

1 MEETING OF THE HUMAN SUBJECTS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
2 NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION
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P R O C E E D I N G S

CALL TO ORDER AND REMARKS

DR. CHILDRESS: Let me welcome subcommittee members and others. I am glad that all of you could make it and make it this early. Let me also welcome others.

We will have an opportunity for public testimony at 11:15. We had, I think, two people who have indicated they would like to testify at that time. If there are others, please indicate to Pat Norris or someone at the desk outside and we will be glad to then adjust the time to make sure that we have enough allowed to accommodate everyone.

Before I say something about our agenda today let me see if Dr. Shapiro would like to say anything at the outset.

DR. SHAPIRO: No. Just to thank everyone for their continuing efforts and to wish us good luck today.

DR. CHILDRESS: Thanks, Harold.

MR. CAPRON: Did you see the poster that was up in the elevator talking about balancing family life and work? I am sure it had nothing to do with holding these meetings on a Sunday.

DR. SHAPIRO: Why would you raise that now?

(Laughter.)

MR. CAPRON: No, it just was of interest I

1 thought.

2 MS. CHARO: Some of us would like to have the
3 time to create a family. This does not look like a
4 fertility clinic.

5 (Laughter.)

6 DR. CHILDRESS: Are you restricted to a
7 particular date on that on the record, Alta?

8 (Laughter.)

9 DR. CHILDRESS: Our agenda today is a very
10 full one. Let me make a few observations about it.
11 First, we want to determine where we are and what else we
12 need to do over what period of time to produce a report on
13 decisionally impaired research subjects.

14 For the consideration of the commission as a
15 whole and that will be a stage we have to think about when
16 we think we are ready to send something to the commission
17 as a whole, at what point in the process, and in talking
18 to Dr. Shapiro the idea emerged that probably it was best
19 as soon as we had some fairly clear recommendations even
20 though the rest of the report might still be evolving. We
21 will think about that towards the end of the day as we
22 consider this very fine draft that Jonathan Moreno has
23 developed in response to the discussion last time and in
24 response to individual questions and criticisms and
25 suggestions after the meeting.

1 In addition to going over that very carefully
2 today we will hear from some other researchers with
3 particular focus on imaging research and everyone should
4 have received in addition to the testimony we will hear
5 today -- should have received written testimony from Dr.
6 Bruce Cohen that was faxed to everyone on Friday. He
7 could not join us.

8 Those that are traveling obviously did not get
9 that.

10 DR. DUMAS: I thought I got two pages of it.

11 DR. CHILDRESS: Oh, two. Okay.

12 DR. DUMAS: Yes.

13 DR. NORRIS: I have copies.

14 DR. CHILDRESS: We have copies here. All
15 right. And it will be helpful to look at that at some
16 point. It is relatively brief but also very, very
17 helpful. He regretted he could not join us and would be
18 glad to at some later point.

19 And then we will have public testimony today
20 but that will be on a broader -- that is it will go beyond
21 the research involving decisionally impaired subjects.

22 And then second we need to determine where we
23 are and what we need to do to finish and when we can
24 finish our report on federal agency protection of human
25 subjects in research.

1 One important point on the basis of discussion
2 with staff and with other commissioners and with Dr.
3 Shapiro, we do not expect to complete this report until
4 the early months of 1998. The staff has done a great job
5 in obtaining important information for us but we still
6 need as a commission, and I hope we will make progress on
7 this, this afternoon, to determine the exact findings and
8 appropriate recommendations.

9 In addition to that we need, with Kathy
10 Hannas' help, she has agreed to work with us, and others,
11 to recast and rewrite the report in order to attend to the
12 overall picture. So that will be a stage that we will
13 move to after the discussion this afternoon.

14 In connection with that report and more
15 generally we will consider today, this afternoon, two
16 thorough draft contract papers, by Charles McCarthy and
17 John Fletcher, on the federal regulation of human subjects
18 research with particular attention to the location of an
19 OPRR-like mechanism within the federal government. This
20 grew out of a point and suggestion that Alex Capron made
21 and I think. And I think that we fortunately have two
22 very thorough and interesting papers. We will have a
23 paper later by Tina Gonzalez on whether this mechanism
24 could function to regulate or to provide oversight of
25 nonfederally funded research.

1 We will also hear this afternoon from Joan
2 Porter about the period between the proposal and the
3 adoption of the common rule to try to understand better
4 the obstacles that were in the way of the implementation
5 of the common rule that may still endure. Some of those
6 are addressed in a draft report but there may well be
7 others and this grew out of some suggestions that Alta
8 Charo made.

9 So that is what we are doing today with some
10 thoughts at the end about our next steps but also along
11 the way in relation, for example, to the report on
12 decisionally impaired research subjects talk about next
13 steps. So at the end of today we are simply pulling
14 together some of the discussion we had earlier.

15 That is our agenda. Any comments about that
16 agenda?

17 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Jim, I have a question.

18 DR. CHILDRESS: Sure.

19 DR. SCOTT-JONES: This is just about materials
20 that we were sent prior to this meeting. There was a note
21 that we get a report on the survey of federal agencies
22 under separate cover. I did not get that.

23 DR. CHILDRESS: Right. But my recent mail
24 said that nothing would be provided until we arrived and
25 you should -- were you at the hotel last night?

1 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Yes.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: You would get it at the hotel
3 last night.

4 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Rhetaugh got something but
5 they told me there was nothing for me.

6 (Simultaneous discussion.)

7 DR. CHILDRESS: I did not get it and I do not
8 think anyone got it in time to read it and that was not
9 the point but rather to have it available before this
10 morning but we have copies available here.

11 DR. SCOTT-JONES: If I could get a copy that
12 would be great.

13 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. See if we can get
14 copies made then.

15 DR. DUMAS: Do you want my copy? Here it is.

16 DR. CHILDRESS: If you have it handy that
17 would be great.

18 DR. DUMAS: Yes.

19 DR. CHILDRESS: You are trying to get rid of
20 paper, I believe.

21 DR. DUMAS: I am.

22 (Laughter.)

23 DR. CHILDRESS: So this afternoon the
24 discussion will not focus so much on a document but rather
25 on the way in which Bill and the staff have developed a

1 more narrative approach and descriptive approach to some
2 of these materials in order to respond to the questions
3 that were raised last time and the concerns that
4 individuals have expressed since then about how to make
5 sense of the report as a whole. So that is what we will
6 be doing this afternoon, looking at, in a very open way,
7 of the findings and recommendations in these few pages he
8 provided. There are not very many. They come largely
9 from factors two and three and basically provide that kind
10 of a summary, and Bill will help us do that this
11 afternoon.

12 The staff working on the federal agency report
13 circulated it to the Interagency Human Subjects Committee
14 this week for discussion and then met with the committee
15 of the draft document so part of what will be reflected in
16 the discussion this afternoon will be the kinds of
17 concerns that were expressed at that point as well.

18 Any other comments or questions?

19 All right. Let's start then with the report
20 on decisionally impaired research subjects and again as I
21 mentioned we are very grateful to Jonathan Moreno for his
22 very responsive revision, especially trying to deal with
23 the points raised last time in the meeting but then also
24 subsequently by individual subcommittee members.

25 I have asked subcommittee members to take

1 primary responsibility for kicking off the discussion of
2 the same topics in the draft report that we looked at last
3 time but before I turn to individual subcommittee members
4 let me ask Jonathan if he would like to highlight some of
5 the major changes in the draft document and then we can
6 talk about the other matters.

7 REPORT ON HUMAN SUBJECTS SUBCOMMITTEE

8 ACTIVITIES AND DISCUSSION

9 UPDATE AND OVERVIEW

10 DR. MORENO: It has been too long and I do not
11 remember the different design between this draft and the
12 previous one in detail but the major difference is that
13 the risk discussion was moved around as people
14 recommended. There is a new first chapter that highlights
15 some of the issues that people got out of the upfront of
16 the draft and then also I hope changes the way in which
17 the other material that is now chapter 2 is introduced and
18 the introduction of that material is also a bit different.
19 And various language and interpolations of members have
20 been introduced throughout.

21 DR. CHILDRESS: Any questions for Jonathan
22 about this draft before we move into the substantive
23 discussion?

24 Okay. All right. Let's then first of all
25 think about the overall structures, direction and tone of

1 the report. You have already heard from Jonathan some of
2 the changes in the overall structure. I have asked Trish,
3 Laurie and Alex to address these points but this is for
4 everyone. These people are just to get us started on the
5 discussion.

6 Trish?

7 MS. BACKLAR: I have a number of points. So
8 many that I cannot find them all. I do want to start
9 right away with something that may be an old problem that
10 was not corrected and very specifically on page 64 it
11 says, "This report will concentrate on the question of
12 whether research should be permitted on those found to be
13 decisionally incapacitated rather than those at risk for
14 decisionally incapacity."

15 I am sorry. This just blew me away again. I
16 thought am I reading this correctly or maybe this is an
17 old problem. I just need to know again very clearly who
18 we are addressing because in the beginning you did use
19 that little formula that I gave you about the different
20 groups of people. But as we progressed through the paper
21 I am not really certain who we -- what population we are
22 addressing. It is not that I have any doubt. I knew this
23 had to be a mistake but I wanted to be reassured.

24 DR. MORENO: Yes, of course.

25 MS. BACKLAR: Thank you.

1 If I have anything to say overall it is this
2 fact that I am not quite certain who we are addressing
3 other than I am quite certain that we are addressing
4 people who are decisionally impaired but this is such a
5 large group that each time I would find something I was
6 wondering who that person was -- who that -- in that
7 population who it was. Was it going to be people with
8 Alzheimer's who were no longer -- who were incapable of
9 decision making? Was it going to be people who could
10 consent but might lose -- I do not need to go through all
11 of those. That is point one. I am a little concerned
12 about that aspect of the paper.

13 The other thing that was never really
14 clarified for me --

15 DR. CHILDRESS: Excuse me. Since I --

16 MS. BACKLAR: Oh, sorry.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Would it be the case that the
18 direction of the recommendations indicates pretty clearly
19 how these different groups will be covered?

20 MS. BACKLAR: Yes, I am going to get to that.

21 DR. CHILDRESS: But if that is the case then
22 what we need to do is just make sure that the report moves
23 that way if we accept those recommendations.

24 MS. BACKLAR: I think that as we go along the
25 way the report is set up in such a way now that we go

1 bumbling along and then we get to something about the
2 commission. I also want to say something about that. It
3 is not clear enough to me yet which -- we talk about the
4 National Commission and then we talk about the commission
5 and I think --

6 DR. CHILDRESS: This is -- the commission is
7 always now the National Bioethics Advisory Commission.

8 MS. BACKLAR: Right. If I was reading this
9 paper and I had never read it before I would be very
10 concerned --

11 DR. CHILDRESS: Well, that is an editorial
12 thing that will be inserted --

13 MS. BACKLAR: That is why I am just making
14 that comment because --

15 MS. CHARO: Directly on what Trish was saying
16 because I think that as I was reading it I was finding in
17 it a wealth of observations but I was also struck by the
18 fact that the graphic box analysis that is very complex as
19 you look at the particular subpopulation of at risk
20 fluctuating currently incapacitated levels of risk of the
21 experiment, therapeutic benefit and possible
22 interventions, and I found that I was wondering if it
23 might make sense to actually break this thing out by
24 specific subpopulations.

25 It will mean a lot of text will be copied over

1 multiple times for different subreports but this way focus
2 one report on those who are at risk of progressive loss of
3 capacity and a second report on those who are currently
4 have fluctuating, and the last one on those who are
5 functionally incapacitated to address Trish's concern
6 because I found it all in there but it is true that as we
7 trace examples you are not -- for the sake of editorial
8 purposes you are not going to rewrite each sentence to
9 give an example for each population and yet then it gets
10 hard for the writer and the reader to hold it all
11 together.

12 MS. BACKLAR: I am very concerned about the
13 people who are going to read this who want to get
14 something useful out of it how they are going to get what
15 -- where they are going to go.

16 MS. CHARO: Yes.

17 MS. BACKLAR: Even though one might be able to
18 do that ultimately in the recommendations --

19 MS. CHARO: Right.

20 MS. BACKLAR: -- I would like to be guided. I
21 would like for that group of people who we are addressing
22 for them to be guided through in some way --

23 MS. CHARO: Right.

24 MS. BACKLAR: -- that is easier for them.

25 MS. CHARO: Yes. I mean, this is tedious and

1 it is all there and I doubt you will find that there were
2 any substantive gaps that are revealed by this editorial
3 change although this would help reveal them if they are
4 there and that we will miss them but it might be worth
5 waiting for --

6 MS. BACKLAR: I also --

7 DR. CHILDRESS: Does everybody -- Alta just
8 made a contract proposal here. Is this something, Alta,
9 you want to elaborate?

10 MS. CHARO: I am throwing it out as a
11 suggestion as one way that one might be able to tackle the
12 problem of having so many variables operating all the time
13 throughout the report and you can cut it any way. You
14 could just divide it into research that is minimal risk
15 and therapeutic or you could slice it any way you want but
16 what I am suggesting is that you might need to slice it
17 and have three separate subreports. And by "nature of
18 underlying population" might be one way to approach it
19 because that -- I always find in legislative drafting what
20 you want to do is think about things from the point of
21 view of the user.

22 DR. CHILDRESS: Let me pose a question though.
23 I guess I would take the view that rather than -- I guess
24 I think the analysis that has been provided by Jonathan
25 and Rebecca is a very, very important analysis and that

1 there is no need to get rid of that. There is a need to
2 perhaps sharpen that at points and expand it and so forth.
3 But then it seems to me that what you are proposing is a
4 clear, and I hear Trish too, is basically a clear set of
5 recommendations that will tell us now what we have to do
6 with different types of populations.

7 MS. CHARO: In other words, in the end the
8 recommendations are going to be based on a series of
9 variables having to do with the underlying population and
10 the nature of the decisional incapacity.

11 DR. CHILDRESS: Right.

12 MS. CHARO: The nature of the risk, the nature
13 of the benefit, and specific interventions that we might
14 recommend. I think that the underlying analysis for all
15 of those things is already present in here. I have no
16 problem with that. And I think that as a piece of -- I
17 mean, I actually did not find it difficult to follow the
18 analysis. It was just that in the end when it comes to
19 leading up to the recommendations it might be easier to
20 have smaller bite size pieces and that means perhaps a lot
21 of duplicative writing but it does provide you in the end
22 with a series of smaller more focused report followed by
23 recommendation. Here in this case the suggestion is to
24 the underlying population that you are looking at.

25 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Let's get some

1 response. Alex?

2 MR. CAPRON: I think I would only be able to
3 respond to this if we at some point today or some other
4 time carefully walked through the report and asked which
5 of the portions are going to be relevant generally and
6 there is really no reason to repeat those and at what
7 point are we dealing with something -- say the advanced
8 directives idea, which is much more relevant to either a
9 fluctuating or diminishing capacity situation.

10 And it might be to have -- I am not sure what
11 Alta means by separate reports or whatever, but it
12 certainly might be that as we approach the recommendations
13 section that we would have a chapter on this research
14 population and a chapter on this one and a chapter on that
15 one. And as you say within that there might either be
16 some explicit repetition or a full statement and then a
17 briefer recapitulation with reference back as with those
18 who are in diminishing capacity situation are at risk of
19 losing their incapacity so too here with those at
20 fluctuating capacity the device of an advanced directive.
21 In other words -- which has been more fully discussed in
22 chapter 7 or whatever.

23 MS. CHARO: Right.

24 MR. CAPRON: But I think in principle what
25 Alta suggested is very sensible and I would just want to

1 be able, which I am not able to do in my own head right
2 now, to know at what point you really are -- you have to
3 shift to that mode. It does seem to me a good deal of
4 what is in here would not be changed by your suggestion.

5 MS. CHARO: I mean, I am not the writer and I
6 do not want to try to staff this thing. It is being well
7 staffed already. It is just it is a way of trying to put
8 a little more detail on to Trish's reaction which I think
9 is well narrated but it is all there but by the time you
10 get the recommendations you have covered so much terrain
11 that you can find it difficult to remember which things
12 apply to which situations. So it is really just feedback
13 to the staff about how to handle this difficulty in such a
14 complicated area.

15 DR. MORENO: I have thought about this as well
16 and Jim and I have talked a little bit about some of this
17 in the margins. Of course, a difficulty in doing it
18 population by population is you have to agree on how to
19 discriminate one population from another and people know
20 better than I around the table that there is a lot of
21 range in terms of capacity and so forth within a single
22 diagnostic group. So you probably are not going to end up
23 being able to do it that way except perhaps by begging the
24 question about what counts as being in this population.
25 Very far gone Alzheimer's, for example. Those you could

1 say clearly have profoundly diminished capacity. But then
2 what about people who are very psychotic?

3 So another way to do this, and I think you
4 actually touched on it, and I had done a little fantasy
5 piece for Jim at the beginning before I even started
6 writing anything months ago, taking the recommendations at
7 the end and doing a box but characterizing it in terms of
8 cells for risk group and kind of research, therapeutic and
9 nontherapeutic, a distinction that I know has
10 difficulties. So that one thing you could do is box it
11 that way into those kinds of cells.

12 You are going to get --

13 DR. CHILDRESS: That could be useful even as
14 part of the discussion --

15 DR. MORENO: That would be very useful --

16 (Simultaneous discussion.)

17 DR. CHILDRESS: -- to chart it in some way.

18 DR. MORENO: Right.

19 MS. CHARO: Yes.

20 DR. MORENO: That kind of chart would
21 certainly be very useful.

22 MS. CHARO: Yes.

23 DR. MORENO: Especially for the endusers as
24 you put it, the --

25 DR. CHILDRESS: But also for our thinking

1 process.

2 DR. MORENO: Right. To understand what the
3 picture -- the universe is that has been created here.

4 DR. CHILDRESS: Yes.

5 DR. MORENO: But I am very concerned that the
6 specialists here are going to disagree about, you know,
7 what kind of patient population is going to be suitable
8 for what kind of protection if we put it that way.

9 DR. CHILDRESS: Would one possibility be to
10 take the kinds of categories that Trish helped developed
11 for the beginning of the report and use those as
12 organizing devices at the end with then a different, say
13 for example, disease categories appropriately falling in
14 more than one as you write a note in the report? Is that
15 a possibility?

16 MS. BACKLAR: But that is, of course, what I
17 intended about those categories, that they were more open
18 and that people would slip in and out of various ways of -
19 -

20 DR. CHILDRESS: But see raising it this way --
21 I mean, it is a little different than choosing, you know,
22 Alzheimer's patients, et cetera, et cetera.

23 MS. BACKLAR: Yes, right.

24 DR. CHILDRESS: Is this a possible direction?

25 MS. CHARO: Sure, absolutely.

1 DR. CHILDRESS: For charting it out then. Do
2 we have an agreement that this is worth exploring both in
3 terms of -- and you are comfortable with Alex's use of
4 chapter rather than report?

5 MS. CHARO: Yes.

6 DR. CHILDRESS: And then to use -- try it with
7 the categories of Trish's.

8 MR. CAPRON: But this might even -- this might
9 be within a chapter framework or Jonathan's and Trish's
10 comments might say, "Well, let's just deal with the issues
11 and recognize that the population is not well enough
12 defined to be segregated by chapter." I am also
13 comfortable with that. I was just responding to Alta's --

14 DR. DUMAS: My thinking tends to be more in
15 line with what Alex just suggested. I have been in
16 conflict about how best to focus this and if we try to
17 focus it on types of patients, levels of impairment, I
18 think it is going to be more confusing. So I would
19 suggest that we try -- I think there is a need for
20 focusing that and that we consider doing that by issue, by
21 type of concern or condition that we want to see
22 considered in relation to whether these patients should be
23 involved in research or not.

24 DR. CHILDRESS: Eric, sorry I forgot to come
25 back to you and I promising I would.

1 DR. CASSELL: I want to throw a little monkey
2 wrench and I am disturbed in part because when we do this
3 the implication is that there is a category, by far the
4 largest one, in which people have no trouble making
5 decisions or are not at all impaired in making decisions
6 and they can consent, weighing the benefits and the risks
7 of what is being proposed, and then there are these
8 impaired subjects. But the study that one of my research
9 assistants is now carrying out shows that virtually
10 everybody in the hospital has impairment to some degree.
11 Sometimes it is very subtle but the sicker they are the
12 more impairment they have.

13 We all know, to add further, that the standard
14 consent form which meets that business of ordinary healthy
15 people can make decisions, we all know that that is
16 thought. So while I think it is fine to have certain
17 categories because they help people fix their minds on
18 something we should not let it come out with the
19 implication that the other folks are all fine and that we
20 can go back to the kind of decision or the kind of consent
21 form we had in the past.

22 In a sense I think one of the things this
23 should help us do is move forward with all consent. It
24 changes the responsibility of the consent, the person
25 obtaining consent so that the possible impairment by the

1 environment is recognized in almost everybody.

2 Now if you say, "Well, what does that mean,
3 Eric?" I really do not know the answer to that. But if
4 you say -- I say to you, "Well, what does it mean that a
5 person with Alzheimer's is prospectively incapacitated?
6 How are you going to change what consents you get from
7 them?" I think you are equally troubled by that.

8 DR. MORENO: I have, by the way, introduced
9 some language to satisfy your concern about this point,
10 Eric. I have not -- I did not enlarge on the question of
11 -- the larger questions of the inadequacy of consent
12 processes but obviously we would be happy to do that if
13 that is what folks wanted.

14 DR. CHILDRESS: Alta and then Diane?

15 MS. CHARO: I do not disagree with what you
16 said, Eric. I agree completely but I do -- not only was
17 there some language that certainly can be beefed up
18 already in there to address this but I do want to continue
19 to recognize a significant distinction between research on
20 people who have illnesses whose primary effect is to
21 interfere with their cognitive or emotional capacities to
22 make decisions and people whose illnesses have that as a
23 secondary effect.

24 I think there is a fundamental difference
25 because of the phenomenon of them doing research on people

1 -- when you are doing it on people with an illness whose
2 primary effect is, in fact, interfere with the decision
3 making and you are researching the very thing that is
4 interfering with your ability to enroll them. I mean, I
5 think it creates a special problem that is different from
6 the usual problem of obtaining all kinds of consent from
7 people.

8 I hope you are not suggesting that we abandon
9 the distinction.

10 DR. CASSELL: No, no, no. This is -- but as
11 we begin to move out from that population, the people who
12 were presented to us in testimony, for example, the really
13 at-risk schizophrenic, for example, I do not want that
14 abandoned for a moment. They are special.

15 MS. CHARO: Okay.

16 DR. CASSELL: But if they are special -- I
17 think we get in danger by saying they are special and the
18 others are okay. I mean they are special but how do we
19 preserve that quality of their being special and research
20 on them being done with difficulty and at the same time
21 the others.

22 DR. MORENO: Well, I disagree that there is --
23 certainly you wanted this up front in the report. On page
24 11 there is a paragraph that I have framed as the Eric
25 Cassell paragraph for which I need an Eric Cassell cite

1 actually. Why don't you jot that down for me? I would be
2 happy at that point to insert any other language you
3 thought was important on this but I do need a cite, Eric.

4 DR. CHILDRESS: Diane and then Laurie.

5 DR. SCOTT-JONES: The comment that I have -- I
6 thought of it when Eric was talking so it may not be
7 really related to what he said but I was thinking is that
8 when we talk about consent we are talking about consent in
9 the abstract and we are not talking about what the person
10 is consenting to. For example, some aspects of the study
11 may be easier to positive such as concrete details about
12 what the person had experienced whereas more abstract
13 elements of the research may not be easily comprehended by
14 persons.

15 So it seems to me that sometimes we are
16 talking about a person who has impairment as if that
17 person is not capable of understanding anything and not
18 keeping in mind that the person is going to be consenting
19 to something and that others are going to be giving the
20 information in a specific way. So I think we are losing
21 the focus on the context in which persons give consent and
22 we are thinking only about the individual outside of a
23 context and outside of the others who are engaged in the
24 process of giving consent.

25 DR. CHILDRESS: What would you like to see

1 changed or added?

2 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Well, I am just looking back
3 to see if -- there is a section called individualizing
4 consent and it is hard for me to find that because my
5 pages are mixed up but there is a section here. Jonathan,
6 maybe you can tell me where it is. Page 65? But I cannot
7 find page 66 to see what is next. Okay.

8 DR. MORENO: Actually it is precisely this
9 kind of concern that that section was designed to
10 recognize so it would be very appropriate to add -- I
11 mean, it would be no problem at all working out some more
12 language on that.

13 DR. CHILDRESS: Diane, would you be willing to
14 work with Jonathan on that standing and elaborating that
15 as --

16 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Sure.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: -- that would be useful.

18 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Sure. And some aspects of
19 Celia Fisher's paper might be relevant here because she
20 talked about a relational perspective between the research
21 participant and the researchers.

22 DR. CHILDRESS: And if you would use that as
23 well in proposing changes here. Okay.

24 Laurie?

25 MS. FLYNN: I just wanted to underscore both

1 Eric and Diane's comments and just to add that I think it
2 is important that we not lose sight of the fact, really
3 two factors.

4 Number one, I think as Trish indicated most
5 people even with most severe psychotic disorders are not
6 decisionally impaired most of the time. If we assume that
7 they are involved in any kind of treatment and even those
8 who are not by nature of their illness are not psychotic
9 and incapacitated most of the time. And I worry that we
10 may have introduced a tone that can be stigmatizing to
11 these individuals. It is important that we recognize that
12 nearly everyone can make good informed decisions given an
13 appropriate process in research settings. I am wanting to
14 focus on what we need to do to make sure that that can
15 occur so that the appropriate autonomy is retained by the
16 individual.

17 The other question I have, and it may have
18 been in here and I may have missed it, relates to how it
19 is. It has already been discussed how we are going to
20 structure the matrix around this and I think there are
21 some problems with doing it by disease category because
22 those categories are not as well described and well
23 defined as we would like and because psychiatry is not yet
24 an exact science. In my own daughter's case we have had
25 four different diagnoses in twelve years and that is not

1 uncommon.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: Could I interrupt there?

3 MS. FLYNN: Yes.

4 DR. CHILDRESS: If I understood the discussion
5 correctly we are moving towards using Trish's categories
6 and then letting the disease categories --

7 MS. FLYNN: Yes. And I --

8 DR. CHILDRESS: -- is that okay?

9 MS. FLYNN: Yes. And I think that is a much
10 better way to go.

11 I am also interested in how we -- if we have
12 made any -- and it may be that we have not. I missed it
13 in the organization here. Have we been able yet to
14 describe the different categories of risk with any greater
15 degree of specificity because that is a huge issue here
16 and I think some of us who are trying to balance the need
17 to strengthen informed consent and protection of
18 decisionally impaired subjects need also to look at how we
19 begin to describe what is greater than minimal risk, what
20 is minimal risk because so many of these procedures come
21 into question at just that point.

22 DR. MORENO: Let me note that there is a set
23 of attempts to define by example that may help us a bit.

24 DR. CHILDRESS: Let me note that, and this
25 will be when I go back to Trish, the comments for this

1 part are the structure, direction and tone of the report.
2 So we will come back to risk with the next -- after we do
3 this we are going to talk about decisional impairment and
4 incapacity in informed consent as one big set of topics
5 and then risks and benefits, and then procedures such as
6 advanced directives and then recommendations.

7 MS. FLYNN: Jim, then just if I can make a
8 final comment. Again, as I did last time, I want to thank
9 you for your continuing and evolving sensitivity to the
10 role of families and caregivers, which I think is an
11 important addition that you have made in each of the
12 drafts of the paper and I think it really is an important
13 piece particularly for some of these individuals who have
14 fluctuating capacity over long periods of time.

15 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Trish, any last
16 comments on overall structure, direction and tone?
17 Remember we will come to the particulars later.

18 DR. BACKLAR: You knew exactly where I was
19 going. All right. Right, I will hold back. One of the
20 references that I think that you might want to look at in
21 terms of what Laurie was saying and in a particular group
22 of people who much of the time do have capacity for
23 decision making as Appelbaum has some good papers and I
24 will be glad to give you the references on that. So that
25 people reading this will understand that this particular

1 population does and can often have capacity to make some
2 decisions in some ways as well as the general population.

3 DR. CHILDRESS: Any other comments on this
4 first topic?

5 DR. BACKLAR: No. I think it is going very
6 well.

7 DR. CHILDRESS: Laurie?

8 MS. FLYNN: No.

9 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Alta, and Diane, and
10 then I want to get Alex's comments on the overall
11 structure.

12 MS. CHARO: All right. I think this is
13 structured. One of the things that happens in this report
14 because it happens throughout the regulatory approaches
15 that are proposed is a very reductionist way of
16 approaching things in which we identify one or two key
17 variables like risk and population. I found myself
18 wondering at a certain point whether we should be
19 considering the synergistic effects of some of these
20 factors and cutting things that way.

21 So, for example, when recommendations are made
22 about the possibility of consent monitors, is it
23 appropriate to think about them when you have got a
24 population of people with decisional impairments who are
25 institutionalized because that is a special

1 synergistically vulnerable population or where it is the
2 treating physician who is the PI and that it might be a
3 different way of thinking about what triggers different
4 kinds of protections rather than the simple population
5 versus risk matrix that we are used to using.

6 I do not know if that is structure or
7 something else but I did find myself thinking this might
8 be --

9 MS. FLYNN: That is a useful --

10 MS. CHARO: -- a place where -- in fact, Diane
11 might call it a more contextualized approach.

12 DR. CHILDRESS: I think, Diane --

13 DR. SCOTT-JONES: I just had a couple of
14 comments about overall structure and tone but, Jim, I did
15 not know if you were wanting to get through all the people
16 that you assigned to talk about that first or do you want
17 our comments --

18 DR. CHILDRESS: I think it would be useful
19 actually to get Alex's comments. I think Laurie and Trish
20 have finished their general comments --

21 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Okay. And then I will --

22 DR. CHILDRESS: -- but Alex's, I think, will -
23 -

24 DR. SCOTT-JONES: -- my two.

25 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. And just make sure --

1 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Okay.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: Alex?

3 MR. CAPRON: Well, I echo the previous
4 comments that the draft is moving along well. In terms of
5 structure and tone the problem that I have in part came
6 into focus with Eric's suggestion for which he retreated a
7 little or clarified in a way because this is something
8 that comes up in the first chapter here very much and that
9 was you were suggesting, Eric, that we tie the discussion
10 here into a broader reexamination of the issue in a sense
11 and the inability that people who are sick, and patients
12 have to give an informed and voluntary consent because of
13 their circumstances.

14 Likewise already in the discussion besides the
15 Cassell paragraph there are discussions of things like the
16 therapeutic misconception that plays into that, too, but
17 it is sort of a separate topic. Even if you were quite
18 capable are you being implicitly misled by the way things
19 are presented?

20 I have found some of the discussion hard to
21 follow but beyond that I was concerned that it was in some
22 ways a diversion from what it seems to me this report
23 ought in its opening pages to make very clear, which it
24 does not really do. And that is why this report? And it
25 is fine for us to signal that the commission will be

1 looking at broader issues and I assume that part of our
2 process in the future, Jim, that we can consider is how --
3 to what extent should we more generally revisit certain
4 basic assumptions.

5 We said more than a year ago that some of the
6 ideas in the Belmont Report might need to be reexamined if
7 not as principles at least as principles applied to the
8 field. I think that is fine for us to drop a footnote as
9 it were to say this is merely a particularly acute problem
10 as the way Alta answered you and I agree entirely with her
11 answer that when you are dealing with an illness, which
12 itself is an impairment of the capacity and that is what
13 you are researching about, it complicates things
14 substantially but that we recognize that it is not a
15 unique phenomenon. It is simply a particularly acute
16 example.

17 But what is missing to me here are -- is a
18 clear statement of what our task is, which to me as of now
19 until we revise the whole structure supposedly if we ever
20 do that, is how to incorporate the cognitively impaired
21 into the framework of protection of human research
22 subjects. That is what I thought we were all about and
23 that is something that the national commission tried to do
24 and in its recommendations in this one area did not
25 succeed.

1 So I think we need right at the beginning to
2 say why that is. Some of the difficulties seem to be
3 inherent difficulties. The ways in which the ability to
4 deal with personal contemporaneous consent are interfered
5 with. They may be interfered with very temporarily and so
6 you can look to another time period. They may be
7 substantially interfered with. The interference may be
8 very peculiar to the ability to assess risk to one's self.
9 Whatever it is, but there are difficulties here. That is
10 why we use the word "impaired."

11 Secondly, the settings for some of the
12 research raise the issue particularly acutely for people
13 who are in psychiatric facilities particularly as long-
14 term patients. Their role creates a special vulnerability
15 that is beyond that for people who have other dread
16 diseases.

17 Third, we have to recognize the marginalized
18 nature of this field and the people who suffer from these
19 illnesses, which again makes them particularly vulnerable
20 and it makes them also vulnerable to the fact that they
21 have limited -- often have limited access to other
22 resources. Their insurance may be inadequate. They may
23 be in a condition because their medical condition
24 interferes with their ability to have a livelihood which
25 takes them outside of an insurance mechanism and they are

1 just generally regarded by people as having the kinds of
2 illnesses that make them difficult to be with, that
3 doctors feel frustrated, the armamentarium of responses
4 may be inadequate or they may be resistant to using what
5 is there. All of these are problems.

6 Fourth, there is the nature of the illnesses
7 themselves and there is a reference in here, but you can
8 almost miss it, to the sense that unlike many other
9 illnesses -- although I am always worried about making
10 anything too categorical -- but unlike many other
11 illnesses a difficulty has been the absence of good animal
12 models for many of these illnesses so that there is this
13 kind of weak forward to human testing at a stage when one
14 might otherwise in another illness be trying to do work at
15 the animal level. I do not know the extent of that but
16 you make amendments to it.

17 And then there is an additional factor, which
18 seems to me less intrinsic but nevertheless very
19 pronounced, and I get this more -- the more I read about
20 the research in this field. I have a sense of a separate
21 research subculture which has not been as sufficiently
22 affected by the last twenty-five years of examination of
23 these issues. Maybe for all the inherent reasons they
24 apparently explain it and it is not a desire to be on the
25 attack against it. It is simply a recognition as to a

1 need to especially address and to respond to the concerns
2 that may have led people to behave as a separate
3 subculture.

4 But as several people have said in exchanges
5 of e-mail it would be impossible to imagine people with
6 the severity of the diseases that some of the things we
7 have seen being put into frank relapse of their cancer or
8 other life-threatening conditions -- these are life-
9 threatening conditions for some people -- in order simply
10 to see what happens. It is at that level equivalent to a
11 Tuskegee study it seems to me and is to say there it was
12 the observation. Let's watch what happens in the natural
13 course of this illness without treatment. It seems to me
14 that part of the outrage over there had to do with that.

15 So I think these factors have got to be front
16 and center and I do not want to wade through a discussion
17 of the therapeutic misconception and other things until I
18 know why is this.

19 The second thing along --

20 DR. CHILDRESS: Let's stop on the first one
21 just a moment.

22 MR. CAPRON: Yes.

23 DR. CHILDRESS: Now, I take it in your summary
24 you were included some things that are already here as if
25 you were --

1 MR. CAPRON: It is --

2 DR. CHILDRESS: -- listing because there --

3 MR. CAPRON: -- organization. It is not that
4 the materials are not to be found somewhere in the report
5 --

6 DR. CHILDRESS: But then there are some
7 things, including the institutional kind of research
8 subculture here --

9 MR. CAPRON: Yes.

10 DR. CHILDRESS: -- that do not appear.

11 MR. CAPRON: Yes.

12 DR. CHILDRESS: And I take it that the
13 articles you were directing us towards and the kind of
14 research you wanted might go get at some of that.

15 MR. CAPRON: Yes.

16 DR. CHILDRESS: Is that correct?

17 MR. CAPRON: Right. And to elaborate on the
18 point you were just getting to, I think we need to bring
19 home to the general reader some of the things that we have
20 seen by way of these research studies, Jonathan. That is
21 to say any -- a person just coming to this cold ought to
22 have described to them some of the published studies and
23 the way that they were done. Again it is not a matter of
24 singling out Dr. Jones and saying whatever. It is a
25 matter of saying that respected researchers in this field

1 --

2 DR. CASSELL: A la Beecher.

3 MR. CAPRON: Yes, a la Beecher, exactly.

4 DR. CASSELL: Yes.

5 DR. CHILDRESS: A la Beecher. The names of
6 the researchers were not important. I mean, he was even
7 more protective of which studies he was dealing with and
8 shared with the journal editors the citations to -- these
9 are all in the New England Journal, of course. The
10 articles that he was referring to. But just to make clear
11 the problematic nature of the field that these kinds of
12 things have happened.

13 And I would also have right up there in front
14 a brief statement of the regulatory -- which is then
15 elaborated in the second chapter, I guess -- the
16 regulatory efforts. In other words, we are not the first
17 group of people to come to the field. And then I am
18 talking about something of a paragraph length at this
19 point but those recommendations did not go forward. This
20 produced the following sort of ironic situation that on
21 the one hand some people feel they can go ahead with
22 research with no special protections because the code does
23 not provide for special protections. Other people feel
24 that their research efforts -- they cannot go ahead with
25 the research because the framework for special protections

1 does not exist.

2 And at the very least because of the kinds of
3 issues that I have just mentioned, these inherent and
4 maybe extrinsic special factors here, this is a field that
5 cries out for a careful regulatory response that will
6 bring this population finally into the umbrella of the
7 protections. Not getting yet into the question of whether
8 those protections themselves need to be rethought and
9 tinkered with or totally refined or something. But we
10 have these protections, it is all we have now, yet this
11 group does not get the attention.

12 I want to be able to pick up this report and
13 in the first ten pages know why I am reading it. Okay.
14 Why this is a concern. Why action must be taken. And I
15 think we all feel that that is the case and it is a matter
16 of focusing it more sharply and putting some of the stuff,
17 Jonathan, that is in the first few pages now further back
18 or --

19 DR. MORENO: The first chapter keeps turning
20 into a subsequent chapter but that is fine with me. But I
21 just want to observe from the drafter's chair that the
22 charge that the subcommittee had in mind last time was a
23 sort of generic, general educational, almost text-like
24 textbook-like document. This is a more reformist, which
25 is fine with me. This is out of a more reformist approach

1 which is consistent with other things that Alex has said
2 before. I just need to know if everybody wants to buy
3 into this.

