MEMORANDUM

TO: Members
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina

FROM: Chairman Tom Davis

DATE: March 13, 2006

RE: Consideration of Supplemental Report and Document Annex

On Thursday, March 16, 2006, at 1:15 p.m., the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina will hold a business meeting to consider the Select Committee’s Supplemental Report and Document Annex. The Supplemental Report briefly reports conclusions related to the sworn statements of former Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary Michael Brown in his deposition before the Select Committee on February 11, 2005 and before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Some of this testimony had been previously unavailable to the Select Committee because of restrictions imposed by the White House on Brown’s testimony relating to his communications with Senior White House staff and the President.

The Supplemental report concludes that Brown failed to follow the National Response Plan ("NRP"), deliberately ignoring key provisions. The record demonstrates that Brown opposed structural changes at FEMA and viewed the mechanisms of the NRP as bureaucratic. Brown rejected his responsibilities under the NRP and chose to follow seek direct assistance from the White House instead. The Supplemental Report is attached.

Attached to the Supplemental Report of the Select Committee will be a Document Annex. The documents published are significant documents from all chapters and Select Committee correspondence. Those documents are available for review in the Select Committee office in 2157 Rayburn House Office Building.

If you have any questions about this please contact Select Committee Special Counsel Keith Ausbrook at 6-6122.
FORMER UNDERSECRETARY MICHAEL BROWN’S COMMUNICATIONS WITH WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, REFLECTED A DISREGARD FOR THE PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN.

I. Introduction

The Select Committee’s efforts to obtain documents and other information from the White House are well-documented in the Select Committee’s original report. While the Select Committee received more than 22,000 pages from the Executive Office of the President and the Office of the Vice President, the White House refused to produce communications among senior White House staff and would not permit witnesses to testify or be interviewed regarding communications with senior White House officials and the President.

Before the Select Committee on September 27, 2005, Former Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Michael D. Brown told the Select Committee he would not respond to certain questions regarding his communications with senior White House officials, including the President. Brown told the Select Committee, “I’m being advised by counsel that I can’t discuss with you my conversations with the President’s Chief of Staff and the President.”

On February 10, 2006, however, Brown appeared before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, declaring that, as a private citizen, he no longer felt bound by the same restrictions that applied to his previous testimony. In that appearance, he testified about specific conversations with, among others, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph Hagin, and the President.

Deprived previously of this information, the Select Committee served a subpoena on Brown that same day, compelling him to appear on Monday, February 13, 2006. In lieu of his appearance on that date, the Select Committee took testimony from him in a sworn deposition on Saturday, February 11, 2006. In that testimony, he discussed his conversations with President Bush and Chief of Staff Card, among others.

Brown’s communications with the White House generally confirm the Select Committee report’s findings. They confirm the Select Committee’s conclusions regarding the use of the National Response Plan’s (NRP) protocols and procedures and

3 Subpoena served on Michael Brown by House Katrina Select Comm. Staff in Wash., D.C. (Feb. 10 2006).
4 See Deposition of Michael Brown by House Katrina Select Comm. Staff in Wash., D.C. (Feb. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Brown Dep.].
the potential for better response if the President had been involved in the details of the response at an earlier date.

But Brown’s communications with the White House also raise serious questions about when and how the White House becomes involved in disaster response under the NRP. Brown testified he regularly communicated with senior White House officials and asked for their assistance in the response. It is well-documented that the response at all levels of government was inadequate. The record establishes that Brown deliberately ignored the procedures, responsibilities, and mechanisms of the NRP and called directly on the White House for assistance instead.

II. Brown Deliberately Ignored the National Response Plan

Brown’s communications with the White House and his sworn statements to the Select Committee and others reflect his deliberate decision to ignore the NRP. The NRP was required to be promulgated under the Homeland Security Act and was established at the direction of the President under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 “to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management.” It was designed to “serve[] to unify and enhance the incident management capabilities and resources of individual agencies and organizations acting under their own authorities in response to a wide array of potential threats and hazards.” Thirty-two Departments and Agencies of the federal government adopted it.

The NRP was completed in 2004 and provided new tools for dealing with disasters, including catastrophic disasters. These tools include the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and its constituent entity the National Response Coordinating Center, the Regional Response Coordinating Center, the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), the Catastrophic Incident Annex, and the designation of the Secretary of Homeland Security as the person responsible for execution of “overall coordination of federal incident management activities” in a disaster.

Brown’s own testimony establishes that he ignored or circumvented the procedures under the NRP for managing the disaster. Brown’s testimony demonstrates that he deliberately chose to disregard key provisions of the plan, communicating with White House officials to secure resources. His circumvention of the NRP contributed to depriving the nation of an opportunity to determine whether the NRP worked. While it is clear that the federal, state, and local response was inadequate, it is not clear that the NRP itself would not have worked, or worked better, if it had been executed by those responsible for doing so, including Brown.

