| FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 27, 1999 |
| PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Donald C. Smaltz, Independent Counsel In re Espy, announced:
A unanimous Supreme Court decision today in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of
California held that in order to establish a violation of the federal gratuities
statute, 18 U.S.C. section 201(c)(1)(A), "the Government must prove a link
between things of value conferred upon a public official and a specific 'official act' for
or because of which it was given." By this holding, the Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which had reversed
Sun-Diamond's conviction for giving Secretary Espy approximately $5,900 in tickets to the
1993 U.S. Open, luggage, meals, and crystal while Sun-Diamond had various matters pending
before Secretary Espy.
The D.C. Circuit Court had reversed Sun-Diamond's conviction because it concluded the
trial judge had erroneously charged the jury regarding the intent necessary to sustain a
gratuities conviction. The D.C. Circuit Court held that, under the statute, "the
giver must intend either to reward some past concrete official act or acts or to enhance
the likelihood of some future act or acts." The D.C. Circuit's decision was in
conflict with four other federal circuits that held there was no requirement that a nexus
be proven between the thing of value given and a particular act. These various
interpretations had effectively created a situation where the giver of things of value in
New York, Philadelphia, Houston, and Los Angeles could be convicted on lesser proof than
officials in the District of Columbia. It was a concern of the Independent Counsel that
the most senior public officials in Washington, D.C. and persons and corporations who deal
with them be held to identical standards of conduct as officials throughout the rest of
the United States and persons and companies who deal with them.
Mr. Smaltz stated:
In its decision today, the Supreme Court has ruled against the interpretation of the
federal gratuity statute urged by the Government. I applaud the fact that the Court has
now articulated a single, understandable rule to guide public officials, their
constituents, and law enforcement in the future. The establishment of such a rule was one
of our goals in bringing the case to the Supreme Court.
I am, of course, disappointed that the Court chose to adopt a rule governing the
gratuity statute that, in my view, allows too much latitude to those who would attempt to
buy governmental favor. The Court has read the gratuity statute to forbid gratuities to
public officials only where the official act for which the gift was given can be
identified with specificity. The Supreme Court's job, however, is to declare the meaning
of statutes, and I respect the fact that it has done so in this case. For those who
believe that no one should be allowed to give gifts to public officials to purchase
goodwill or curry favor, regardless of the specificity with which the desired official
acts can be identified, any future refinement of this law must come from Congress, or from
the Office of Government Ethics, whose regulations govern the behavior of governmental
officials in the Executive Branch.
Press Contact: Jan Drake
Press Officer
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