4 DR. CHILDRESS: Alex, do you mind, before you
5 go to your second point, your first important set of
6 comments spoke to several hands so could we sort of
7 address the issues surrounding the first one before we
8 turn --

9 MR. CAPRON: Yes.

10 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. I have Diane, Eric and
11 Trish. Alta, you are down -- you are sort of out of my
12 line of vision so you will have to be -- you will have to
13 --

14 DR. CASSELL: Move to the other side of the
15 table.

16 (Laughter.)

17 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Okay. I have a couple of
18 comments about overall tone and structure and these are
19 directly related to what Alex has just said. The first
20 has to do with the statement of purpose and the placement
21 of this statement of purpose in the chapter and then the
22 second has to do with the role of researchers and
23 researchers' understanding of their role.

24 For the first one, if you look on the first
25 page of chapter one in the first paragraph it is the

1 statement of the purpose of this report. I think that
2 statement needs to be at that point considerably beefed up
3 before moving on to examples which come in the next
4 paragraph and you can look forward to page three, the end
5 of the second full paragraph, there is another statement
6 about what the report's purpose is and it is a little bit
7 different from the purpose stated at the end of paragraph
8 one.

9 The paragraph one purpose statement would lead
10 a reader to believe that perhaps we are questioning
11 whether research should go forward and I think that
12 statement will cause researchers to react in horror
13 because they will immediately think that commission is
14 trying to halt research and halting research is bad.

15 So I think that tone needs to be taken out of
16 there or elaborated immediately at this point with a
17 richer description of what the report is going to be about
18 so other places throughout chapter one where there is an
19 elaboration of the purpose. Whether it is as Alex
20 described it or not, I think it needs to come here so that
21 will be clear to a reader from the very beginning what the
22 purpose of the report is.

23 I think it should not be set up this way
24 because I think it is set up in a way to polarize this
25 more than I think reflects most people's thinking.

1 Then the second point that I have has to do
2 with the role of researchers as it is presented in this
3 first chapter and what I think researchers' understanding
4 of their role is. On page four, the first full paragraph,
5 refers to a subject of research being engaged in a form of
6 public service but are we then saying that researchers see
7 themselves also as engaged in a form of public service
8 because they are engaged in the same research enterprise.
9 If you look at page ten there is a much more negative view
10 of researchers' role in research and that is that they are
11 trying to make money and advance their careers.

12 So there is not a consistent presentation of
13 what we understand to be the role of researchers and of
14 researchers' understanding of their own role. I think we
15 should be clearer about that. We cannot at one point say
16 that research is a form of public service for the persons
17 who participate and then a few pages later say that for
18 the researchers themselves this is a source of advancement
19 financially and advancement professionally.

20 DR. MORENO: Can I just say that this was a
21 statement that was made at the last meeting. Mainly that
22 it should be -- it is important to say that people who
23 participate in research are doing public service. It is
24 also important to recognize the external considerations
25 that drive researchers. So if you want to change that I

1 also would need to get some --

2 DR. CHILDRESS: It is possible to have a view
3 about research's role in society as a whole, the functions
4 that these different individuals, including research
5 subjects and researchers play, and distinguish the
6 motivations of all those individuals from what we said
7 about the other. That is I do not think they are
8 incapable but we need to be very clear about which level
9 is being addressed in point because the research subjects
10 also have a variety of motives for taking part in what is
11 a public service but their motivations might be relief of
12 boredom or whatever.

13 DR. SCOTT-JONES: If you ask researchers
14 themselves what they think about what they are doing they
15 may bring up academic freedom, that I study what I want to
16 study, and that is still another perspective. I will just
17 feel better if there are --

18 DR. CASSELL: Aerosmith rides again.

19 DR. DUMAS: But what is the relevance of that?
20 Why is it important to comment on that in this report?

21 DR. CHILDRESS: I guess, Diane was making the
22 observation that insofar as we do make comments along the
23 way we need to at least --

24 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Right. And I --

25 DR. CHILDRESS: -- we need at least to be

1 clear and consistent in what we are saying about --

2 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Right. We need to have a
3 clearer view that we agree on about what the research
4 enterprise is for researchers and for those researchers on
5 understanding of their role because they are going to be
6 reading this document, hopefully, and I think we have to
7 be crystal clear about that and I do not think we can at
8 one point say, "Well, people should participate in
9 research for the public good," and at the same time turn
10 around and say, "Well, researchers are in this because
11 they are making money and advancing their careers."

12 DR. CHILDRESS: But then distinguish the
13 public good aspect of the role as -- distinguish from the
14 motives individuals might have for entering that role.

15 MR. CAPRON: But I think Diane could fairly be
16 saying that one of their motives might be scientific
17 curiosity, the desire to add to knowledge, as well as the
18 fame and material benefits they would get from that.

19 DR. CHILDRESS: Right.

20 MR. CAPRON: They are not going to get either
21 the fame and the material benefits if they do not add
22 something to knowledge.

23 DR. CHILDRESS: Right. And I think the point
24 is well taken that those modifications can and should be
25 made.

1 MR. CAPRON: Yes.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. I remind you I want to
3 get Alex's other points and I have Eric, Trish and Laurie,
4 who are basically tagging in on Alex's bigger point about
5 why this report, et cetera. Okay.

6 DR. CASSELL: First of all, I agree with you,
7 Alex. I think there is something special about the group
8 and that should be made absolutely clear but for my own
9 philosophical perspective of it I think that what the
10 first commission did was, in part, recognize that sick
11 people are persons and that that was happening at that
12 time in the culture. It was not just the commission but
13 it was going on in the culture. In the subsequent time we
14 have seen women in public and most recently persons with
15 disabilities become persons, fully accepted persons, but
16 not the psychiatrically sick yet.

17 I think that the way that the very
18 psychiatrically sick are treated and receive -- and you
19 just produced two papers, right -- seeming abandoned of
20 those principles which are now present as you have pointed
21 out. And in cancer you have to explain that to someone.
22 You cannot do it by just saying there are bad guys and
23 people who do this thing. But somehow their relationship
24 to the subject is different and I think that the problem
25 is that the subject is still a nonperson in this culture.

1 I think that you are absolutely right. It
2 should be made clear. It should stand out in front for
3 everybody to know. That is on the one hand. But on the
4 other hand what issues we raised before and my own
5 particular concerns are still present. I think that the
6 first commission ducked the problem, it incubated the sick
7 persons and, therefore, gave them the ability to consent
8 for themselves when, in fact, they do not have that -- in
9 fact, maybe we should, so we may be able or may not, but
10 we may be able to start picking up that challenge of how
11 to solve the problem of persons whose capacity to make
12 decisions is not entirely like that entirely.

13 MR. CAPRON: Are you agreeing we would signal
14 that is a bigger project that we are at work on? We will
15 not have to resolve that for this report.

16 DR. CASSELL: I do not think we have to
17 resolve it. I think we have to say that it has to be
18 resolved at this time. I mean, the commission as a whole
19 may say this and we do have to resolve it but I do agree
20 with you that we are here about this group because they
21 are special and that we should not dilute that. On the
22 other hand, I would hate to see us as a commission give up
23 on the other problem.

24 MS. CHARO: Can I just ask for a point of
25 clarification from Eric?

1 DR. CASSELL: Yes.

2 MS. CHARO: Jim?

3 DR. CHILDRESS: Yes.

4 MS. CHARO: I am trying to -- I mean, I was --
5 I am intrigued by this notion that there is a special
6 subculture in the research world and I do not know for
7 myself whether it is true or not but are you talking about
8 the problem with empathy when you are talking about the
9 nonperson's thing that the researchers cannot empathize
10 enough with these subjects because the nature of the
11 illness is one that presents empathy and that, therefore,
12 there is just an obstacle to considering things from their
13 point of view in a way that is necessary to take these
14 things seriously?

15 I mean, I am trying to understand the meaning
16 of saying that they are treated as nonpersons in a way
17 that I can understand. It is the phrase of something kind
18 of academic.

19 DR. CASSELL: Can I address that briefly?

20 DR. CHILDRESS: Briefly.

21 DR. CASSELL: Yes. I could show you medical
22 people who are medically sick where you would have great
23 difficulty with empathy. They stink. I mean, literally
24 smell and look so bad that you would have trouble.

25 MS. CHARO: Okay.

1 DR. CASSELL: But your heart would be rendered
2 by the fact that somebody should be in that condition.
3 People who are not nonpersons like people who are never
4 sick used to be when I first went into practice, you could
5 be kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave until you were
6 wonderful but they are not like me and you. They are
7 different. And that is, in fact, the way the psychiatric
8 ill are treated. They are different. They are not just
9 sick. They are different. And it is the erasure of that
10 difference that comes in part we are addressing.

11 DR. CHILDRESS: I have Trish and Laurie for
12 brief comments in relation to Alex's first point.

13 MS. BACKLAR: I agree with Alex completely
14 that we have to set up saying why we are doing this and I
15 think one of the problems that keeps escaping us is that
16 it is not simply the consent issue. It is the progress of
17 the research and what happens to people with this disease,
18 these kinds of diseases, is that they can lose their
19 capacity to care for themselves or to make decisions. So
20 there is a whole group of people who may enter into the
21 research. I know you all know this but I want to make it
22 very clear why this becomes so complicated. It is not
23 simply just agreeing to go into the research. It is how
24 we deal with it as it goes along.

25 The other thing is that I fear that we as a

1 commission, people are looking puzzled when Alex is
2 referring to these challenge studies, and that maybe you
3 did not get to read them, and I also suggested to Jim, and
4 I do not think this came out, three other studies that had
5 been given to us in earlier -- at another one of our
6 meetings and had pointed out these kinds of studies -- we
7 do not do this with people who have AIDS. We do not
8 promote their illness in order to study it. I think it is
9 very important that we address that in this report and in
10 our discussion.

11 DR. MORENO: Okay. Can I just -- again from
12 the draftperson's point of view the challenge -- if the
13 challenge studies are the only ones that the subcommittee
14 has trouble with and you are talking about specific
15 population of disease, and I can imagine that some people
16 will say, "Gee, that does not affect the kind of work I
17 do." So we need to be careful about that.

18 MR. CAPRON: Well, I think we should have a
19 broad description of things other than just challenge
20 studies.

21 MS. BACKLAR: Yes. One other thing in terms
22 of what Diane was saying, I also think that one cannot
23 give up addressing the fact that as David Rothman has
24 said, the gilded age of research and the research
25 industrial complex does play some part in here, both

1 private and federally funded, and the pharmaceuticals and
2 so on and so forth. So there is money in here and money
3 plays a big thing even in terms of subjects, which you did
4 not address. This is getting a little diffuse.

5 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Laurie?

6 MS. FLYNN: I guess I want to make two
7 comments that will sort of sound like an opposition to
8 each other. This is a painful discussion to be part of as
9 someone who is in touch with these illnesses and
10 individuals as I am and I think we need to emphasize the
11 otherness of this population. The culture, our society,
12 reflected in many, many ways continues to keep these folks
13 at a distance and to see them as inherently different and
14 in some ways less human than we are.

15 DR. CASSELL: That is right.

16 MS. FLYNN: And we do need to say that. At
17 the same time I am not comfortable, and I want to be clear
18 that I am really not comfortable with the tone that comes
19 through in many of these discussions that tends to isolate
20 that particular societal response to the research
21 community. The research community is in need of more
22 guidance and we need to strengthen the protections.

23 But we are sitting today looking backwards at
24 research studies and trying to interpret studies that are
25 going on in an arena where until quite recently there was

1 very little research where the stigma that attaches to the
2 disorders attached to the research too. I would be leery
3 of our making judgments as nonscientists about the
4 perceived value of individual studies.

5 I, for one, am uncomfortable, for example,
6 with so-called relapse studies. But I also know that many
7 of these studies were done in a time in an era, and even
8 today there persists a strong belief in some quarters that
9 mental illnesses are really not biologically based, that
10 medications are themselves more toxic than illnesses, that
11 these illnesses are somehow as yet not well enough
12 catalogued to be able to be effectively diagnosed and
13 treated, and in some of these instances the provoking of
14 relapse was an effort to try to determine what, if any,
15 are the biologically underpinnings of some of the
16 symptomatology that we see. Some of it can be quite
17 distressing moving from disorientation all the way out to
18 aggression.

19 So it is easy for us today to make some
20 judgments about the hypotheses that were being tested and
21 to do it from the framework of a much more sophisticated
22 understanding of the brain mechanisms but we must remember
23 this has only been achieved in the very recent past and I
24 am much more comfortable emphasizing the otherness of this
25 population than I am taking lines of research to task.

1 I think we get into deep water when we start
2 trying to intuit the motivations, either scientifically or
3 personally, for any group in society and certainly given
4 what I know of the lack of reward for research in
5 schizophrenia for so many years, the lack of prestige, the
6 lack of career advancement, I fear that we may literally
7 tar the reputations of some individuals who have been
8 singularly helpful in bringing this population forward
9 into a much safer and much more sophisticated research
10 environment.

11 DR. CHILDRESS: And the last point on Alex's
12 first point and then we will return to Alex, Diane.

13 DR. SCOTT-JONES: I would like to make a point
14 related to some of the ones that Eric and Laurie have made
15 about being respectful of persons we are talking about in
16 this particular document. I think it comes through in the
17 language that we use to describe them. So I am pleased to
18 see that most of the time we say persons with decisional
19 impairments instead of saying the decisionally impaired
20 because we are labeling the whole person when we use that
21 latter phrase. So I would suggest that throughout we try
22 to get rid of the language that labels persons in that way
23 and always even though it may be a little bit more awkward
24 and maybe not always as elegant to say persons with
25 decisional impairment or something that names them as

1 persons and not just by that category.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: Thanks. Alex?

3 MR. CAPRON: The other two comments that I
4 have are small about tone. One has to do with the use of
5 the first person plural and I do not like "us". When you
6 are not actually even referring to the commission it is
7 "us." Somehow there is vague "us." If it is other
8 research subjects we say other research subjects. If it
9 is all Americans when we feel we can confidently say all
10 Americans. Also I think a lot of the times the phrase
11 "the commission believes" or something is unnecessary
12 addition. Obviously this report is our beliefs and
13 conclusions and findings and so forth. I just -- it is
14 just filler.

15 DR. MORENO: Rhetorical filler.

16 MR. CAPRON: Rhetorical filler.

17 The other point loops back to something that
18 Laurie was just saying. Some of the times the concerns
19 that arise here are expressed as the concerns of this
20 group of patients and their families. And there may be
21 times that the concerns are that narrowly focused. I have
22 a sense that many of those concerns are shared by the
23 researchers, that is to say the concern that on the one
24 hand we do not want to have injury and on the other hand
25 we want to find some answers to these terrible puzzles and

1 these awfully burdensome diseases. They are shared by the
2 members of this commission and probably by most people.

3 So while it seems to me useful, if the
4 observation is that a particular concern is surprisingly
5 found even among the families, then to put it that way
6 that it is even -- and even has been articulated to the
7 commission by family members, then fine. But otherwise I
8 do not think we should -- to me, again to use your
9 concern, it almost marginalizes that this is something,
10 this is a concern of the subgroup. I think it is a broad
11 concern.

12 But let me make clear about my comment about
13 the research culture, which was not as broad as the
14 comment that Eric added to it. I was not looking at the
15 motivations as much here. I was descriptively saying that
16 in part because the regulations have not specifically
17 addressed the problems that people trying to conduct
18 research or subjects trying to be subjects as it were in
19 this research phase because they have not said, "Yes,
20 there are some special concerns and here is how you deal
21 with them," it may be for that reason or whatever, it just
22 seems as though -- or maybe because their academic
23 colleagues marginalize them, I do not know, whatever
24 reasons, but it is as though there really is a group that
25 has not had the same attention to the kinds of things that

1 45 CFR -- whatever it is now, it is not 45 CFR, whatever
2 it is -- is it still 45 CFR? I thought it was 21 or
3 something. Anyway wherever --

4 DR. MORENO: That is FDA.

5 MR. CAPRON: Okay. They have not had
6 apparently as much attention to these. I mean, maybe the
7 research community -- this research community has not gone
8 through as many of the educational seminars. I do not
9 know what it is but you do just get a sense. And the
10 reason for pointing to any of these is not to say, as I
11 said before --

12 DR. CASSELL: You do just get a sense --

13 MR. CAPRON: You do just get a sense that it
14 is a separate community. So the reason for pointing to it
15 is to show that research is carried on which does not seem
16 to have attended to the obvious concerns that arise, not
17 to say the challenge studies, anybody who ever did a
18 challenge study is bad and not to say that there were not
19 questions that they had addressed. Not in other words to
20 pass on the scientific reasons for the research or even
21 the scientific benefits the research had but just to say
22 that things have been done and are being done in
23 publications in 1997, which is what I shared with you all,
24 which indicate that a problem exists that is not at least
25 on the surface adequately attended to by the researcher.

1 I mean I would expect that if they had
2 adequately attended to it their methods section in
3 describing how they recruited the subjects and how the IRB
4 dealt with these issues would have gotten big attention
5 because it just -- to anyone reading it with that eye it
6 leaks out of the report and yet it gets no attention and
7 no attention at such a level that you have to think that
8 they did not think it was a problem.

9 I have a sense, as Trish said a moment ago,
10 someone doing AIDS research would have said, "I have a
11 problem here. I have got to figure out how to deal with
12 that problem and then I have got to tell people that I saw
13 it as a problem and this is how I dealt with it because
14 anybody looking at my research would otherwise say --"

15 So it is not a matter of being these people.
16 It is sort of saying that we are dealing with another
17 factor that is a reason why we have to give special
18 attention here because there seems to have been a research
19 subculture that does not seem to have been brought into
20 this.

21 MS. FLYNN: If I can just comment. You may be
22 correct but I am not persuaded that is the case. I think
23 there is a need to strengthen the protection for this
24 group because of the cognitive impairments that they bring
25 to the research enterprise. I am much less certain that

1 there is some particular lack on the part of the research
2 community as a whole and I am concerned that we would seem
3 to give the tone that this group somehow as a subgroup of
4 the research community has brought less than their best
5 effort to this arena or has been less than appropriately
6 sensitive. They have, in fact, worked within a framework
7 they have been given. There have been those who I am sure
8 have reached the ethical barriers that have been in place
9 but I am concerned that there is this kind of broad brush
10 characterization that I do not think is brought out by the
11 reality.

12 We heard in this commission on the occasions
13 that we have had comments from a very small number of
14 highly vocal individuals bringing situations and
15 conditions that deservedly got attention and they are
16 deservedly concerning. But I would posture to you that
17 they are not representative of the large number of
18 experiences of the large number of individuals with
19 cognitive impairments at least in the mental illness arena
20 who participate in the research. At least we have no
21 evidence that they are.

22 So that while I think we ought to be very
23 clear that this group needs additional protections and
24 while we ought to be calling for more attention to ethical
25 principles on the part of the investigators, my concern

1 goes to making them sort of the judgment about a
2 subculture that I am not certain is supported and I am
3 concerned that we not say that.

4 DR. CHILDRESS: There are two responses and
5 then Alex wants to get in. But let me just say that maybe
6 it is possible to point out the need for the protections
7 as you suggested without necessarily offering a full
8 explanation which is what the --

9 MS. FLYNN: I mean, the fact that these folks
10 are excluded from --

11 DR. CHILDRESS: -- subculture tries to do.

12 MS. FLYNN: -- the Common Rule is enough.
13 They are excluded currently.

14 DR. CHILDRESS: But without --

15 MR. CAPRON: Laurie, I do disagree. I do not
16 want to base this, as disturbing as the things we have
17 heard here, on what is anecdote to everyone. I want to
18 look at the literature and that is why I started bringing
19 these studies forward. I want our research staff to
20 search the literature. I want them to look at these -- at
21 research on psychiatric illnesses and see whether the
22 studies which we have begun to turn up are indicative that
23 there is something that needs to be addressed.

24 I mean, if I am sitting as an American citizen
25 or as a member of Congress or whatever being asked, "Why

1 should you have special regulations in this area," I do
2 not want to base it on the fact that someone says, "I was
3 at NIMH at the clinical center and I was given a stack of
4 consent forms and asked to sign one after another." I
5 cannot imagine a patient in the hospital for diabetes
6 asked if he can sign 20 or 30 consent forms at once and
7 being told that is standard operating procedure. I cannot
8 imagine an IRB would allow that. Apparently it happened
9 there but I want to gloat on that.

10 I want to look and see research studies in
11 which people were given challenge doses of chemicals that
12 brought on psychiatric -- that brought on psychotic
13 symptoms, that brought on cognitive impairment, and the
14 study does not address at all such questions as what long
15 term effects are there, how are those being monitored.
16 There is not attention to that. I cannot imagine that in
17 another -- I mean, just go on and on and on. And this is
18 not anecdotal. This is the published literature.

19 DR. CHILDRESS: That is the question today and
20 we are trying to address. The question being whether we -
21 - how far we need to go in terms of an explanation. I
22 think that the --

23 DR. DUMAS: I think that is one of the
24 critical issues here. I think we are trying to do too
25 much with this one report. I think we are getting into

1 too much detail and I think we need to get kind of a broad
2 outline, a framework, for what it is we really want to
3 convey and how to attend to that. And my concern is that
4 we are losing -- in the details we lose the principle
5 reason and purpose for our concerns about this.

6 Now, for example, we are concerned about the
7 protection of human subjects in research and I see the
8 mentally ill or the decisionally impaired -- I see the
9 decisionally impaired as being a broader category than
10 just people who have mental illness or disease. But I
11 believe that the people who have mental illnesses provide
12 a dramatic example of the kinds of difficulties and
13 problems that one confronts in this area and I think it
14 should be treated that way as an example of problems in
15 securing informed consent when there are certain
16 impairments in decision making.

17 I think our guidance -- there should be
18 guidance that will enable the researcher and the IRB's,
19 the people who are participating to the extent that they
20 can, and those people who are caring for them to make
21 certain decisions about whether or not they are able to
22 participate and at what points. And I think we get lost
23 in the details of this report and I would like to suggest
24 that we try to filter out those things that may be
25 important and interesting to consider but not specifically

1 relevant to those basic purposes.

2 DR. MORENO: Jim, I wonder if I might not
3 suggest a way out of this but I am sure it will not work.
4 The Radiation Advisory Committee already went through a
5 procedure very much like the one that Alex described and
6 it functioned you might say as kind of a post-hoc IRB and
7 it found reason for concern, I think was the kind of
8 language that was used, about a number of studies that
9 have gotten through a couple of IRB's, both NIH and local
10 boards. Some of those studies involved, for example,
11 substance abuse studies. I think that the advisory
12 committee can cite the Radiation Advisory Committee's work
13 in general, sign on to that and also indicate that there
14 are some specific kinds of studies in these areas that
15 concern us in the same spirit as that of the Radiation
16 Advisory Committee.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Alex? And then I have got
18 Diane and then Bill Freeman.

19 MR. CAPRON: I am happy to see an attempt
20 along the lines that Jonathan just described. I think
21 that we are dealing with something that is more akin to
22 what Henry Beecher faced. I do not think there would have
23 been in the years after 1966 when that article was
24 published the receptivity in the scientific community, the
25 medical community, or the general public, people here at

1 NIH for that matter, to the notion that there really was
2 need for attention to this if it had not been made clear
3 that respected researchers at respected -- publishing in a
4 respected journal had example after example of -- what was
5 the phrase that you just used? It is a questionable --

6 DR. MORENO: Reason to --

7 MR. CAPRON: The questionable concern.

8 DR. MORENO: -- that there are reasons for
9 concern in the current system.

10 MR. CAPRON: There are reasons for concern
11 that the ethical principles are not being applied to a
12 category of research and again it simply says this is
13 something to take seriously. This is not a few people --
14 unhappy people complaining because something bad happened
15 to them. That happens in every field, et cetera, et
16 cetera. This is an area that needs attention. That is
17 all I am trying to say. There are reasons for concern.
18 So I would be happy to see you try to bring these examples
19 in and it should not just be the challenge studies. I
20 quite agree. Those are dramatic examples but I am sure we
21 should look elsewhere. It is not a matter of then saying
22 this is X percentage. We know this to be X percentage of
23 all studies in the field. Either 100 percent or one
24 percent. It is just an example that there are reasons for
25 concern.

1 DR. CHILDRESS: And as has already been noted
2 not only do we have the expressions of concern on the part
3 of the research subjects and families but also on the part
4 of researchers who in a number of the articles supports an
5 indication of the need of clarification. So at least
6 there are several reasons --

7 MR. CAPRON: Yes.

8 DR. CHILDRESS: -- and that perhaps could be
9 elaborated as well.

10 Okay. I am going to take a -- let's see --
11 Diane and then Bill Freeman comment here and then we will
12 see if Alex has any more general comments.

13 MR. CAPRON: I do not.

14 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay.

15 DR. SCOTT-JONES: I have a comment about what
16 I thought Alex was saying earlier. Alex, it seemed like
17 you were raising a general issue of whether researchers
18 exist in sort of a separate subculture with a different
19 perhaps set of values and standards for their own behavior
20 and I do not know if we need to comment on that in our
21 document but I believe that what you are suggesting is, in
22 fact, true to some extent among researchers because a
23 researcher's goal is generalizable knowledge and it is to
24 the researcher's interest in pursuing that goal to enroll
25 everyone in a study who is eligible for it.

1 But if on the other hand we have informed
2 voluntary participation in informed consent that means
3 that some subset of those people ought to be able to
4 decline to participate and that is good for them. In the
5 researcher's world that is bad when any one person
6 refuses. So there is inherently a separateness of the
7 researcher's goal from the goals of persons who are
8 considering whether to participate.

9 I think we have to recognize that and not
10 pretend that does not exist. For many researchers the
11 attention that is given to ethics represents an obstacle
12 to their conducting their research on an everyday basis
13 and they dislike it enormously.

14 Although I agree with what Laurie is
15 suggesting that people are probably well intentioned but
16 in the real research world on an everyday basis many
17 people dislike enormously the fact that they have to go
18 through this process and I suppose we should recognize
19 that but somehow I am not quite sure how we do that. But
20 it certainly exists.

21 DR. CHILDRESS: I take it Alex though was also
22 making a further claim that within this subset of
23 researchers --

24 DR. SCOTT-JONES: It is especially bad.

25 DR. CHILDRESS: -- it is -- right. So, you

1 know, that is probably the issue.

2 MR. CAPRON: I think even -- I mean, I
3 actually do not think that Laurie and I are that far
4 apart. I mean her very comment that this group of
5 researchers has faced obstacles themselves and has not
6 been as appreciated by their scientific colleagues --
7 maybe part of the difficulty is the difficulty of
8 conducting research in this field as well as the
9 frustrations of understanding the mechanisms of the
10 diseases involved have made it harder to have the kinds of
11 concrete findings. Now that can lead several different
12 ways.

13 It can mean that you are a separate culture to
14 a certain extent and it can also mean that your drive to
15 break through that barrier is all this -- I mean, I do not
16 know. I suspect that some of the other things that were
17 criticized -- and Charlie McCarthy's paper which we are
18 talking about later gives us a couple of examples of
19 people working on the far edges of somatic biomedical
20 research, gene therapy and bone marrow transplantation,
21 and some of the people there -- a couple of examples from
22 UCLA -- were of people who stepped over that line. I am
23 sure part of that was that drive to break through and so
24 forth. Sometimes it leads people to do bad things.

25 But their culture that they were in recognized

1 that they were stepping over the line. I get the sense
2 that this is a group of people who when looking at each
3 other's work do not see that they have stepped over the
4 line.

5 MS. BACKLAR: And part of that is because of
6 the population that they are dealing with and that old
7 time long-term stigma that these people are not like us.
8 That still pertains.

9 DR. CHILDRESS: All right. I think there are
10 several directions that have come out. Not all of them
11 are compatible with each other. We will have try to some
12 drafts and maybe even a couple of different versions of
13 structuring this material and then see where we go.

14 Bill gets the last comment.

15 DR. FREEMAN: I am going to try a
16 compatibility thing. It seems to me -- I come at this as
17 an IRB'er. These articles -- this research was reviewed
18 by IRB's. It was also reviewed by grant funding people.
19 It is not just researchers or a bad subgroup of
20 researchers that is the problem. So I think, what Laurie
21 is saying, to focus on people who are doing it -- in fact,
22 there is only one group of people who are involved in the
23 chain of approving this project is incorrect. In fact, we
24 do not know what IRB's and researchers have done that have
25 not done this research. It was proposed to look at this

1 and they did something different that was ethically
2 acceptable.

3 The problem it seems to me is that we, the
4 society, have not had a consensus about what is the
5 meaning of our ethical standards of research in this
6 subset of research, not researchers. There has not been a
7 national commission that has established our consensus.
8 There are not regulations derived from that consensus. In
9 the absence of the consensus do not be surprised if we
10 have what we now consider to be unethical research being
11 proposed and done by ethical researchers and ethical
12 IRB'ers and ethical grant funding agencies. I think maybe
13 focusing on society is the way to look at it.

14 MS. FLYNN: Thank you.

15 MR. CAPRON: Let me if I may just add one
16 analogy to a different field that we have dealt with in
17 our cloning report where it does not touch the
18 sensitivities of people around the table as much. We had
19 no problem in saying that one of the reasons why we
20 thought the so-called private sector needed to be
21 addressed was that the subset of people working on the
22 infertility field were apparently willing to do things
23 which a lot of others looking on in society thought were
24 stepping over the line and that if cloning was the kind of
25 thing that they could do technically this would not be a

1 group that had shown itself as subjects to self-regulation
2 as for example people doing heart transplants or
3 something. An equally cutting edge field.

4 So that there are times when we have
5 recognized that within the broader group of biomedical
6 acts there may be a subgroup that seems to have its own
7 subculture which sometimes raises questions for us and we
8 did not have any problems, I think, with that and the
9 implications that we needed to address.

10 DR. CHILDRESS: Harold, and let me also then
11 just see if there are any final comments on the broad
12 topic, and I think a number of important issues have come
13 out regarding the overall structure and direction and tone
14 of the report, and I think that we can work out some of
15 these that will be much further along in the report.

16 DR. SHAPIRO: Again, I think you are still in
17 the area of overall structure and motivation. I very much
18 associated myself with Alex's comments. This is a very
19 important report. More important than any other report we
20 have written so far and involves what we will do in the
21 future but it is really important in an important area and
22 so we have to be cognizant of that.

23 I also think it is good to have what I call a
24 parsimonious principle regarding motivation. That is we
25 ought to attribute motivations only when it is necessary.

1 Otherwise we just ought to be silent on motivations and in
2 all the issues that have come up today we really -- I
3 would not say all, most of them -- we could use the
4 parsimonious principle because there are very strong
5 compelling reasons to reach the same conclusion without
6 worrying about whether someone worries about money or
7 worries about professional advancement or just concerned
8 about disease or whatever. I just think that is helpful
9 as we go through this.

10 And in some areas -- and this is a small point
11 really because it only comes up one or two times, if we --
12 some areas are settled by data, information. And when
13 that is settled we ought to have the information or we
14 ought not to opine on it. So, for example, let me take a
15 very small, not very direct example, a not very important
16 example. That is we say that private funding, meaning by
17 this case corporate funding, has added a new dimension to
18 this which is important somewhere. I have forgotten
19 exactly where it is.

20 Well, maybe that is true and maybe it is not
21 true but it is set-able by knowing, you know, what
22 proportion of this now compared to ten years ago is here.
23 And so in those cases where we find that in the report
24 where data settles the issue we ought to get the data
25 together and it is the same point Alex made in

1 relationship to his review of the literature on another
2 issue all together.

3 MR. CAPRON: Would you accept one comment on
4 that? I agree with everything you have said and I
5 certainly do not think we want to attribute motivation
6 unnecessarily.

7 There is a difference between attributing
8 motivation and to follow up on your comment about
9 additional corporate funding in the area.

10 If the proportion between basic research
11 funding from NIH and corporate funding shifts and if that
12 corporate funding is mostly on the development of drugs
13 and if we also know that people in those corporate run
14 studies are paid substantial amounts of money for
15 recruiting subjects, et cetera, et cetera, without talking
16 about their motivations or however you want to word it, we
17 should have a risk factor which makes --

18 DR. SHAPIRO: Absolutely.

19 MR. CAPRON: Okay.

20 DR. SHAPIRO: Absolutely.

21 MR. CAPRON: Then we are in agreement.

22 DR. SHAPIRO: Absolutely right. That is
23 exactly right. I agree.

24 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Any last comment on the
25 overall structure and direction we are going?

1 DR. CASSELL: We have gone over a good deal of
2 ground.

3 MR. CAPRON: I know the chairman is worried we
4 are not --

5 DR. CHILDRESS: No, I actually think that --

6 DR. DUMAS: I thought that the first chapter
7 was quite an improvement and I thought that despite the
8 finetuning that is going on now that the second draft
9 really took into consideration a lot of concerns that we
10 had earlier and we have made -- you know, we have come a
11 long way.

12 RESEARCH WITH DECISIONALLY IMPAIRED SUBJECTS

13 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. We are going to turn
14 then to decisional impairment, incapacity and informed
15 consent. And in thinking about each of the areas we are
16 going to look at now, that area, risk and benefits, and
17 procedures, we might also keep in mind the tentative
18 recommendations that have been formulated and think about
19 not only the discussion that builds up the recommendations
20 and we also talked earlier about those in which we need to
21 develop that build up even more, but also the kinds of
22 recommendations that are tentatively proposed. So as you
23 are working on this area if that is possible to keep in
24 mind then do so.

25 I have Arturo first and then Diane, and then

1 Eric on the decisional impairment, incapacity and informed
2 consent. The discussion that runs throughout the report.

3 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Jim, could I ask a question
4 before we begin that? So then are we pleased with the
5 placement of the historical chapter?

6 DR. CHILDRESS: That is actually a good
7 structural question. Did you have a comment about the
8 placement of the historical chapter?

9 DR. SCOTT-JONES: We are skipping it in our
10 discussion. Are we pleased with --

11 DR. CHILDRESS: Well, these are not simply
12 chapters but rather themes that run throughout.

13 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Okay.

14 DR. CHILDRESS: But we have not talked about
15 that. Any comment --

16 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Then I can hold off on it.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: No, I think this -- before we
18 get into this, why don't we go ahead and make any comment
19 about the -- the question has to do with the placement of
20 the historical chapter, chapter two. Did you want to make
21 a comment about it?

22 DR. SCOTT-JONES: I am not sure. I guess it
23 is okay to hold it until we finish our discussion but I
24 think we should consider where it belongs because I think
25 it fits great as it is. I am just not sure about the

1 transition from one part of the report to another.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: Yes. We will certainly need
3 to work on transitions but any quick thought about the
4 placement of historical discussion? We had some
5 discussion of that last time and thus it became the second
6 chapter.

7 MS. CHARO: Jim?

8 DR. CHILDRESS: Yes, Alta.

9 MS. CHARO: I think it may be difficult to
10 make comments about it now because in light of the last
11 round of discussion it may turn out that the historical
12 chapter will wind up being folded into that because of the
13 need to provide explanation for the assertions that
14 underline this vision of a kind of synergy of factors so
15 maybe it makes sense to just leave that until Jonathan has
16 had a chance to struggle with the writing problem.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. All right. Arturo?

18 DR. BRITO: We are up to chapter three now.

19 DR. CHILDRESS: And again it is not simply
20 chapter three but rather the way in which these issues
21 about decisional impairment, incapacity and informed
22 consent are dealt with in the document, but especially in
23 chapters marked three and four.

24 DR. BRITO: Well, I am trying to process a lot
25 of what I heard this morning and relate it to this

1 subtopic, I guess. The difficulty I am still having is
2 the section titled "Impairment Versus Incapacity." In the
3 context of what we heard this morning about distinguishing
4 between those that are temporarily incapacitated and those
5 that have impairment, and maybe Laurie can help us with
6 this and enlightening us a little bit on this because my
7 previous readings on people that have cognitive or mental
8 illness have been found not to be -- not to be able to
9 consent for their own research.

10 Is that not right, Laurie? You mentioned
11 something this morning about that you do not believe that
12 to be true. You believe that people that would have
13 mental illness can consent to their own research most of
14 the time. Is that -- did I interpret that correctly?

15 MS. FLYNN: Yes, that is correct. The people
16 who have psychiatric illnesses can give informed consent
17 most of the time. In other words, they are not floridly
18 symptomatic or incapacitated most of the time, most of the
19 people. There are, of course, some few very unfortunate
20 individuals who are incapacitated a great deal of the
21 time. That population, as Alta indicated earlier, is
22 perhaps worthy of special focus because they are very
23 frequently in institutional care. But most people
24 participating in most research today are not those
25 individuals and they are mostly capable of participating

1 in consent procedures.

2 MS. BACKLAR: And there is data to uphold
3 this.

4 MS. FLYNN: Yes.

5 MS. BACKLAR: And the McCarthy studies.

6 MS. FLYNN: Yes, there is a recent rigorous
7 look at this issue that provides support for that premise.

8 DR. BRITO: So along those lines maybe there
9 should be emphasis on that somewhere in here and I am not
10 sure quite where --

11 MS. FLYNN: Well, that was, I think, the point
12 of the comment I was making earlier this morning about
13 tone.

14 DR. MORENO: This is incapacity in particular,
15 right, Laurie?

16 MR. CAPRON: On page 41 you have impairment
17 versus incapacity but you are saying --

18 DR. BRITO: Maybe emphasize that point within
19 that --

20 MR. CAPRON: -- the gradation and the temporal
21 nature.

22 DR. CHILDRESS: So the end of the first
23 paragraph on 41 -- I think that sentence captures much of
24 what you are getting at but I take it you are calling for
25 a fuller elaboration.

1 DR. BRITO: A little more elaboration than
2 that general topic.

3 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay.