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6 Id.
7 Id. at v-viii.
8 Id. at ix-x.
9 Id. at 15
Brown chose to operate as he had in previous disasters -- prior to the adoption of the NRP. Responding to questions from Select Committee Chairman Tom Davis, Brown testified that he relied on his “previous experience with lots of disasters” to “relay [his needs] to Hagin or Card, and it would get done. . . .” He reported that if he “needed, for example, DOD to do something in particular, then either [Deputy Secretary] Gordon England, or Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld or Assistant Secretary Paul McNally would call me and confirm that, yeah, we just got a call from Andy, and . . . we are going to get that done for you.” He testified that he had “literally dozens” of conversations or e-mails with senior White House staff, including the President, the Vice President, Card, Hagin, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and Karl Rove.

Brown virtually boasted that he deliberately avoided communicating with the Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff. When asked in the Senate by Senator Lieberman whether he had talked to Chertoff on Monday, August 29, and why he “would . . . not have if that was the chain of command,” he responded: “Because I’m still operating that I need to get things done, and the way I get things done is I request them from the White House . . . .”

He further testified in the Senate that calling Chertoff for support “would have wasted my time. . . .” Brown claimed that “DHS was an additional bureaucracy that was going to slow me down even more. And the way I got around that was dealing directly with the White House.” Senator Bennett observed, “[I]f I were Secretary Chertoff and I had a Deputy Secretary who would prefer to call the White House rather than talk to me, I would find that very disturbing.”

At the same time as he was eager to call the White House for assistance, Brown tried to cut off communications with the Secretary. He told another FEMA official: “I did tell [Secretary Chertoff] privately that the phone calls were killing me, and he said he understood. He assures me he is not trying to interfere, but they are literally driving me crazy.” He also admitted that Card directed him to use the proper procedures. He testified that Card responded to a request:

Mike, we are going to have to follow the protocol. We are going to have to follow the chain of command on this one. And I took that to mean that the way we have played ball for the past couple of years, we are not going to play ball that way, and now we are going to play ball by “if you

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10 Brown Dep. at 16.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 8.
14 Id. at 65-66.
15 Id. at 69.
16 Id. at 66.
17 E-mail from Michael Brown to Brooks Altschuler, Dep. Chief of Staff, FEMA (Sept. 1, 2005, 21:31).
really need something, you need to go to Chertoff or back though HSOC or whatever you are going to do and do those requests that way."18

Brown operated under the old procedures, despite his own recognition of changes to the NRP and at FEMA. In both his September 27, 2005 appearance before the Select Committee and his February 11, 2006 deposition, he complained about FEMA budget cuts and reorganization at DHS.19 In response to Chairman Davis's question about whether the NRP had changed since the 2004 hurricane season in Florida, Brown replied: "It had. It had."20 Brown was also asked: "[I]t looks [as if] you may have spent a couple of years fighting a system that you didn't like, and then when the disaster came, it came [time] to use that system you chose not to use it. How would you address that?"21 He responded:

I would say that is generally true because the system that is in place works, whether it is catastrophic or not. The system that is in place worked.22

But that was emphatically not the system in place for Hurricane Katrina, and Brown deliberately ignored it. He admitted that he never advised the Secretary to designate Hurricane Katrina as an Incident of National Significance23 and never even discussed with Chertoff activating the NRP's Catastrophic Incident Annex.24 He testified that he would have "fought the activation of the IIMG as hard as [he] could."25 He testified that, if he had gone through the HSOC or the Secretary, it would have "added two new phone calls and two new layers to get things done."26 Similarly, he objected to the designation of the Principal Federal Official for an Incident of National Significance because "it adds an additional layer of bureaucracy."27 He testified: "[T]hat's why I am such an opponent of the PFO designation . . . ."28

Yet when asked if these were the "mechanisms" for managing disasters under the NRP and for pushing resources into the field, he responded: "Right."29 When confronted

18 Brown Dep. at 17.
19 See Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 114, 115-117 (statements of Michael Brown); Brown Dep. at 41, 43, 85. See also Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 77, 99, 114, 139-140 (statements of Michael Brown).
20 Brown Dep. at 17.
21 Id. at 94.
22 Id.
23 Brown Dep. at 48-49.
24 Id. at 93.
25 Id. at 95.
26 Id. at 48.
27 Id. at 49.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 94-95.
with that fact that he “choose [sic] not to use them,” again, his unambiguous response was “Right.” 30

At the same time, while he plainly perceived the structures of the NRP to be bureaucratic, he admitted that he had no reason to think that those structures could not and would not respond to his needs. When asked if he had “any reason to think that you couldn’t get [the logistics mission] assignment accomplished through regular channels,” he testified: “No. I really didn’t.” 31 Thus, there did not appear to be any need to communicate with the White House to obtain the assistance that he sought.

