusting to.

So it is mostly about letting go of the
past and sealing off and capitalizing on effective
peace dividends that we actually did achieve from the
Cold War, and moving on to the new challenges.

So I think it is going to be a net cost
when you add it up over time, because we are going to
go from, frankly, more expensive real estate to
cheaper real estate, but we are going to go from
players who could fund most of that activity for us locally to those who are not -- they are not in a position to fund, and the net resources transfer is going to be from us to them over the long haul.

So we are going to be writing this stuff off. But to succeed in these efforts -- to eliminate these sources of violence and the catastrophic consequences they can generate -- I think over the long term, is a tremendous cost savings in terms of the efficiency for the global economy.

So long as we understand that we have a special role in playing and making that future come about, and understanding that there are others willing to pay through the purchase of our debt or through the greater efforts they make in things like foreign aid, then it is a useful transaction, and it is a useful role that we play.

So we shouldn't be caught up too much, in particular, with the net savings or costs associated with any one aspect of this particular shift, because I think it is historically necessary.

COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I guess I don't quite know where to go from here. I would like to make a few comments, but I think I will hold them for a later time.

I would just finish with one final question, I think, and that is -- First of all, I think you would have to realize that there are probably other threats out there other than terrorism and, you know, we talk about unknown threats or we just don't know what the threats are. We hear that all the time. I am sure all those concerns are not applied only to terrorism.

As we visited countries in Europe, almost every country we visited was drastically reducing the size of their military as well. So my question is this: Do any of you have any concern that our reduction of our military forces overseas will create any kind of a security vacuum and -- again, thinking of threats that might be other than terrorism?

PROF. BARNETT: Personally, I don't -- in the sense that, again, I think what we are doing is we
are moving off past successes. I think it takes a certain amount of courage to realize those past successes are a bit more stable than we give them credit for being.

I think, until we solve a Kim Jung Il situation in East Asia, we will be prevented from realizing the real benefits of that situation, the tremendous effort we have made in discouraging arms races and interstate war across Asia for the last 25 years, which has facilitated the integration of roughly half the world's population which lives there into a global economy in a huge fashion over the last quarter-century, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. So -- an enormous good.

So I think what rushes into those situations that we are (quote/unquote) "kind of pulling out from" is the connectivity of the global economy and economic opportunity. I think, over the long haul, those forms of stability are far better than anything offered by arms build-ups or big militaries.

So I find the fact that rich countries, in
effect, are unwilling to spend money over time on
defense to be a very, very good sign. That creates a
huge opportunity for us in terms of a role that we
have been entrusted with, and are still, I would
argue, largely entrusted with.

So I'm very sanguine about the future, and
I am very sanguine about our ability to ferret out and
understand threats as they appear.

MR. CORBIN: Specifically on your comment
about other nations reducing their defense
expenditures or personnel: I think that is more a
function of the end of the Cold War and their changing
their militaries. I think it is, in general, a good
thing. They tend to have excess numbers of personnel,
and I would much rather see, in general, much smaller
forces on their part that were able to do things -- go
places and do things -- more effectively.

So while they may be downsizing budgets or
personnel, I think what is more important is their
actual capabilities, and I am hopeful, if we haven't
seen it yet, that there will be overall an increase in
their capabilities which they can use to contribute to
MR. NOONAN: I will also have to concur that I don't think it will cause any great security stress in either of the regions in Asia or in Europe, particularly as NATO has moved to the Baltic Republics and Poland and down the line.

In South Korea, for instance, I think that actually it could create a lot of goodwill there, especially if we cede some of the bases that we have in Seoul, particularly the ones that are very attractive to developers and business owners there. I think that could create some goodwill diplomatically there. And we are only talking about a 10-15,000 reduction in Asia, which I don't think will drastically tip the strategic scales.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

Well, gentlemen, we thank you for being here today, and your expertise has been very valuable to us. We appreciate you sharing it with us. We would like to call on you in the future if any questions arise or if there are things that we want to follow up on. Again, thank you for taking the time.
away from your other efforts to join us.

Anything else to be brought before the hearing?

The Commission has received and will take into consideration the written comments and statements from the Mayor of the City of Ginowan, Okinawa, Japan, the President of Okinawa International University, and the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.

To the members of the general public, press and others, we thank you for attending and for your interest in these important issues that affect the defense of our nation. Future public meetings and hearings will be announced and appropriately published prior to their scheduled date. This concludes the November 9, 2004 hearing of the Overseas Basing Commission.

(One tap of gavel.)

(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record at 3:32 p.m.)

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