4 MR. CAPRON: I understand the comment
5 differently. It is not --

6 DR. MORENO: It is decision specific capacity.

7 MR. CAPRON: It is decision specific and it is
8 time specific.

9 DR. MORENO: Right. Time in the course of the
10 illness.

11 MR. CAPRON: In the course of the illness.

12 DR. MORENO: Yes. Got that. Thank you.

13 DR. BRITO: Other than that when I initially
14 read it I thought it was -- the organization was pretty
15 good and as a tone I did not find it difficult. Now after
16 I am reprocessing the information and from what I heard
17 this morning of the overall tone so it was taken out of
18 context so right now I do not have any other comments.

19 DR. SHAPIRO: Could I just ask a question,
20 Laurie? I just want to make sure I can understand the
21 comment. You say most of the people who participate in
22 these as human subjects in these areas are for most of the
23 time they are perfectly capable of making decisions.

24 MS. FLYNN: Yes.

25 DR. SHAPIRO: Now, I am just trying to think

1 of what image that is and it is easy or difficult to know
2 when they are able and when they are unable.

3 MS. FLYNN: That is right.

4 DR. SHAPIRO: Is it easy or is it difficult?
5 I am asking a question. I did not mean to --

6 MS. FLYNN: I am not a clinician but as a
7 layperson it is pretty easy to tell.

8 DR. SHAPIRO: Pretty easy to tell.

9 MS. FLYNN: It is pretty easy to tell when
10 someone who has a psychiatric -- long-term psychiatric
11 illness is in good shape and is capable functional and
12 able to understand a process and repeat information and it
13 is pretty easy to tell when they are not organized and
14 able to make those kinds of decisions. Now as a layperson
15 I could tell and I am quite sure that there is a finer way
16 for clinicians to test the limits of that incapacity.

17 MS. BACKLAR: But there are two things. One
18 is as Paul Appelbaum told us when he was here that
19 understanding works better if the information is given by
20 element rather than all at one time and that is not
21 necessarily different from the general population.

22 MS. FLYNN: That is right.

23 MS. BACKLAR: But the other issue is that
24 Appelbaum and Griso (?) have put together what they call a
25 clinical tool to assess patient's capacities to make

1 treatment decisions and I had hoped that this paper could
2 have been given around today and I think it would be very
3 useful if somebody would xerox it and you all look at it.
4 And within 15 minutes a clinician can assess a person's
5 capacity to make treatment decisions according to this
6 particular tool and the research that has gone on. So
7 that is more data in terms of that.

8 DR. CHILDRESS: And I think we could build
9 more on the Griso-Appelbaum discussion than we do in this
10 report.

11 MS. BACKLAR: That is what I had -- one of my
12 remarks.

13 DR. CHILDRESS: Yes.

14 MS. FLYNN: The concern just is that there is
15 -- there is a widespread perception that by virtue of the
16 diagnosis of a serious mental illness you are incapable
17 and incompetent all or much of the time, and that is not
18 correct and I want to see greater emphasis over time on
19 engaging and appropriately educating and informing and
20 creating active partnership with subjects in research
21 rather than the emphasis that they are all incapacitated,
22 they are all vulnerable. It is a stigmatizing and it is
23 an inaccurate portrayal of what really exists and it tends
24 to lead us in directions different than the ones I think
25 we want to go, which is to much more effectively inform,

1 engage and create partnerships with these subjects.

2 DR. BRITO: And by --

3 DR. CHILDRESS: I am sorry, Arturo.

4 DR. BRITO: I was just saying by elaborating
5 on this point we can get back to Laurie's earlier comment,
6 too, about emphasizing that most research and most
7 researchers are not doing unethical research and we do not
8 want to persuade people not to do research and I think by
9 doing this there is more of a positive outlook on it and
10 it is also I think putting a little more burden on -- or
11 the onus of the proof of the informed choice on the
12 researcher would help in that manner also. But I am not
13 really sure where to address this in this or how to
14 address it right now.

15 DR. CHILDRESS: But certainly the comments
16 that have been made, including the last one about the
17 relational aspects, those can be developed at greater
18 length with appropriate kind of support in this section
19 and with attention to the tone issues that have been
20 raised.

21 Alex?

22 MR. CAPRON: Well, I just wanted to note that
23 it may be that Alta's early comment about the need for
24 some differentiation will arise more here because if we
25 are talking about Alzheimer's patients or others with

1 progressive forms of dementia the rosier picture that
2 Laurie has painted is different. But we are also talking
3 about research that proceeds on the presumption that
4 subjects are free to withdraw at the point where research
5 becomes problematic for them, which is our general
6 presumption research, we have to recognize that that may
7 not coincide either because of the nature of the illness
8 or because of the challenges, and I do not mean by
9 challenge studies alone, but the effects of the research
10 process itself may render the subject during the research
11 less able to exercise that degree of self-protection.

12 MS. FLYNN: And that is important.

13 MR. CAPRON: And that is an important point to
14 keep in mind as we talk about procedural protections.

15 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Arturo, anything else?

16 DR. BRITO: Not right now.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Diane?

18 DR. SCOTT-JONES: I will just make a few
19 comments. I must say that I have trouble getting the
20 sense of this chapter because I had to flip back and forth
21 from pages because my pages were xeroxed in a very odd way
22 so I do not probably have the sense of reading it from
23 beginning to end of this chapter but the main things here
24 are the informed aspect of this and then the voluntary
25 aspect of this. And this is related to a point I was

1 trying to make earlier, we need to think about consenting
2 to what, not just the person's own internal capacity or
3 lack of capacity. And there is some discussion here, and
4 I think it is very important and might need to be detailed
5 more about how the information is actually presented to
6 the person who needs to give consent. This is true
7 generally not just of persons who have some mental
8 disorder or some demonstrated impairment.

9 Sometimes consent letters are in very small
10 type but even when I read them myself I miss some of it
11 because it is so difficult just physically to read it so
12 there are all sorts of things like that that can be done
13 to make consent easier. I think the report might
14 highlight that more because remember it is not just a
15 person consenting in the abstract, you are consenting in a
16 specific situation in a specific context so I would
17 probably like to see more on that.

18 The issue of a consent auditor is discussed in
19 detail here. I am not quite sure how we are going to come
20 down on that in the end or exactly what I think about that
21 but I think that is something that is worth discussion.
22 And then the voluntary nature of this could perhaps use
23 some more attention because we do not think as much about
24 how a research participant may feel a sense of obedience
25 to someone perceived as an authority. They may feel some

1 emotional dependence on other persons so the notion of
2 whether this is voluntary and you can demonstrate that the
3 person has voluntarily consented is one that we might want
4 to think about more. Again that is mentioned in here in a
5 couple of the paragraphs. But those are my main three
6 concerns about this is consenting in a particular context
7 what type of information is typically given, whether there
8 is actual voluntariness, and the role of the consent
9 auditor if we are to go towards that type of a
10 recommendation.

11 I believe at the last meeting Harold mentioned
12 something about having a person who represents that
13 population help with the consent process like appear who
14 actually helps with the consent process. I do not know
15 how that would work but I think those are three things
16 that maybe we ought to talk about in terms of our
17 recommendations.

18 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. So unless -- at this
19 point unless people want to jump in more -- we could get
20 to recommendations which I have asked people to keep in
21 mind as we went along, but does anyone want to address any
22 aspect of Diane's comments?

23 MS. FLYNN: If I could just make one comment
24 following up on what I -- her last point. I would believe
25 that it is there -- that there is some utility and if it

1 is practical exploring the suggestion that I think did
2 come from Harold initially that there may be some ways for
3 IRB's or research groups to involve representatives of the
4 community involved in the research as consultants, as
5 advocates, as providing some input and oversight to the
6 consent forms and the consent process that may or may not
7 be in any way the same as the consent monitoring or
8 auditor that has discussed in other places.

9 But it is an appropriate kind of an outreach
10 to the community of individuals and their families who are
11 part of this research. There is great willingness, I
12 think, across many of these decisionally incapacitated
13 communities to provide that kind of input and it might
14 help to break down some of the isolation of that research
15 community that Alex has continued to reference his
16 concerns about.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Other comments? Harold?

18 DR. SHAPIRO: I have a comment. It is, in
19 part, taking a step backwards but if this inappropriate
20 now, Jim, I would come back to it later. As I looked at
21 these early chapters there were really some interesting
22 things to me as the history rolls out, as it rolls out
23 through the description -- helpful descriptions that
24 Jonathan has given it.

25 One is that although for much of the general

1 public, myself included, Nuremberg stands as a huge kind
2 of event that always colors one's view towards these
3 things but the history -- putting that aside for the
4 moment, but the history is one of extraordinarily well
5 meaning people doing things which in retrospect we do not
6 think really continued to be appropriate. I think that is
7 important to keep in mind here.

8 It is not that there is a lot of bad -- there
9 are some bad people but it is not like there were a lot of
10 bad people and they are always getting us into trouble.
11 It was that they were very well-meaning people who did
12 things which in retrospect we now think we no longer
13 continue doing and it seemed to me that was a helpful
14 thing that came from reading this all at once.

15 But the much more important part of this is
16 Jonathan traces from Nuremberg to Helsinki through various
17 other national -- our own national commission, of course,
18 and the other commission which is differing attitudes
19 towards this. I think it would be helpful, Jim, that at
20 whatever the appropriate point is for us to have some
21 discussion of exactly those issues. They have evolved.
22 They have changed. The national commission changed what
23 some previous commissions have changed and so on and now
24 we are going to do something and it may be helpful to see
25 whether we have some agreement or some assessment

1 ourselves of that evolving history and where we want to
2 focus ourselves on it.

3 Now that may be something we want to discuss
4 much later. I was not sure whether it should come at this
5 point or not.

6 DR. CHILDRESS: What do you want to do?

7 DR. SHAPIRO: I am not eager to discuss it
8 right now.

9 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Let's flag it then and
10 come back to it and let's get -- let's see, Diane, did you
11 finish everything you wanted to get out?

12 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Yes.

13 DR. CHILDRESS: So then we will turn to Eric
14 and then we will finish up the discussion of decision
15 impairment, incapacity and informed consent.

16 DR. CASSELL: Well, my comment is that I am
17 troubled and I am still having Sunday dementia but it
18 really --

19 (Simultaneous discussion.)

20 DR. CASSELL: -- it really follows on Harold's
21 point.

22 Jonathan talks about on page --

23 DR. CHILDRESS: By the way we are using
24 Jonathan here as a name for --

25 DR. MORENO: This is the name for the

1 document.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: -- for the evolving report.

3 (Simultaneous discussion.)

4 DR. CHILDRESS: The evolving report.

5 DR. CASSELL: The evolving report, not to be
6 ascribed to any individual.

7 It talks about the standards for the ability -
8 - for decisional incapacity. But there is a historical
9 point that I think is important and that is that in the
10 1960's when people were talking about decisional
11 incapacity they were talking about something called
12 autonomy in which a person ought to be able to exercise
13 their autonomy. And in those days the idea of autonomy
14 was really a quite naive one that anybody in the same
15 position given that would come up with the same conclusion
16 like a contian way of seeing autonomy. But in subsequent
17 years we are not quite so naive about that and we really
18 know that the environment and the context all have an
19 influence on what somebody is doing at any particular
20 point. I take it that you recognize that in these
21 discussions.

22 On the other hand what is the consequence of
23 recognizing that? That is our problem. Do we -- and in
24 the 1960's you could give a person a piece of paper and it
25 would not matter if the paper had settled down from the

1 ceiling, somebody could exercise. But we really know that
2 is not true anymore. So -- and you really point that out.
3 But what is the consequence of that?

4 So I really think in a way we ought to pick up
5 on the suggestion about the history but also pick up on
6 our concept of what it meant to be -- what it means to
7 understand the nature of the research, to appreciate, to
8 exhibit ability and so forth.

9 On Friday I saw an 18 year old woman who had
10 been having sex with a previous intravenous drug user,
11 unprotected intercourse -- I mean she used birth control
12 pills but without a condom -- for a year-and-a-half and
13 then she got all upset because she discovered he had
14 another partner and now maybe she could get AIDS.

15 Well, I am not talking about somebody who is
16 decisionally impaired in any way we might say but most of
17 us would think that is decisional impairment. Her reason,
18 "I loved him."

19 DR. SCOTT-JONES: That is emotion.

20 DR. CASSELL: Well, but people who are sick
21 have emotion too and people who want to help have emotion
22 and we have not figured out yet how to deal with that kind
23 of problem and maybe we cannot figure it out. I do not
24 know. Maybe we cannot. But on the other hand I do not
25 think we can entirely duck it and see the historical

1 difference between the 1960's understanding of autonomy
2 and what might be in 1990.

3 DR. MORENO: I just want to say I second that
4 emotion.

5 (Laughter.)

6 DR. CHILDRESS: Diane has pointed several
7 times now about context, who, what and relationality, and
8 I think put it very well.

9 DR. CASSELL: Yes.

10 DR. CHILDRESS: Diane?

11 DR. SCOTT-JONES: This is what I was trying to
12 say in my earlier comment about whether you can claim that
13 participation is voluntary because there is an emotional
14 relationship that is going on when someone asks you to
15 comply with them. You feel something as well as think.
16 So I think that is really important. We are not just --

17 DR. CASSELL: Whitehead in the 20's talks
18 about the -- how affect influences sensory input.

19 DR. CHILDRESS: Now, Eric, let me be clear,
20 would your suggestions then follow the lines that Diane
21 has already proposed?

22 DR. CASSELL: Yes.

23 DR. CHILDRESS: Or are you --

24 DR. CASSELL: No, and also the historical. To
25 pick up and to show that it is not just what Diane said

1 but to show that it is not --

2 DR. CHILDRESS: Right.

3 DR. CASSELL: -- we used to have a different
4 belief because we were just coming to believe about
5 autonomy in this setting and now we are beginning to
6 change. We still believe people ought to make autonomous
7 choices but we have a different meaning by those words
8 than we did numbers of years ago. In part, because a
9 document like this is an educational document. It does
10 not just come up with conclusions or recommendations. It
11 is an attempt to educate a public and to bring them up to
12 the same point that we think we are.

13 DR. CHILDRESS: I think the distinction in
14 part is whether you are working with an ideal of autonomy
15 that says decisions ought to be made in a certain kind of
16 rational way versus respecting people's autonomous choices
17 which may build in emotion and a whole new --

18 DR. CASSELL: Yes.

19 DR. CHILDRESS: -- and the informed consent
20 part of this is really an effort to get at the issue of
21 respecting their autonomous choices.

22 DR. CASSELL: Well, I --

23 (Simultaneous discussion.)

24 MR. CAPRON: Would the gentleman from New York
25 accept the possibility that this is a topic being of

1 general application that deserves further elaboration and
2 thought by the commission and again that we might in this
3 report signal our recognition that the changed use of the
4 term be equally applicable here but that what we are
5 focusing on here is, as the Chairman has just said, is the
6 question of respect for this group of persons at least at
7 the level that they -- that this respect is accorded to
8 others even if that respect was built on a theory that
9 overemphasize the rational side of "autonomous" choice.

10 DR. CASSELL: Well, I --

11 MR. CAPRON: Our educational document that
12 reexplores the other -- and I do not mean to dismiss it,
13 Eric. I just --

14 DR. CASSELL: Okay. I understand.

15 MR. CAPRON: I am just worried about trying to
16 do too many things at once.

17 DR. CASSELL: The gentleman from New York is
18 not an oxymoron.

19 (Laughter.)

20 MR. CAPRON: I would stop right there.

21 DR. CASSELL: I would like to say that you are
22 either in it or you are not in it. You cannot in a way
23 say we are going to address this and later on we will go
24 on without referencing that. If you say in this document
25 this is a larger concern, blah, blah, blah, and we intend

1 to address it later, fine. But you cannot partly get in
2 it and not --

3 MR. CAPRON: I would happily see us assign an
4 appropriation of our funds towards that study and commit
5 ourselves to it. I am very serious.

6 DR. CASSELL: All right.

7 MR. CAPRON: But without saying that in a
8 topic that is already complex enough that we would take
9 this as the occasion for --

10 DR. CASSELL: I think we should index it.

11 MR. CAPRON: Okay.

12 DR. CHILDRESS: And also suggestions of
13 what --

14 DR. CASSELL: So we are in agreement.

15 DR. CHILDRESS: -- suggestions about possible
16 people to write such a paper and we will get it because as
17 we look ahead --

18 (Simultaneous discussion.)

19 DR. CHILDRESS: -- and some are already
20 underway, other studies are underway and we are getting
21 the min --

22 DR. CASSELL: Some more of the discussion.

23 DR. CHILDRESS: I just got in the one on -- a
24 draft of the one on community for example. So we have
25 others coming in and we have Celia Fisher's paper on

1 relationality. So we need to -- we are building up now
2 some larger conceptual papers for our work.

3 Alta gets the final word before the break.
4 Eric is already taking his break.

5 (Laughter.)

6 MS. CHARO: Will the gentleman from New York -

7 -

8 (Simultaneous discussion.)

9 DR. CHILDRESS: All right, Alta.

10 MS. CHARO: You know in the spirit of always
11 plotting your own course I find myself in this section
12 wondering again why we make the distinction we do between
13 children and those who suffer from a variety of
14 impairments in their decision making ability since most
15 children I know are fundamentally decisionally impaired.
16 It may be species typical normal for their age but they
17 are the nonetheless impaired with respect to competent
18 decision making.

19 In the struggle to understand that, which I
20 think actually can become useful because it helps to
21 reveal the differences and similarities and the conditions
22 which lead to some reflections in the terms of
23 recommendations, differences and similarities in
24 recommendations, things that you might want to move the
25 attention to also because when you have juvenile research

1 of people with mental illness you do not want
2 recommendations that will yield regulatory requirements
3 that are in conflict with one another.

4 I found that actually begins to play back into
5 the idea that in the context of the history and the
6 synergistic effects of the factors that have led to the
7 treatment of people in this area being so inadequate we
8 may need to pay attention to the -- how to put this? I am
9 not doing this very well.

10 We may need to think about looking at the
11 decision making problem specifically in the context of a
12 person with a particular kind of illness in a particular
13 kind of setting in a particular kind of relationship.
14 Setting being inpatient, outpatient. Relationship being
15 with a stranger PI, with a therapeutic caregiver who is
16 suddenly turning into a PI, with which kinds of family or
17 informal caregivers being second representatives because
18 these are the things that begin to distinguish the
19 situation of those with mental illnesses from the
20 situation of children and may help to understand why it is
21 that certain kinds of protections are triggered in one
22 situation versus another.

23 So in some ways I think that an effort at page
24 41 to better spell out why we do not treat children as a
25 subcategory for decisionally impaired, which would make

1 sense if you were focusing solely on cognitive function,
2 might lead naturally into a discussion about the
3 interaction of these factors as well as the historical
4 treatment of children versus people with mental illness,
5 neither one of which has been very good but it has been
6 very bad for different reasons.

7 It might lead to some recommendations that
8 will have different triggers for different protections
9 than the ones we are now contemplating.

10 Am I making any sense or am I desperately in
11 need of more coffee?

12 DR. MORENO: I am not sure how it would fall
13 out. In other words, all of the factors you mentioned,
14 institutionalization, dependence and so forth are true
15 with children also.

16 MS. CHARO: Not --

17 DR. MORENO: But there are other factors I can
18 think of that would not be --

19 MS. CHARO: But what I am --

20 DR. MORENO: -- a history of having no
21 decisions for example.

22 MS. CHARO: When I first wrote the comment on
23 the page I have got to tell you that it was a challenge.
24 Like why struggle to make the distinction? Why not just
25 treat children as a subcategory because almost every

1 problem that you have identified is present with children
2 as well and yet I know that we make -- I mean, I
3 understand that there are some situational differences
4 that are relevant.

5 For example, the caregivers in the case of
6 children, being the parental figures almost exclusively,
7 right. I think stands in a different relationship than
8 many family members, particularly peer family members,
9 siblings or parents of older mentally ill patients in
10 terms of the kind of emotional dynamic or protectiveness.
11 It is just a different thing. It is kind of an age
12 dependent phenomenon.

13 Second, you are frequently -- children have
14 not historically been viewed the same way. They have been
15 viewed as unimportant from a decision point of view but
16 they are not viewed as alien and in some ways distasteful,
17 right, which I think is critical of the distinction of how
18 they are guarded by the caregivers as well as by the PI's.

19 But an attempt to try and distinguish children
20 from other people with difficulty making decisions I think
21 we may be revealing some of the key -- like combinatorial
22 factors that lead to the recommendations and it may, as I
23 was saying, also lead to some thinking about triggers for
24 particular protections like consent monitors or double
25 consent and things like that. It may not but I just

1 thought it might be worth struggling harder on page 41 on
2 the notion of impairment.

3 DR. CHILDRESS: And you will be glad to work
4 with Jonathan along those lines?

5 MS. CHARO: More effectively than I did last
6 month.

7 DR. CHILDRESS: We will take the last comment
8 from Diane and then we will go take our break.

9 DR. SCOTT-JONES: I would just like to say I
10 like what I envision from what Alta is saying about laying
11 everything out but in the case of children I think it is
12 different, Alta, because parents are legally responsible
13 for the children. They have a responsibility and they
14 have legal rights over their children. So they are
15 different immediately.

16 MS. CHARO: Yes, I agree. But with many
17 people who are mentally ill there is a legal guardian
18 present who has all the same requisites of a parent over a
19 child.

20 MS. FLYNN: Sometimes it is a parent.

21 MS. CHARO: And sometimes it is. In fact,
22 probably not infrequently it is the parent. But it might
23 be the parent of a now adult person who has a mental
24 illness and I think that actually changes things. Indeed,
25 it just changes the parent-child relationship.

1 DR. CHILDRESS: All right. Let's take an
2 eight minute break.

3 (A brief break was taken.)

4 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Let's go ahead and
5 resume. Is there anything else we need to discuss? I
6 think several good suggestions came out regarding
7 decisional impairment, incapacity and informed consent for
8 putting that discussion in a larger context but also
9 focusing fairly specifically on the relational issues as
10 well. So I think that we have gained some clarity on the
11 directions there. But is there anything else anyone wants
12 to add before we turn to risk and benefits?

13 Okay. I have Alta, Rhetaugh and Eric.
14 Rhetaugh, since you are the only one here you get to --

15 DR. DUMAS: I am the only one here. I get my
16 point with my time.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: You get your's in first.

18 DR. DUMAS: I think that the -- this chapter
19 reflects the lack of clarity and the contradictory nature
20 of work so far on these issues. As I understand it what
21 we are attempting to deal with are conditions that will
22 justify and those that would probably prohibit research on
23 subjects who have decisional impairment.

24 I think that what is needed, and this
25 certainly is borne out in the text of the chapter, are

1 clear definitions of these conditions. So far there are
2 two concepts to reflect the conditions and they are risks
3 and benefits. And in talking about risks it seems to me
4 that the definition is limited to risk of harm or
5 discomfort and it is further qualified, you know, minimal
6 risk and greater than minimal risk.

7 But if I had to use this as any type of
8 guidance I would still be left to my own devices for
9 determining what is it -- you know, how to detect
10 discomfort, how to measure discomfort or harm, and then I
11 think the benefits are defined similarly. That is if it
12 is something that will -- has a probability of benefiting
13 the subject directly or if it is something that benefits
14 the subject indirectly or not at all.

15 And I think that there are recommendations
16 that tailor these definitions. Although as I say the
17 definitions are vague. So we might have ways to -- we
18 might have guidelines or even regulations related to these
19 but until we gain some clarity about what it is we mean by
20 the risks and the benefits we will still have considerable
21 problems.

22 So I think that there is some necessity to be
23 a little bit more specific about the measurement. Not
24 that I expect this document would instruct people how to
25 measure risks and benefits as much as to determine that

1 they need to be better defined. I am not sure whether
2 this committee ought to get into those definitions but
3 rather say what should be considered in defining them.
4 Some broader guidelines.

5 I think that relates to my continuing concern
6 about questions like how do we determine risk and
7 benefits. Who determines them? On what basis? And what
8 measures do we have to avoid conflicts of interest and
9 other possibilities of bias?

10 DR. CHILDRESS: I think you are right to
11 suggest that part of the difficulty here is the way in
12 which much of the rest of the discussion and applicable
13 issues surrounding research involving human subjects, much
14 of the rest of that discussion has failed on this point
15 also and has left things relatively unclear and we are in
16 the position of having to relate this to the way in which
17 minimal risk is understood in relation to children, for
18 example. And the question is how much progress we can
19 make in this particular document.

20 DR. DUMAS: I tend to vasculate on this. I
21 would like to give people -- I would like to make this
22 document a very clear overview of the numbers and the
23 problems inherent in making decisions about the
24 involvement of human subjects and research in general and
25 the involvement of this subgroup in research more

1 specifically. And what kinds of conditions pertain in
2 general and furthermore specifically. And then how do we
3 decide -- who should make the determination about the
4 conditions, at what point or points, and then what kind of
5 guidance can be provided for making those determinations.

6 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Before opening it for
7 discussion let me go ahead and get Alta and Eric in on the
8 risk and benefits and we will get all the points out and
9 then see what in general or specific things we need to do
10 for this subject.

11 MS. CHARO: First, building on what Rhetaugh
12 was suggesting I do not think that in this report we can
13 define minimal risk with regulatory language that is going
14 to be superior to what exists because that is bigger than
15 this report. However, what we could choose to do in this
16 report is to say given the acknowledged problems with the
17 language and the variable interpretations, all of which
18 are referenced in here.

19 Is it acceptable for this population to
20 continue using those categories at all or should we be
21 searching for a different way to structure the rules
22 governing when you can enroll and under what conditions?
23 And that is a legitimate inquiry. Are the problems with
24 these definitions so overwhelming that we need to simply
25 abandon them versus these are problems, we acknowledge

1 them, they are generic, they go to deeper issues, not only
2 regulatory language, but in -- as we will talk about this
3 afternoon -- the role of the federal government in helping
4 IRB's and the placement of the organs of government that
5 are going to be doing that in helping to provide
6 definitive interpretations or super adjudicatory powers,
7 et cetera.

8 DR. MORENO: Alta, I am sorry, I am just
9 unclear. You mean -- by the language you mean minimal or
10 greater -- or nonminimal as the --

11 MS. CHARO: That is correct.

12 DR. MORENO: -- trigger for all the other
13 protections?

14 MS. CHARO: That is right.

15 DR. MORENO: Okay.

16 MS. CHARO: So that might be a discussion you
17 would want to engage through here, right. Are the
18 problems big enough that we want to abandon it and go to
19 something that is a straight risk benefit comparison and
20 abandon staging of protections based on definitions of
21 minimal and nonminimal.

22 Another thing that might be worth doing to
23 help deepen that discussion would be to acknowledge the
24 interaction between minimal risk and things like expedited
25 review so that we begin to see at a regulatory level, at

1 the local IRB level, the implications of this kind of
2 language for review of human subjects generally and how
3 that would play out. And that -- the beginning of kind of
4 documenting that might make it easier for us to then
5 discuss it as a policy question in terms of
6 recommendations.

7 The second independent comment, and it will be
8 the last one I make, is on the way in which we think about
9 financial incentives in the context of benefits. We are -
10 - in the discussions beginning on page 83 and going on to
11 84 -- assuming that monetary benefits are indirect.
12 Monetary benefits are actually so distinct that it may be
13 worth just listing them separately because in this context
14 where frequently there is going to be a second person
15 involved in the consent process, a second person who may
16 be, in fact, exercising some kind of legal authority over
17 the life circumstances and finances of the human subject.

18 The financial incentive question gets more
19 interesting because however you define direct or indirect
20 the benefit the question becomes who is going to be
21 actually receiving that benefit. This is an issue for
22 children as well. Is it going to be the caregiver who
23 actually receives the benefit or is it going to be the
24 subject?

25 Now for kids this is a very under examined

1 issue and yet you can imagine ways around it like the
2 financial benefits would be in the form of bonds that are
3 going to be accruing for the child's benefit at some time
4 in the future and you can isolate the benefit to guarantee
5 the kid gets it. In these cases that is going to be an
6 even more intriguing problem. How do you ensure that what
7 benefit exists goes to the subject? This is not to cast
8 dispersions on the motivations of the family members but
9 especially as you see on page 85 when you pick up towards
10 the end there is some ambiguity about the basis on which a
11 surrogate decision maker when that is the situation we are
12 in -- some ambiguity about the standard by which the
13 surrogate decision maker makes the decision. Is it based
14 on what they think the subject would have wanted if
15 competent in all senses? Or is it based on the
16 surrogate's own independent decision making?

17 Financial inducements then begin to get
18 particularly problematic. So I was suggesting perhaps we
19 hold that separately from other benefits to allow that
20 discussion to take place.

21 DR. DUMAS: Maybe there might be an argument
22 for defining financial rewards as putting the person at
23 higher risk.

24 MS. CHARO: Because of the inducement to --

25 DR. DUMAS: Because of the inducement.

1 DR. CASSELL: We do that about papers which --

2 MS. CHARO: It is possible. I mean, that is
3 exactly what I am saying. Pull it out so that we can
4 think about it slowly.

5 DR. CHILDRESS: Because direct and indirect
6 does not work well.

7 DR. DUMAS: Right. No, it does not.

8 DR. SCOTT-JONES: But it does need more
9 discussion.

10 MS. CHARO: Yes. The hints are already there
11 and I am just suggesting we go ahead and expand on them.

12 DR. CHILDRESS: Eric? Risk and benefits,
13 anything you want to add?

14 DR. CASSELL: I have very little except I want
15 to pick up on, on something Alta said. Ultimately all of
16 these categories get bureaucratized.

17 MS. CHARO: Yes.

18 DR. CASSELL: So that, for example, the
19 category of minimal risk got bureaucratized, then blood
20 drawing became a minimal, and it obscures what it was
21 meant to do, what the whole thing was meant to do, which I
22 think is one of the points you were really highlighting.
23 Nobody should participate in something that puts them at a
24 risk greater than any benefit they could get. When you
25 start talking about minimal risks you obscure that and you

1 obscure it because you give a bureaucratic way out of
2 somebody really specifying am I going to do harm to this
3 patient.

4 MS. CHARO: Well, see, but you actually do not
5 even mean -- I do not think you really mean what you just
6 said because you would have now just eliminated all
7 nontherapeutic research.

8 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Yes.

9 MS. CHARO: You know, research that is purely
10 exploratory that involved a blood draw. Right? Because
11 the risk would necessarily outweigh the benefit.

12 DR. CASSELL: No, no, no. That is not risk.
13 It is not risk. It is not risk in the sense that the risk
14 with which -- when Alex sends us a research proposal I
15 would say it is not a proposal, it is a piece of research
16 in which people are allowed to be psychotic for a short
17 time. Alex, I do not know why you think that is -- just a
18 few hours of psychosis.

19 (Laughter.)

20 DR. CASSELL: And somebody when they reviewed
21 that must have thought that that was low risk. So my
22 point is not going to excuse that, it is to get rid of
23 that so that people focus on risk. Risk is what risk is.
24 These people were put at risk. Not -- it is not
25 equivalent of drawing blood or they were inconvenienced.

1 It is not inconvenienced. It is risk.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: But there are different kinds
3 of risk. Risk refers only to the probability of some --

4 DR. CASSELL: Something --

5 DR. CHILDRESS: -- adverse outcome they did
6 not know.

7 DR. CASSELL: That is right.

8 DR. CHILDRESS: And you can talk about the
9 probability of something negative happening to a number of
10 these. But what we say about the risk has to do with both
11 how probable it is that a negative outcome will occur and
12 what is the magnitude of that outcome.

13 DR. CASSELL: But then that is what we ought
14 to focus on. If it is magnitude of probability, which of
15 course is what we do in clinical things when you are
16 trying to figure out if something bad is going to happen,
17 it is not just the magnitude, it is the probability.

18 MS. CHARO: Right. But, Eric, does that mean
19 that a blood draw has no risk. As somebody who has had
20 hematomas that go from my wrist to my shoulder from having
21 a blood draw there is a risk. It may be small but if I
22 were incapable of understanding what had happened and if I
23 suffered without understanding, which might be true for
24 people with severe forms of dementia, that is real.
25 Right?

1 Or some of the things we review in our IRB.
2 There is a remote problem -- the remote risk that you are
3 going to yield incontinence.

4 DR. CASSELL: But then you are --

5 MS. CHARO: You know, to some populations
6 incontinence is a huge issue.

7 DR. CASSELL: -- you are making the point.
8 You are making the point that if you get it as a
9 bureaucratic thing and you say there may be a hematoma
10 (black and blue mark) and go on. You have not specified
11 what you just talked about. The magnitude of the meaning
12 of that risk to that person is not there at all.

13 DR. CHILDRESS: Except --

14 DR. CASSELL: Even though you have specified
15 it in the form.

16 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Arturo and Diane,
17 remember the question is given the material we have and we
18 have had some discussions from Rhetaugh and some
19 suggestions from Alta about ways to deal with this body of
20 material, and I am not sure where Eric's suggestions have
21 gone here, but two quick comments and then let's open it
22 up.

23 DR. BRITO: Okay. I am not sure where they
24 are going either. The comment I wanted to make was I
25 think the difficulty is in defining -- physical risk is

1 much easier to define than psychological risk. Like, for
2 instance, I was just briefly looking over one of the
3 articles that Alex gave us on amphetamine induced
4 exacerbated psychotic symptoms.

5 If you look at the subjects -- the methods
6 section, the second paragraph, gives a statement "All
7 subjects were in good physical health as determined by
8 physical exam, EKG, laboratory tests, et cetera." To me
9 that implies that the physicians doing this study actually
10 thought that by making sure they were in good physical
11 condition that there is no risk. So the problem becomes
12 defining minimal or above minimal risk, et cetera, and
13 that is the problem, is defining what truly is a
14 psychological risk.

15 There have been studies on blood draws in
16 children looking at the long-term psychological risk, et
17 cetera, and that is in essence what we are talking about,
18 and a lot of -- and what we are really talking about doing
19 is research on mentally incapacitated individuals which we
20 know very little about. That is why --

21 DR. CASSELL: Well, I am trying --

22 DR. BRITO: -- I think I saw -- are we going
23 to get into -- are we going not get into actually defining
24 what risk is? I misunderstood what you were saying there,
25 Eric.

1 DR. CASSELL: I am trying to go back -- well,
2 let me try and make it simply -- I mean, simplify it for
3 myself. What has happened as a result of previous
4 categorization of levels of risk is a bureaucratization of
5 it that obscures the basic concept of risk so that
6 ultimately the researcher is not focusing on what is my
7 responsibility but towards this person -- that is what
8 risk -- you know, when somebody is at risk --

9 DR. BRITO: Okay.

10 DR. CASSELL: -- somebody else is responsible.

11 DR. BRITO: Right.

12 DR. CASSELL: If there is no risk the
13 responsibility is diminished in that sense. So that it
14 has gotten people away from focusing on their
15 responsibility to avoid harm to a research subject or at
16 least make a research subject know the extent of harm
17 possible so that they can make an informed decision about
18 participation in this research.

19 MS. CHARO: Eric, actually I think I
20 misunderstood you before and let me try out again what I
21 think I -- let me use an example. We were reviewing a
22 protocol that had to do with interviewing people and at
23 one point you asked them about suicidal ideation. It
24 struck us that although that question might be benign in
25 most of the population, but for somebody who actually has

1 been on the edge, that simply asking the question might,
2 in fact, begin to trigger thinking about it in a way that
3 was dangerous. And we asked the PI to help us come up
4 with some literature discussing the phenomenon of suicidal
5 ideation following a discussion about suicidal ideations
6 so we could understand what risk this survey actually
7 posed to this population.

8 So maybe in some ways what you are talking
9 about imbedding the discussions about minimal risk versus
10 nonminimal risk perhaps more closely in the discussion
11 about the need to individualized the discussion of risk
12 first to this particular population being studied and then
13 potentially to the particular subject being recruited and
14 in that way begin to go away from the suggestion that
15 people have made of having classic examples of things that
16 will always be reviewed as minimal risk and instead return
17 again in each case a context specific examination of
18 whether there is minimal risk here for these people.

19 Am I now capturing --

20 DR. CASSELL: Yes, much more so.

21 MS. CHARO: But not quite then.

22 DR. CASSELL: Well, I think you are and I
23 think its meaning is being obscured. The word "risk" is
24 -- risk is a probability of harm. And it is that that has
25 gotten obscure. The word "risk" has moved away from the

1 probability of harm. Now there are harms I am willing to
2 endure for good, right, and --

3 MR. CAPRON: But the word "risk" usually also
4 encompasses the negative --

5 DR. CASSELL: Yes, that is right.

6 MR. CAPRON: Harm over two dimensions.

7 DR. CASSELL: And has a magnitude of a
8 probability.

9 MR. CAPRON: Yes.

10 DR. CASSELL: And that has gotten obscured in
11 what followed and I think might not have been possible
12 otherwise. It may be we will not solve it either. But
13 the researchers should be knowing that that is the
14 researchers' responsibility to make sure that they have
15 assessed what harms are coming to this subject because of
16 what you are doing and then your question there in a
17 population of people who might commit suicide that
18 question is not benign. That is not a benign question.

19 DR. CHILDRESS: Before I get to Diane, let me
20 just note that it seems to me that several of these
21 suggestions have focused on the way in which we can
22 emphasize the context of informed consent and the context
23 of risk analysis. So that, I think, is an important way
24 for us to think about the evolving draft and I think all
25 those suggestions should be taken very seriously.

1 Remember we are focused on this particular
2 chapter and seeing what changes we want to recommend and
3 we want to spend -- our two speakers for the discussion of
4 imaging research and other issues and research involving
5 human subjects with decisional impairments are already
6 here. We are running -- going to run probably about 15
7 minutes behind. If you folks can bear with us we
8 appreciate your coming. We will try to get some of these
9 other issues out for purposes of revising the draft.