Finally, Brown also appears to have represented to Secretary Chertoff that he could live with the changes at FEMA, when in fact he could not. According to Secretary Chertoff’s testimony, Chertoff and Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson met with Brown and specifically asked him if he was “going to have a problem functioning as the head of FEMA” with the changes at FEMA that Brown had opposed. 32 Chertoff testified that they told Brown it was “perfectly creditable to say, I can’t go along with this. I want to leave. If you are going to stay, though, we need to have your full commitment. He told us he had felt he had gotten a fair hearing and would give this his full commitment.” 33 Brown’s refusal to follow the NRP seems contrary to that representation.

It is not clear that following the NRP’s procedures would have dramatically altered the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina. It is clear, however, that it was Brown’s responsibility to use those procedures. It is equally clear, by his own admission, Brown failed to follow them. He thought he could just ignore the NRP and do it the way he did it in Florida in 2004. That way involved direct communication with the White House to get resources, circumventing the Secretary of Homeland Security and the interagency processes and mechanisms designed to speed relief to disaster victims.

The nation will never know whether its response would have been better if the NRP had been followed. We only know the actual response, where the NRP was not followed, was woefully inadequate.

30 Id.
31 Id. at 92. Even when Brown had the opportunity to seek assistance from the White House, he did not. When Andy Card asked Brown directly on Monday, August 29—the evening following landfall—if there were “[a]nything you want me to do?” Brown did not ask for anything, saying only that “[h]ousing, transportation and environment could be long term issues.” (E-mail from Michael Brown to Andy Card, Chief of Staff, White House (Aug. 29, 2005; 22:00) in response to E-mail from Andy Card to Michael Brown (Aug. 29, 2005; 21:51:07).) Moreover, in the August 28 video teleconference in which the President appeared, Brown did not request anything. (Daily Video Teleconference [“VTC”] amongst key officials dated Aug. 28, 2005, Transcript at 14-15). Later in the same conference call, Brown asked Louisiana State Coordinating Officer Jeff Smith if he had “any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to you that you need . . .?,” Smith replied simply “Mike, no.” (Id. at 18.)
33 Id. at 24-25.
Executive Order 12148

Federal Emergency Management

July 20, 1979


Section 1. Transfers or Reassignments

1-1. Transfer or Reassignment of Existing Functions.

1-101. All functions vested in the President that have been delegated or assigned to the National Response and Preparedness Agency, Department of Defense, are transferred or reassigned to the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-102. All functions vested in the President that have been delegated or assigned to the Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Disaster Assistance Administration, including any functions transferred or reassigned to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, are transferred or reassigned to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-103. All functions vested in the President that have been delegated or assigned to the National Response and Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration, are transferred or reassigned to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-104. All functions vested in the President by the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (42 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.), including those functions performed by the Office of Science and Technology Policy, are transferred or reassigned to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-2. Transfer or Reassignment of Resources.

1-201. The records, property, personnel and positions, and unexpended balances of appropriations, available or to be made available, which relate to the functions transferred, reassigned, or reallocated by this Order are hereby transferred to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-202. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall make such determinations as may be necessary to issue such orders, and take all actions necessary or appropriate to effectuate the transfers or reassignments provided by this Order, including the transfer of funds, records, personnel, and other resources.

Section 2. Management of Emergency Planning and Assistance

2-1. General.

2-101. The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall establish policies for, and coordinate, all civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of Executive agencies.

2-102. The Director shall periodically review and evaluate the civil defense and civil emergency planning functions of the Executive agencies. In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of those functions, the Director shall recommend to the President alternative methods of performing Federal planning, management, mitigation, and assistance.

2-103. The Director shall be responsible for the coordination of efforts to promote early warning systems for the coordination of natural and nuclear disaster warning systems, and for the coordination…
of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents.

2-104. The Director shall represent the President in working with State and local governments and private sector to stimulate vigorous participation in civil emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery programs.

2-105. The Director shall provide an annual report to the President for subsequent transmittal to the Congress on the functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The report shall assess the current overall state of effectiveness of Federal civil defense and civil emergency functions, organizations, resources, and systems and recommend measures to be taken to improve planning, management, assistance, and relief by all levels of government, the private sector, and volunteer organizations.

2-2. Implementation.

2-201. In executing the functions under this Order, the Director shall develop policies which provide that all civil defense and civil emergency functions, resources, and systems of Executive agencies are:

a. founded on the use of existing organizations, resources, and systems to the maximum extent practicable;

b. integrated effectively with organizations, resources, and programs of State and local governments, the private sector and volunteer organizations; and

c. developed, tested and utilized to prepare for, mitigate, respond to and recover from the effects on the population of all forms of emergencies.

2-202. Assignments of civil emergency functions shall, whenever possible, be based on extensions (under emergency conditions) of the regular missions of the Executive agencies.

2-203. For purposes of this Order, 'civil emergency' means any accidental, natural, man-caused, or wartime emergency or threat thereof, which causes or may cause substantial injury or harm to the population or substantial damage to or loss of property.

2-204. In order that civil defense planning continues to be fully compatible with the Nation's overall strategic policy, and in order to maintain an effective link between strategic nuclear planning and nuclear attack preparedness planning, the development of civil defense policies and programs by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall be subject to oversight by the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.

2-205. To the extent authorized by law and within available resources, the Secretary of Defense shall provide the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency with support for civil defense programs in the areas of program development and administration, technical support, research, communications, transportation, intelligence, and emergency operations.

2-206. All Executive agencies shall cooperate with and assist the Director in the performance of his functions.


2-301. The functions which have been transferred, reassigned, or redelegated by Section 1 of this Order are reclassified and revised as set forth in this Order at Section 4, and as provided by the amendments made at Section 5 to the provisions of other Orders.

2-302. Notwithstanding the revocations, revisions, codifications, and amendments made by this Order, the Director may continue to perform the functions transferred to him by Section 1 of this Order, except where they may otherwise be inconsistent with the provisions of this Order.

Section 3. Federal Emergency Management Council

3-1. Establishment of the Council.

3-101. There is hereby established the Emergency Management Council.

3-102. The Council shall be composed of the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, who shall be the Chairman, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and such others as the President may designate.

3-2. Functions of the Council.

3-201. The Council shall advise and assist the President in the oversight and direction of Federal emergency programs and policies.


3-301. The heads of Executive agencies shall cooperate with and assist the Council in the performance of its functions.

3-302. The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall provide the Council
with such administrative services and support as may be necessary or appropriate.

Section 4. Delegations

4-1. Delegation of Functions Transferred to the President.

4-101. The following functions were transferred to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization by Section 2 of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953 (50 U.S.C. 404 note); they were subsequently transferred to the President by Section 1(a) of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note), and they are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency:

a. The functions vested in the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Interior by the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, as amended (50 U.S.C. 98 et seq.), including the functions vested in the Army and Navy Munitions Board by item (2) of Section 6(a) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 98(e)(2)), but excluding the functions vested in the Secretary of the Interior by Section 7 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 98f).

b. The functions vested in the Munitions Board of the Department of Defense by Section 4(b) of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 714b(h)).

c. The function vested in the Munitions Board of the Department of Defense by Section 204(f) (originally 204(e)) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (40 U.S.C. 405(f)).

4-102. The functions vested in the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization by Sections 103 and 303 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by Sections 8 and 50 of the Act of September 3, 1954 (Public Law 779; 68 Stat. 1228 and 1244) (59 U.S.C. 404 and 405), were transferred to the President by Section 1(a) of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note), and they are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-103.

a. The functions vested in the Federal Civil Defense Administration or its Administrator by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1956, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2251 et seq.), were transferred to the President by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, and they are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

b. Excluded from the delegation in subsection (a) is the function under Section 205(a)(4) of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1956, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2286(a)(4)), relating to the establishment and maintenance of personnel standards on the merit basis that was delegated to the Director of the Office of Personnel Management by Section 2(b) of Executive Order No. 11669, as amended (Section 2-101(b) of Executive Order No. 12107).

4-104. The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is authorized to redelegate, in accord with the provisions of Section 1(b) of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note), any of the functions delegated by Sections 4-101, 4-102, and 4-103 of this Order.

4-105. The functions vested in the Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration by Section 43 of the Act of August 10, 1956 (70A Stat. 638) were transferred to the President by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note), were subsequently vested in the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization by Section 512 of Public Law 86-500 (50 U.S.C. App. 2285) [the office was changed to Office of Emergency Planning by Public Law 87-296 (75 Stat. 530) and then to the Office of Emergency Preparedness by Section 402 of Public Law 90-658 (92 Stat. 1194)], were again transferred to the President by Section 1 of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note), and they are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-106. The functions vested in the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness by Section 15 of the Act of September 23, 1950, as amended (20 U.S.C. 464), and by Section 7 of the Act of September 30, 1950, as amended (20 U.S.C. 241-1), were transferred to the President by Section 1 of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note), and they are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-107. That function vested in the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness by Section 762(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as added by Section 181(a) of the Education Amendments of 1972, and as further amended (20 U.S.C. 1132d-1(a)), to the extent transferred to the President by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note), is hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-2. Delegation of Functions Vested in the President.