10 Diane?

11 DR. SCOTT-JONES: I have a few comments about
12 this chapter. One of them has to do with what Eric was
13 just saying earlier about risk being the probability of
14 harm and I think there is a problem in the language that
15 is used when we use "risk/benefit" instead of
16 "harm/benefit" because the risk/benefit does not in and of
17 itself convey a probability so you have to use the term
18 "expected benefit" or "anticipated benefit" the way
19 Jonathan does in most of the chapters. I think that is
20 really an important distinction because when we use
21 risk/benefit it sort of implies that somehow the benefit
22 is somehow guaranteed instead of a probability, the same
23 way risk is, indeed, a probability of harm occurring. So
24 it would be better if we said harm/benefit to use terms
25 that are more parallel to one another.

1 And then also Jonathan has done a great deal
2 to talk about how one might well define what risk is in
3 specific cases or what minimal risk is and I think that is
4 consistent with what some people in the research world on
5 children are doing. We are talking about a standard of
6 decent treatment to replace the notion of minimal risk
7 tied to the circumstances of an individual's life. So you
8 have a standard of decent treatment in research instead of
9 this shifting notion of minimal risk tied to individuals'
10 own lives.

11 I think also when we talk about the benefit of
12 research we have to remember that research is research.
13 If we knew the answers for sure we would not need to do
14 the research. So the notion of benefit is already
15 qualified when you put it in the context of research
16 because research always has uncertainty in it or it would
17 not by definition be research. So we have to be careful
18 not to overplay the notion of benefit, direct benefit from
19 research. And if we are in our society creating some new
20 entity that is not research and not treatment but some
21 entity in between those then maybe we ought to be clearer
22 about that because research does not have known outcomes
23 or it would not be research.

24 DR. CASSELL: Just put the word "probability"
25 in. Once you do that you put the word "probability" in

1 just as we have in risk which is an abstraction for
2 probability of harm. Benefit is an abstraction for the
3 probability that good will come.

4 DR. SCOTT-JONES: No. Benefit in and of
5 itself is not. You have to say expected or anticipated
6 benefit.

7 DR. CASSELL: Yes, but I mean in research --

8 DR. CHILDRESS: I am not sure that is done.

9 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Yes.

10 MS. CHARO: But, Diane, you do need to clarify
11 this. There are subcategories of research where benefit
12 is known to be probable, not just possible. You can have
13 comparisons between two standard known to be effective
14 treatments --

15 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Exactly.

16 MS. CHARO: -- in which you are looking just
17 to find the relative degrees of efficacy. So there are
18 going to be subcategories where this is not true and where
19 you really have genuinely therapeutic interventions that
20 are simply being compared.

21 DR. CHILDRESS: Any last comments on risk and
22 benefits, this revision? Trish?

23 MS. BACKLAR: That old problem with children
24 and that is when we talk about minimal risk are we talking
25 about people who are healthy, are we talking about people

1 with minimal risk for people who are ill, and we need to
2 make sure we make a decision about this, and I am
3 concerned that we keep that risk is -- minimal risk means
4 that kind of everyday risk for a healthy person.

5 DR. CHILDRESS: Any response? Jonathan?

6 DR. MORENO: I would welcome the opportunity
7 for the advisory committee to get on record -- advisory
8 commission, excuse me -- to get on record on this issue
9 because this is something that really is a problem. The
10 shifting standard or shifting interpretation of what
11 counts as minimal risk. I really think just speaking in
12 my professorial role and as a staff consultant I think
13 this is an important issue NBAC really needs to get into,
14 whether here or on some other report.

15 DR. CHILDRESS: Well, and it is something that
16 is general topics that cut across several areas for the
17 purposes of contract papers. It seems to me this is one
18 that cries out for it as well. So we would welcome
19 suggestions from people.

20 DR. MORENO: And it relates to Alta's first
21 comment a few minutes ago with respect to risk categories.
22 My concern is that if you really want to raise the deep
23 question of whether these risk categories, this
24 nomenclature ought to apply to these populations of
25 specific concern in this report, that is a much -- there

1 is no reason to isolate that only to these populations and
2 that is a big discussion which --

3 MS. CHARO: But the point simply was if you
4 think the categories are so broad and so subject to
5 manipulation, that for this population for which we have
6 already identified lots of other reasons why they tend to
7 get over enrolled or inappropriately enrolled or whatever,
8 you may say to this population in particular we are going
9 to say you cannot even use the categories. That is an
10 option. I am not suggesting it necessarily but it is an
11 option.

12 DR. MORENO: You can strongly suggest though
13 that this subcommittee is going to follow up that problem
14 with respect more generally to the regulatory scheme.

15 DR. CHILDRESS: Let me call this one to a
16 close and let's turn to procedures and let me start --
17 sorry to have to cut it off but I am conscious -- first of
18 all, let me say I have two people on the list to testify
19 during the public testimony period. If you have not put
20 your name on the list and are hoping to testify do let me
21 know because we are going to have to structure the
22 remaining time this morning to be able to accommodate
23 people. If there are only two we will not get to until
24 probably 11:20.

25 DR. MORENO: The subcommittee members should

1 be clear that they are not going to see another draft of
2 this December 3rd unless you want to pay for my child
3 support.

4 (Laughter.)

5 DR. CHILDRESS: No. Our understanding would
6 be that on December 3rd when several of us from the
7 subcommittee will be gathered to try to reflect on what
8 has been gained from the second and third discussions at
9 the National Institute of Mental Health we will be working
10 from this draft and trying to incorporate things here.
11 Then the next draft after that, which by the way we want
12 to put changes from this point on -- given the way that we
13 have now read this -- let's put the new material in bold
14 or something so that people can really concentrate on what
15 is new and not have to reread. I think we will be at that
16 point. Because there will be a fair amount of new
17 material with the discussion on the 3rd and what Jonathan
18 incorporates given our discussion today as well as
19 subsequent suggestions.

20 Okay. Henrietta reminded me that the meeting
21 of the National Institute of Mental Health, that session
22 is a work group and not a public meeting. This also
23 reminds me to ask since several committee members have
24 raised it, are those of us who are planning to attend
25 fully registered and duly accounted for, and all that.

1 Could you check on that and let us know? We have not done
2 anything other than reserve the hotel room but we need to
3 just make sure that all of us are properly included.

4 DR. HYATT-KNORR: You mean at the NIMH?

5 DR. CHILDRESS: Right. Right. So if they
6 have limited space they are aware that we will be present.

7 Okay. We have been looking at procedures and
8 we will just be able to hit the key points for purposes of
9 working on another draft. Alex and then Alta, and then
10 Trish.

11 MR. CAPRON: I think that the advanced
12 directive discussion is very helpful and I guess I would
13 like to see us there tease out a little bit more the range
14 of categories that we think are going to -- Trish is
15 signalling to me from her paper we have a basis for this
16 discussion of research advanced directives.

17 There were a couple of small points -- I
18 might as well just put them on the record -- where I
19 thought there were some problems. It seemed to me that
20 the consent auditor discussion or the re consent procedures
21 needed further support and a little bit further
22 exploration of the role of the family in this process. I
23 think we also have to begin being a little more specific
24 whether we see these kinds of added burdens or expenses as
25 something that is part of the research process and this

1 goes to -- this is connected with our broader examination
2 of research.

3 But it is clear and I think we need to make
4 sure that it is clear in something like our federal report
5 just what a huge enterprise even from the federal side
6 without even counting the drug companies research with
7 human subjects is in terms of hundreds of millions,
8 millions of dollars that are involved. And the notion
9 that part of that should be adequate support so that we do
10 not put on to research institutions and on to individual
11 research subjects the need out of their own pocket to
12 somehow figure out how to protect themselves.

13 The discussion of wraparound studies has a
14 paragraph that I agree with about the notion that
15 sometimes a wraparound study may be a useful protection
16 but there are a couple of points made there that I think I
17 actually disagree with Jonathan and I want to get it out
18 on the table. I do not think that the coexistence of a
19 wraparound study along with the research intervention is
20 an example of the therapeutic misconception. I think we
21 are in a danger of misconceiving what the therapeutic
22 misconception is if we do that.

23 The therapeutic misconception arises from a
24 misunderstanding about the purpose of the research part
25 itself. The idea of offering a wraparound study could be

1 seen as a reasonable or, in light of what Alta was saying
2 about payment before, an unreasonable or undue inducement
3 if the only way you can get real treatment is to go into
4 the research.

5 I mean that is the Willowbrook issue again in
6 a way. And that is a separate thing. It is not the
7 therapeutic misconception. I mean in some ways it would
8 be quite clear. Here I am asking to be in research. Here
9 I am offering you some treatment. The research is
10 obviously research because I am describing the treatment
11 separately. It ought to diminish the therapeutic
12 misconception. It has a different problem that it raises.
13 I think it is a mistake to mix those.

14 You also --

15 DR. CHILDRESS: Jonathan agrees.

16 MR. CAPRON: Yes, Jonathan agrees.

17 MR. CAPRON: I do not think this is a matter
18 of arguing. It is just a matter of making -- suggesting
19 that you need to change that.

20 DR. MORENO: Right.

21 MR. CAPRON: The other thing is you say
22 wraparound could be suitable follow-ups to certain kinds
23 of -- I am sorry. Reading page 132 at the bottom. Page
24 132. Wraparounds could be suitable follow-ups to certain
25 kinds of research that involve the provocation of

1 symptoms. Again that seems to me to be a dangerous
2 statement. If you provoke symptoms it is not that a
3 wraparound could be. You have an absolute obligation to
4 return that subject as nearly as possible if you have not
5 made that impossible by your research to the condition in
6 which the subject was before. That does not seem to me as
7 an example of a wraparound study.

8 The wraparound I take to be offering some
9 other benefit. I mean, that is not a could be. That is a
10 must. And it is not a wraparound. It is part of the
11 research design.

12 DR. CHILDRESS: Would you work with Jonathan
13 on redoing this paragraph?

14 MR. CAPRON: I think -- well, Jonathan, he got
15 that.

16 DR. MORENO: I got it.

17 MR. CAPRON: Finally, on the placebo
18 discussion -- this is particularly a difficult question
19 because of the suggestion that we do not really explore
20 fully here about accommodating other federal requirements
21 for drug approval. And I understood, maybe I
22 misunderstood, the fellow who was here from the FDA
23 talking to us about this.

24 DR. CHILDRESS: Dr. Temple.

25 MR. CAPRON: Dr. Temple. Thank you for the

1 name. A cognitive impairment as to names.

2 To suggest to us reasons why a research design
3 was much stronger and, in effect, cheaper. You could get
4 a lot more information out of fewer subjects if you were
5 doing a strong placebo control because then you did not
6 have the question of what the people who were on the
7 active arm really were showing you and whether they were
8 giving you a stable baseline or not, et cetera.

9 But I did not understand him to say that even
10 the FDA regards that as an absolute requirement. They
11 have a level of expectation of the reliability of the data
12 and reasons why that data is usually much more reliable
13 when it comes out of the placebo study. But it seems to
14 me that we ought to be a little clearer, and I may be
15 wrong in my understanding, but we ought to be a little
16 clearer about the difference between a predilection
17 towards a particular kind of design and something which
18 requires an explicit exception or is just beyond exception
19 because it goes against the regulation.

20 And again it becomes a particular issue where
21 people have chronic conditions which can be exacerbated by
22 being forced to be on a placebo arm and so forth. Where
23 we ought to clear as an ethics group looking at this that
24 one is always talking about choosing between benefits and
25 harms or among harms or among benefits. It is not as

1 though it is black or white one way or the other.

2 Anyway, so I just would like to have that
3 discussion revised in light of those comments. Thank you.

4 DR. MORENO: That equivocation, Alex, has to
5 do with the perception at least among many investigators
6 that the FDA may say one thing but do another as you know.

7 MR. CAPRON: Yes, but then --

8 DR. MORENO: But that is the point that is
9 made.

10 MR. CAPRON: -- then we need to dig more
11 deeply into it and have a more definitive statement and
12 either say to people you are right and the FDA needs to
13 change or you are wrong, you are over reading what the
14 actual regulations are, you are dealing with a
15 predilection. So this is not --

16 (Simultaneous discussion.)

17 MR. CAPRON: It is a question -- yes, it is a
18 real question of what is the factual base. As I say, I
19 may have misunderstood Dr. Temple. I thought it was a
20 very informative presentation he gave us which was
21 actually in the context more than we were looking at the
22 AIDS issue, I guess. But, yes.

23 DR. CHILDRESS: Thanks. Okay. Very briefly
24 let's hear from Alta and Trish on suggestions for the
25 procedural discussion and I should emphasize that I have

1 talked to Jonathan already about exploring possible ways
2 to group some of these so we do not have such a laundry
3 list and see whether some of these might be grouped under
4 a heading of consent or re consent or something. He is
5 going to explore that for the draft.

6 MR. CAPRON: This includes what follows on
7 page -- does this include chapter 8 or not?

8 DR. CHILDRESS: If you want to make some
9 reference to that as well because we do talk about
10 procedures there of various kinds, special protections.

11 MR. CAPRON: No, I am going to hold off.

12 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay.

13 MS. FLYNN: May I make a comment about the
14 last point?

15 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Laurie wants to do a
16 tag on, on the last point. All right.

17 MS. FLYNN: Just quickly. I want to reinforce
18 and agree with Alex that we need much more discussion of
19 the placebo issue and that there is substantial
20 information that I think would help and we can try to get
21 it to you.

22 The other thing that I did not see here that
23 we may want to consider and that the national organization
24 I represent has adopted as a policy is that where there
25 has been participation in a placebo controlled drug trial

1 that it is ethically mandated that all individuals who
2 have a need for improved response should have -- somewhere
3 in the study and at the conclusion of the study if they
4 have responded well to the experimental therapeutic that
5 they should be permitted to continue it until such time as
6 the source of funding can be found for it so that you have
7 sort of two points there.

8 One is that everyone should have a chance on
9 the experimental medication, even those who may be
10 assigned into the placebo arm, so that everyone gets a
11 shot at what may improve their care. And that once the
12 study is over then the drug company has an obligation to
13 continue all those who have responded well on the
14 experimental drug until such point in time as they secure
15 a source of funding, usually when the drug is approved,
16 can be found.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Can you give --

18 MS. FLYNN: I can send you wording on that.

19 DR. CHILDRESS: All right. And others too
20 because there will be a lot of things we are not going to
21 be able to touch on obviously in our short time today. If
22 you could send stuff to Jonathan and ask for incorporation
23 in the next draft.

24 So just a couple of minutes, Alta and Trish,
25 for your final comments.

1 MR. CAPRON: She passed.

2 MS. CHARO: I guess I will do it now.

3 DR. CHILDRESS: Oh, you passed. Did you pass?

4 MS. CHARO: I was hoping to get in a final
5 comment after we do these.

6 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Trish?

7 MS. BACKLAR: I think that perhaps at this
8 point I do not need to go into this. We are going to talk
9 about the research advanced directive. I do want to say
10 that the way it is right now in the document that suddenly
11 we come across this. There is very little before that has
12 referred to it. There is a little bit about it. And then
13 afterwards we do not use it in any way to --

14 DR. MORENO: To come back to the
15 recommendations.

16 MS. BACKLAR: -- the recommendations. And I
17 think that we need to find some way to integrate it and
18 also for people to be very aware of one of the big
19 problems that is there and that is in terms of the after
20 care which one might get into the wraparound studies of
21 who is going to pay for that after care, particularly as
22 we move to managed mental health care. So that is a big
23 issue.

24 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay.

25 MR. CAPRON: We do get to it in the

1 recommendations.

2 DR. MORENO: I do cite it in the
3 recommendations.

4 MR. CAPRON: State law, we recommend that
5 state --

6 DR. MORENO: State's model.

7 DR. CHILDRESS: That is right, consider the
8 state model. That is a really good point. I have raised
9 with Jonathan the issue of how we get into chapter 7, too,
10 and propose that something -- that he try to work up --
11 that he try to work up an introduction.

12 MS. BACKLAR: I am sorry but there is one
13 thing that I think that is important that maybe is not
14 spelled out enough about this particular model and you may
15 have had my original paper which I sent to everybody on
16 it. And that is that I perceive that this is a way to do
17 this that does not burden down the regulations. It can be
18 incorporated but becomes the responsibility of the
19 research community to see that this is done.

20 DR. CHILDRESS: Well, thanks, everyone. There
21 is a lot more to do. We will try to get some of it in
22 today but we have had two very patient guests and since we
23 had hoped to start with them about 20 minutes ago, and we
24 are very happy to have with us today Dr. Carol Tamminga of
25 the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center and Dr. Trey

1 Sunderland of the National Institute of Mental Health and
2 also chairs the National Institute of Mental Health IRB if
3 I recall correctly. So we are glad they could join us.

4 I have asked each to speak no more than ten
5 minutes at the outset so we can then have time for
6 interaction.

7 Dr. Tamminga, we will start with you. Thank
8 you again for joining us today.

9 DISCUSSION OF IMAGING RESEARCH

10 DR. TAMMINGA: I am very pleased to be here
11 and appreciate the work that you as a committee are doing.
12 I am a psychiatrist at the University of Maryland and I do
13 schizophrenia research. I do not do private practice. I
14 am 100 percent university employee.

15 The nature of my -- and I have been doing
16 schizophrenia research for probably 15 or 18 years. The
17 nature of my research has been highly experimental for the
18 whole time that I have been doing it. I always fall into
19 the maximal risk IRB categories. And the point of much of
20 my research, the goal of much of my research is to
21 actually look for mechanism in schizophrenia.

22 My research has actually been focused almost
23 exclusively on schizophrenia and on looking for a
24 mechanism. So the research that I do is often times not
25 of any direct benefit for patients.

1 Imaging research, which Dr. Childress had
2 asked me to address, is often times not a benefit to
3 people. The only -- I was sort of searching while I was
4 listening to you discuss of what benefit imaging could
5 possibly be for the person and an example of a normal
6 control struck me who took the PET Scan, took her own PET
7 Scan, put it on a Christmas card and said, "Thinking of
8 you at Christmas," but that is --

9 (Laughter.)

10 -- that is about the only example I can think
11 of.

12 I think that schizophrenia is one of the -- is
13 one of the only medical diseases that is left whose
14 mechanism and whose etiology are entirely unknown. The
15 treatments that we have for schizophrenia, as all of you I
16 am sure have discussed before, are symptomatic treatments.
17 They are like aspirin treats a headache. They are not
18 curative treatments. They are not treatments like insulin
19 for diabetes. And consequently looking for
20 pathophysiology from my point of view is the only way that
21 we are going to be able to really find out what the
22 mechanism of the illness is and move to specific
23 treatments that treat that mechanism.

24 In the area of schizophrenia research
25 opportunities might be at their highest point for sure in

1 the last 20 years. Basic neuroscience has provided us
2 with a lot of information about how the brain actually
3 works. So that there is a lot of opportunity to take very
4 sophisticated knowledge and apply it to a disease.

5 I asked myself the question what makes
6 schizophrenia research so challenging? So what really
7 makes it -- what makes schizophrenia research really
8 require such contributions from a schizophrenic person?
9 And first of all it is brain research and the brain is of
10 course a buried organ. There have not been many ways that
11 we could tell how the brain works until recently and in my
12 opinion brain imaging, particularly functional brain
13 imaging is one of the ways in which you can actually -- we
14 can actually see how the brain solves a problem and how
15 the schizophrenic brain takes the same problem and solves
16 it or does not solve it.

17 Another thing that makes schizophrenia
18 research very challenging is that it is a -- as far as we
19 know -- uniquely human disease. I have heard people,
20 basic scientists argue whether or not a mouse could have
21 schizophrenia but since I am a clinician I think it is
22 kind of a useless argument and we have no animal models of
23 schizophrenia and questions of mechanism can really only
24 be answered in the schizophrenic person with their -- in
25 research with a schizophrenic person. So that

1 schizophrenia research just of necessity requires that we
2 elicit both the informed consent and the cooperation of
3 people with schizophrenia in order to pursue the research.

4 So that from my point of view schizophrenia
5 research needs both the permission and the cooperativity
6 of people with schizophrenia. And this implies attention
7 to the process of informing the person, to the process of
8 obtaining their assent to do the research, and then of an
9 ongoing -- of assessing their ongoing cooperation or
10 assent with the research.

11 Now I am sure that you have just spent hours
12 and hours and hours talking about informed consent for the
13 decisionally impaired and the only small piece of that I
14 can talk to is informed consent in schizophrenic people
15 who are decisionally impaired. In my experience and I
16 have had a broad experience only within schizophrenia the
17 decisional impairment in people with schizophrenia of a
18 particular kind. Schizophrenics have some difficulty
19 taking in information. Once they get the picture or have
20 all the information they can characteristically make
21 reasonable judgments or they can characteristically make
22 judgments and work with that information.

23 In the way that many investigators like me
24 have just not been required to but have over the years
25 learned to gain informed consent it is clear that people

1 with schizophrenia need information presented to them on
2 multiple occasions slowly, concretely and with examples,
3 and by different people, not only the doctor but also a
4 nurse, a family, multiple people giving them the
5 information. And then they can -- after a period of time
6 they can document that they can take in this information
7 and then make judgments about it.

8 Although most of us have been sort of working
9 by the seat of our pants for these previous years, now
10 that issues about informed consent have come up people
11 have begun to do research and actually assess when it is
12 that people with schizophrenia actually learn something
13 about a project. We have been doing some research at our
14 institution with informed consent and with documenting
15 that people really actually have information and I have
16 some papers here that I would like to leave with you.

17 There is one experiment that we have done in
18 treatment resistant schizophrenics and these are people
19 who have schizophrenia who have been chronically
20 hospitalized who probably have the worst of the cognitive
21 deficits of any of the schizophrenics that we elicit in
22 research.

23 This was a process of informing patients about
24 a rather simple drug-drug study so it did not involve a
25 placebo period. But nonetheless the process of informed

1 consent is the same for us in that study as in any others
2 and to assess this informed consent we set up kind of an
3 educational process. One of the nurses had designed a
4 sixth session informational process and the patients
5 actually were educated.

6 At the end of this education period out of 65
7 patients 95 percent or 62 of the 65 passed a simple test.
8 We have what is called an evaluation to sign consent form
9 with five questions on it talking about the information
10 about a project and patients are required to know these
11 five things about the study.

12 And 62 of the 65 patients passed of the study.
13 Of those 62 people 80 percent agreed to go on to the study
14 and 20 percent -- excuse me, 81 percent agreed and 19
15 percent disagreed. So at least it is some evidence that
16 first of all people with -- chronically institutionalized
17 people with schizophrenia can actually listen to
18 information and can learn information if it is presented
19 in the right way. And also that once people learn this
20 information they do not always say yes.

21 I just want to say a little about what I think
22 the system needs. Clearly as research -- as people start
23 to think about the process of research many problems come
24 up and I will just list out for you what I think is needed
25 to ensure informed consent in schizophrenic people and

1 ethical research.

2 I think that the IRB oversight is very
3 important for our research process. The IRB in my
4 institution has become a much more mature institution over
5 the last 20 years of my interacting with it. It has
6 become an institution that -- the IRB has become a
7 committee in the university institution that takes some
8 independence from the individual projects and the persons
9 of the investigators.

10 It is -- and its oversight is very important
11 and I actually worked interactively with my IRB on several
12 projects that I have had that are quite experimental high
13 risk projects so that the IRB literally looked over my
14 shoulder every -- every three people who were entered into
15 the project and that is actually useful for me as well as
16 an oversight function for them.

17 I think that if anything might be needed it
18 might not be that all IRB's work at the same level of
19 sophistication and maybe some information, guidelines,
20 some recommendations for IRB's might be appropriate.
21 There is one sort of bothersome thing about IRB's that I -
22 - I am really talking about university IRB's. The
23 question about these private IRB's is I think a big
24 question. There have sprung up private IRB's around the
25 country and I think there is two or three of them that

1 approved projects that are independent of a university.

2 What I am saying about IRB's, I do not know
3 that I would extend to private IRB's, and perhaps Trey may
4 have some additional things to say about them, but I think
5 that private IRB's are of more concern because they are
6 not accountable to university systems.

7 Another thing that I think is really needed is
8 some investigator education. Doctors are really not
9 schooled in ethics. In my day when I was schooled I was
10 not schooled in ethics and I was not schooled in ethical
11 research. Everything I know about ethics I learned from
12 my grandmother and it probably -- probably both at the
13 level of the medical student and the resident, of the
14 research fellow, of the university researcher, and even of
15 the practicing physician some schooling in ethics would be
16 very important. And the reason that I can say that it
17 could be really important is because NIMH has already
18 started strongly suggesting if not requiring that those of
19 us who do research and those students who are trained in
20 research actually are also trained in ethics.

21 There are courses in ethics that are set up
22 now that I have participated in. You know, being sort of
23 grandiose sometimes I think, "Gee, I cannot learn anything
24 about ethics from a course like this," and lo and behold.
25 The ethics courses -- not only did I learn things from

1 them but there is -- some of the courses include sort of
2 group discussions around particular case examples and are
3 really very -- I found them very useful and I think myself
4 and a lot of other training programs now utilize them all
5 the time. When NIMH reviews training grants, training
6 grants are almost not approved at all unless they have
7 courses in research ethics.

8 Then, of course, family involvement in the
9 whole research process is very important and is one thing
10 that I have always used to make sure that family members
11 or that people closely associated with the person know
12 about the research, receive protocols, know the risks and
13 benefits. We are not allowed to solicit family consent
14 for the research because research subjects are competent.
15 The research subjects that I use are competent. But for
16 sure the family can act as an ombudsman for the patient.

17 That really brings up just the small caveat
18 that we can discuss more later that not every
19 schizophrenic person is probably appropriate for research
20 and that proper research settings need to be set up in
21 which to conduct research and those sort of are
22 assumptions of all the rest of the things that I have
23 said.

24 Thank you very much.

25 DR. CHILDRESS: All right. Thank you very

1 much. Why don't we just take a few comments or questions
2 at this point and then get Dr. Sunderland and then talk
3 with both of you together. But first any quick comments
4 or questions?

5 Alex?

6 MR. CAPRON: When you described your work as
7 the high risk research, you do imaging studies?

8 DR. TAMMINGA: I do imaging studies.

9 MR. CAPRON: And in the imaging studies the
10 high risk is that you want to observe the brain when the
11 person is off the neuroleptics. Is that what the risk is?
12 Or is it the going into the machine that is risky
13 physically or psychologically? Can you just elaborate
14 because we were having a discussion of what risk was
15 before and I wondered how you use the term?

16 DR. TAMMINGA: Right. For almost all imaging
17 research -- some of our imaging research is not done in
18 drug-free people but most of it is done in drug-free
19 people. It is really necessary in imaging research if you
20 are looking for what is associated with an illness to take
21 away everything but the illness so you can see what is
22 associated with just the illness. So most of the people -
23 - so being in a medication free state and being in a
24 medication free state for a relatively prolonged period of
25 time since antipsychotic drugs have rather long half-life

1 so we characteristically do washouts of two or three,
2 sometimes four weeks.

3 These are hospitalized people in a research
4 study so whereas they do not get antipsychotic treatments
5 they get other treatments but they are drug free. I use
6 some probe medications, some medications that actually
7 increase psychosis. So under a PET scanner you can see
8 what a psychosis increase looks like with a medication
9 like ketamine. Somebody had mentioned that before. And
10 what the brain looks like with an antipsychotic drug that
11 decreases psychosis.

12 MR. CAPRON: So you are using the word "probe"
13 the way the word "challenge" has been used.

14 DR. TAMMINGA: Um-hmm.

15 MR. CAPRON: The other question that I raised
16 before when it was suggested by Laurie that we have -- we
17 ought to recognize that people who are psychotic have
18 periods perhaps on their medication or otherwise when they
19 are quite capable and the process that you described
20 indicates how you would assess that and encourage it and
21 break things down to make it possible for them to consent,
22 quite capable of giving consent. e of giving consent.

23 And then you describe three or four week
24 washout processes and I was concerned how we deal with a
25 change of mind because if I am in a research study and I

1 do not like it I can get out of it. But if my change of
2 mind is ascribed by the people around me to the fact that
3 I am now in a florid psychotic state what happens then and
4 how particularly would something that would require
5 cooperation, which is the second thing that you
6 emphasized, not just the permission but also the
7 cooperation, how do you deal with that?

8 I mean, it must occur that sometimes by the
9 time you get ready to put the person in a PET scanner they
10 are by then delusional or hallucinating or in an angry
11 mode, an aggressive mode, or I mean something. What is
12 your experience with that? How do you deal with that? Do
13 you -- at that point if they say, "I do not want to have
14 anything to do with it," are you bound to listen to them
15 or do you seek consent and continuing permission from
16 someone else? Do you treat them in some way that would
17 sedate them but not obliterate the psychosis so you could
18 still study them? What happens?

19 DR. TAMMINGA: Well, that question is a little
20 easier to answer from the point of view of imaging because
21 so much cooperativity is required. Schizophrenics have
22 different ways of saying no and one of them is saying, "I
23 do not want to go into the scanner." We actually give
24 schizophrenic people a lot of experience with the scan
25 room and an opportunity to get into the scanner on their

1 own and some familiarity with the instrument. It is a bit
2 of an intimidating room and stuff like that. That is
3 before we do the project.

4 If they say, "No, I do not want to do this,"
5 or if on the day of the scan they look at the scanner and
6 say, "No," as did one of our people because we were going
7 to take a look at the family shield in her brain, we were
8 going to see a picture of her family shield, I mean that
9 is no for us and so we do not proceed with the research.

10 And I think that most people do the same thing
11 so that the ongoing assent is really given by
12 cooperativity.

13 MR. CAPRON: Do you -- have you ever published
14 on that subject giving numbers of recruited subjects? You
15 just gave us, for example, the 81 percent on the 62 who
16 got through the knowledge level and then 19 percent said,
17 "No," and 81 percent said, "Yes." Have you ever looked
18 back and for the information of the field published on
19 your nonassent rate as well or has this ever been a
20 subject? Do you know of others who have addressed that?

21 DR. TAMMINGA: I do not -- I cannot -- I
22 certainly have never published on it myself. I would
23 guess that somewhere between five and ten percent of the
24 people that we take through this scan process. I work on
25 a research ward so that the people who come to the -- come

1 into this inpatient setting already know that research
2 happens there so that they are already somewhat in the --
3 in a research mindset or cooperative with research before
4 they come.

5 MR. CAPRON: Right.

6 DR. TAMMINGA: And then we do everything
7 really by process and repeated exposure and if they want
8 to go down to the scan with one of their peers and watch
9 it just so that they can see what happens before they
10 starts. And none of us have really -- I have never really
11 published on it, no.

12 MR. CAPRON: The only reason I ask is in the
13 other washout studies that we have seen certainly the
14 problems that are described of people who are in the
15 washed out phase of the drug include such manifest
16 psychotic symptoms and particularly senses of persecution
17 and the like that it just is surprising to me that even if
18 someone who is being treated for schizophrenia comes to
19 your unit knowing its research and wanting to participate
20 that you might not see a fairly high percentage of them by
21 the time you have washed them out and three or four weeks
22 have gone by and when they are not getting their
23 medication that they would not have more problems of them
24 saying, "No, you know, this is not -- what are you doing?"
25 And you described the one woman who was -- she thought you

1 were going to be looking at her family shield or
2 something. I mean, whatever it is.

3 But I am just surprised that this is not a
4 common phenomenon. That is why I wondered if it has been
5 written --

6 DR. TAMMINGA: There are people who do not
7 agree to the research from the beginning.

8 MR. CAPRON: Yes, I understand that.

9 DR. TAMMINGA: And I was not including those
10 people.

11 MR. CAPRON: I understand. But it is the ones
12 who agree before you wash them out and then once they are
13 washed out and they are back in -- at least some
14 percentage of them just by the cycling of the illness
15 would be --

16 DR. TAMMINGA: See, when a schizophrenic
17 becomes psychotic or when they have some return of their
18 symptoms it is not as though their whole mind is consumed
19 by the symptoms. They might have -- they might have the
20 delusion that the food is poison but they do not have the
21 delusion that everybody is trying to kill them all the
22 time. They might have hallucinations and feel that God is
23 speaking to them but they do not -- but there are still
24 many other aspects of their mind and of their judgment
25 that they can bring to bear on other questions. So just

1 because schizophrenic people have florid symptoms does not
2 mean all -- sometimes it happens but it does not always
3 mean that those symptoms completely take over their minds
4 and their judgments.

5 MR. CAPRON: That is very helpful. Thank you.

6 DR. CHILDRESS: We will take three quick
7 questions. Actually four. I have Eric, Diane, Trish and
8 Alta. Okay. We will need to make them quick.

9 DR. CASSELL: How many times does it happen
10 that a person who gave consent and then told you that they
11 wanted to go back on their treatment? Half way through
12 your project they said they had enough and they wanted to
13 go back on treatment. What percentage of the time does
14 that happen?

15 DR. TAMMINGA: It is rare that a schizophrenic
16 says they want to go back on treatment. Neuroleptic
17 medications are unpleasant to take and some of the reasons
18 that people actually come to our ward is so they can be
19 drug-free. It is not unusual to have somebody say that
20 they want to stop a research project. They may not like a
21 drug. They do not like the effects of the drug. I would
22 guess maybe ten percent, fifteen percent, twenty percent.
23 They do know that when they stop a research project they
24 will eventually get back on treatment. We work with them
25 around the treatments that they want.

1 DR. CHILDRESS: Diane?

2 DR. SCOTT-JONES: When you are reporting your
3 studies do you report the number and percentage of the
4 participants who wish to stop and you allow them to stop
5 once the study has begun? Do you report that rate?

6 DR. TAMMINGA: I do not. In my grants I
7 report that.

8 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Right.

9 DR. TAMMINGA: In order to --

10 DR. SCOTT-JONES: So one can go back and get
11 that information.

12 DR. TAMMINGA: Oh, yes. I am sure -- it is
13 important to know for scientific reasons as well as
14 ethical reasons.

15 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Right.

16 MS. BACKLAR: That is what I wanted -- two
17 things I wanted to say is that you must have some record.

18 DR. TAMMINGA: Yes.

19 MS. BACKLAR: So that would be very
20 interesting for us to know if that is not too terribly
21 difficult.

22 The other question that I have is how do you
23 go about recruiting subjects for this kind of research?

24 DR. TAMMINGA: We do keep careful records so
25 it would be easy enough for -- it would be maybe not easy

1 but it would be straight forward for me to get information
2 if you wanted some additional information.

3 DR. CHILDRESS: It could. That would helpful
4 to give us kind of a picture.

5 DR. TAMMINGA: Sure. We recruit people to
6 come to our inpatient research unit usually very slowly
7 and I think this is not uncharacteristic of research
8 projects. People who are looking for an alternative to
9 usual treatment. First of all, they have to need
10 inpatient hospitalization. They have to be looking for an
11 alternative for some of their current treatment. Then we
12 invite them to come and see our place and listen to the
13 kind of research that we usually do. We tell them about
14 the research that happens on the unit. We let them look
15 around and we let them meet the nursing staff. We meet
16 them and their families. We look at their records.

17 And if they have an interest in participating
18 in research and if they are not put off or whatever by the
19 kind of research they hear about then they come into our
20 research unit. Nobody is really required to sign informed
21 consents before they come but we do want them to listen to
22 what kind of research commonly happens here so they gain
23 some familiarity. And then they come into our inpatient
24 setting and they accommodate to it for a month or two and
25 then we present them with the research protocol that we

1 think -- or a research protocol that we think would be
2 important for them or would be -- into which they would
3 fit and might be something that they could participate in.

4 And then a number of different people from the
5 unit present the nature of the research. We talk to their
6 families and caretakers about the research. We encourage
7 the families to get outside information of whatever kind
8 about the protocol or the patient for that matter.

9 We had an interesting experience. One time
10 earlier in my career I worked part-time at the NIH in the
11 Neurology Institute and still worked at the University of
12 Maryland ward I was talking about so I had encouraged one
13 of my families to call around to find out about this
14 particular medication. They called up NIH and they were
15 referred to me at NIH so that they wound up talking to me
16 at NIH about -- I referred them to somebody else. But we
17 really encourage people to -- families and the
18 schizophrenic person themselves to be thoughtful about it
19 and then they sign off. That is sort of part of the
20 informed consent.

21 MS. BACKLAR: I forgot to thank you so much,
22 Carol, by the way for coming. We really appreciate that.

23 Do their physicians sometimes send them to
24 you? Does that occur? Their psychiatrists send them to
25 you? Is that one of the ways?

1 DR. TAMMINGA: Well, what happens sometimes --
2 mostly in our dyskinesia clinic, which is a tertiary care
3 clinic, because then the schizophrenics retain a
4 relationship with their primary physician. If any primary
5 physician or psychiatrist refers us a patient we are
6 mighty pleased and would talk to them. We do not usually
7 get people that way. Schizophrenic people who are lucky
8 enough to have invested physicians often times are doing
9 pretty well on the outside.

10 MS. BACKLAR: That was -- my final question is
11 after care. How do you -- what are your procedures when
12 you are finished using some of these in research?

13 DR. TAMMINGA: Well, we first take our time.
14 We first get them back to -- we first treat them
15 clinically and we usually take three or four months in
16 doing that. One of the luxuries of the unit that I have
17 is we do not have any length of stay requirements.

18 MS. BACKLAR: And what are the issues to do
19 when they refuse treatment when they are inpatient? How
20 do you deal with that if they refuse treatment? In other
21 words, refuse to go back on medication how do you deal
22 with that and get a civil commitment?

23 DR. TAMMINGA: Well, we do not -- on my
24 particular research unit we do not have any people who are
25 not legally competent or people who are involuntary

1 admissions. Initially we would really try to work with
2 them and we would go through the variety of antipsychotic
3 treatments with them, some of which might include medicine
4 and some of which might not, and we would try to invest
5 them in one kind of treatment strategy or another. We
6 would work with them.

7 I think it is people -- I have never run into
8 a person who sort of flatly refused to take all medication
9 but really they might try this medicine and if they got a
10 bad side effect we would stop it and they would try
11 another medication. Most generally people can get to
12 their most optimal treatment.

13 Almost inevitably we -- not always, but in
14 many cases when people leave are much better treated and
15 in a much better clinical state than when they came.

16 MR. CAPRON: Do they ever check out against
17 your advice without taking the treatment?

18 DR. TAMMINGA: Oh, sure. But they -- but
19 characteristically we do not allow them to check out of
20 our ward against our advice but we would transfer them to
21 another ward and then they would be on a regular ward
22 where research would not complicate anybody's decision of
23 what to do.

24 MR. CAPRON: And where if they -- that ward
25 might seek civil commitment?

1 DR. TAMMINGA: Oh, yes.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay.

3 MR. CAPRON: This is just -- your exchange
4 with Trish leads me to understand you do not usually see
5 patients referred by their psychiatrist because such
6 patients are usually -- you said are fortunate enough to
7 have their medical care going well. Did I understand
8 that? So the ones who you do see are typically people who
9 are self-referred out of a sense that their own treatment
10 is not going well and they need --

11 DR. TAMMINGA: Well, they are not self-
12 referred. They are usually hospitalized in another -- in
13 another hospital and referred by the physician. They are
14 referred by the physician of that hospital but it is not
15 like that is the patient's physician. It is just somebody
16 that --

17 MR. CAPRON: Oh, well, that is a very big
18 clarification. I am glad I asked. That helped. I had a
19 very different impression.

20 DR. CHILDRESS: Alta?

21 MS. CHARO: Well, it is clearly on this
22 because a theme throughout all this area has been the
23 portrait of misconception and certainly in the testimony
24 we have heard the frustration of people who are patients
25 and their families have expressed at the way in which they

1 have perceive results having been treated has been
2 complicated. Whether they expected they were getting
3 treatment or they expected they were research subjects.
4 So I want to understand even more exactly what is going on
5 as people first encounter your ward.

6 You said to Trish that people come to your
7 ward because they are looking for an alternative which to
8 me sounds like they are looking for a therapeutic
9 intervention better than the one they are getting.

10 DR. TAMMINGA: Sure.

11 MS. CHARO: Right. And that you also attempt
12 to assess their interest in participating in research of
13 various types once they get there. Now, I am trying to
14 understand, the extent to which in a sense what is
15 happening is that there is a quid pro quo. You can get an
16 alternative to treatment that you think are the same
17 therapeutic on the condition that you will be somebody who
18 is predisposed to participate in research although for
19 each individual protocol there is going to be a consenting
20 process that will assess your consent for that particular
21 protocol. Am I understanding correctly what is going on?
22 That this is really a -- this is a quid pro quo. You are
23 generally predisposed to having research done on you
24 including totally nonbeneficial research in exchange for
25 the opportunity to get innovative therapy from the point

1 of view of the subject.

2 DR. TAMMINGA: I do not know that I would put
3 it like that. Treatments for schizophrenia are generally
4 very -- for most people with schizophrenia or at least for
5 two-thirds or three-quarters are generally unsatisfactory.
6 So it is not unusual for people to be dissatisfied with
7 their treatment.

8 We try not to promise people that we are going
9 to for sure be able to do something better. We are rather
10 straight forward with them saying that we have the
11 opportunity to try this, this and this or this given that
12 you want that to be tried and it may be beneficial and it
13 may not be beneficial.

14 MS. CHARO: Okay. But given -- I mean -- and
15 here is the heart of the question. I will just be really
16 clear about it. Given that people are coming with the
17 hope that benefit might accrue to them personally, right,
18 why does anybody in your experience -- what if anybody
19 say, "Yes, your imaging research that has no beneficial to
20 them?" Why don't any of these people ever say, "Sure, do
21 this to me?" You mentioned some people might be looking
22 for an opportunity actually to go for a washout. That was
23 one possible reason people did it and I was curious what
24 other reasons might lead people to undergo research that
25 poses risks and does not have any apparent benefits from

1 the imaging itself?

2 DR. TAMMINGA: The washout is
3 characteristically separate from the imaging so if
4 somebody just wants to be drug free we have what is called
5 the withdrawal protocol and they can consent to that.
6 They do not have to consent to the imaging.

7 MS. CHARO: Okay. So this makes the question
8 even clearer. Why would -- in your experience why does
9 anybody say yes to enrolling in your imaging research?

10 DR. TAMMINGA: I have never really thought
11 about it from that perspective for a lot of them do say
12 yes. People with schizophrenia do not often times have a
13 lot to do in their days and they do not have a lot that
14 brings interest and challenge in their lives and they are
15 not any different than you and me. They really like to
16 understand things. They really like to make contributions
17 to ongoing projects. They like to have -- they are
18 curious about the scanner. They see the imaging pictures
19 and they wonder what they mean. They wonder what those
20 imaging pictures of their own brains would look like.

21 Those would be the reasons that come to mind
22 that they would assent and say yes. We are very -- it is
23 not therapeutic research so we do not --

24 MS. CHARO: Right. Well, I am trying to
25 understand what the motivations are.

1 DR. TAMMINGA: They often times ask for --

2 MS. CHARO: To get a picture of what it is
3 that is going on in people's own minds.

4 DR. TAMMINGA: They often times ask for
5 pictures of their own brain.

6 MS. CHARO: Okay.

7 DR. CHILDRESS: This has been very helpful.
8 Unfortunately, though, given the shortage of time, I have
9 already told Henrietta to tell Harold that we will be
10 running at least ten minutes over so we will not be
11 starting the public testimony until close to 11:30. But I
12 will need to bring this to a close and will you be able to
13 stay around afterwards and sort of talk a bit to people as
14 we are breaking up to grab some lunch?

15 DR. TAMMINGA: Sure.

16 DR. CHILDRESS: Because I think there will be
17 some other things that people will want to raise and get
18 clear on it. Anything you can provide in response to the
19 questions that emerged and any other written material you
20 think of would be most helpful. It has been a very
21 illuminating discussion.

22 DR. TAMMINGA: I do have a paper, only one
23 copy of a paper on drug-free research in schizophrenia
24 that addresses some of the --

25 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. If you could leave that

1 with us we will get copies made.

2 Dr. Sunderland, thank you very much and thank
3 you for your patience.

4 DR. SUNDERLAND: It is my pleasure. I enjoyed
5 it. Thanks for inviting me. It is an honor for me to be
6 here. I have actually had the opportunity already to talk
7 to Dr. Freeman earlier in the summer about some of the
8 issues but not the imaging issues.

9 I thought I would come to you really with two
10 simple points. One, as the chairman of the IRB at the
11 NIMH where I have been for the last seven years, I have
12 been the chairman for the last seven years, have been
13 struggling with some of the issues you have on your table,
14 and also the last 15 years I have been doing research with
15 Alzheimer's disease and struggling with how do you do
16 research with people who not will get cognitive impairment
17 who may get cognitive impairment if you take them off
18 drugs but who do have cognitive impairment by definition.

19 So I think the first thing I will do is just
20 tell you a little bit as a researcher and as an
21 academician. I cannot come anywhere without slides. So
22 may I please show a couple of slides?

23 DR. CHILDRESS: That is fine.

24 (Slide.)

25 DR. SUNDERLAND: Great. Now it works.

1 Okay. The basic questions that we address at
2 the IRB level, this is things that come -- sort of melds
3 together both my IRB work and also I work with Alzheimer
4 patients, is what is cognitive impairment. I am sure you
5 have tried to address that as well. By definition we have
6 a diagnostic and statistical manual. In psychiatry we
7 have certain areas where cognitive impairment is defined
8 by memory impairment as well as at least one other area of
9 cognition such as judgment or vocabulary and visual and
10 spacial impairments.

11 Who determines whether someone is cognitively
12 impaired? This is incredibly important for us. It is
13 usually the researcher at the NIMH and so there might be
14 some bias here. So we have constituted a group of
15 bioethicists. Dr. John Fletcher, who I think you already
16 met with before, I think he was here earlier. He started
17 that program and now it has been continued and doing
18 wonderfully at the NIH and we often times borrow expertise
19 with the Alzheimer patients by way of a consultant
20 bioethicist.

21 What kind of person is cognitively impaired?
22 Here I just wanted to make one quick point which is that
23 any kind of person can be cognitively impaired and we have
24 been focusing this morning on mentally impaired patients,
25 particularly schizophrenic patients, but I want to remind

1 the audience that it could be a patient who has a heart
2 attack who is under anesthesia. It could be a person who
3 has got post-MI psychosis and we have to treat these
4 people the same way we treat the psychiatric patients, the
5 mentally impaired patients, otherwise I think we are
6 guilty of impairing -- giving them a stigmatization which
7 I think is very important. I would just like to emphasize
8 that two or three times to you guys.

9 The issue of whether it is a state versus
10 trait condition is something we always deal with. Is it
11 temporary or is it permanent? With an Alzheimer's disease
12 patient of course it is more permanent although gradual in
13 onset. With a schizophrenic patient or with a patient in
14 an MI situation in an ICU it would be a state or at least
15 temporary reversal of their impairment.

16 Finally, who -- how can these cognitively
17 impaired patients participate in research? We spent a
18 long time trying to figure out how to do that. As to the
19 issue of why they might do it I have a very simple answer
20 as to why the people might do challenge studies and probe
21 studies. Three very simple reasons. One, they get
22 involved. These are people who are disenfranchised many
23 times in the schizophrenic population. Certainly
24 Alzheimer's patients are isolated at home. They have
25 nothing to do. They feel worthless. And you give them

1 the opportunity to work with a group of enthusiastic
2 people and they feel a sense of contribution again and it
3 is a major benefit to them. This is not my words. This
4 is their words over fifteen years hearing their reports
5 back to me. They are thankful to us for being invited to
6 be involved in research. Now that is something we have
7 dampen somewhat because sometimes they will do things they
8 perhaps should not be doing. So we are careful about
9 that. So it is fun for them.

10 (Slide.)

11 Now just to give you a little data this is --
12 I brought a copy of a paper, two papers on informed
13 consent in Alzheimer's disease patients, and we have used
14 something that Dr. Fletcher developed which is a durable
15 power of attorney. I am sure you all know about the
16 concept. We are now applying it to research where we take
17 people who are very mildly cognitively impaired at the
18 very beginning of the time they work with us.

19 Here the mini-mental state is about 22. It is
20 a very slight -- relatively slight impairment. People are
21 still compos mentus in many ways but by the time we see
22 them a couple of years later they are down to a 14 mini-
23 mental. That is a very -- 30 is the highest score by the
24 way. And that is the patients who are on the verge
25 perhaps of going to nursing homes. So clearly they have

1 passed the threshold from being able to give informed
2 consent and then no longer giving informed consent. I
3 will show that visually in the next slide.

4 (Slide.)

5 In yellow is the first admission where we get
6 an assigned durable power of attorney from our subjects.
7 Usually it is a spouse. It might be a son or a daughter
8 or even a friend and neighbor. They become their advocate
9 if you will. And then by the time that we start studying
10 them at this point where they still are able to give
11 informed consent even though they are slightly impaired
12 and may have an early diagnosis of dementia, by the time
13 they reach the second time we see them two years later
14 they are clearly very impaired.

15 We already have a seamless transition if you
16 will between mild cognitive impairment where they are
17 still able to give informed consent and major cognitive
18 impairment where they can no longer of their own free will
19 give informed consent although we very carefully -- it is
20 not in the regulations yet but we use assent as a major
21 component of the informed consent process much like we do
22 with children so that if there is any physical
23 manifestation of their unwillingness to work in our
24 research program we withdraw them and that includes up to
25 the very moment we do spinal taps or something like that.

1 MR. CAPRON: What does the GDS mean?

2 DR. SUNDERLAND: The GDS, excuse me, is the
3 Global Deterioration Scale for Alzheimer's disease
4 patients. So one and two is no dementia. Three to four
5 is very mild dementia. Five, six and seven are very
6 severe dementias, much more severe dementias. And seven,
7 almost all sevens are in nursing homes by that time.

8 MR. CAPRON: Thank you.

9 DR. SUNDERLAND: There are no more slides.
10 Now in terms of -- we tried to develop this
11 system along with Dr. Fletcher's advice and others because
12 we felt it was important -- because we do a lot of imaging
13 studies. I just brought a couple of pictures of what
14 imaging studies, like we said, which is, you know, spend
15 lots of money for a color picture basically, and this is a
16 picture of an MRI here. This is the template that we use
17 to analyze individual areas of interest and then we
18 superimpose that template from someone's actual brain to a
19 SPEC scan. This happens to be a SPEC scan. This is a
20 minor version of a PET scan if you will.

21 We have used this to develop a therapeutic
22 study. So I would go a little bit further than what Carol
23 said. We think that PET scans can be used therapeutically
24 as a dependent variable or a marker of improvement. We
25 have shown that you can increase the colenergic binding in

1 some Alzheimer's patients given with a PET study. We are
2 now using this as a rationale for giving them a certain
3 new drug that has not been determined before. So this
4 particular study that I am showing you, I have this data,
5 led to a therapeutic study which has been introduced and
6 we hope a direct benefit.

7 So our Alzheimer's patients we think can give
8 us informed consent. Initially when they are mild and
9 certainly if they give us a durable power of attorney --
10 thank you very much -- we think that they can give us
11 informed consent via their advocates, the person they have
12 chosen previously. We try to have everyone sign the
13 papers at the beginning and at the end so as not to
14 humiliate the patients by telling them today you can no
15 longer sign this paper yourself. We ask -- even if it is
16 just an "X" we have them put their name on the document so
17 that we are not even sure who is giving us informed
18 consent in some ways. Whether it is the DPA or the
19 patient. We see them together as one uniform group.

20 The other important point I will make about
21 that is that the DPA must be someone who knows the person
22 before they become cognitively impaired so that they can
23 go along with us in the research process so that they do
24 not make a decision that is not congruent with what that
25 patient would have done were they still cognitively

1 intact.

2 Now if I can shift a little bit to work with
3 children because that was part of what I was asked to do
4 today was to talk about imaging work. We have struggled
5 with the issue -- I now have a hat on as an IRB chairman -
6 - with how to do control studies with PETs in young
7 people. And actually Dr. McCarthy was involved in an
8 outside panel that we had. We convened about 20 people
9 and I will leave this document with you if you wish, which
10 is a review of this -- some of this meeting that we had.
11 Whereas could we do more than minimally impaired, more
12 than minimal research, minimal risk research with control
13 subjects who were under the age of 18 and we came up with
14 four answers.

15 One was tied to siblings of the impaired
16 subjects, usually schizophrenic subjects, that they would
17 be getting some direct benefit perhaps if, indeed, they
18 were more at risk of developing the illness and secondly
19 they were getting altruistic benefit by helping their ill
20 sibling. We also talked about the issue of implicit
21 pressure from family members to participate in that
22 research and we addressed that issue.

23 I will not say we solved it but addressed it
24 by having an outside panel of people review and meet with
25 that individual or person before they made a decision to

1 go ahead and do the research. And then we also -- while
2 the regulations do not specify the difference between
3 young children and older children we shifted most of the
4 burden of decision on to the older adolescent child if you
5 will. We felt they were somewhat more able to give
6 cognitive -- good informed consent for that particular
7 issue.

8 And then finally the issue of voluntary
9 radiation. Of course, PET scans or SPEC scans involve
10 radiation. We felt that it fit under the CFR 46.406 rule
11 that it was likely to yield generalizable knowledge about
12 the subject's disorder or condition and then that gave us
13 some rationale for the scientific risk/benefit ratio and
14 why we might go ahead and allow a well sibling to
15 participate in this kind of research.

16 So they were the two examples I wanted to give
17 you but the theme I wanted to share with you was the theme
18 of cognitive impairment, who is the person who has
19 cognitive impairment, are they a medically impaired
20 patient or a psychiatrically impaired patient? Is it
21 temporary or is it permanent? And then finally is it
22 something that a patient -- you can get around by looking
23 very carefully at issues of assent as well as concept
24 because too often I think in the IRB process we focus on
25 concept and it is a static decision, a one time decision.

1 And from my perspective it is not. It is really an
2 ongoing decision which is reinforced by assent every day
3 of the ongoing protocol. And whether you need to
4 emphasize that in your report I do not know but that is
5 certainly how we are trying to.

6 Finally, in terms of education for
7 investigators I would certainly agree with Carol that that
8 has not been adequate up until now certainly with medical
9 researchers and that is being addressed by the American
10 Psychiatric Association now. They are developing a manual
11 on informed consent which is being published by the APA
12 and it is in press right now. A number of us have
13 contributed chapters from our various specialties for that
14 book and I think that will be a major tool that we use
15 with researchers in the future.

16 DR. CHILDRESS: Thank you very much and thanks
17 for packing all that under the pressure of time.

18 We will have about ten to fifteen minutes for
19 discussion.

20 Let me just check in terms of the public
21 testimony. Mr. Barker is here, right? Okay. We will
22 start around 11:30 or 25 till.

23 Is Mr. Zohn here? Okay.

24 So we now will take questions and comments for
25 Dr. Sunderland but also for Dr. Tamminga as well, and we

1 will involve both in discussion.

2 Comments?

3 MR. CAPRON: Yes, two questions. I would like
4 to get an assessment from the IRB point of view of two
5 points. One is the question that Alta Charo was raising
6 with Dr. Tamminga which is the extent to which you have
7 examined and thought about how to deal with this so-called
8 therapeutic misconception that patients coming into a
9 research unit to the extent that they are participating in
10 a basic study of the mechanism of disease do not -- a
11 study which was frankly described by Dr. Tamminga and I
12 assume would be described by the IRB as one that does not
13 involve direct benefit to them. In a position of having
14 that therapeutic misconception because of their
15 desperation to have some intervention that is helpful in a
16 disease which may have been recalcitrant to treatment.

17 I guess I will just ask one question at a
18 time. To what extent has this been something which the
19 IRB has explicitly discussed and, if so, can you share
20 with us what kinds of thought processes you or your
21 bioethics consultants have come to as to how that should
22 be addressed as an issue if it is an issue?

23 DR. SUNDERLAND: I guess it boils down to the
24 issue of a carrot. Is the carrot a therapeutic study
25 where the quid pro quo is that you must first do the

1 challenge study? Is that the basic issue that you are
2 addressing?

3 MR. CAPRON: Yes. It is, in part, that, yes.

4 DR. SUNDERLAND: Okay. I think each -- from
5 the point of view of the IRB we address each protocol
6 separately and they are not usually combined. A
7 therapeutic study is not necessarily combined with a
8 challenge study. So that we might actually address only
9 the issue of a challenge study. So in some ways we are
10 putting them -- putting the researchers at a greater
11 disadvantage because they have nothing to offer the
12 individual subject outside of the challenge study. They
13 must prove to us that that is worthy in and of itself and
14 is a stand alone study. So that we --

15 MR. CAPRON: Okay. I get that from the
16 viewpoint of a committee looking at it and as I read the
17 federal rules benefit the science can be weighed off
18 against risk to the individual. It does not have to be
19 benefit to the individual.

20 The question is whether you have examined
21 systemically the position of the research subjects. Let
22 me take a step back. We have heard from people who had
23 been at the NIMH and have -- I came away with an
24 impression -- and it may have been that we heard from
25 unrepresentative people.

1 I came with the impression of people who
2 basically were being asked to make a commitment to come
3 and be subjects for a period of time, maybe an indefinite
4 period of time, but they were not typically coming on so
5 as to go into one study but really were sort of saying, "I
6 have a mental problem. The hospital I have been at has
7 not been able to deal with it and I am being referred down
8 here because NIMH is a source of hope for me."

9 When they get here and what is contemplated is
10 that they will be an inpatient at the clinical center --
11 is that where your research is done?

12 DR. SUNDERLAND: Yes, it is.

13 MR. CAPRON: -- for a period of time that may
14 be months, maybe even more than months, into years.

15 DR. SUNDERLAND: Right.

16 MR. CAPRON: Now in that setting the person's
17 -- the inducement was upfront with the hope that they
18 would come in. Have you given thought to how that would
19 affect their agreement to be in a particular study?

20 DR. SUNDERLAND: I am actually familiar with
21 the specific example that you have been faced with, with
22 the 3 West questions and Dr. Post and some of the issues.

23 MR. CAPRON: Okay.

24 DR. SUNDERLAND: So I know the details. In
25 fact, I have been involved with Dr. Calgary in writing a

1 response to some of those issues.

2 As an IRB we were aware that there were
3 subjects who were staying a long time. What we were not
4 aware of is that people were presented with multiple
5 protocols at the same time. And we are making changes to
6 make sure that is not --

7 MR. CAPRON: That is -- I am glad to have a
8 follow up on that.

9 DR. SUNDERLAND: Yes.

10 MR. CAPRON: But what I am concerned about is
11 I think Professor Charo was putting her finger on an
12 example of the potential in this setting for therapeutic
13 misconception to operate, not simply because of the quid
14 pro quo.

15 DR. SUNDERLAND: Right.

16 MR. CAPRON: But just a sense that, gee, you
17 are doctors, you are offering me participation in
18 something, it has got to be good for me at some level,
19 otherwise I would not be offered it, and I am in a
20 situation where I have entrusted myself to you. I have
21 come into this institution on some kind of a long-term
22 involvement. And to echo something Harold Shapiro said,
23 none of this is a question about the motives of the
24 individual research. It is not impugning anyone.

25 I am asking you as the outside group looking

1 at it, who obviously you have set up, you have showed us,
2 you think about these questions, I wonder is this a
3 question you have thought about and even now or have you
4 written it up, do you have a consultant's paper? Have you
5 addressed it in a way that could help our discussion more
6 than the few minutes that we have to talk about it even?

7 DR. SUNDERLAND: Quickly, no, we have not
8 written on this.

9 MR. CAPRON: Okay.

10 DR. SUNDERLAND: We have tried to address it.
11 I do not know the best answer for you. We are struggling
12 with this issue as an IRB as to how to present. I do work
13 as a clinician as well as a researcher and I am struck by
14 the similarity between that very issue when you do an
15 individual patient in your private office as opposed to in
16 a research center. It is not so different from when a
17 patient walks into your office. They have come to you
18 with the idea that you are going to help them.

19 DR. TAMMINGA: That is right.

20 DR. SUNDERLAND: And no matter what you say to
21 them, whether it be this may not work, or while I can give
22 -- I will tell you the research study that showed 90
23 percent of the time it will work, it may not work for you.
24 So really you are doing an individual research project
25 with that one person in your office privately. I do not

1 think it is so different in a research setting. No matter
2 what you say the people come to you with an idea that you
3 will cure them even if you say this is not going to be a
4 therapeutic study. It may help understand -- help us
5 understand science better and you will be making a major
6 contribution but I can guarantee you for our Alzheimer's
7 patients that is a benefit. They see that as a tremendous
8 benefit.

9 MR. CAPRON: But there has been -- but I would
10 wonder if you have an institution where this is going on
11 whether this is an empirical question. I mean, you could
12 ask people retrospectively as a part of an exit process or
13 as well as part of an entrance process whether you were
14 asked to participate in the studies that you were asked,
15 at that time did you expect to receive some benefit from
16 it? It would be interesting if a lot of people said,
17 "No," and then we are over on the quid pro quo side, which
18 may be fine.

19 It is not an undue inducement. The inducement
20 that I get something from being here. I am in a bad
21 state. You offer a nice hospital with the best quality
22 care there is in the country for these problems and I am
23 willing to give you some time on your research studies as
24 long as you are not going to kill me. That is a quid pro
25 quo and that may be fine.

1 But that is different than a person saying,
2 "Well, sure, yes, I thought I would benefit from
3 participation in the study." If you saw that a lot then I
4 would say institutionally you have some obligation to
5 address it and we as an institution have an obligation to
6 think about how it might be addressed not just at NIMH.

7 DR. SUNDERLAND: I totally agree with you.

8 MR. CAPRON: But you have not done those
9 studies?

10 DR. SUNDERLAND: No, those studies have not
11 been done and I think the sensitivity of the medical
12 researcher is not towards those questions up until now. I
13 think we are beginning to shift our focus a little bit.

14 Around the issue of genetics testing where
15 there is a potential predictive importance to genetics
16 testing we are beginning to ask people ahead of time do
17 you want to know the information and what does it mean to
18 you to hear about this information. Would you want anyone
19 else to have this information available? Do you want us
20 to do further tests once we -- as we can store people's
21 data for many, many years.

22 MR. CAPRON: Right.

23 DR. SUNDERLAND: So we are beginning to
24 proactively address this question and I do not think we
25 have in the past adequately.

1 MS. CHARO: Can I follow up just on exactly
2 that point, please, because on our IRB it is most common
3 in the consent forms to tell people that their decision to
4 withdraw from the research will not affect their
5 healthcare in any other way and yet that promise could not
6 be made on your research ward, for example, because
7 somebody who consistently failed to complete their
8 research protocols or consistently refused to participate
9 you said would be transferred off to a nonresearch ward,
10 right?

11 DR. TAMMINGA: Yes. Not without treatment
12 though. I mean, we would not just take them from a drug-
13 free state and transfer them off to another ward.

14 MS. CHARO: I understand that. But their
15 access -- see, this is basically what I was saying. If
16 people are entering these situations because they see it
17 as an avenue to innovative therapy, that is how they -- in
18 their minds it might be -- it is going to be innovative
19 therapy, an alternative to what has not been working for
20 them.

21 And then persistent refusal or change of mind
22 about participation is going to mean that they will be
23 moved back to standard therapy options that are available
24 on a nonresearch ward. It is very much a change in their
25 healthcare from their point of view because the innovative

1 therapy that is found on the research ward from the point
2 of view of the person coming in is healthcare, not
3 research.

4 Am I making any sense?

5 DR. TAMMINGA: Well, I think the innovative
6 therapy is the research.

7 MS. CHARO: That is my point. So the point of
8 view of the subject is it is not research. That is care.
9 And some of the other little things may be research but
10 that is -- this is the essence of the therapeutic
11 misconception. The point of view is crucial in the
12 characterization of what is going on. It is --

13 DR. CASSELL: It is not a misconception.

14 MS. CHARO: Yes.

15 (Laughter.)

16 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Diane, Eric and Trish.

17 DR. CASSELL: What about --

18 DR. CHILDRESS: Oh, you had a second one.

19 Sorry.

20 MR. CAPRON: The second one with these
21 challenge studies, again to the outsider they look so
22 disturbing. How do you evaluate whether or not you are
23 going to allow one of them to go on? Again if this is a
24 question to which you have given the kind of thought that
25 resulted in guidelines or elaborations and you prefer to

1 share that in writing with us, we have limited time, I
2 would be happy to have it.

3 But where you have mentally ill patients who
4 are on treatment and the study is going to take them off
5 and then give them ketamine or something and induce
6 psychosis and memory impairment and so forth in them. How
7 do you decide which of those studies are acceptable and
8 which are not?

9 DR. SUNDERLAND: Well, there are -- I will
10 give you a quick rule of thumb and then also refer you to
11 a paper that I will send to Dr. Childress if you like
12 written by two of our IRB members, Frank Miller and Don
13 Rosenstein, where they address the issue of challenge
14 studies. So let me address --

15 DR. CHILDRESS: And that one we actually have.
16 Thank you.

17 DR. SUNDERLAND: You have it already. Okay,
18 fine. So you have that paper.

19 The rule of thumb that we use is that one that
20 we are extra especially careful about the review of the
21 informed consent at several points during that study and
22 secondly that we are not exacerbating the symptoms beyond
23 what the patients have fully experienced in the past. So
24 we are not giving them new symptoms that they are
25 unfamiliar with. So that if we are going to -- and we use

1 that as a threshold marker.

2 So if the schizophrenia patient is to take
3 ketamine where there are such studies they have to
4 understand they might get some of the symptoms that they
5 have experienced previously. Rarely would they ever get a
6 symptom that they have not had before and we go over that
7 with them at a time when they are fully able to give
8 informed consent.

9 MR. CAPRON: Is there a documentation of the
10 long-term risk that -- having reintroduced these symptoms
11 it will be harder to get back or is that not thought to be
12 a long-term risk?

13 DR. SUNDERLAND: I cannot speak to the
14 schizophrenia literature. I do not know that as well.
15 But for Alzheimer's disease we give a drug called
16 scopolamine (?) which causes memory impairment. And we
17 can -- we have shown over and over again that the
18 impairment reverts back to their normal baseline within
19 four to six hours and that there is no evidence of it 24
20 hours, four months or six months later. But they still
21 progress but there is no evidence of an acute exacerbation
22 from that immediate psychopharmacologic challenge.

23 MR. CAPRON: But as chairman of the IRB that
24 reviews these you do not know the answer to the question
25 on whether or not in schizophrenia inducing it could have

1 any long-term consequences?

2 DR. SUNDERLAND: No, no, I do know as chairman
3 of the IRB that they do not have long-term effects. I
4 have not studied it myself personally so I cannot tell you
5 that --

6 MR. CAPRON: So you say there are papers?

7 DR. SUNDERLAND: Oh, yes, there are papers
8 that have shown that these drugs are acute -- rather
9 short acting drugs and there is no reason to understand
10 that they would think that they would have chronic
11 effects.

12 MS. FLYNN: If I could just add there is
13 considerable literature actually that looks at the effect
14 of relapse and in a typical person with schizophrenia who
15 may experience two to four episodes of psychosis a year if
16 they are untreated their psychotic episode may go on for
17 weeks and repeated relapses over a period of years will
18 produce permanent disability. These studies, and again I
19 am as uncomfortable as many are with them, but these
20 studies typically involve exacerbation of symptoms for a
21 matter of hours, which is much less than what, you know,
22 an ordinary course of illness would see and what many
23 people with this disorder have experienced repeatedly.

24 DR. TAMMINGA: I could add a bit on to what
25 Dr. Sunderland says in terms of telling you what I had to

1 go through with my IRB in order to do these ketamine
2 studies.

3 Initially we were allowed to do two patients.
4 We knew that ketamine was very short acting and has a half
5 life of 20 minutes and we knew that the amount of
6 psychosis exacerbation was rather small and after we did
7 two patients we had to report back to the committee. For
8 all of the patients that we -- and then when we did six
9 people we had to report back to the committee and tell
10 them what happened.

11 We had to quantify things for them. We had to
12 quantify that there was actually about a 25 percent
13 exacerbation of symptoms. So compared to the 100 percent
14 symptoms that they have in their drug-free state they had
15 about a 25 percent exacerbation and it lasted for 20
16 minutes and in the very long follow-up that we had because
17 they remained hospitalized for months there were never any
18 chronic sequelae. But our IRB now requires that if there
19 is a provocation of symptoms that it is mild and short
20 lasting and that there are no long term sequelae. We have
21 to document that.

22 MR. CAPRON: And you document that?

23 DR. SUNDERLAND: Yes.

24 MR. CAPRON: And you would typically report
25 that documentation as part of your process?

1 DR. TAMMINGA: Yes.

2 DR. SUNDERLAND: Oh, yes.

3 DR. TAMMINGA: Every six months. In the
4 ketamine cases we were more restricted than that.

5 DR. SUNDERLAND: We did the same thing at the
6 NIH. We did it every three patients. Now we have a huge
7 paucity of biologic tests in the mental health field in
8 general. And doing a challenge or a probe test like this
9 with ketamine is not so different than giving a diabetic
10 patient an insulin tolerance test.

11 DR. CASSELL: Of course, it is.

12 DR. SUNDERLAND: No, I am sorry, it is not.

13 DR. CASSELL: Of course, it is. Now I will
14 tell you something, when you give somebody with diabetes a
15 challenge by either stopping their insulin, you do not
16 give them an idea of their state of being.

17 DR. SUNDERLAND: We need to have --

18 DR. CASSELL: When you do that with -- excuse
19 me, please.

20 DR. SUNDERLAND: Yes.

21 DR. CASSELL: Give it a chance. When you do
22 that with ketamine you are telling somebody about their
23 state of being. It is considerably different. It is like
24 talking about long-term effects. One of the long-term
25 effects of anything is the memory that it happened. And

1 that does not produce hallucinations and so forth but it
2 changes a state of themselves. So if you are naive enough
3 to believe that a ketamine challenge and stopping
4 somebody's insulin for a couple of days are the same that
5 in itself is an interesting thought.

6 DR. SUNDERLAND: I think the point I was
7 making is not that there are no differences but that we
8 need to have biologic tests in the field of mental health
9 to go beyond the idea that these are -- to go beyond the
10 stigmatization of these medical conditions.
11 Schizophrenia, while we do not know much about the biology
12 of the illness yet, we do need to develop these tests so
13 we can understand the brain chemistry.

14 This is the small beginning so that from the
15 point of view of an IRB I think we have to take very
16 cautious steps in this direction so that we can develop
17 tests that are medically acceptable so that we can go on
18 into the 21st Century in this field which is otherwise
19 stuck 30 or 40 years behind much -- the rest of medicine.
20 That is my point. Not that they are not -- they are not
21 exactly analogous but they are in the same ball park. We
22 are trying to develop -- researchers around the world are
23 trying to develop small steps in the way of biology
24 testing.

25 DR. CASSELL: Well, I have a turn coming up so

1 I will --

2 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Let me tell you the
3 turn is going to be limited to 30 seconds to each of you
4 because we do have to have public testimony and then we
5 have to break.

6 Okay. Diane, Eric and Trish, 30 seconds only.

7 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Okay. I will speak very,
8 very quickly. My question is about assent. You
9 emphasized assent and could you just say a little bit
10 about the manner in which you do that by giving an
11 example?

12 DR. SUNDERLAND: Certainly. As a researcher
13 individually with an Alzheimer's patient every time we do
14 a procedure we actually -- if that procedure has been
15 covered by the overall protocol we will review it with the
16 patient the night before and the morning of, and ask if
17 they want to go ahead. That is particularly important
18 with the dementia patient because they forget having
19 signed anything weeks or months or even days ahead of
20 time.

21 So we will go over the final tap which is
22 perhaps the most provocative one for the individual and
23 the most difficult for the family to accept before and
24 then the morning of. If they show physically or verbally
25 any reticence then we will hold off the procedure. We may

1 address it with them later but we will stop it that day.

2 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Okay. You post-pone. You
3 do not allow them to discontinue.

4 DR. SUNDERLAND: We post-pone and then offer
5 it again. If they decide a second time not to do it then
6 we discontinue it entirely.

7 DR. SCOTT-JONES: You only try it twice?

8 DR. SUNDERLAND: That is correct.

9 DR. SCOTT-JONES: And do you know the
10 percentage of declines at the point of asking assent of
11 someone for whom you have informed consent?

12 DR. SUNDERLAND: I do not have it at my
13 fingertips but it is less than --

14 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Or ball park.

15 DR. SUNDERLAND: It is less than 15 percent of
16 our subjects decline.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: If you could provide any
18 information that would be helpful for us.

19 DR. SUNDERLAND: Okay. I will see if I can do
20 that.

21 DR. CHILDRESS: All right. Eric, 30 seconds
22 and, Trish, 30 seconds because we need to go to public
23 testimony.

24 DR. CASSELL: I have two comments. One is did
25 the two patients who were the beginning of the ketamine

1 challenge, whether they were the two patients who would go
2 first to find out if it had long-term effects, did they
3 know that?

4 DR. TAMMINGA: Yes. They knew it and the
5 families knew it.

6 DR. CASSELL: Fine. Secondly, we understand
7 the need to develop biological tests otherwise there would
8 be no need to protect human subjects and my -- when I hear
9 you I do not have to ask the other question I was going to
10 ask. Of course, you want to have a biological test. Who
11 does not want to have a biological test. It is not that.
12 That is not the issue at all. It is what is the price of
13 that biological test? That is what -- that is what this
14 thing is all about. What is the price? What is the human
15 price of that benefit?

16 DR. TAMMINGA: Can I say a short thing about
17 ketamine a minute that would speak to at least some of
18 your comments? Ketamine is a drug that will mildly
19 exacerbate one or two psychotic symptoms in a person. I
20 do not know that I generally think that the state of being
21 of a schizophrenic person is really defined by those
22 psychotic symptoms. A schizophrenic may hear voices and
23 that may last for ten minutes but it is not like they
24 become diffusely -- that their mind becomes diffusely
25 taken over by something.

1 DR. CASSELL: Just to clarify. If you had a
2 panic attack, even one panic attack, and maybe if it
3 lasted an hour, it will never leave your mind that you had
4 it.

5 DR. TAMMINGA: That is for sure. That is for
6 sure.

7 DR. SUNDERLAND: I mean, I -- my point in
8 making the reference to medical tests is -- let me give
9 another analogy that might not -- that might be more
10 acceptable. Which is the idea of someone who has a heart
11 condition. When they go in and they have an appointment
12 with their doctor six months from now and they start to
13 worry about the fact that they are going to get another
14 stress test when they go to that cardiologist's office.
15 Three months later they are worried about it again because
16 they know their symptoms might be exacerbated and they
17 might be precipitated by that treadmill test they are
18 about to have or by the infusion.

19 I do not think that is necessarily very nice
20 for them. It is very psychologically damaging. The one
21 thing they are worried about is a sudden death that might
22 happen in the doctor's office. We have not studied that.

23 So to me we have not studied the implications,
24 the long-term implications of that kind of situation
25 either. And I would say that the psychiatric patient is

1 not so different. Yes, it will be psychologically
2 difficult for them but it can be handled if done so
3 properly. And much like the cardiologist should be very
4 careful psychologically when their patient when they come
5 in for a treadmill test. That is really what my point
6 would be.

7 DR. CHILDRESS: Trish, 30 seconds, and then we
8 go to public testimony.

9 MS. BACKLAR: My question is how do you --
10 again like my question to Carol, how do you transition out
11 your patients? But I want to back up what Eric is saying.
12 I personally am very concerned about the discomfort and
13 the psychological discomfort of these kinds of research
14 and challenge issues. But how do you transition out your
15 patients?

16 DR. SUNDERLAND: Transition them out from --

17 MS. BACKLAR: From the basic --

18 DR. SUNDERLAND: -- from clinical research --

19 MS. BACKLAR: Yes.

20 DR. SUNDERLAND: In our case it is a little
21 bit different. The Alzheimer's patients, they are all
22 referred to us by primary physicians. We do not want to
23 be in a situation where we maintain the care for the
24 individual. So they must be referred by an individual
25 ongoing doctor who gives us their referral and we refer

1 them back to that doctor. Or help transition them if it
2 is time for them to go into a nursing home. We might help
3 that process. But it is via their local doctor. So that
4 is not -- we do not take on the responsibility of the
5 primary physician for just that reason.