4-201. The functions vested in the President by the Disaster Relief Act of 1970, as amended (42 U.S.C. Chapter 58 note), are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-202. The functions (related to grants for damages resulting from hurricanes and tropical storm Agnes) vested in the President by Section 4 of Public Law 92-355 (96 Stat. 556) are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
4-203. The functions vested in the President by the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (89 Stat. 142; 42 U.S.C. 5211 et seq.), except those functions vested in the President by Sections 301 (relating to the declaration of emergencies and major disasters), 401 (relating to the repair, reconstruction, restoration, or replacement of Federal facilities), and 409 (relating to food coupons and surplus commodities), are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-204. The functions vested in the President by the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (91 Stat. 1096; 42 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.) are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Section 5. Other Executive Orders

5-1. Revocations.


5-102. Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 10296, as amended, entitled 'Providing for the Performance of Certain Defense Housing and Community Facilities and Service Functions', are revoked.

5-103. Executive Order No. 10494, as amended, relating to the disposition of remaining functions, is revoked.

5-104. Executive Order No. 10529, as amended, relating to federal employee participation in State and local civil defense programs, is revoked.

5-105. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 10601, as amended, which concerns the Commodity Set Aside, is revoked.

5-106. Executive Order No. 10634, as amended, relating to loans for facilities destroyed or damaged by a major disaster, is revoked.

5-107. Section 4(d)(2) of Executive Order No. 10680, as amended, which concerns foreign currencies made available to make purchases for the supplemental stockpile, is revoked.

5-108. Executive Order No. 10952, as amended, entitled 'Assigning Civil Defense Responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense and Others', is revoked.

5-109. Executive Order No. 11051, as amended, relating to responsibilities of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, is revoked.

5-110. Executive Order No. 11415, as amended, relating to the Health Resources Advisory Committee, is revoked.

5-111. Executive Order No. 11755, as amended, entitled 'Delegating Disaster Relief Functions Pursuant to the Disaster Relief Act of 1974', is revoked, except for Section 3 thereof.

5-112. Executive Order No. 11725, as amended, entitled 'Transfer of Certain Functions of the Office of Emergency Preparedness', is revoked.

5-113. Executive Order No. 11749, as amended, entitled 'Consolidating Disaster Relief Functions Assigned to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development' is revoked.

5-2. Amendments.

5-201. Executive Order No. 10421, as amended, relating to physical security of defense facilities is further amended by (a) substituting the 'Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency' for 'Director of the Office of Emergency Planning' in Sections 1(a), 1(c), and 6(b); and, (b) substituting 'Federal Emergency Management Agency' for 'Office of Emergency Planning' in Sections 6(b) and 7(b).

5-202. Executive Order No. 10480, as amended, is further amended by (a) substituting 'Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency' for 'Director of the Office of Emergency Planning' in Sections 1(a), 1(b), 201(a), 201(b), 301, 304, 307, 308, 310(b), 311(b), 312, 313, 401(b), 401(e), and 505; and, (b) substituting 'Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency' for 'Administrator of General Services' in Section 610.

5-203. Section 3(d) of Executive Order No. 10582, as amended, which relates to determinations under the Buy American Act is amended by deleting 'Director of the Office of Emergency Planning' and substituting therefor 'Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency'.

5-204. Paragraph 21 of Executive Order No. 10789, as amended, is further amended by adding 'The Federal Emergency Management Agency' after 'Government Printing Office'.

5-205. Executive Order No. 11179, as amended, concerning the National Defense Executive Reserve, is further amended by deleting 'Director of the Office of Emergency Planning' in Section 2 and substituting therefor 'Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency'.

5-206. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 11912, as amended, concerning energy policy and conservation, is further amended by deleting 'Administrator of General Services' and
substituting therefor 'Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency'.

5-207. Section 2(d) of Executive Order No. 11088 entitled 'Floodplain Management' is amended by deleting 'Federal Insurance Administration' and substituting therefor 'Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency'.

5-208. Section 3-3 of Executive Order No. 12046 of March 29, 1975, is amended by deleting 'General Services Administration' and substituting therefor 'Federal Emergency Management Agency' and by deleting 'Administrator of General Services' and substituting therefor 'Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency'.

5-209. Section 1-201 of Executive Order No. 12065 is amended by adding 'The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency' after 'The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration' and by deleting 'Director, Federal Preparedness Agency' and to the 'from the parentheses after 'The Administrator of General Services'.


5-211. Section 1-102 of Executive Order No. 12083 of September 27, 1978 is amended by adding in alphabetical order '(x) the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency'.

5-212. Section 9.11(b) of Civil Service Rule IX (5 CFR Part 9) is amended by deleting 'the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and'.