6 MS. BACKLAR: And your schizophrenic patients,
7 the people with schizophrenia, their transition --

8 DR. SUNDERLAND: From the institute -- the IRB
9 -- we do not have a requirement of that at the IRB level
10 so I cannot speak. From the IRB point of view we do not
11 have an actual requirement of the transition.

12 MS. BACKLAR: All right.

13 DR. SUNDERLAND: But I know from clinical
14 practice --

15 MS. BACKLAR: That is important that you know.

16 DR. SUNDERLAND: Yes. From the clinical
17 practice my understanding is that most of the referrals
18 are also doctor to doctor in the institute but I would
19 have to check on that.

20 DR. CHILDRESS: We thank you both very, very
21 much for being with us, for sharing these thoughts, and
22 also for sharing materials with us. If you could pass
23 those on and Henrietta or Pat could get the materials from
24 you, we will be glad to make copies and distribute them.
25 If you can think of anything else that might be useful to

1 us, we would welcome that.

2 If you are around for a few minutes after we
3 have public testimony then perhaps there may be other
4 individual questions.

5 I have one person who is planning to present
6 public testimony, Mr. Allan Barker.

7 Mr. Barker, we appreciate your coming and we
8 do limit public testimony to five minutes. So you have --
9 if you can come and sit at the table or stand and use the
10 microphone there or sit there beside Dr. Sunderland would
11 be fine. If you have some written testimony we would very
12 much appreciate a copy of that which we could also
13 distribute to the whole commission.

14 MR. BARKER: I have already given it.

15 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Thank you.

16 STATEMENTS BY THE PUBLIC

17 MR. BARKER: I am here to talk about
18 electromagnetic antipersonnel weapon and mind control
19 technology. While there is still denials that such
20 weapons exist anyone who is remotely familiar with the
21 technology and its history can only conclude that the
22 United States has such devices.

23 Dr. Robert Becker wrote in his 1985 book The
24 Body Electric that we would have to be very naive to
25 assume the United States has no electromagnetic weapons.

1 Microwave beams can be modulated with voice
2 signals such that when the beam is directed towards a
3 subject's head he hears a voice. This has been reported
4 in the open scientific literature since at least 1975.
5 There are U.S. patents for devices with microphones which
6 will project a speaker's voice into a subject's head.

7 In addition to voice projection microwaves can
8 impair performance, affect heart rhythms and cause bone
9 damage due to heating effects.

10 MS. BACKLAR: I cannot hear.

11 DR. CHILDRESS: Excuse me, sir. Sorry, Mr.
12 Barker.

13 MR. BARKER: This is just the hardware. How
14 this technology is used can be likened to the software.
15 For example, when combined with familiar surveillance
16 devices such as miniature pinhole cameras microwave
17 weapons and other so-called nonlethal weapons can be used
18 to reversibly condition and train people inside their own
19 homes. They may not even be aware this is going on.

20 Because the effects of these weapons mimic the
21 symptoms of some mental illnesses and can cause brain
22 damage in addition to the dramatic stress of torture the
23 victims typically have no where to turn. They may be
24 further abused by the mental health system.

25 The CIA admitted in Appendix E of the Interim

1 Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
2 Experiments that it investigated the use and effect of
3 microwaves on humans. It determined that this research
4 was outside the purview of the Radiation Committee. I
5 hope it will fall within the purview of this committee.

6 Beyond microwave technology I want to talk
7 about implanted devices. Their existence is often denied.
8 Implanted devices, even brain implants, have been around
9 for years. There are U.S. patents for implantable
10 tracking devices that allow people to be tracked from
11 cellular phone towers. Implanted listening devices and
12 even EEG analysis devices are well within the capability
13 of black budget projects.

14 As recorded in December of 1993 by the City
15 Sun newspaper of Brooklyn Brian Wrung (?) discovered after
16 being released from a correctional facility that he had
17 various devices implanted in his body. These devices
18 showed up on CT and MRI scans. Even so he had difficulty
19 getting a lawyer to represent him. Surgeons citing fears
20 of reprisal would not remove the devices from his body.
21 The group of Physicians for Human Rights refused to assist
22 him or help him find a surgeon.

23 Major newspapers did not cover the story.
24 This last fact should not be a surprise. According to the
25 Columbia Journalism Review the data on human radiation

1 experiments that was reported as new in 1993 had actually
2 been known for almost a decade. A congressional committee
3 had issued a report detailing those abuses in 1986. The
4 report was widely ignored and misreported.

5 The indifference shown towards still surviving
6 victims of these experiments is shocking. I have
7 personally experienced harassment and torture inflicted by
8 people using mind control or influencing technology. It
9 began when I was doing research work associated with the
10 intelligence community. In the bizarre logic of this sort
11 of harassment those who claim to have experienced it
12 firsthand are often accorded less credibility than those
13 who have not. I do not let this stop me from trying to
14 describe how truly horrifying it is to have your very mind
15 repeatedly violated inside your own home where there is no
16 escape.

17 Just describing the hardware capability does
18 not begin to touch on the software techniques of
19 psychological warfare that are applied using the
20 technology. I hope this committee can begin to address
21 some of these human rights abuses. But people who commit
22 such crimes will think nothing of lying or worse to cover
23 up their involvement.

24 What would be worse than involuntary human
25 experiments like these would be if the techniques become

1 standard practice to be applied regularly and in secret.

2 Thank you.

3 DR. CHILDRESS: Thank you, Mr. Barker. I
4 thank you for your patience this morning as we ran so far
5 behind.

6 Are there any questions for Mr. Barker? Any
7 comments?

8 DR. DUMAS: Do we have copies of this one?

9 DR. CHILDRESS: Yes. You say copies have been
10 provided?

11 MR. BARKER: Yes.

12 DR. CHILDRESS: Copies have been provided so
13 that we can make copies.

14 DR. _____: He just brought one in this
15 morning.

16 DR. DUMAS: Oh, okay.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. So we will get copies
18 made.

19 Any other questions or comments?

20 Thank you very much, Mr. Barker.

21 Committee, let's get some lunch. Dr. Shapiro,
22 be back here immediately.

23 DR. SHAPIRO: Immediately, yes, meaning that
24 we would like to get the joint session started.

25 (Whereupon, a luncheon recess was taken at

1 11:52 a.m.)

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A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

1:35 p.m.)

FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

DR. CHILDRESS: We are very glad to have this afternoon session devoted to an issue that Alex Capron raised on the placement of OPRR forum or OPRR-like structure within the Federal Government. We are also getting a third paper by Tina Gonzalez that will deal with the possibility of a regulation of private research as well.

But for this afternoon we are dealing really with oversight of federally conducted or funded research and w are very glad to have Charles McCarthy, former head of OPRR, National Commission of Ethics, and John Fletcher, a former director of Clinical Ethics, NIH, and most recently the Center for Bioethics, University of Virginia, both of whom presented papers, be with us this afternoon. Each will speak about five minutes and then Alex Capron will raise questions but before then we will have a --

(Laughter.)

DR. CASSELL: I speak not only for myself but when we joined together just now interesting things are happening in the other group, ongoing interesting things, and we are not -- we do not really know enough about them as they are going on. So I do not know how to solve that

1 problem but maybe they feel the same way or should.

2 (Laughter.)

3 DR. CASSELL: I just wanted to raise that
4 point and I have finished my 28 seconds.

5 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Actually I think it was
6 raised in the previous session and I think that there will
7 be an effort to deal with that and try to balance those
8 two for the January and February meetings as I understand
9 it. But thanks. All right.

10 DR. CASSELL: I am sorry.

11 DR. CHILDRESS: Charlie and John, you have
12 provided such fine papers for us. Each, if you would
13 like, to just say a few words at the beginning, no more
14 than five minutes to open it up. Anything you would like
15 to highlight. Charlie can go first and then John, and
16 then Alex will kick off our discussion with you.

17 DR. MCCARTHY: Thank you very much and I am
18 delighted to be here. I want to wish this commission all
19 the best. We have hoped for its existence for many, many
20 years. We are delighted with the make up of the
21 commission and mandate, and so we hope that you will have
22 great success in fulfilling what I think is an
23 extraordinarily public function.

24 As you know, I retired from the government
25 about five years ago and I have recently reminded my

1 friends at FDA that the government has degenerated
2 dramatically since I left.

3 (Laughter.)

4 I reminded FDA that they have now approved Ex
5 Lax or they have banned Ex Lax and approved thalidomide.

6 (Laughter.)

7 And what further evidence could anybody have
8 of the decline of the government?

9 What I want to say to you today is something
10 about the organization of OPRR. First, I think you need
11 to get a very, very quick understanding of where it is
12 now. Namely that although the authority for OPRR is set
13 in the law and directed to the Secretary it is delegated
14 down through the Assistant Secretary for Health, through
15 the Director of NIH, and finally to the Director of OPRR.
16 So there are several channels above OPRR that feel that
17 they have some right or some authority and responsibility
18 for the protection of human subjects.

19 Usually this comes up when there is a
20 disagreement and so it is quite possible for there to be
21 more than one cook stirring the soup or putting
22 ingredients into the soup at the same time.

23 I found that that ambiguity as to who is
24 really in charge cut both ways. Sometimes it complicated
25 our lives and sometimes it actually hindered OPRR from

1 doing its work. At other times we found champions. For
2 instance, there were times when the Director, NIH, was
3 very unsympathetic to the work of OPRR. In that case we
4 often turned to the Assistant Secretary for Health for
5 backing in a particular case. In some cases, particularly
6 with Secretary Califano, we found he was willing to back
7 the decision of OPRR and so we identified ourselves as a
8 secretarial office.

9 So, in fact, we had stationery in our office
10 from the Secretary's office, from the PHS level and from
11 the NIH and we chose the stationary according to the
12 situation. And we found that the very ambiguity sometimes
13 hindered us and sometimes helped us in getting our work
14 done.

15 So I just want you to know I had a boss who
16 one time said to me, "The bureaucracy is like a 12 string
17 lyre. It is extraordinarily difficult to play and some
18 people only squeak and squawk. But those who learn to
19 master the instrument can make beautiful music."

20 What I am suggesting is that no matter what
21 you do there will always be that bureaucratic mastery that
22 must be developed and it is that that you cannot put into
23 laws or regulations or even into your reports. Yet it is
24 that that will ultimately either make OPRR succeed or
25 fail. So I think it is important to keep that in context.

1 One other comment I wish to make and then I
2 will talk a little about my findings, and that is simply
3 that OPRR is the kind of office that looks at haystacks
4 and it searches out needles. As a consequence an enormous
5 amount of what OPRR does turns out to be a deadend, a
6 negative finding and nothing was wrong, nobody did
7 anything bad, we just had to check.

8 Now and again it finds a needle. So what OPRR
9 is known for in the public world are those few needles it
10 finds that OPRR feels in the day-to-day work of the office
11 is the enormous burden of that haystack. Consequently it
12 is difficult to recruit and to retain highly competent
13 well-motivated staff. Sometimes they may get so numb
14 looking at the haystack that even when they run across a
15 needle they are not sensitive to it.

16 Again I think no matter where the office is
17 placed that kind of problem will persist and I think it is
18 very important work that must be done but remember you are
19 dealing with those rare exceptions first of controversial
20 cases and, secondly, bad judgments by OPRR, or an IRB, or
21 by an investigator, or by an institution, or all of the
22 above, and those must be dealt with promptly and
23 expeditiously. But they first must be identified and that
24 can only be done in my judgment through a sound
25 educational program.

1 So the points I simply want to make are first
2 and foremost that even as you heard today the discussion
3 about minimal risk and other kinds of issues none of that
4 can ever be fully captured in a regulation. It always
5 must be amplified by education to raise sensitivity or the
6 regulations themselves will not work. You may change the
7 wording. You may redefine the risks. You may redefine
8 benefits, whatever you wish to do, but unless that is
9 accompanied by a strong and continuing education effort it
10 will finally become fossilized and it will have just the
11 opposite effect that you would like to intend.

12 So that education program must be alive. It
13 is hard to find people today who read the reports of the
14 old National Commission. They were dynamic at the time
15 but now they are gathering dust from the shelves and your
16 reports in time will have the same fate. As a consequence
17 unless that education program is renewed, updated, and
18 continuous, I think no placement of OPRR or staffing or
19 other kinds of bureaucratic efforts will ever be fully
20 successful.

21 There also, of course, must be a compliance
22 dimension but I think that is self-evident. OPRR, no
23 matter how big it is, or how good its staff is, must be
24 always draw on outside expertise. It deals with all kinds
25 of research in all kinds of disciplines. And often times

1 a factual situation requires a good deal of understanding.

2 You spent quite a lot of time this morning
3 talking simply about washout studies and those imaging
4 studies simply trying to learn what the scientist is
5 trying to do and how it is to be done. Only then can --
6 if you understand the process can you then begin to
7 wrestle with the ethical issues. And OPRR cannot possibly
8 have all that kind of expertise and, therefore, I would
9 argue that it needs to be in a position to command that
10 expertise particularly from the intramural scientists
11 within the department but also from outside if that
12 expertise is not available inside.

13 On occasion OPRR's work overlaps with other
14 ethical offices. Many times the animal issues and the
15 human subjects issues get intertwined. On occasion the
16 research issues relating scientific conduct or misconduct
17 get intertwined with human subjects issues. Therefore, I
18 think it must always be in close alignment with those
19 other offices that have a cooperative relationship with
20 them so that when an investigation or a compliance issue
21 arises there is already an easy relationship across those
22 offices willing to work together.

23 So that brings me then to the set of
24 conclusions that I would like to make. The first is I
25 think that at times because of congressional pressure,

1 White House pressure, pressure from the Office of
2 Management and Budget, pressure from powerful institutions
3 in the country, major universities and the like, I think
4 OPRR if it is to survive and to thrive must have the
5 backing of a cabinet level officer. Therefore, I would
6 like to see the office established in the Office of the
7 Secretary but because that office itself is highly
8 politically motivated I think it should be protected by
9 some additional kinds of legislation that would keep the
10 Secretary even from interfering unduly in the work of
11 OPRR.

12 I would like that office to be filled not by a
13 political appointee but by a career person with proper
14 qualifications. I would like that person to have the
15 level of an Undersecretary which is sufficient, I think,
16 in virtually every case to exercise supervision over the
17 various agencies within the department and give sufficient
18 stature so that person could have some weight in the
19 interface with other agencies across the Federal
20 Government.

21 I think it should be located in a larger
22 ethics office in the Secretary's office so that the sister
23 offices on animal care and humane care and use of
24 laboratory animals and the ethics of research integrity
25 are closely aligned and can easily interact whenever that

1 is appropriate. I think it must always have an education
2 branch and that must be funded.

3 Then finally even OPRR independent as I would
4 like it to be needs to be accountable to someone. So I
5 would like to see it accountable to a particular set of
6 committees in the Congress reporting no less than
7 annually, reporting on the performance of the various
8 agencies within the Department of Health and Human
9 Services, reporting on the performance of the other
10 agencies across the Federal Government, and giving an
11 account of its own stewardship.

12 Those are the main kinds of recommendations I
13 would make and I think OPRR then with the proper personnel
14 and the proper training of that personnel could serve an
15 even more important role in the future than it has in the
16 past.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Thanks, Charlie.

18 John?

19 DR. FLETCHER: Mr. Chairman and members of the
20 commission, thank you very much for inviting me. It has
21 been a real pleasure for me to engage in this project, in
22 this paper. I have had a number of interesting interviews
23 and visits. My findings revolve around a central problem
24 that I think is irremediable without a more radical
25 solution than Dr. McCarthy recommends.

1 The problem is that OPRR's location within the
2 National Institutes of Health is a very imposing conflict
3 of missions. The two agencies have different missions.
4 OPRR's mission is to uphold the primacy of respect for
5 human subjects. NIH's mission is as the nation's main
6 sponsor, federal sponsor, of biomedical research. And
7 this -- the location of OPRR within the NIH, the fact that
8 its staff is supervised by the Deputy Director of
9 Extramural Research, is a conflict of missions that does
10 create conflicts of interest.

11 Dr. McCarthy's report, interestingly, detailed
12 one very significant conflict of interest which he
13 adroitly negotiated his way around when Dr. Healy asked
14 for a briefing on the Gallo investigation and she got one
15 from the Office of Scientific Integrity for which she was
16 criticized and they were criticized. Dr. McCarthy
17 negotiated his way out of that recognizing that that would
18 have been an extremely sensitive and palpable conflict of
19 interest. But the fact that the request was made shows
20 you the tip of an iceberg, which I have had the privilege
21 of investigating in more detail, which is filled with
22 examples of conflict of interest.

23 The most compelling proof to me of the problem
24 of OPRR's location is if you compare the record that OPRR
25 has of investigating violations in PHS agencies, that is

1 the NIH, the CDC and to a very small extent in the FDA,
2 the first two agencies, the time required for those
3 agencies to make correction, when you compare it with the
4 track record of major universities in making quite similar
5 changes, it is -- it cannot be explained in terms of
6 complexity. It can only be explained in terms of the
7 ingrained attitude of administrators and veteran
8 scientists within these agencies towards the OPRR.

9 The tools that the OPRR has for its normal
10 every day work with its -- with sources of its assurance,
11 namely the threat of removing -- the threat of suspension
12 of federal funding, the threat of bad publicity, et
13 cetera, et cetera, these tools do not work when it comes
14 to the agencies of the Federal Government. They are not
15 worried about their funding.

16 And my -- in my own professional opinion they
17 look down on the OPRR. There is a lot of data about the
18 lack of respect of OPRR. But the data is in the -- the
19 main data is in the time that is required to make changes.

20 I feel fairly confident on this point that
21 there is a very imposing problem. The solution that I
22 recommended follows the example of the Nuclear Regulatory
23 Commission which was at one time part of the Atomic Energy
24 Commission and which had very serious similar problems.
25 The Office of Government Ethics was at one time part of

1 the Office of Personnel Management and they had similar
2 problems of being overshadowed and running into problems
3 of conflicts of mission which escalate into conflicts of
4 interest.

5 Both of these agencies today are independent.
6 They are located in the -- broadly speaking in the
7 executive sector. They report to Congress. They are very
8 well funded. The Office of Government Ethics is extremely
9 well funded and has an outstanding education program.

10 So I recommended in conclusion that the
11 commission consider cutting the Gordian knot of conflicts
12 of mission which lead to conflicts of interest and
13 recommending that OPRR have an independent location that
14 is certainly accountable to Congress, which will be
15 responsible for funding it, but reporting to the President
16 as a matter of accountability.

17 That there be created a new national office
18 for human subjects research with a view towards a mission
19 which I think is compatible with the commission's previous
20 statements about universalizing protections of human
21 subjects beyond the federal dollar. Our federal policy
22 today follows the dollar and this is morally and legally
23 questionable. All research subjects in the United States
24 deserve equal protection of IRB review and informed
25 consent. The new office of human subjects research ought

1 to have that universal mission along with being the
2 primary agency responsible for monitoring the quality of
3 compliance with the Common Rule.

4 I also recommended that there be a national
5 advisory committee for human subjects research to be
6 appointed within the context of OPRR for purposes of
7 ongoing policy debate, ongoing debate about interpretation
8 of the regulations, a forum for significant problem cases.
9 I recommended that this not be set up according to a
10 commission model but as an advisory committee to the new
11 national office to meet at least four times a year under
12 the national advisory committee act and so forth.

13 The national advisory committee, I believe,
14 would partially meet the longstanding recommendations of
15 Professor Katz and others. It is not the model that he
16 proposed but it goes partially towards meeting the need
17 for a permanent national forum and a source of expert
18 advice.

19 Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I just remind
20 the commission that the -- my attachment number one which
21 shows that OPRR is 12 levels down in the bureaucracy at
22 the NIH, my understanding would be that any
23 recommendations that the commission might make which would
24 become OPRR's responsibility would find these
25 recommendations would quickly find themselves in this

1 lower realm of problem and be in effect asking for the
2 same kind of trouble that affects OPRR on a -- not just on
3 a periodic basis but on a permanent basis.

4 So if you want to help yourselves to be free
5 from this problem I call upon you to work together to find
6 the ways, including the political ways, to liberate OPRR
7 from its present problems and make it an independent
8 agency with sufficient stature and tools and staff to do
9 its job.

10 Thank you very much.

11 DR. CHILDRESS: Thank you, John.

12 I have asked Alex to kick our discussion off.
13 I know Alta has a comment to add too.

14 MR. CAPRON: I want to thank our paper writers
15 for two really very well put together and illuminating
16 papers, both analytically and in terms of their content
17 adding to our knowledge of the history both by looking at
18 sources and bringing them together and since each of these
19 paper writers has a great deal of personal experience
20 adding to the record by bringing out things which I do not
21 think have been on the record before, there is a great
22 deal of benefit we get by having turned to Drs. McCarthy
23 and Fletcher. The wisdom that is borne of their
24 experiences is very apparent in what they have written.

25 Since we began this topic by thinking we would

1 look for opposing views it is clear that the conclusion to
2 which they come does differ in some ways. What is most
3 remarkable to me is the convergence and congruence of the
4 two papers not only in their description of what has
5 happened but their diagnosis of the meaning of that. If
6 not in their proscription of how to respond there is a
7 surprising amount of congruence.

8 There are certain parts of the papers, which
9 while interesting, I do not think we have to be as
10 directly concerned about. Obviously Dr. McCarthy speaking
11 out of his personal experience necessarily provides an
12 endorsement of the methodology that the office that he
13 headed has used and he gives good argument for why that
14 methodology is to be preferred. But I do not think that
15 the question of the methodology necessarily affects the
16 location, which is the issue that we are mostly
17 addressing.

18 I think it would be incumbent on either anyone
19 running the present office in its present form or any
20 office of this to learn from Dr. McCarthy's comments which
21 I think are generally very well taken but it is not
22 directly on point to the issue. Likewise, Professor
23 Fletcher's philosophical standpoint, which I personally
24 share, on the relative balance between the imperative to
25 do research and the imperative to protect human rights is

1 interesting but I think actually we could extract that
2 also from the paper and his actual recommendations would
3 not differ. So in each case I hope that we do not really
4 focus on those and if people disagree on that I hope we
5 can put that aside.

6 The papers together present a picture of
7 gradual expansion of the oversight function punctuated by
8 crises and scandals, some that were widely known and some
9 that through great maneuverings were prevented from
10 becoming very public scandals. Sometimes the responses
11 seem to be aimed at the highest level of human subjects
12 protection.

13 They were motivated by a recognition that
14 there was a problem and a need to respond by increasing
15 the level of protection. Sometimes it appears that they
16 were motivated by institutional impulse towards self-
17 preservation and both in resisting rules sometimes but
18 also even in endorsing greater oversight as the way to
19 avoid an outside interference. A strategic retreat on a
20 point to save -- to win the war while losing the battle.

21 The central issues that come out of both
22 papers are the lack of perceived authority outside of the
23 NIH for the agency which those of us from outside
24 recognize as the major agency in the government, although
25 we are reminded by both papers that is not really anything

1 which has any statutory basis. It is more or less custom
2 that puts OPRR in that position. The resources are not
3 provided to OPRR to serve that function. It is something
4 that somehow they cram into an already busy schedule.

5 Within the rest of the public health system
6 this authority seems to be resistant in other parts of the
7 public health system and outside of the public health
8 system, while it is acknowledged, it does not have any
9 actual enforcement power and is very informal.

10 There is secondly the point of lack of
11 leverage which I think Dr. McCarthy makes and then Dr.
12 Fletcher underlines and illustrates.

13 He just mentioned the absence of the budget
14 authority vis-a-vis the internal -- the intramural work
15 and the time that was required to respond to the OPRR's
16 1990 recommendations. Likewise, the appearance that the
17 OPRR's statement that changes in the assurance were only
18 proposed and were simply ignored. Certainly that
19 indicates a lack of leverage, no fear of contradicting
20 this group, of ignoring them.

21 The conflicts of mission which were at the
22 center of what I originally was pushing are underlined
23 this time, I think, by Dr. McCarthy as much as Dr.
24 Fletcher and it is interesting -- it was interesting to me
25 in Dr. Fletcher's paper to see a quotation on page 19 from

1 testimony by Dr. Varmus in response to the GAO report
2 insisting that OPRR had freedom and that it was
3 independent of any oversight of the people concerned with
4 research because the lines of authority of the NIH Deputy
5 Director of Intramural Research and the OPRR Director do
6 not cross within NIH.

7 I gather that what this means is that in
8 organizational chart OPRR must somehow report to the
9 Director without going through that office and yet as Dr.
10 Fletcher's chart on page 28 shows the actual work of OPRR
11 in terms of having something signed off on goes not only
12 through the Director of Intramural but also the Director
13 of Extramural and all the other management people and the
14 general counsel and so forth and so on. So that is the
15 layers.

16 I gather that these additional lines drawn on
17 here where they have -- you have the Institute, Center and
18 Division Directors means that it is unlikely that the
19 Deputy Director for Intramural or Extramural respectively
20 is going to sign off before he or she has circulated to
21 those people and gotten their response.

22 So there is a sense that perhaps Dr. Varmus'
23 statement is truest in one way but it seems to be not
24 representative of the freedom that the office would have
25 in another way.

1 Now as a matter of prediction Dr. McCarthy
2 says that were the human subjects protection function to
3 be separated from a department it would in his words not
4 survive as an independent agency. We are all dealing with
5 matters of prediction. Were we to follow Dr. McCarthy's
6 view we would not know what would happen the other way.
7 And if we take the other view he may in truth be right.

8 If I can go beyond now describing what I take
9 to have happened here and just comment on the
10 recommendations to lead off the discussion, it seemed to
11 me that the protection that was being brought by putting
12 the office in the Secretary's office for HHS seemed very
13 thin to me for the following reason just as a sort of an
14 amateur student of bureaucracy.

15 The insulation that you think would happen,
16 Charlie, comes about because of two things. One that you
17 have a career officer heading it up and not a political
18 appointee. And, two, that it would make a direct report
19 to a congressional committee that would include its
20 account of what is happening and a statement of its own
21 budgetary needs and personnel needs.

22 Unless the Secretary is absolutely prohibited
23 from having any say what this one particular Assistant
24 Secretary says on these subjects and how it fits into his
25 or her overall budget scheme and personnel scheme and

1 policy for her or his department, it seems very odd to
2 assume that this report could go forward without having
3 been through the normal processes that everything else
4 does before it gets sent to Congress. In which case it
5 really is subject to all the problems if there is the
6 problem of conflict of mission and everything else that we
7 started with trying to avoid.

8 If it is insulated then the Secretary has no
9 desire to give it any protection. I mean basically you
10 are on your own. You get to talk to Congress. Talk to
11 Congress. And there is no protection.

12 What is bought in the process of course is the
13 awkwardness of the relationship to the other departments.

14 And in Dr. McCarthy's description the body is
15 to include in their annual report an evaluation of the
16 performance of each of the departments and agencies but no
17 authority actually during the year sort of up until then
18 to do anything with those departments and agencies as far
19 as we can see because it is still an HHS office.

20 And that just -- I mean, it seems to me it
21 puts them in an impossible position of sort of commenting
22 on things and their only apparent power to move people is
23 that they are going to comment on them but they do not
24 have any day-to-day or week-to-week direct authority. If
25 they do, then Dr. Fletcher's recommendation would seem to

1 make more sense. If they are going to have that direct
2 authority government-wide why should they be lodged in the
3 office of a particular secretary?

4 I would say that this is the point at which
5 the divergence comes and I think Dr. McCarthy's
6 recommendation means that the upward curve continues
7 upward on a fairly straight line. That is to say if you
8 go back to 1953 with the Intramural Program or 1966 with
9 Surgeon General Stewart's policy statement as to the
10 extramural and place it along in an office and so forth it
11 is fairly even. This would be -- Dr. Fletcher's move
12 changes the shape of the curve and takes it outside of the
13 department.

14 Since everything that we have seen in both of
15 these reports indicates why it is problematic in its
16 present location the question is isn't this the time then
17 to shift the curve upward and to have that break?

18 I would only comment that neither of you
19 directly addressed as far as I could see the question of
20 whether there would be in the individual departments some
21 continuing internal office concerned with their own issues
22 and administration. I see nothing inconsistent with the
23 notion of having a national office of human subjects
24 research with the kind of advisory committee that Dr.
25 Fletcher recommends and having each of the departments to

1 the extent that they support enough research to warrant
2 this having the kind of internal capabilities that Dr.
3 Freeman and our group has been trying to discover if they
4 have now.

5 I believe that is indeed the same arrangement
6 that happens on the ethics issue, the departments have
7 their own internal ethics officers which implement for the
8 department their ethics -- government-wide ethics policy,
9 but the office of governmental ethics has the overall
10 responsibility to make sure those offices are doing the
11 right things and to address policy issues and questions of
12 interpretation of statutes or regulations.

13 So there is -- you did not address that but
14 the notion that -- in other words, one might not, in fact,
15 end up obliterating OPRR or some other institute based
16 capability or departmentally based capability for the
17 department. Certainly Dr. McCarthy's indication that you
18 might need to move it up within the department to get the
19 attention of the other PHS components that do not seem to
20 be too ready to listen to NIH might indicate that OPRR
21 itself should go up departmental-wise but that is
22 different from the question of whether the overall
23 function is better lodged in a department.

24 So that those comments -- and again thank you
25 both very much. It really was -- there are many things I

1 have not commented on here that I found very illuminating.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: Thanks, Alex.

3 Let me see if Charlie or John would like to
4 respond just briefly to anything Alex said and then we
5 will go to Alta.

6 DR. McCARTHY: Yes, I am sure John wants to
7 make a comment or two and I would too. The first is,
8 Alex, you describe yourself as an unprofessional observer
9 of the government.

10 MR. CAPRON: Amateur, I said.

11 DR. McCARTHY: Amateur. I would dispute that
12 but we can have that discussion.

13 MR. CAPRON: Do you prefer the word "ignorant"
14 to amateur?

15 (Laughter.)

16 DR. McCARTHY: No. I would prefer the word
17 "long-time seasoned professional."

18 With respect to the level of independence I
19 think what you have described does not quite fit the
20 government that I knew from the inside. All budget
21 requests will go up to whether you have an independent
22 office or office within NIH with a line item. They will
23 go up through the Office of Management and Budget which
24 will then get comments and should this ethics office,
25 whatever we call it, be independent then the comments OMB

1 will get will not only be from HHS, from the Department of
2 Defense, from a number of other cabinet levels, and there
3 will be no one who owns that office to defend it.

4 So what you are suggesting is that somehow
5 that independence will give them a bigger budget. My
6 suggestion is that HHS, DOD, the Department of Veterans
7 Affairs and other offices will say, "We have no investment
8 in that. It is not our's. We do not -- if they do not do
9 well it is no skin off our nose." So it will be
10 unprotected within the executive branch.

11 I am suggesting that it would be far better
12 protected if someone owns that office and it is very
13 difficult for a Secretary to disown an Assistant
14 Secretary. So that I think at least you could count on
15 defense from one cabinet level officer for OPRR should it
16 be invested or remain in the department.

17 So that would be at least a point of
18 disagreement. We are both making predictions about what
19 might happen so obviously I am offering you simply an
20 opinion.

21 Secondly, I think there is no doubt that the
22 agency heads within the Department of HHS, which fund the
23 vast majority of federally funded research, answer very
24 promptly and without delay to directives from the Office
25 of the Secretary. My experience has been that requests

1 for action coming from outside agencies are relegated to a
2 much lower level of importance and, therefore, might run
3 into the very kind of delays that John and I both
4 described.

5 So those are a couple of areas where I would
6 disagree with you. I think the Secretary himself or
7 herself would recognize this now is a very visible office
8 and any secretaries wanting to have a successful career
9 would need to support it rather than undermine it.
10 Particularly if it had strong congressional oversight and
11 support in both houses.

12 So one has to draw kinds of scenarios about
13 what might happen or would happen but at least the
14 arguments that you and John have raised have not been
15 persuasive to me.

16 MR. CAPRON: If I may ask just on this last
17 point, I guess our point of difference would then be you
18 would think that the directives or anything coming out of
19 this office if it were lodged in the Secretary's office
20 would get attention within HHS but if it were counted as
21 an outside office vis-a-vis the 16 or so other departments
22 and agencies conducting research it would be ignored. And
23 so the -- I am then put in the position if I agree with
24 you about the ignoring and being worried of adding one
25 more department to that list, and then the question is if

1 they are going to be ignored are they less likely to be
2 ignored not only in HHS but elsewhere if they come from a
3 presidentially appointed office that is -- has government-
4 wide authority.

5 You have raised a very good question which is
6 what actions, force and power should that office have and
7 that is not addressed by John Fletcher.

8 DR. McCARTHY: My answer to that simply is if
9 HHS was a small agency then I think lodging it in -- even
10 at the highest levels within that agency would not give it
11 very much authority or power. But lodging it within the
12 office -- the cabinet office it will get the attention not
13 only in the agencies within HHS but the agencies outside
14 as well in a way that an independent office in my judgment
15 will never command the same level of respect.

16 I think even -- I think John cites the
17 Government Office of Ethics and it does have a good budget
18 and it has done some good things. I think were it
19 strictly a regulatory office, running into areas where
20 sometimes it must expose shortcomings in the programs at
21 the other agencies and punish that it would have a very
22 different kind of history. It really needs the backing in
23 my judgment of a major cabinet level office. Again it is
24 a matter of opinion.

25 John and I both, I think, want the same

1 general result, namely independence with some
2 congressional oversight over an extraordinarily important
3 kind of function that to some degree at the present time
4 is awkward.

5 DR. CHILDRESS: John, and then I will get Alta
6 and Rachel.

7 DR. FLETCHER: Obviously Charlie's political
8 philosophy and mine differ. I am not saying that his
9 solution would not work to the end that he desires it to
10 work, that is to protect the regulatory body from attack,
11 from being dismantled. What Congress can create it can
12 uncreate.

13 But although that danger is always there I
14 think it is still an inherent contradiction and a
15 weakening of the oversight function and the action -- I do
16 have some comments about the action of creating capacity
17 of the agency which I would like to go back to.

18 But the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
19 Office of Government Ethics are not disregarded. They are
20 highly regarded and I think they are effective as
21 agencies. So as a matter of historical record two
22 agencies that were once encumbered by very similar
23 dynamics, the problems have been recognized by Congress,
24 and the -- and corrections have been made.

25 I think that my recommendation presuppose a

1 vision of human subjects research that I believe the
2 commissioners share a universalizing of the protection of
3 human subjects of research which our European colleagues
4 have already done and which I feel we are behind in terms
5 of moral considerations and legal considerations of the
6 imperatives of protections of human subjects.

7 So if the evolutionary -- if the evolution of
8 human subjects research and protection of human subjects
9 is towards universalizing the basis of it and making it
10 equal then the future national office needs to be set up
11 within that paradigm. It needs to be established to have
12 a much larger theater of operation and reconceptualize not
13 within the federal paradigm but within a national
14 paradigm.

15 This is a major undertaking and will be very
16 unpopular with private funders of research. It will be
17 extremely unpopular but a fight worth engaging in for all
18 the reasons that the first stage of it within the federal
19 sector was worthwhile.

20 Sixty percent of funding for biomedical
21 research now comes from the private sector. Excuse me,
22 fifty percent. Forty percent from the federal sector and
23 ten percent from the nonprofit sector. I reviewed these
24 figures recently for a meeting about women's health
25 research. So the fulcrum has changed. The fulcrum of

1 financial power, of economic power is no longer within the
2 federal sector. It is within the private and nonprofit
3 sector. The country needs a new national office.

4 Professor Capron's further helpful comments
5 about the -- about having a vestigial or a remainder of
6 OPRR within NIH, indeed within each agency, indeed this is
7 a pattern within all universities that have any kind of --
8 any major investment in human subjects research is there
9 is an officer in charge of that concern and more staff to
10 help their IRB members and the many ethics committees that
11 major universities now have.

12 So there is an infrastructure already there
13 that does not have to be dissolved. In fact, it would be
14 necessary to continue. But all should be responsive to a
15 higher authority that acts on behalf of the nation in a
16 more protected and independent location.

17 Both of the agencies, Professor Capron, that I
18 mentioned have abilities that would strengthen OPRR's
19 successor. They can propose and finalize regulations in
20 the Code of Federal Regulations, visit and/or audit their
21 clientele, promulgate guidance and educational materials
22 for consumption by their clientele and independently
23 govern pertinent activity within another federal
24 department or agency.

25 This would be some of the action producing

1 capacities of the new office.

2 DR. CHILDRESS: Alta?

3 MS. CHARO: First I want to reiterate the
4 gratitude for enormously illuminating and provocative
5 papers and a real jump up in the level of inquiry that is
6 possible around this table.

7 Second, although I am not a seasoned
8 government employee, I consider myself lightly salted as
9 an observer. So I want to preface my remarks by what may
10 seem somewhat paranoid but it has to do with conflict of
11 interest for NBAC itself.

12 I do not know if anybody shares this sensation
13 but I feel slightly constrained on this particular topic
14 specifically because of the position of NBAC and its
15 charter within the whole federal scheme of things. We
16 have an acting executive director who works as an employee
17 at the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and
18 Evaluation of HHS at the same time that we are talking
19 about things that fundamentally affect HHS, its
20 organization, its image, et cetera. In the job
21 description for a permanent executive director is the
22 requirement that that executive director report to that
23 same office even after the permanent executive director is
24 appointed.

25 We are experiencing the gracious assistance of

1 NIH on a daily basis. Witness where we are sitting today
2 instead of in a hotel. So there is an awful lot of good
3 will that we depend on from NIH as well as, I think, NIH's
4 revenge by foisting their contract travel agent on us.

5 (Laughter.)

6 So I feel somewhat -- I recognize other fellow
7 over travelers.

8 So I feel like we are in a position of having
9 to rely strongly on our DFO sitting to my right to bring
10 our message to the NSTC and to the OSTP and the Office of
11 the President despite the fact that we are deeply enmeshed
12 within the single cabinet department that is most
13 primarily affected by these conversations.