5-213. Section 3(2) of each of the following described Executive orders is amended by adding 'Federal Emergency Management Agency' immediately after 'Department of Transportation'.

a. Executive Order No. 11331 establishing the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission.

b. Executive Order No. 11345, as amended, establishing the Great Lakes Basin Commission.

c. Executive Order No. 11371, as amended, establishing the New England River Basins Commission.

d. Executive Order No. 11579, as amended, establishing the Ohio River Basin Commission.

e. Executive Order No. 11658, as amended, establishing the Missouri River Basin Commission.

f. Executive Order No. 11659, as amended, establishing the Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission.

5-214. Executive Order No. 11490, as amended, is further amended as follows:

a. Delete the last sentence of Section 102(a) and substitute therefor the following: 'The activities undertaken by the departments and agencies pursuant to this Order, except as provided in Section 3003, shall be in accordance with guidance provided by, and subject to, evaluation by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.'.

b. Delete Section 103 entitled 'Presidential Assistance' and substitute the following new Section 103: 'Sec. 103 General Coordination. The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall determine national preparedness goals and policies for the performance of functions under this Order and coordinate the performance of such functions with the total national preparedness programs.'.

c. Delete the portion of the first sentence of Section 401 prior to the colon and insert the following: 'The Secretary of Defense shall perform the following emergency preparedness functions':

d. Delete 'Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA)' or 'the Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA)' and substitute therefor 'Director, FEMA', in Sections 401(3), 401(4), 401(5), 401(9), 401(14), 401(15), 401(16), 401(19), 401(21), 401(22), 501(8), 601(2), 904(2), 1102(2), 1204(2), 1401(9), 1701, 1702, 2003, 2004, 2005, 3001, 3002(2), 3006, 3007, 3008, 3010, and 3013.

e. The number assigned to this Order shall be substituted for '11051 of September 27, 1962' in Section 3001, and for '11051' in Sections 1802, 2002(3), 3002 and 3008(1).

f. The number assigned to this Order shall be substituted for '16952' in Sections 1103, 1104, 1205, and 3002.

g. Delete 'Department of Defense' in Sections 502, 601(1), 804, 905, 1103, 1104, 1166(4), 1205, 2002(3), the first sentence of Section 3002, and Sections 3008(1) and 3010 and substitute therefor 'Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency'.

Section 6. This Order is effective July 15, 1979.

Jimmy Carter
THE WHITE HOUSE
September 2, 2005

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I ask you to approve 180 days of military duty in Title 32 USC 901 status for soldiers and airmen serving on state active duty in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Title 32 status will allow the soldiers and airmen supporting Hurricane Katrina Relief to receive military retirement points, health insurance and disability protection.

Hurricane Katrina struck Alabama, our neighbors in Mississippi and Louisiana on Monday, August 29, 2005. I ordered over 3,000 Alabama National Guard soldiers and airmen to state active duty to provide security, medical, engineers and communication support to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. None of the soldiers or airmen are serving in a federal status.

Currently, our soldiers and airmen are engaged in the protection of vital infrastructure to include medical facilities, fuel distribution, I-10, water and power distribution systems which are all vital to the recovery of the entire Gulf coast area.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Bob Riley
Governor
September 4, 2005

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
C/o Mr. Haynes - DoD General Counsel — via fax
Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I ask you to approve up to 180 days of military duty, retroactive to August 29, 2005, in Title 32 U.S.C. § 901 status for soldiers and airmen serving on State Active Duty in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Title 32 status will allow the soldiers and airmen supporting Hurricane Katrina Relief to receive military retirement points, health insurance and disability protection.

Hurricane Katrina struck Mississippi and our neighbors in Louisiana and Alabama on Monday, August 29, 2005. I ordered several thousand Mississippi National Guard soldiers and airmen to State Active Duty to provide security, medical, engineer and communication support to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. None of those soldiers or airmen is serving in a federal status.

Currently, our soldiers and airmen are engaged in the protection of vital infrastructure to include medical facilities, fuel distribution, I-10, water and power distribution systems — all of which are vital to the recovery of the entire Gulf coast area.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Haley Barbour
Governor of the State of Mississippi

cc: COL Parker - NGB General Counsel — via fax
September 5, 2005

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I ask you to approve 180 days of military duty in Title 32 USC 901 status for all National Guard soldiers and airmen serving in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. As you are aware, Title 32 status will allow the soldiers and airmen supporting Hurricane Katrina committed to Hurricane Katrina Relief to receive military retirement points, health insurance and disability protection. Further, this action will ensure equitable compensation across the supporting National Guard Force.

As you are aware, Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana, our neighbors in Mississippi and Alabama on Monday, August 29, 2005. I ordered over 3,000 Louisiana National Guard soldiers and airmen to state active duty in order to provide security, medical, engineer and communication support to relief efforts. None of these soldiers are in a federal status.

Currently, our soldiers and airmen are engaged in the protection of critical infrastructure to include medical facilities, fuel distribution, water and power distribution systems which are all vital to the recovery of the entire region.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Governor
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts

I approve Federal funding for use of the National Guard in Title 32 U.S. Code status to support Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts retroactive to August 29, 2005.

The Secretary of the Army and the Acting Secretary of the Air Force shall coordinate the exercise of this authority with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

cc: CJCS
USD(C)
USD(P&R)
GC, DoD
ASD(HD)
Chief, NGB
American Red Cross
Tropical Storm and Hurricane Action Plan

Introduction

Tropical storms and hurricanes, by their massive force and unpredictable nature, have the potential to cause injury, death and widespread destruction, and to displace many people.

Because these storms are a recurring threat to a substantial number of people in the United States, the American Red Cross has long held and frequently executed a special response plan specific to tropical storms and hurricanes. This plan has evolved over time and is based on operational experience and increasing development and resident population in at-risk areas. It is in accordance with changes to the structure of the Red Cross and its Disaster Services Program.

As in the past, the American people today expect the Red Cross to be at the site of such events quickly to render assistance for basic human needs. Reliance on the expertise and commitment of the Red Cross in times of major and sometimes catastrophic disasters is reaffirmed in the federal government’s National Response Plan.

Purpose and Results

This document outlines the systematic approach the Red Cross will undertake to prepare for and respond to tropical storms and hurricanes (hereafter described simply as hurricanes). The objective of this plan is to enable the Red Cross to be ready to deliver immediate services and assistance needed by those threatened and affected by such storms at an appropriate scope and scale. These actions will be executed in an integrated and coordinated manner by Red Cross chapters, service areas, disaster relief operations and national headquarters and enable the Red Cross to meet the needs and expectations of its five key constituents groups – clients, partners, volunteers and employees, donors and the American people.

Assumptions

This response plan makes the following assumptions:

1. Hurricanes are a recurring threat to the United States mainland, territories and possessions.

2. While tropical storms are less intense than hurricanes, they can produce extensive damage (particularly flooding) and should not be considered a lesser threat.

3. The available technology used to predict the direction and intensity of these storms is limited; therefore the Red Cross must have an integrated approach of preparedness and readiness efforts followed by prompt, focused, flexible and prudent response actions.
4. Not all threatening storms make landfall in the United States, its territories or possessions. Yet, in order to ensure and conduct an effective response, the Red Cross must take action well in advance of each approaching storm.

5. Hurricanes, by their significant scope and force, have the potential to affect wide geographic areas and require special attention, unified direction, action, coordination and collaboration by the Red Cross.

6. The scope and magnitude of human needs produced by hurricanes triggers the deployment of Red Cross resources and technical support to the threatened or affected Red Cross chapters and their service areas.

7. Effective Red Cross service delivery following a hurricane requires the ongoing engagement of all affected Red Cross units.

8. Annual pre-hurricane season planning and targeted resource development by hurricane-prone chapters and service area jurisdictions enhances the ability of the Red Cross to effectively respond.

9. Response actions by Red Cross units must be conducted in concert with their local, state and federal government counterparts.

10. The success of the Red Cross response to a hurricane is defined by the key constituents of the organization — our clients, donors, volunteers and employees, partners and the American public.

11. A clear and visible Red Cross presence in the disaster-affected area, plus ready availability of and easy accessibility to Red Cross services and assistance, are essential factors in the satisfaction of our constituents.

12. Red Cross response actions during each hurricane season produce valuable lessons learned that facilitate more effective and efficient responses for future storms.

13. The pre-defined geographic risk of hurricanes supports the value of significant service delivery planning and preparedness, particularly in coastal areas.

14. The chapters serving the affected area provide the initial incident response in their respective communities, report their activities and assessments and are augmented by human and material resources and guidance, in a coordinated manner, from the service area or national headquarters.

15. The affected chapters are integrated into a service delivery system once the relief operation is established and retain their role as elements participating in service delivery throughout the life of the disaster relief operation.
Annual Continuous Improvement Cycle

The frequency, intensity and location of threatening storms often vary from year to year, yet ongoing focused preparedness and performance enhancement activities are possible and warranted in all regions susceptible to such storms. Attachment 1 outlines the Annual Continuous Improvement Cycle, a critical component of this plan.

Concept of Operations

The Red Cross response to hurricanes begins with the preparedness and readiness actions taken by its units as outlined in the Annual Continuous Improvement Cycle. Upon the development of each threatening storm, the Red Cross initiates a seamless two-phased (pre and post-landfall) set of actions.