14 And so although this may not sound like it
15 this is me being constrained in my comments about this
16 issue.

17 With that backdrop to my concerns, first, a
18 huge reiteration about the concern about the fact that any
19 recommendations we make substantively on human subjects
20 regulations, for example the decision making capacity of
21 people, will be aimed at the OPRR for the moment since it
22 is the only office that can actually write regs for
23 proposal purposes at this level and then will have to get
24 reviewed not only by all these people but specifically by
25 the division directors in charge of doing research

1 specifically on these kinds of people.

2 We know the history of the consent auditor
3 proposals in the past so I want to reiterate the concern
4 about that.

5 DR. McCARTHY: Could I interrupt just a
6 moment? I appreciate what you say is largely true but do
7 not forget that a major segment of the research in the
8 private sector is regulated by FDA that is gathered around
9 in the audience here.

10 MS. CHARO: All true.

11 DR. McCARTHY: So that covers a major chunk of
12 those statistics that John gave a little while ago.

13 MR. CAPRON: The sights of many rifles are
14 aimed at a chair across the table. Not just the NIH.

15 (Laughter.)

16 MS. CHARO: But I want to just pick up on
17 three specific points that were raised so far in the
18 conversation. One is that part of this conversation has
19 to do with the ability of an office in charge of
20 protecting human subjects to affect all cabinet
21 departments through various actions, force and mechanisms.

22 Now we are going to be hearing later on today
23 about the fact that we have, for example, in the
24 Department of Justice an interpretation of key terms that
25 differs from what casual readers might think of as being

1 the natural definitions of things like research and such.

2 It is my understanding that the legislation
3 that now exists and the regulations that now exist
4 specifically grant authority to each independent
5 department -- each department independently through their
6 secretaries to interpret those key terms. So that right
7 now it is not just the positioning of the office but it is
8 the very way in which the notion of human subjects
9 protection is constructed to the legislation that
10 specifically decentralizes interpretation of key terms.

11 I was wondering if we could in the
12 conversation try to deal with that question at the same
13 time that we deal with the position of the office because
14 position of the office is irrelevant if the departments
15 have independent authority over key interpretations.

16 The second point I wanted to throw out for
17 your comments has to do with the notion of an independent
18 agency and I do not know the difference between agency and
19 an office so I am going to use those terms
20 indiscriminantly but it may not be accurate to do so.

21 Among the possibilities you have mentioned so
22 far are new office or putting it within a department,
23 probably HHS because that is where the bulk of the big
24 invasive research goes on. But there is an additional
25 possibility, which is to stick it inside an existing

1 office that already has some power and some influence,
2 right?

3 And the Office of Government Ethics is one
4 possibility. OMB, which I know is just barely above the
5 IRS in popularity, is another possibility because it, too,
6 wields enormous authority across the government and
7 through legislation that gave it more power than it does
8 now have this kind of capacity to function in this kind of
9 a fashion.

10 I wondered if you could -- I wonder if you can
11 comment on the possibility of existing offices. I
12 understand that there might be a particular issue if we do
13 move forward with what we did resolve to do which is to
14 universalize protections to privately financed research
15 that is not already voluntarily as pledged to government
16 standards, that putting things within something like an
17 Office of Government Ethics might pose a challenge because
18 now that office's jurisdiction has been -- the
19 jurisdiction is not wide enough to accomplish those
20 private activities.

21 Finally on the action forcing thing, I
22 wondered if you could speak to, among other action forcing
23 things, the potential importance of what kinds of
24 committees in Congress and what kinds of review gets done.
25 You talked about annual reports which clearly have a

1 publicity value but my extremely brief experience on the
2 Hill at OTA led me believe that the only place that has
3 real power here is the corporations and that everything
4 has to do with money and if your money is threatened you
5 will do anything you have to do. If your money is not
6 threatened you will just shuffle paper. That is, of
7 course, hyperbolic but that was, you know, not too far
8 from my experience.

9 So I throw those out just to kind of season
10 the discussion.

11 DR. CHILDRESS: Is it unfair but I will ask
12 for brief responses since we are going to need to bring
13 this session to a close fairly soon.

14 DR. McCARTHY: First, with respect to the
15 separate regulatory authority, when we tried to develop a
16 Common Rule we found that there is no -- at the present
17 time and in the present circumstances -- no central office
18 anywhere in the government, even in the White House, that
19 can issue regulations. Each agency has its own regulatory
20 power.

21 My guess, and it is only a guess, is that were
22 one to propose a central regulatory power that it would be
23 opposed by every agency within the U.S. Government and,
24 therefore, the chances of getting one would be very slight
25 or slim. Again that is an opinion. So, yes, in the best

1 of all possible worlds I would have a single set of
2 regulations governing all.

3 In the way our government is established
4 traditionally one would -- it would be a major eruption
5 and I sincerely doubt whether it would be a successful
6 effort or whether your recommendation if you were to make
7 it would be taken very seriously. So as a practical
8 matter I would say not a very good idea. As a theoretical
9 matter I would say it is excellent.

10 MS. CHARO: Well, I am a professor you know.

11 DR. McCARTHY: Yes. So that is the first
12 comment I would make.

13 Secondly, I think I would agree at least in
14 part if money is involved agencies respond. But OPRR
15 rarely affects the money of any agency in any dramatic
16 way. Therefore, what it has to be able to do is to
17 embarrass the agency in other ways. Publicity about
18 ethics, even though these days we perhaps have a surfeit
19 of it in our public areas, it still is front page news
20 and, therefore, I think it should not be discounted as an
21 element. It needs to be used wisely and sparingly and
22 adroitly but it is a powerful element. And because OPRR
23 does not directly affect very much funding what it can do
24 is shut down an investigator, an office or a specific kind
25 of research, and that affects money, but it is not likely

1 to shut down an agency anywhere. Absent that it is not
2 going to have the kind of power within government that I
3 think OMB, for instance, would have.

4 And then my final comment, and John may
5 disagree on all these points, my final comment would be
6 that the long tradition of OMB is that it has never been
7 anything but a politically sensitive office. Therefore,
8 in the kind of subculture that different agencies develop,
9 and we learned a lot about that when we did the Common
10 Rule. We found out it would be easier to make peace in
11 the Middle East than to negotiate regulations across
12 agencies or almost that much. Each agency has its own
13 subculture and the subculture of OMB would be hostile to
14 the kind of principled approach that I think we all
15 would like to see within OPRR. That again is an opinion
16 and OMB might bridle at my saying so but that reflects my
17 own experience in interacting with that agency.

18 DR. CHILDRESS: John, another brief response.

19 DR. FLETCHER: Just on your idea, Alta, of
20 possibility of locating a new office within the context of
21 the Office of Government Ethics. In my interviews several
22 other people made such a suggestion as a compromise
23 especially in the present climate in Congress where the
24 feeling is broadly among people I interviewed is that
25 politically this would be very difficult to bring about

1 unless the White House and the department strongly came
2 out in favor of this.

3 I think that this possibility should not be
4 overlooked because to the extent that NIH is an executive
5 department and to the extent that the Department of Health
6 and Human Services is involved in the problem that Charles
7 and I described and both the White House and the
8 department are involved, they cannot deny that they are
9 largely the parents of the problem, they should be part of
10 the solution. But given the present climate of not
11 wanting to create new government agencies several people
12 mentioned that as a halfway measure relocating a new OPRR,
13 a new national office, alongside the Office of Government
14 Ethics, which does have stature and does have good
15 funding, would be better than a continuation of the same
16 location and possibly better than Charles' solution, which
17 is to keep it within the department.

18 DR. CHILDRESS: Rachel, and then what I am
19 going to do is bring this discussion to a close after
20 Rachel's question or comment, and responses of John and
21 Charles.

22 DR. LEVINSON: I guess rather than a question
23 this is really comments and echoes and reminders on what
24 the two speakers have just said. John's point about
25 having -- moving to a national paradigm from a federal

1 paradigm is very important, that if you are as a
2 commission considering expanding the Common Rule
3 protections or other forms of human subjects protections
4 to the private sector that it would be wise to do that and
5 to develop this model in that context. That can be done
6 while keeping the office within the Department of Health
7 and Human Services.

8 As you pointed out, FDA regulates the private
9 sector but only if you are focusing on biomedical
10 research. We have to remember that there are 16 other
11 agencies that are signatory to the Common Rule and many of
12 them are not focusing on biomedical research and a number
13 of those agencies continually remind the group that works
14 on implementation of the Common Rule that you try and work
15 beyond just the biomedical model. There are other forms
16 of research that perhaps might not be overseen
17 appropriately within HHS.

18 The other issue is if you do that within HHS
19 it leaves out the other departments. And the point, I
20 think, has made pretty clearly -- although, Charlie, your
21 feeling is that if it is within a large department that
22 other departments will listen, other secretarial cabinet
23 level departments will listen. But there is no authority.
24 Listening I do not think is enough. An embarrassment,
25 while useful, is not necessarily enough and that is a not

1 a formal change that can be pointed to.

2 So I think there are a number of good points
3 that have been raised but you have to think about the
4 limitations of each of the models.

5 DR. CHILDRESS: Charlie and John, do you want
6 to respond?

7 MR. CAPRON: Could I ask one question of
8 clarification before we lose you? Charlie, you have the
9 examples of things like the Klein and Gayle situations.
10 My impression was that while OPRR reached a conclusion
11 that any debarment or anything else that applied to those
12 people or cutting off of funds would have come from
13 whichever institute was funding them or from the NIH
14 Director's office but I may be wrong. Is that something
15 that OPRR itself has the authority to do directly?

16 DR. McCARTHY: Yes. OPRR has actually shut
17 down at least in the animal area, but I think the animal
18 is clear, the entire research program of a whole
19 institution. Now it has to do that by interdicting the
20 research funded by each of the institutes throughout the
21 NIH but none of those institutes could continue funding
22 unless OPRR lifted the bar. So, yes, it has pretty good
23 authority to shut down research even -- and some of those
24 institutes grumbled and complained but they all complied.

25 MR. CAPRON: Does it have similar authority

1 vis-a-vis the funding going to individual researchers
2 within NIH?

3 DR. McCARTHY: Within NIH, no, because these
4 are salaried employees and their research budgets go to an
5 office. Yes, we could shut down a whole unit within but
6 it is very difficult to get at it by the mechanism of
7 funding. It would have to go through administrative
8 channels because the funding does not flow through the
9 same kind of channels as grants or contracts. It goes to
10 the institute and the institute apportions its budget in a
11 very different way than through a specific amount set
12 aside for a specific project. So, yes, I think we could
13 shut that down. In fact, I think we threatened to do that
14 with Dr. Gallo's office. But it would have to go through
15 slightly different channels.

16 MR. CAPRON: Thank you.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Thank you.

18 DR. McCARTHY: When I speak "we" I sometimes
19 forget I am still not -- I am not at OPRR.

20 MR. CAPRON: Right, I understand.

21 DR. CHILDRESS: There are still traces.

22 Thank you both very much. You are welcome to
23 stay around for the subsequent discussion and we are going
24 to have Joan Porter with the history of interim period
25 between proposal and adoption of the Common Rule but I

1 know that you both have other obligations as well but we
2 thank you very much for joining us today and for the paper
3 you submitted.

4 Before we turn to the other subject, though, I
5 wonder if I could ask Alex and Alta to put their heads
6 together at some point and to talk about a way to proceed
7 with the discussion we have just heard and possible
8 recommendations to work out with staff. So what you would
9 like to bring before us as a kind of proposal and I will
10 be glad to join you on that. But if that is okay with the
11 subcommittee I would like to proceed that way.

12 Thank you again, Charles and John.

13 Okay. We have a discussion with Joan Porter
14 with the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War
15 Veterans Illnesses and formerly of OPRR to talk about, as
16 I mentioned, the history of the period between the
17 proposal and adoption of the Common Rule, and this is
18 something that grew out some recommendations that Alta
19 Charo brought before us.

20 Thank you very much for joining us today.

21 HISTORY OF THE INTERIM PERIOD BETWEEN PROPOSAL AND

22 ADOPTION OF THE COMMON RULE

23 DR. PORTER: Thank you for asking me.

24 I am going to discuss the Common Rule,
25 sometimes known as the federal policy or the federal-wide

1 policy for the protection of human research subjects.
2 Sometimes it is incorrectly referred to as the model
3 policy still.

4 Dr. Childress asked me to present a
5 perspective on why the Common Rule was created and why it
6 took so long to craft a response to the first
7 recommendation in the first biannual report of the
8 President's Commission on the Study of Ethical Problems in
9 Medicine, Biomedical and Behavioral Research, also what
10 were some of the difficulties for the departments and
11 agencies in their implementation strategies.

12 (Slide.)

13 I am presenting from the perspective of the
14 Executive Secretary of the committees that coordinated the
15 creation of the Common Rule. I served in this position
16 from 1982 until 1995 at which time I took a position on
17 the staff of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf
18 War Veterans Illnesses which is going to end this week.

19 I did bring some copies of excerpts from the
20 preamble from the 1991 Common Rule Federal Register
21 publication for you if you need to refer to them at some
22 time in your deliberations to get specific dates of events
23 and specific names of organizations and committees
24 involved.

25 In 1981 the President's Commission issued its

1 first biannual report on the adequacy and uniformity of
2 federal rules and policies and their implementation for
3 the protection of human subjects in biomedical and
4 behavioral research. In part, this was based on staff
5 work accomplished by the National Commission for the
6 Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
7 Research.

8 (Slide.)

9 The first recommendation of the President's
10 Commission first biannual report was as follows: The
11 President should require through appropriate action all
12 federal departments and agencies adopt as a common core
13 the regulations governing research with human subjects
14 issued by the Department of Health Services, HHS, as
15 periodically amended or revised while permitting additions
16 needed by any department or agency that are not
17 inconsistent with these core provisions.

18 Public Law 95-622 required the departments and
19 agencies whose rules, policies, guidelines or regulations
20 were affected by any commission recommendations to publish
21 in the Federal Register and to receive public comments.
22 All this was to have been done in 180 days and in reality
23 it was more like 180 months before an adequate response to
24 the commission's recommendation was made.

25 Since 17, I recall it was 17, federal

1 departments and agencies were identified by the commission
2 as being affected major redundancy would have been
3 involved in the Federal Register publication.

4 Dr. McCarthy, then Director of the Office for
5 Protection from Research Risks, OPRR, approached through
6 channels the Office of Science and Technology Policy that
7 agreed to have HHS publish the recommendation on behalf of
8 all the federal departments and agencies. HHS was chosen
9 as the department whose policies would serve as the basis
10 for all of the others. It was not the only game in town
11 but it just about was the only game in town.

12 It was the department that had first issued
13 regulations and had the most experience with history and
14 human subjects protection issues. As it later evolved,
15 the Office of Management and Budget, as well as the Office
16 of Science and Technology Policy, played a major role in
17 the numerous steps along the way to create a federal
18 policy.

19 It took from 1981 to 1991, ten years, for the
20 recommendation to reach a major implementation milestone
21 of publication of a federal-wide policy, that is the
22 Common Rule in the Federal Register as a final regulation.
23 In reality it was not a federal-wide policy. Some
24 departments and agencies that might have had or may now
25 have research involving human subjects were not involved

1 in the rulemaking exercise primarily because the
2 commission's report did not identify them or because the
3 department or agency head indicated that no research
4 involving human subjects was supported by the respective
5 department or agency.

6 Why did it take so long?

7 (Slide.)

8 First, there have been several committee
9 structures created that served to adapt the 1981 HHS
10 regulations as the rule for federal-wide acceptance. The
11 first committee was chaired by the Assistant Secretary for
12 Health in the Department of Health and Human Services, Dr.
13 Edward Grant. The Office of Science and Technology Policy
14 set up this committee with representatives of departments
15 and agencies affected as an ad hoc interagency committee
16 under the Federal Coordinating Council for Science,
17 Engineering and Technology.

18 As I said, the goal was to use the HHS
19 regulations as the basis for creation of a policy by which
20 all the departments or agencies could abide. That meant
21 to have a common policy HHS had to be open to some
22 modifications in its own regulations to accommodate the
23 needs of the other players.

24 Along the way the ad hoc committee evolved
25 into a fully chartered committee under the Federal

1 Coordinating Council called the Interagency Human Subjects
2 Coordinating Committee. The head of OPRR became the
3 committee chair rather than the Assistant Secretary for
4 Health.

5 When the final rule was published in 1991 the
6 committee became the Human Subjects Coordinating Committee
7 of the Committee on Life Sciences and Health of the
8 National Science and Technology Council.

9 The idea of the biannual report recommendation
10 was to have a common core policy. That core concept
11 really became along the way more like a common policy or a
12 common rule. The benefits were thought to be numerous in
13 devising a common approach in deciding how to implement
14 the commission's recommendation. The idea of an executive
15 order was explored but the ad hoc committee moved to the
16 concept of a model policy that each of the affected
17 departments and agencies could adopt.

18 The policy idea was appealing because some of
19 the numerous details encompassed in the federal
20 regulations could be tailored to departments and agencies'
21 needs that could not be so easily addressed in an
22 executive order.

23 A federal policy could potentially do the
24 following: Cover gaps in federally supported work whose
25 departments and agencies had no human subjects protections

1 in place. Replace ill-founded, obsolete or incomplete
2 policies. Lift an administrative burden from
3 institutions, investigators and institutional review
4 boards, IRB's that would potentially have to deal with 17
5 different departments and agencies with 17 different
6 policies and rules.

7 A federal-wide policy could also save the
8 other federal departments and agencies from having to
9 reinvent the wheel. They could piggyback on to the HHS
10 experience in some but as we will learn not in all senses.

11 So the committee started down the road of a
12 model policy. A drafting subcommittee of the Interagency
13 Committee assembled and met regularly to address every
14 line in the HHS regulations Subpart A. Subparts B, C and
15 D of the regulations were not the focus of any of the
16 discussions for the first stab at the model policy except
17 peripherally perhaps. You recall that subparts B, C and D
18 had to do with special protections for pregnant women and
19 fetuses, prisoners and children involved as subjects of
20 research.

21 The drafting subcommittee, frequently hosted
22 by the National Science Foundation, consisted as I
23 remember of the Department of Health and Human Services,
24 the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of
25 Defense, the Environmental Protection Agency, the

1 Department of Energy, and the National Science Foundation
2 representatives.

3 Bill Dommel played a major role with the
4 regulatory redrafting of the then version of the HHS
5 regulations incorporating suggestions by members of the
6 subcommittee to clarify meaning and to accommodate
7 different organizational operations.

8 The National Institutes of Health legal
9 advisor, Robert Lanman, also participated in the process.

10 A quite obvious groundrule advanced by the HHS
11 representatives was that the HHS regulations would be
12 changed as little as possible. The 1981 words in the
13 regulations had a specific meaning with the research and
14 institutional communities. Messing with the words
15 "unnecessarily" could send unintended repercussions to
16 those communities.

17 I would like to give you an idea of some of
18 the specific department and agency redrafting issues. In
19 the drafting subcommittee there were numerous needs that
20 were never anticipated. One of the first major issues
21 concerned the Food and Drug Administration. The section
22 on assurances, Section 103 in the regulations, and other
23 sections, had to be rewritten around the Food and Drug
24 Administration. In its capacity as a regulatory agency
25 considering investigational new drug exemptions it had

1 more of a spot check up after the fact approach. No
2 upfront assurances as described in Section 103 on
3 assurances in the HHS regulations.

4 The Food and Drug Administration's regulatory
5 relationships were with sponsors and clinical
6 investigators rather than institutions as reflected in the
7 HHS regulations. The Food and Drug Administration and HHS
8 had a long history of working together to make compatible
9 if not identical aspects of their respective regulations
10 to address human subjects protections. So I would
11 characterize this aspect of redrafting as time consuming
12 but there was a good understanding of what needed to be
13 done.

14 Another dilemma was raised by the Department
15 of Defense. Representatives from this department were
16 concerned about the assurance negotiation in Section 103
17 as well. The military ethos involved everything ordered
18 to be done from the top down. The Department of Defense
19 representatives wanted some language that they might be
20 able to use to interpret that a Department of Defense
21 directive as to what would be done with regard to human
22 subjects protections could be equivalent to an assurance
23 flowing upward from a component of that department.
24 Ultimately this was not the way the Common Rule was
25 implemented but this aspect of the deliberations took

1 quite a bit of time.

2 Along the way there were other lengthy
3 discussions about definitions such as minimal risk, about
4 covering foreign research, inclusion of both genders on
5 institutional review boards. Some of the wording that may
6 seem esoteric to users of the regulations has a long
7 history of negotiations. For example, I cannot tell you
8 how many hours went into the crafting of the regulatory
9 provision regarding IRB membership that states that "every
10 nondiscriminatory effort will be made to ensure that no
11 IRB consists entirely of men or entirely of women,
12 including the institution's consideration of qualified
13 persons of both sexes so long as no selection is made to
14 the IRB on the basis of gender." There is a long history
15 to that one.

16 The section of the HHS regulations that
17 involved the most dramatic changes was the section on
18 exceptions, 101B. Some exemptions were combined with
19 others and/or reworded. The exemptions are tricky. What
20 I mean by tricky is that they are difficult to understand
21 and confusing to apply in my view. They were tricky
22 before they were modified and they still are tricky but I
23 think they are better after the redrafting.

24 It took considerable discussion on the part of
25 the subcommittee members to grasp some of the subtleties

1 and nuances of the exemption section before we could even
2 begin to entertain any modifications there.

3 In addition, over the course of the request
4 for clearances and approvals from the departments and
5 agencies a new exemption on taste testing was eventually
6 drafted. That is Section 101B6. This had to be carefully
7 coordinated with the Food and Drug Administration, the
8 Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of
9 Agriculture because each had different terms of art and
10 legislative authorities conveying varying meanings towards
11 like "safe" or words like "approved."

12 Also created was a part of an exemption
13 regarding confidentiality for supposedly applying only to
14 a specific program of the Department of Justice. That is
15 exemption 101B32. I am not sure that the Department of
16 Justice today knows exactly the applicability of that
17 particular exemption feature.

18 Further delays: Based on our work in the
19 committee, on June 3rd, 1986, the Office of Science and
20 Technology Policy published for public comment in the
21 Federal Register a proposed model federal policy for
22 protection of human research subjects finally. To effect
23 this publication we were really plowing new ground. The
24 federal-wide policy was a new type of animal in many
25 senses. We need to work closely with the Office of the

1 Federal Register, with the Office of Management and
2 Budget, and with the Office of Science and Technology
3 Policy to figure out how to have the most efficient
4 clearance procedure for 17 federal departments and
5 agencies with regulatory making delegations and
6 authorities and Code of Federal Regulations sections.

7 Much of it got made up as we went along. The
8 Office of Management and Budget helped cut some paperwork
9 corners for us but there was still plenty of paper. To
10 publish in the Federal Register we had to have signatures
11 from 17 federal department and agency heads or those to
12 whom they had delegated authority. Believe me just
13 finding out to whom they had delegated authority was a
14 major fete.

15 The regulation had to clear 17 different
16 regulatory processes. Members of the drafting
17 subcommittee, an ad hoc committee and chartered committees
18 by and large worked hard and stayed with the process. But
19 in almost all cases these were personnel who were in the
20 echelons in the organizations in which research was
21 conducted or supported. Persons who knew something about
22 clinical research but persons who were not in the outer
23 offices of the department and agency heads.

24 To clear this first model policy proposal
25 there was a massive effort needed by the representatives

1 and the committee leadership to educate officials up and
2 down the line in each one of the departments and agencies
3 about the background of this proposed policy and about the
4 new logistical clearance details that have been cut with
5 the Office of Management and Budget like the Paperwork
6 Reduction Act.

7 These were officials who knew nothing about
8 human subjects research and had other pressing priorities.
9 You must remember that we did this clearance process not
10 once but three times. Once with the proposed model
11 policy, once with the proposed Common Rule, and once for
12 the final rule.

13 In the course of that time frame we had, I
14 believe, three different federal administrations.
15 Therefore, we had 17 sets of new officials to educate and
16 persuade that this was important to do each time there was
17 an administration change. There was also turnover in the
18 Office of Science and Technology Policy so that we lost
19 some of our most powerful influence to get this done and
20 we had to recultivate this influence more than once.

21 In addition, during the ten-year period the
22 Office for Protection from Research Risk moved from the
23 Office of the Deputy Director, National Institutes of
24 Health, to the Office of the Deputy Director for
25 Extramural Research where the support, attention and focus

1 on the Common Rule Project was perhaps diluted somewhat in
2 favor of more National Institutes of Health specific
3 fiscal and mechanism issues.

4 Departures equaled delays. There was a change
5 all around us in some senses but there was some stability
6 in the Office for Protection from Research Risk, the
7 members of the interagency committee, and the Office of
8 Management and Budget representatives who did have a real
9 commitment to seeing this through.

10 When the proposed model policy was issued
11 departments and agencies expected that they would be
12 allowed to take departures or deviations from the common
13 core policy to meet the peculiarities of their own
14 organizational ethos, historical events, legislative
15 mandates and research systems.

16 (Slide.)

17 Recall again the language in the original
18 President's Commission recommendation. The federal
19 departments and agencies adopt as a common core the HHS
20 regulations or permitting additions needed by any
21 department or agency that are not inconsistent with these
22 core provisions. The departments and agencies wanted a
23 plethora of departures all carefully crafted in legalese.
24 All eroded the spirit of uniformity and in some cases
25 protection commitments.

1 The Veterans Administration led in the number
2 of departures as I recall and the Department of Education
3 followed. The Food and Drug Administration had departures
4 and even the HHS had departures from what had been its own
5 regulations.

6 To condense a long story the Office of
7 Management and Budget officials insisted and persuaded the
8 Office of Science and Technology Policy officials to
9 insist on one driving principle, uniformity. Not a core
10 but uniformity. No departures.

11 (Slide.)

12 In the face of all of the proposed departures
13 the departments and agencies had cooked up the Office of
14 Management and Budget moved us from a model policy to a
15 Common Rule or regulation. The common regulation had
16 something with teeth. In other words, a mechanism that
17 could not be so easily manipulated with interpretations
18 and deviations by the departments and agencies without the
19 scrutiny of a central authority in the form of the Office
20 of Management and Budget.

21 So the concept of the model policy was dropped
22 and a regulatory mode became the vehicle of the next
23 years.

24 In the ensuing time the Office of Management
25 and Budget held a line on individual department and agency

1 departures. It simply refused to publish or entertain any
2 deviations for the final rule that were not grounded in
3 explicit legislative requirements imposed on the
4 departments or agencies. Some of the proposed departures
5 were done away with through a redrafting fix in the rule
6 so that there could be some wiggle room such as the
7 Department of Justice exemption creation that I mentioned
8 earlier.

9 Eventually the Department of Veterans Affairs
10 dropped flat out all of its recommendations with some
11 pressure from the Office of Management and Budget.

12 The Department of Energy representative pushed
13 the other representatives in every way possible. The
14 Department of Energy had a special problem. The Human
15 Subjects Protections Regulations and directives that the
16 Department of Energy did have on the books were based on
17 the original 1978 HHS regulations and they were quite
18 unworkable. The Department of Energy had some pressing
19 and visible human subjects protections problems to address
20 by regulatory revisions in the Common Rule drafts but
21 these revisions were being held hostage by the other
22 departments and agencies' failure to drop departures they
23 thought they needed.

24 The Office of Management and Budget would not
25 let one department or agency publish unless all did in a

1 common uniform rule.

2 In all candor I will tell you that the single
3 most difficult set of negotiations from my perspective was
4 with the Department of Education. The Department of
5 Education did drop some of the departures it thought
6 important over the years but the publication of the final
7 rules literally held up for over a year regarding a few
8 words in the section on Institutional Review Board
9 membership requirements that symbolized a profoundly held
10 set of personal and departmental values. It finally took
11 the President's Science Advisor, himself, with
12 intervention from high levels in OMB, Office of Management
13 and Budget, to create a compromised solution.

14 The issue had to do with the composition of
15 the IRB.

16 Now OMB did have an interest in the thrust and
17 tone of the regulations as well as substance. The goal
18 was to make them as little onerous as possible on the
19 institutions. Remember the 1980's was an era that took on
20 a mode of deregulation and minimization of governmental
21 requirements on the private sector. In the section of the
22 regulations that had to do with Institutional Review Board
23 composition the 1981 HHS regulations we were working with
24 as our starting point indicated that "if an IRB regularly
25 reviews research that involves that vulnerable category of

1 subjects, including but not limited to those described in
2 subparts B, C and D, the IRB shall include one or more
3 individuals who are primarily concerned with the welfare
4 of these subjects."

5 The Office of Management and Budget influence
6 rechanneled the regulatory requirement to drop the term
7 "welfare" all together and substitute instead that "if an
8 IRB regularly reviews research that involves a vulnerable
9 category of subjects such as children, prisoners, pregnant
10 women or handicapped or mentally disabled persons
11 consideration shall be given to the inclusion of one or
12 more individuals who are knowledgeable about and
13 experienced in working with these individuals."

14 The Department of Education would not go along
15 with this language. It did not sufficiently protect
16 handicapped children in the view of that department. The
17 Department of Education had originally proposed many
18 departures they had dropped along the way. This was their
19 last remaining concern.

20 The final compromise was the publication of
21 one departure to the rule by the Department of Education.
22 "When an IRB reviews research that purposefully requires
23 inclusion of handicapped children or mentally disabled
24 persons in the research sample the IRB must include at
25 least one person primarily concerned with the welfare of

1 the research subjects."

2 It is not my purpose here to comment on the
3 merit of the issue but merely to illustrate the nature of
4 some of the negotiations that delayed us in promulgation
5 of the final rule.

6 (Slide.)

7 DR. CHILDRESS: Because of our time
8 constraints we really -- we had talked ten minutes and --

9 DR. PORTER: Okay.

10 DR. CHILDRESS: -- and we are about double
11 that now.

12 DR. PORTER: Okay.

13 DR. CHILDRESS: We will need some time to
14 interact with you and we may just have to do most of it by
15 reading it.

16 DR. PORTER: Okay.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Unless you can move through
18 pretty quickly.

19 DR. PORTER: Let me hit the high points here
20 in giving you a couple of observations.

21 First of all, OPRR or HHS for that matter was
22 not and is not empowered to require compliance with the
23 Common Rule on the part of the departments or agencies.
24 It exerted influence by explaining, cajoling,
25 coordinating. A major mechanism to do that was through

1 the Human Subjects Coordinating Committee. There is no
2 direct provision for the Secretary, HHS, to exert
3 authority over the interpretation of another federal
4 department's or agency's regulations nor is there a direct
5 way HHS can make the departments or agencies implement the
6 rule.

7 There is, however, a more indirect but quite
8 important influence of the Office for Protection from
9 Research Risks, that is HHS. The Office of Management and
10 Budget's effort to minimize paperwork for the regulated
11 institutions and the federal departments and agencies
12 resulted in its insistence that the Common Rule require
13 the federal departments and agencies accept the HHS
14 multiple project assurances negotiated with the research
15 institutions with which HHS has a lot of research business
16 rather than having each department and agency negotiate
17 with these institutions their own forms of assurances.

18 OPRR, therefore, had the potential of holding
19 the line on interpretation of the regulations involving
20 research conducted or supported by all of the departments
21 at those institutions holding HHS multiple project
22 assurances. These assurances required by and large that
23 all research at the institutions be carried out in
24 accordance with HHS regulations and assurances.

25 (Slide.)

1 I will move quickly here to summarize a couple
2 of other observations. First of all, everyone is tied to
3 everyone else. If one agency wants to move they all have
4 to move. If the Department of Energy needs a regulatory
5 modification regarding classified research all must be
6 involved. There are some technical ways around this but
7 the principle and the problems should be evident.

8 (Slide.)

9 I would like to give just a few observations
10 and hypotheses on why I believe implementation of the
11 Common Rule has been nonexistent or minimal in some of the
12 departments or agencies. Has what has been done enough?
13 I think that depends on our perspectives, our values and
14 our priorities. If the departments and agencies did more
15 by way of education, assurance negotiation, monitoring of
16 institutions would human subjects be better protected?
17 Would potential for a violation of rights and welfare of
18 human subjects lessen? I am inclined to think so but I am
19 not sure quite how to assess this.

20 With the understanding that I have not been
21 working with the Human Subjects Coordinating Committee for
22 the last two years I would like to give you a list of
23 implementation complications that the departments and
24 agencies faced and probably still do face.

25 (Slide.)

1 These are lack of access to echelons to effect
2 implementation through commitment and resources. I think
3 there is a view that the Common Rule was intended for
4 research such as the National Institutes of Health or the
5 Department of Health and Human Services has but activities
6 like surveillance, demonstration, social sciences,
7 evaluation, focus groups, this was not seen as under the
8 purview of the Common Rule by many persons. The
9 definition of research in the Common Rule is quite broad.

10 I think that the department and agency
11 personnel understood its applicability to HHS types of
12 research. They might understand Tuskegee but they really
13 failed to see the relevance of protection of research
14 subjects in their own activities.

15 A second problem was that representatives on
16 the coordinating committee were for the most part not
17 full-time working on this issue or responsibility and pay
18 offs for them came through other positions or other
19 responsibilities that they had. There were some quite
20 dramatic exceptions but generally that is what was the
21 case.

22 I think a major complication in the
23 implementation was that there was confusion early on about
24 how much OPRR could do for the other departments and
25 agencies. Some of the departments and agencies thought

1 that because the Common Rule required acceptance of the
2 HHS multiple project assurances that OPRR was going to do
3 all the work of negotiating all of the assurances for all
4 of the departments and agencies and that OPRR would not do
5 this came as a big shock to some of the departments and
6 agencies.

7 I think OPRR's staff tried to be as responsive
8 as we could but in the face of our own workload there was
9 not too much more that we could do than facilitate the
10 coordinating committee meetings, provide advice and
11 encouragement on the telephone from time to time,
12 cosponsor an occasional educational workshop and attend an
13 occasional meeting to support another department or agency
14 representative. It was really having a tough time trying
15 to sell the implementation message.

16 (Slide.)

17 Other problems which for time sake I will not
18 elaborate had to do with lack of clarity in the
19 regulations especially I think in the exemption section.
20 That is really hard for departments and agencies.

21 One to be unnamed agency decided in its
22 implementation proposals that blood drawing is survey
23 research and that that could be exempt under the
24 regulations, for example. That really was not in my view
25 compatible with the intention of the exemption.

1 I think another implementing problem had to do
2 with evolving technologies and perspectives. There are a
3 lot of new things on the horizon such as repository
4 research, data sharing capabilities, new types of devices
5 and techniques that might qualify for expedited research.
6 These make it exciting for all who have to implement these
7 regulations but it is difficult if you are the only person
8 in your department or agency who is able to deal with
9 this. The staff in the OPRR have relatively easy access
10 to each other, to the ethics community, to the scientific
11 communities, and to well-informed legal advisors with whom
12 to check out interpretations, history, precedence on
13 applications. But the representatives of the other
14 departments and agencies by and large do not have those
15 kinds of advantages so readily.

16 Last, department and agencies may have special
17 issues. The National Aeronautics and Space
18 Administration, Department of Defense, for example, who
19 have programs whereby employees who by their very
20 employment responsibilities are participants in research
21 activities almost on a daily basis. For example, human
22 factors research. So it is challenging to think how to
23 apply the regulations to those type of situations.

24 I have numerous other examples of special
25 issues which I will forego.

1 (Slide.)

2 In conclusion -- and bear with me, I am trying
3 to condense 15 years of my life here for you. It took
4 many years to develop the Presidential Advisory Commission
5 recommendation into a rule and I hope that this
6 information gives you some understanding as to why it took
7 so long and some suggestions for how similar initiatives
8 might be facilitated. In my term in my opinion it has
9 taken a long time for the departments and agencies to
10 implement minimally the rule even by the most basic of
11 standards.

12 Could the departments and agencies do a better
13 job in implementing the Common Rule? Yes, in many ways,
14 of course, depending on the reality of a world of limited
15 resources, a myriad of competing value systems, and the
16 resulting scheme of priorities, and criteria that may be
17 fairly soft.

18 What would it take? Some obvious actions.
19 Commitment from the top of each department or agency, more
20 staff time and resources dedicated solely to these issues,
21 more interagency dialogue and access to others who have
22 confronted implementation efforts.

23 Is strict implementation of the Common Rule
24 the best way to protect human subjects of research
25 conducted or supported by the Federal Government? That

1 has been our premise but I think we have to really visit
2 that as a fundamental question.

3 DR. CHILDRESS: Thank you very much. You have
4 given us so much information and honestly I have to bear
5 responsibility for trying to work in such an important and
6 extended discussion into a schedule that was already set
7 up and thus put a lot of pressure on you time-wise and I
8 apologize for that.

9 Do you have a copy of the -- is there a way we
10 can get a copy of that? It would be easier if we could
11 get it and share it rather than working from the
12 transcript.

13 DR. PORTER: Yes.

14 DR. CHILDRESS: Would that be possible? I
15 think that would be --

16 DR. PORTER: If I can polish it up a little
17 bit and add some things.

18 DR. CHILDRESS: Well, we do not even mind
19 receiving it in the form in which you presented it. That
20 would be fine if you would not mind sharing it that way.
21 But I had set aside 30 minutes for this and we still have
22 within that a few minutes so let's see if there are a few
23 questions and comments before we take a break. This was
24 most helpful and something we will want to ponder and
25 think.

1 First, Alta, did you have anything you wanted
2 to say before Eric?

3 MS. CHARO: No.

4 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay. Eric?

5 DR. CASSELL: Well, in hearing you, I am not
6 sure that when you say could we do better, I was not
7 convinced that better could be done without markedly
8 increased pressure from above. I wonder how that bears on
9 the discussion we have heard earlier about where the OPRR
10 should be placed.

11 DR. PORTER: I think it does indeed. I think
12 it is quite -- the experience we have had with
13 implementation and are having with implementation of the
14 Common Rule is directly related to the position on the
15 authority for the Office for Protection from Research
16 Risks. There are other factors. Resources of course is a
17 major concern. But it is a coordinating committee.

18 It is not a -- I would say that the Office of
19 Management and Budget really had the most final and
20 authoritative voice when the Common Rule was implemented
21 in exactly what the language would look like. They had
22 the power to hold everyone's feet to the fire and require
23 the kinds of language that the administrations wanted.
24 Some of these words have to do with policy deliberations
25 and debates about welfare and labor, and things that were

1 going on in the background that would be difficult to
2 understand.

3 Alta?

4 MS. CHARO: Joan, one of the reasons I thought
5 that your presence would be so valuable is because of the
6 data collection and analysis of the federal surveys
7 previously done and of the things that are coming out --
8 that have come out of that, one finds that the agencies
9 that were engaged in survey research seem to have more
10 frequently than others either interpreted what they were
11 doing not as research or perceived what they were doing as
12 exempt from research that they agreed to regulate or
13 simply have slipped through the net.

14 I was curious about the degree to which the
15 exemptions that were being argued for at the time that the
16 core Common Rule was being debated reflected this focus on
17 noninvasive, nonbiomedical research, which is survey in
18 nature and for which it is harms associated with breeches
19 of privacy that we worry because I am trying to understand
20 the degree to which the current situation is really simply
21 a reflection of long-standing resistance and perhaps
22 reflects more than anything else a failure to completely
23 address those concerns effectively. That is not meant as
24 a criticism, but address them effectively at the time the
25 Common Rule was adopted.

1 DR. PORTER: I think there are others in this
2 room who could probably answer that question more
3 precisely and eloquently but I would say that really those
4 kinds of changes came earlier in the regulatory redrafting
5 that took place from 1978 to 1981. The exemptions,
6 although they are a little different today, were basically
7 in place in the 1981 regulations that we used as the
8 template. So some of those issues with the nonbiomedical
9 research community had been hashed out beforehand.

10 There is a long history probably of trying to
11 encompass the behavioral and social sciences community in
12 the regulations protections as well and I think perhaps
13 that those exemptions reflected some easing of burden or
14 some compromises for the behavioral research community.
15 So those kinds of influences came earlier on in my
16 perspective but they were evident again when we were
17 discussing the Common Rule exemptions.

18 DR. CHILDRESS: Is there a last question or
19 comment for Dr. Porter before we take a quick break?

20 Well, thank you very much.

21 DR. SHAPIRO: Excuse me. As I listened to
22 this presentation and the previous one, both of which were
23 very helpful, the thing that sticks in my mind is C ¹⁷
24 power. Both of them have described the extraordinary
25 difficulty given the way the government is structured to

1 really implement even a very good idea and a very simple
2 set of very good ideas just get bogged down in some
3 elements and it is just incredible that this is what you
4 had to deal with.

5 It is the same thing here said in different
6 words. They tried to describe an effective way to
7 position OPRR.

8 MR. CAPRON: Wouldn't it be helpful in that
9 regard to hear from people from the Nuclear Regulatory
10 Commission, or the Environmental Protection Agency, or the
11 Office of Government Ethics as to whether positioned
12 differently than OPRR or the interagency committee,
13 whether they have any quicker avenue to have decisions and
14 rules implemented?

15 DR. FLYNN: It is not just position though.
16 It is also resources.

17 DR. SHAPIRO: Well, it is exactly that because
18 the -- I remember in dealing with the review of some years
19 ago now, reviewing NIH and its structure in the
20 institutes, it all came back to appropriations and which
21 subcommittee it came to and here you have a whole bunch of
22 them working through here, and that is just the
23 fundamental structure of government here. You are not
24 going to change that. You, therefore, are inevitably left
25 with some of these problems but I think it might be

1 interesting to hear from some of the people.

2 MR. CAPRON: I mean, I know with the
3 President's Commission we went to OMB and then we went
4 directly to the appropriations committee. I do not know
5 who OMB may have talked to but our request was never
6 altered by any of that conversation and then we -- I went
7 to Representative Natcher and sat there, was directly
8 examined and --

9 (Simultaneous discussion.)

10 MR. CAPRON: What was that?

11 DR. SHAPIRO: -- usually handles people --

12 (Laughter.)

13 DR. CHILDRESS: Well, thank you very much
14 again for -- and we will look forward to getting a copy of
15 the paper as well. Thank you for sharing with us.

16 All right. A quick five minute break and then
17 we will pick up our last task of the day.

18 (Whereupon, a brief break was taken.)

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EVENING SESSION

DR. CHILDRESS: The subcommittee is ready to resume. I thank everyone for his or her endurance, patience, understanding, et cetera. We are now going to deal with the Report on Survey of Federal Agencies and I have to thank again, as I have so many times before, Bill Freeman, Susan Katz, Joel Mangel, Emily Feinstein, Everson Hull, and Sean Simon, and everyone else who has been involved.

You recall last time that we had to deal with -- we raised several questions by the subcommittee about matters needing further explication, some descriptive materials that could help you get a sense of how much research was involved in particular agencies or departments and so forth getting a clearer picture of the ball park.

What we are going to do this afternoon is Bill is going to -- and any other members, Bill I see at the table and Emily, any others who have been involved, help us get a better understanding and by reflecting on the findings and the tentative recommendations that have emerged.

And then as I mentioned our next step will be to get Kathi Hanna involved with guidance from subcommittee members in recasting and redrafting the

1 material for purposes of the next stage of our -- of
2 developing this report.

3 So, Bill, you have passed out some materials
4 to us and you want to tell us how to proceed.

5 REPORT ON SURVEY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES

6 DR. FREEMAN: I just briefly want to apologize
7 for the lack of editing of the materials. We have had
8 some discussions with the members of the commission and
9 staff that resulted in a change. We had planned on having
10 materials at the end of last week to mail to you. That
11 was when the discussions occurred. So what we did was to
12 in the past week revise things. We had also, however, had
13 planned to meet with agencies and did continue to do so
14 because we thought that was going to be a week to do that
15 kind of work. So we have not been able to devote as much
16 time to polish up what was in the handout that you
17 received last night as we would like.

18 Summary of the message -- you see the handout
19 and the outline. Summary of the message is to remind you
20 Phase I was structure with higher level people in the
21 organizations. Phase II was process with people at the
22 middle level like IRB chairs.

23 You have in your handout what we -- this was
24 one of the changes. We developed agency specific
25 summaries. The ones you have are the ones that have been

1 approved by the agencies. The tables have been approved
2 by the agencies as well as, by the way, those summaries.

3 In that paragraph for each agency, which I
4 believe the first one is Census, which is within the
5 Department of Commerce, is three basic items of
6 information. What is the scale of the research that is
7 conducted or funded? Defined typically as dollar amount.
8 Also it is projects if we can get it.

9 Then the middle of it is what is the degree,
10 or really it is a yes or no situation, of implementation
11 of the Common Rule, yes or no. Often with -- as we will -
12 - as we will talk about, there is some complexity there.

13 And then the last item is changes by that
14 agency in protection of human subjects since the initial
15 interview.

16 Now if you have had a chance to read the
17 material that you got you will notice that there is a
18 section about tension of two different things that we had
19 to face in terms of our report. One is that we were doing
20 -- the initial idea was to do a snapshot or in scientific
21 terms a cross-sectional study of each agency. At one time
22 what was their status? And that was at the time of the
23 interview.

24 In fact, our process of developing the report
25 has changed the subjects of our research and they are now

1 -- some of them were changed. Some were changing along --
2 agencies, of course, change over time all the time. So
3 they are a moving target and the question of a snapshot of
4 a moving entity, how accurate is it. But in particular
5 the -- starting in September when agencies received our
6 preliminary tables of information, some agencies have been
7 very dramatically paying attention to more than they had
8 been and altering what they are doing in this area.

9 So the question is how do we combine these two
10 things, the longitudinal study that includes changes
11 versus a snapshot or cross-sectional study. We thought
12 for scientific reasons, among others, of doing the
13 research that we needed to adhere to the original plan,
14 which is a snapshot. But, in addition, include
15 information about changes since that snapshot as well as,
16 by the way, a history before. In other words, if this was
17 a relatively recent change we wanted to know about that.
18 At the time of the interview if things had only been
19 implemented recently we needed to know that information
20 and include that in our report.

21 That gives us an additional scientific
22 benefit, which is that we can talk about the effect of
23 doing the report and that experience says something about
24 the way the federal government operates, namely as others
25 have mentioned, the threat of disclosure. It turns out to

1 be it appears fairly strong.

2 Okay. What were the findings? This is
3 something for -- that the commission needs to weigh? We
4 just presented one way to do it or a way that we think is
5 reasonable but there are many reasonable ways to do it.

6 The first major finding is that most of the
7 federal government, defining most as the amount of
8 research done in dollar terms, is done under the Common
9 Rule in terms of the structures and the processes. We
10 have not looked at quality of those. That was not our
11 task.

12 Secondly, that even within that, a more -- as
13 important, an additional point is that there is some
14 exemplary work being done by these agencies. It includes
15 all of what I call the big four agencies, NIH, DOD, DOE,
16 and CDC, not necessarily in that order, that do the
17 riskiest -- you are shaking your head. Oh, I am sorry.
18 NIH, Defense --

19 MS. CHARO: Well, I am just -- you do not want
20 me to interrupt.

21 DR. FREEMAN: You can interrupt.

22 MS. CHARO: All right. I am just -- I am
23 surprised but maybe because I am not understanding the way
24 you are using the word "fully implemented." I mean, I am
25 picking up Diane's specialty, which is actually paying

1 close attention to language here, which she does better
2 than anybody. But, you know, CDC did not appear to have
3 gotten all of its ducks in a row before it started
4 authorizing that research in Africa that turned out to be
5 so controversial. DOD engaged in a highly controversial
6 negotiation with FDA over the use of investigational new
7 drugs on soldiers in the Persian Gulf.

8 And so characterizing these agencies as
9 exemplary in light of recent controversies seems
10 surprising to me. That is not to say that they have not
11 got a lot of structures in place and that they do not make
12 a very credible effort, et cetera, et cetera, but that is
13 why I am saying that the word "fully implemented," which
14 could be interpreted as meaning "fully effective," is
15 potentially confusing.

16 DR. FREEMAN: We certainly need to be very
17 careful about the wording. If you recall I talked about
18 that issue at the time of the interview what was the
19 recent history leading up to it and CDC -- of the four,
20 CDC is one agency that we say had implemented fully the
21 structures and processes but recently some essential
22 elements were done recently before the date of the
23 interview and, therefore, they are in what we call
24 Category 2, that the recency of the implementation calls
25 into obvious question how permanent is it. The other

1 three seem to have had these structures in place for some
2 time.

3 MS. CHARO: Right.

4 DR. FREEMAN: That leaves out DOD and we will
5 have to talk about that when we can talk about that.

6 MS. CHARO: Right. Where informed consent is
7 not even required for medical treatment let alone medical
8 research.

9 DR. CHILDRESS: Let me clarify something here,
10 though, you could have everything in place and still have
11 a wrong decision --

12 DR. FREEMAN: Right.

13 MS. CHARO: This is absolutely true.

14 DR. CHILDRESS: Okay.

15 MS. CHARO: Which is why I focus a little bit
16 on the language.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Right.

18 MS. CHARO: But, I mean, DOD does not require
19 informed consent for medical treatment. When we were
20 looking at this for the Presidential Committee on Persian
21 Gulf War Veterans Illnesses I was amazed to find out that
22 you did not have to get informed consent to treat soldiers
23 under at least some of the services and with that as a
24 backdrop to them doing investigational drug treatment or
25 treatment with investigational drugs or medical research

1 it makes it problematic in the extreme to characterize it
2 as exemplary in any respect even if they have made good
3 effort.

4 DR. FREEMAN: Well, what I am talking about
5 again is the structure and the processes implemented being
6 exemplary and that is not to say that concurrently you
7 cannot have structures and processes that are adequate and
8 also that you cannot have bad decisions on any of those.

9 MS. CHARO: All right.

10 DR. FREEMAN: One of the two that you have
11 mentioned -- my point is one of the two that you mentioned
12 we specifically have included as a special category.
13 Fully implement on the date this goes back to this
14 agency's change. It has been recently, and recently
15 within the past year-and-a-half, rapid change by CDC. So
16 to say that I give in cross-sectional data that everything
17 is fine would be to negate that history and we have at
18 least included that.

19 It sounds like we will have to deal with how
20 these statements interrelate with the history that DOD has
21 and we will figure that one out. We did not do that in
22 the report of the draft as you know.

23 The third -- the second major finding, and
24 again one of the question is what is the balance of these
25 that you will want to put in your report, but the second

1 major finding is that some agencies, including two that do
2 a significant amount of work, we have estimated it is
3 approximately \$800 million of research, some of that with
4 vulnerable subjects, some of it with greater than minimal
5 risk, some of it with greater than minimal risk with
6 vulnerable subjects, had not implemented the two basic
7 parts of the Common Rule that we have since the last time
8 focused on.

9 Do you have a system of reviewing all
10 intramural research to include an IRB for any nonexempt
11 intramural research? And, two, do you have a system to
12 assure yourself that all extramural, that is to say grants
13 and contracts funded by yourselves or done by others,
14 research has been reviewed by an appropriate IRB and
15 approved by that appropriate IRB? If the answer is no to
16 those that is nonimplementation leaving aside everything
17 else that is done.

18 Now, we also have included in the report with
19 a lot of footnotes additional things but that is sort of
20 the bottom line of how we define implementation or not.
21 To have those or not to have them. So it is not really a
22 degree. We do in the text talk about additional items of
23 protection.

24 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Can I interrupt?

25 DR. FREEMAN: Yes, please.

1 DR. SCOTT-JONES: I am going to have to leave
2 in just a minute so I wanted to ask a question very
3 quickly. Having just read this after we arrived and were
4 given this, I have not had really a chance to digest this
5 carefully, but it just seems to me that there might be a
6 problem in moving from conclusion I-A to I-B in that in I-
7 A -- under Arabic Numeral I you have a statement about the
8 persons you interviewed. It seems to me that a person
9 might want to be cautious in doing that because by
10 inference it might suggest that the persons you
11 interviewed in the agencies that are not in your judgment
12 fully implementing are not exemplary in their dedication
13 and understanding.

14 Do you see what I mean? You have a statement
15 about the persons interviewed and a judgment of persons.

16 DR. CHILDRESS: Page 30.

17 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Page 30 under I-A-I.

18 DR. CHILDRESS: Right in the middle of the
19 page?

20 DR. SCOTT-JONES: You have a statement that
21 some people are exemplary. It is a judgment of persons
22 rather than the agencies and you are going to go on with
23 the next section to make a statement that some agencies
24 may not be implementing and you do not comment one way or
25 another about the persons. By inference you might be

1 saying that the persons are not exemplary and we were not
2 to judge persons, were we?

3 DR. FREEMAN: One of the things -- that is a
4 good point and when -- if you would see where you are at
5 that point when you do have a chance to read it, one of
6 the things we found was in addition to structures and
7 processes it appeared, and it is actually along some of
8 the things that the review of Eric's book talks about, is
9 that it seems like the behavior of some people, at least
10 as was described to us, seemed very important on a one on
11 one basis to help researchers learn how to do it right and
12 what was the importance of ethical research -- of ethics
13 in research.

14 The mentoring system.

15 There was also examples of people higher up
16 who made it a priority to get a good system in place and
17 maintained. Yes, it is in distinction not to individuals.
18 We purposefully did not say individuals because we did not
19 know who they were nor did we want to and we did not think
20 it was appropriate to say individuals. But to agencies in
21 which the first subset of that group that does not -- the
22 agencies that did not implement, lack of priority.

23 For whatever reason the agency -- some
24 agencies have exhibited a lack of priority to implement
25 the regulations. And it seems to me appropriate to lay

1 that at -- and Bill Raub would say this, I believe, if he
2 were here -- at the highest levels of executive
3 leadership. He said it to Harold and I.

4 All we are doing is contrasting people who
5 show that kind of dedication at their level of training
6 researchers in special ways with a lack of priority
7 further up. That may be a problem. You may not want to
8 do that. But if that was --

9 DR. CHILDRESS: There is a way to do it,
10 though, without appearing --

11 DR. FREEMAN: I understand. That needs maybe
12 some work.

13 DR. SCOTT-JONES: Instead of saying "persons
14 we interviewed" maybe some statements about leadership, a
15 little bit more abstract.

16 DR. FREEMAN: Okay.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: I think that would be a
18 preferable way.

19 DR. FREEMAN: Okay. We may need your help on
20 that kind of wording.

21 DR. CHILDRESS: Diane, any other things you
22 wanted to raise since you have to go?

23 DR. SCOTT-JONES: No.

24 (Technical difficulties with sound.)

25 DR. FREEMAN: That was about -- the first

1 clause was lack of priority within some, not all,
2 agencies. We define actually lack of priority as agencies
3 that knew they were under the Common Rule -- there is no
4 question about that. No one denied it. They said, "Yes,
5 we are under the Common Rule." And at least six years and
6 in one case 16 years later still have not the structure or
7 the processes in place. It is difficult to say that that
8 is not.

9 A second problem we found was lack of
10 understanding. There was confusion, I think was our
11 terms, and also disagreements at the same time about what
12 are and should be things like what is research, what is
13 exempt, those exempt categories. How do exempt, like the
14 confidentiality statute, relate to the Common Rule, et
15 cetera?

16 And then the third thing was we got from
17 especially agencies and departments even that do
18 relatively small amounts of research that the overhead as
19 they understand it to simply implement the structured
20 processes is incredibly high compared to the amount of
21 research they do. And in some small agencies, like the
22 Office of Civil Rights -- I mean, you know, there is only
23 a few people there -- it would be overwhelming. So that
24 they at least do not know how to do that.

25 Now that is not to say that it cannot be done.

1 It is just that they are not aware of that.

2 The were, as you can see in the report, some
3 additional lower level of findings. But those were the
4 two primary ones based on -- and defined in the terms
5 actually fairly closely as I indicated.

6 The rationales for the importance of
7 nonimplementation was discussed and raised. I include it
8 here. Now, that is different than the scale. The scale
9 is does this nonimplementation occur only in a few
10 peripheral agencies that do hardly any research? The
11 answer is no.

12 Then is nonimplementation a problem? What are
13 we talking about? What is the importance there? And I
14 have included in the draft some reasons about it. And, in
15 particular, going back to the original National Commission
16 that was set up in order to protect, among other reasons,
17 the research enterprise that the research enterprise was
18 under attack very validly for a series of highly unethical
19 research, perhaps with the Tuskegee disclosure.

20 And it was very clear by the commissioners
21 that talked about it that this was going to, in effect, be
22 a social contract, they used the term, or a contract
23 between researchers and society. And not implementing
24 those can be seen by society as not fulfilling the
25 researchers or at least in this case the federal agencies

1 not fulfilling their side of the bargain.

2 I will tell you personally when this report
3 comes out if it comes out anything like what is here it is
4 going to make my life difficult in the Indian Health
5 Service because Indians distrust research and here is a
6 report saying that the feds have not done what they are
7 supposed to do to protect groups and people. It is going
8 to be brought up to researchers in Indian country. Is
9 that part of what is going on?

10 And that is one major reason to be concerned
11 about nonimplementation.

12 Another is that the implementation of regs are
13 to prevent things and especially in a setting where there
14 is mistrust. For historical reasons Indians are not the
15 only ones. One more problem just adds one more nail to
16 that distrust and reinforces it.

17 The additional findings are -- as well we did
18 not put in that you may or may not want to include come
19 more from Phase II but also from Phase I. There are some
20 opinions about the practical issues of the issue of
21 elevating or not OPRR. Not about what you heard here, not
22 about these -- the discussion here was -- but some
23 practical issues about oversight. How is oversight done
24 in the Federal Government?

25 And then what also has been mentioned

1 repeatedly, the limits of the Common Rule, limits of the
2 IRB people, and I think Trey talked about one of them --
3 we interviewed him -- or a set of them. There are some
4 perceptions that reinforce what the commission is looking
5 at may help give additional about what the Common Rule
6 currently with all the changes that have gone on since
7 1981 -- these are -- not '91, these are '81 regulations
8 for all intents and purposes. That is 17 years or 16
9 years old. What do we not deal with and the IRB's on
10 their own they feel trying to deal with them without
11 guidance from some authoritative body like NBAC? So we
12 can add those if you like.

13 We can also add other things but those I think
14 are the major issues.

15 DR. CHILDRESS: Thanks very much, Bill.

16 Joel, do you want to add anything? Okay.

17 Let me ask -- I know that last time Harold and
18 Eric and I think Alta also raised some questions about the
19 materials we had received. I know that part of what you
20 provided here in terms of the data summaries but also in
21 terms of the findings and recommendations relate in part
22 to those concerns.

23 Let me see -- Harold, have some of your
24 concerns from last time been addressed?

25 DR. SHAPIRO: Yes, certainly so. I very much

1 appreciate the response to this. Some have been
2 addressed. I am still -- I want to wait to hear this
3 discussion but I am still trying to work out in my mind
4 whether we really have the right analytical approach to
5 reform or to change. I understand the data, it was very
6 helpful and it is essential that we understand where we
7 are.

8 I am not quite sure whether I have heard yet
9 or am comfortable with the analytic approach that might
10 really help project this into some better -- you came
11 right at the end, Bill, and you said, you know, these are
12 1981 regulations and lots has happened since then aside
13 from whether you can implement it or not and in what way
14 to implement it.

15 It may be that we have to pay maybe some close
16 attention to that as we evaluate. I understand the first
17 mandate was are they doing this or aren't they doing it.
18 We have some answers to that. But maybe the effective way
19 to deal with that or the responsible way to deal with that
20 is to take that information and direct it into a set of
21 observations that may also deal with some of the
22 modifications that are necessary to protect human
23 subjects, which I think what you are saying is the
24 protection of human subjects is one thing and the Common
25 Rule is another thing all together. They are related of

1 course. One is designed for the other but they are not
2 the same, are not coincident.

3 I still feel we are struggling for a way to
4 capture that. That is my sense of it but I want to wait
5 to hear some of the discussion.

6 DR. CHILDRESS: All right. Alta?

7 MS. CHARO: Yes, I would like to second that
8 and perhaps continue flushing out how that might work
9 because I know you mentioned earlier today, Jim, that we
10 now have a staff person assigned to kind of take over the
11 drafting of a full scale report that will incorporate all
12 these elements. I mean, all of these elements, the
13 contract reports from Fletcher and McCarthy, and the ones
14 coming in, and Joan's talk as well as this are just means
15 to an end. They are none of them ends in themselves.

16 It seems to me that there is the fundamental
17 goal of human subjects protection first and foremost when
18 the government is somehow involved. Rachel just reminded
19 me actually about the question of whether or not the
20 Common Rule actually does, in fact, serve to protect
21 people or does it, in fact, hinder human subjects
22 protection.

23 And we have got, I think, to acknowledge that
24 there is a fundamental possibility in answering that
25 question because we do not have the ability to get

1 specific answers to the question of how many subjects, how
2 many protocols, how many adverse events that are
3 associated and also caused by the protocols that are
4 covered by the Common Rule versus a control set of those
5 that are not in order to our study in that way.

6 But we can take the information about the
7 origins of the Common Rule, the obstacles to its
8 development, observations about its current status of
9 implementation from the purview of the paper
10 implementation, the anecdotal evidence about the problems
11 associated with that and whether or not it is actually
12 effective in doing what is designed to do. Speculation
13 about reasons why it is not effective sometimes, some of
14 which will come from the Fletcher and McCarthy papers, in
15 fact a lot of it.

16 And then I would like to suggest that there is
17 still a missing part of the puzzle in that evaluation and
18 that would be to then get now people from the various
19 agencies that have been trying to implement this to come
20 in and talk with us about both their reactions to what was
21 found in the survey now that they have had a chance to
22 receive this although they did not get a chance to receive
23 it in a fashion that would let them really look at it and
24 talk with us both about their reactions to this as well as
25 to tell us about their perception of the obstacles they

1 have been facing and what would improve their situation.

2 So an opportunity, not just a demand that you
3 respond to allegations, quite the contrary, but
4 opportunity to talk about their own frustrations and to
5 feed that into the evaluation of the system. And at the
6 end come up with some set of findings about the degree in
7 which the Common Rule is being implemented and the
8 existing obstacles to its full implementation and our
9 speculations about the limitations that would be faced
10 even if it was fully implemented and actually achieving
11 the goal of human subjects protection.

12 DR. CHILDRESS: Good. Then you are proposing
13 that as soon as we --

14 MS. CHARO: I am proposing that Kathi write
15 all that, yes.

16 DR. CHILDRESS: Except we have to get the
17 agencies and departments in.

18 MS. CHARO: I think -- I would like to throw
19 that on the table as a possibility because although some
20 agencies have had people come to talk with us and
21 sometimes they have come through the public testimony,
22 five minute resource, I would like to give a more formal
23 opportunity to the agencies to present both their
24 frustrations in trying to accomplish this goal as well as
25 their reactions to anything that was found that suggested

1 that they are not doing a good job of it.

2 DR. SHAPIRO: I have heard two different kinds
3 of things here exactly in relation to the issue you
4 raised, Alta. One is that somehow the Common Rule can
5 also serve as an impediment to doing the right thing,
6 whatever that is. I have not heard any examples of that
7 but there could be and I would be anxious to know more
8 about it or the way it is implemented or something in the
9 structure that makes things worse for human subjects than
10 it would otherwise be.

11 Another is really a case of omission, namely
12 we have not -- we, meaning whoever is sort of focusing on
13 this, OPRR or others -- are not getting out guidance to
14 the IRB's, that they want more. The reason they are
15 frustrated is we, whoever the we is in this situation,
16 simply do not -- have not updated our thinking and have
17 not done things which would have made it easier.

18 Now are you thinking of those two categories
19 or other categories all together?

20 MS. CHARO: Well, I think, the possibility
21 that it is an impediment, I think, needs to be
22 acknowledged. I agree with you, we have not heard any
23 specific examples and we have to be open to them if they
24 exist.

25 DR. SHAPIRO: Sure.

1 MS. CHARO: I think also the fact that a
2 regulatory requirement exists means it exists in the
3 agencies and they are not free to simply say the issue is
4 not to follow but we are in a position of evaluating
5 sensible -- how sensible the regulation is for the purpose
6 of providing advice.

7 DR. SHAPIRO: Yes.

8 MS. CHARO: I guess, I am trying -- you know,
9 Rachel, like I said, did remind me that we are trying to
10 keep in mind two things simultaneously, which is the
11 degree to which there is some implementation of the
12 regulatory requirement, which is at the first level simply
13 having structures on paper and at the second level having
14 those structures actually function, and at the third level
15 -- this is where it dovetails into the next big question -
16 - having them function in a way that actually achieves the
17 underlying goal, which is the protection of human
18 subjects.

19 And that last question, I think, is the one
20 that leads very naturally into the larger set of issues
21 about how one designs a system that will provide adequate
22 authority within the Federal Government. And you reminded
23 me, and I am glad you did in this whole kind of outline
24 thing, about the importance of incorporating anything that
25 comes out from Charles McKay's survey in time for our

1 report to use it because of the degree to which the
2 dependence upon a decentralized IRB system is part and
3 parcel of the evaluation of the ability of this set of
4 regs to actually accomplish its underlying goal. That has
5 to be part of the whole picture, too.

6 DR. CHILDRESS: Bill, and then Laurie.

7 DR. FREEMAN: Along the lines, I think, to
8 make your contrast very clear, you should read -- please
9 read the report. Please read the report. Have we made it
10 clear? We tried to. The difference or the distinction
11 between the Common Rule and protections, we have tried to
12 say why we think, in fact, the Common Rule is a
13 protection. And those agencies that think they have
14 protection without it, what they have left out by not
15 looking at the Common Rule? If that is not enough or you
16 disagree with whatever, let us know. We have tried to do
17 that.

18 DR. CHILDRESS: That is another question.

19 MS. CHARO: Yes, but I think actually -- no, I
20 think what has been developed is going to be extremely
21 useful and I am extremely grateful for it. Not only does
22 it talk about the Common Rule versus actual protection
23 but, you know, in the observation about things like the
24 interpretation of whether or not research is going on
25 there is an opportunity to highlight exactly what happens

1 when you have from a legal point of view the authority to
2 interpret scattered among, you know, all 17 agencies and,
3 therefore, not only are you likely to get these
4 interpretations but they are what you expect to get. They
5 are justifiable. They are legal. They are supposed to be
6 there. And you get a chance then to say are we happy with
7 that kind of result.

8 DR. FREEMAN: Right. The other question is
9 that we have not -- we have not tried to address, I do not
10 think as well -- and by the way this is because we tried -
11 - like I said if we have not done it well let us know or,
12 you know -- obviously you will be doing that.

13 The question of function versus -- the Common
14 Rule versus implementation of the Common Rule. I think it
15 is fair to say that we have from having this discussion
16 paid attention about implementation. We have added from
17 the last time an organization section about the -- what is
18 called the cooperative regulations. And just today I was
19 working on some stuff that Rod had prepared and we will
20 have by the middle of next week some more about how to
21 implement things effectively of this kind of regulation in
22 the federal government.

23 There is a little bit about improving the
24 function of the Common Rule. There are actually ways to
25 improve it from the implementation end that would decrease

1 the cost and increase the benefits to each agency. But
2 you may want to really look at that and does that need to
3 be strengthened in a much stronger way about looking at
4 the functioning of the Common Rule and can we say
5 something more about that.

6 DR. CHILDRESS: Laurie?

7 MS. FLYNN: Let me just see if what I am
8 hearing tracks with where you are going. First of all, I
9 think we are hearing that implementing the Common Rule in
10 and of itself is not synonymous with always having
11 complete protection in every instance in decision making
12 that would protect human subjects.

13 On the other hand, it is rather shocking and
14 disturbing how poorly implemented many places in the
15 government after this many years we find the Common Rule
16 to be. And I think one of the things that at least is
17 clear to me and that we may want to make explicit is
18 implementing the Common Rule really wanted to affect a
19 basic culture change in science and you indicated the
20 history upon which this regulatory process was built.

21 So we talked about creating a real culture
22 shift in this social contract with science and then we
23 proceeded to under resource it everywhere, to give it not
24 the level of priority, not the level of leadership, not
25 the level of respect within a bureaucracy, or the ongoing

1 protection for its role, and the independence and
2 integrity one would like to see for that role, but the
3 social contract and, indeed, the problems which it was
4 addressing would have demanded.

5 Consequently, you know, I think it is terrific
6 that we are going to have this kind of disclosure
7 uncomfortable though I am sure it will be in many quarters
8 because advocacy groups, patient groups, the general
9 public interest, and certainly those who are allied as
10 partners with research in the general health disciplines
11 do not really realize that within the government itself we
12 have done such a poor job and we are hardly in a strong
13 place to tell, although I believe we should,
14 pharmaceutical industries and others in the private sector
15 that they should be, you know, doing what we have not seen
16 done well.

17 We need to recognize that it is a cultural
18 shift that we have tried to get a few people to do from
19 inside and this report, I think, will have the effect of
20 bringing a lot more strength to that discussion and
21 perhaps both inform people who simply do not know, engage
22 perhaps leadership at a new level of urgency about this.

23 And I guess the other thing I would say is it
24 is useful to hear from people about the problems they have
25 encountered and I think we should.

1 I am also interested to learn if we can where
2 it has been done well, what did that take. What was
3 required to appropriately sensitize investigators? We
4 have heard today from some of these investigators and they
5 tell me freely everywhere I ask the question, "When we
6 graduated from medical school we had advanced residency
7 training in psychiatry or name that discipline but we
8 never had a course in ethics."

9 And I mean there are some basic and
10 fundamental gaps between what we are expecting as a
11 cultural shift in the field that plays out in individual
12 decisions around patients and protection and the basic
13 education that goes on at all levels. And so I do think
14 at some point for us to be able to bring forward out of
15 the work that you have done and out of other kinds of
16 dialogue we may get some specific indications of what it
17 looks like when it is done well and what it requires to do
18 it well. And what kinds of specific programs of
19 education, instruction, support, monitoring and reporting
20 enable one to feel that somebody -- while not maybe yet
21 exemplary -- is at least -- has the apparatus and the
22 personnel adequately trained to do the job that this very
23 important social contract asks for.

24 MS. CHARO: Good idea.

25 DR. CHILDRESS: Arturo?

1 DR. BRITO: There is one big piece of the
2 puzzle that I have not heard here but I am going to go
3 back and summarize what I am hearing. Basically the first
4 big portion of this is that we have to determine the value
5 of the Common Rule in itself. And, Alta, you raised the
6 question of whether or not it is truly protective or not.
7 But I have not heard that it is not protective but we have
8 to obviously determine that first and go from there.

9 And then I will touch on what Laurie was
10 saying about the method of how to best implement it and
11 how has it been implemented and what has been the -- what
12 methods can be best utilized to increase implementation
13 assuming that it does have value.

14 But what I have not heard is what are the
15 consequences of not implementing the Common Rule because I
16 can tell you that no matter what regulation we come up
17 with, no matter what changes we make to the Common Rule,
18 how are we -- I am assuming that what we want to do is
19 improve the protection of human subjects through increased
20 regulation, not necessarily increase regulation, or to
21 change the regulation, but what are the consequences to
22 the federal agencies or the private organizations that
23 have not implemented the Common Rule?

24 You know, I would like to hear a little bit
25 more about that because it seems to me that the

1 consequences do not seem to outweigh the benefits for --
2 in fact, the people are either ignorant about the Common
3 Rule or just choose not to follow those regulations.

4 DR. FREEMAN: In the private sector there are
5 some reporting requirements, minimal as they are, and
6 sanctions, minimal as they are. One of the interesting
7 things is that the Federal Government made them part of
8 the implementation of the Common Rule. For the private
9 sector there are nothing, not sanctions, no reporting
10 requirements for how within the Federal Government
11 agencies implement or do not implement the Common Rule.
12 As far as I can tell there are -- except for the report
13 that is about to be issued by NBAC in a few months --
14 there are no -- I mean, there has been -- there was no
15 structure to do anything of trying to understand whether
16 it is implemented or not, or whatever.

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Can I just say one thing?
18 Harold and Alta, before you leave if I could just get one
19 thing in.

20 It seems to me in response to Alta's concern
21 maybe one thing to do would be to see if can get -- given
22 the fact that the interagency Human Subjects Committee --
23 I do not have the exact title -- met with Bill and others
24 this week and looked over the report, could we ask for
25 feedback not simply about the report but also their

1 broader concerns since they will be actually continuing to
2 respond -- I have already heard from two of them as a
3 matter of fact -- to respond to us. This would at least
4 give us something to work with and then we can make a
5 further decision about whether to invite groups in.

6 There is always the open invitation to the
7 public hearings.

8 DR. MANGEL: It should be clear that we do
9 have data that we did as part of the questionnaire process
10 elicit comments and we asked them what is going on, how do
11 you like it, what is working, what is not working.

12 MS. CHARO: Right. Some of these Randy had
13 summarized.

14 DR. MANGEL: Yes. So we do have some data in
15 there. If you want to call them in and ask them, that is
16 fine too, but there is data. There are data already.

17 MS. CHARO: That is a good reminder.

18 DR. CHILDRESS: That is important but also it
19 seems to me at this point now having gone through the
20 process and seeing the report, a draft of it, that to go
21 and get some other feedback too.

22 Thank you both.

23 DR. FREEMAN: Maybe you, Gary, and we at the
24 office here could work out for the December meeting
25 that --

1 DR. ELLIS: If you can frame the question with
2 precision I am certain the agencies will do their best to
3 answer whatever question you frame.

4 NEXT STEPS

5 DR. CHILDRESS: We will continue to work on
6 it.

7 We are losing our members as you can see. The
8 exodus has occurred. So let's see if there are any last
9 comments from people and then we will bring it to a close
10 since we are down now to three of us. Arturo, Laurie and
11 myself.

12 DR. FREEMAN: You mean last comments from us?

13 DR. CHILDRESS: From you folks, yes.

14 DR. FREEMAN: I think the more feedback we can
15 get from you folks the better. So I encourage you to do
16 that. What is not clear and so on? This is somewhat of a
17 different report obviously. I mean, we are not talking
18 about thoughts and just ethics and stuff. We are talking
19 about some facts and noncompliance, and it is
20 controversial.

21 DR. CHILDRESS: Right. I think we are kind of
22 broadening that. Some of the subcommittees are moving
23 towards we will incorporate this into a larger kind of
24 document --

25 DR. FREEMAN: That is right.

1 DR. CHILDRESS: -- that will include some of
2 the other sorts of things and I think that is the stage we
3 will be starting on.

4 DR. FREEMAN: Good.

5 DR. CHILDRESS: But that means though that
6 your work will still continue.

7 DR. FREEMAN: Yes.

8 DR. CHILDRESS: That is to say there is still
9 the flushing out that you folks are working on all the
10 time that will be part of it as well.

11 DR. FREEMAN: The other thing is there is a
12 question of how -- to help us as well -- how close do you
13 think this is to where it needs to be in timing?

14 DR. CHILDRESS: Well, as --

15 DR. FREEMAN: I am not saying we need the
16 answer now but this is --

17 DR. CHILDRESS: Right. Okay. But I think
18 that we will have Kathi go ahead and start with
19 subcommittee members on recasting and doing the larger
20 and then I think you should provide -- continue to provide
21 the information you can. For example, I am assuming that
22 the descriptive -- the summaries, the data summaries, that
23 we have part of that, the others are in the process of
24 being developed. I am sure that some of the Phase II
25 material, for example, is in the process of being

1 developed. So all that should continue and we will start
2 the other process as well. Did that make sense?

3 DR. FREEMAN: Sure.

4 ADJOURNMENT

5 DR. CHILDRESS: Well, thank you, Emily, Joel
6 and Bill, and everyone else involved, and we are grateful
7 to you and I thank the subcommittee members for your
8 endurance today. This is becoming a test of endurance for
9 everyone at these meetings but thank you all.

10 We are adjourned.

11 (Whereupon, the proceedings were adjourned at
12 4:15 p.m.)

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