During the pre-landfall phase, as it is not possible to determine the precise path of a storm, all chapters servicing threatened communities activate their respective response plans. At the same time, the jurisdictional service areas move into their Major Disaster Response Structure; see Attachment 2. The service areas establish direct communication with or staff Red Cross liaisons at the threatened states' emergency operations centers and with the federal Regional Response Coordination Center. The service area begins deploying resources from its jurisdiction to the threatened chapters as defined by the chapters' hurricane priority requirements (a deliverable of the Annual Continuous Improvement Cycle) and activates an anticipated disaster relief operations headquarters.

Red Cross national headquarters provides support to and consultation with the threatened service areas, establishes direct liaison with appropriate federal government agencies and determines the availability of additional human and material resources the potentially affected region may need.

In anticipation of a hurricane and the resulting Red Cross relief operation, service areas not at risk from the storm will alert and place on standby human and material resources within their respective jurisdictions.

If landfall does not occur, the service area coordinates the phase-down of chapter pre-landfall activities.

The second phase begins upon landfall; the service area promptly transfers operational oversight and direction of Red Cross relief activities to the established disaster relief operation headquarters. The relief operation headquarters provides guidance and direction to the affected chapters and coordinates additional available resources to enhance service delivery throughout the disaster-affected area. The relief operation headquarters reports to Red Cross national headquarters while continuing to engage the service areas in planning and consultation. If the post-landfall operation is more limited in scope than initially expected, the service area and the Disaster Operations Center will decide the level of ongoing support to the relief operation.
When the Disaster Operations Center supports the relief operation, a conference call that includes the disaster relief operation, the service area and the Disaster Operations Center will occur to define the scaling-up of operations management support activities.

Chapters in the disaster-affected area remain actively engaged throughout the course of the disaster relief operation by providing, within their capability and capacity, assistance to their affected communities. These chapters continue their community involvement after the disaster relief operation concludes its activities.

Pre-Landfall Roles and Actions Defined

Chapters

When confronted with an approaching storm, the chapters servicing at-risk communities and hosting hurricane evacuation shelters activate their respective local response plans and prepare to receive the resources dispatched by the service area. Each chapter primarily focuses on five key activities (not a preferential order):

- Sheltering
- Feeding
- Government and Emergency Management Liaison
- Disaster Assessment
- Public Information and Fundraising

Chapters proactively establish and maintain these activities with knowledgeable staff in a timely manner prior to and after landfall. The chapters ensure the safekeeping of human and material resources received from their service area and deploy these resources, as needed, to ensure quality service delivery. Each chapter should identify a specific employee or volunteer to interact directly with the service area’s response structure.

Service Area

The hurricane-threatened service area(s) shift their group configuration to the Major Disaster Response Structure detailed in Attachment 2. In this posture, the service area begins direct communications with the hurricane-prone chapters and deploys human and material resources identified by the service area to individual chapters based on their hurricane priority resource requirements.

The service area, in its Major Disaster Response Structure, deploys personnel in advance to establish a relief operation headquarters. The service area identifies the location and facility and secures facility agreements. The service area or national headquarters (in joint consultation) activates one or more pre-designated staging areas, if required.
Disaster Operations Center

Upon activation of one or more service areas for a threatening storm, the Disaster Operations Center immediately shifts to its hurricane response mode. The Disaster Operations Center is staffed by personnel from Preparedness and Response and other national headquarters departments. Liaisons are dispatched, as needed, to the various federal operations centers. The Disaster Operations Center contacts other service areas to place human and material resources on alert and dispatches these resources, as requested and needed, to the threatened or affected service area jurisdictions.

Disaster Relief Operation Headquarters

The relief operation headquarters does not have an active operational role before hurricane landfall. Based on the storm’s projected path and logistical considerations, one or more forward headquarters cells are deployed by the planning cell of the service area’s Major Disaster Response Structure. The task of the forward headquarters cell is to establish the headquarters site and receive human and material resources. Service delivery is not a component of their purpose.

Post-Landfall Roles and Actions Defined

During the post-landfall phase, the Red Cross rapidly expands its service delivery focus and resources in the affected area. This effort supplements the service delivery actions of chapters during the pre-landfall phase and occurs quickly, seamlessly and in a coordinated manner.

Chapters

The affected chapters continue to provide and conduct five key activities (not a preferential order):

- Sheltering
- Feeding
- Government Liaison
- Disaster Assessment
- Public Information and Fundraising

Using all available human and material resources, the chapters enhance activities where needed and expand service delivery as required, including bulk distribution, individual assistance and mental and physical health services. The chapters support the relief operation in developing and executing a comprehensive service delivery plan for the entire affected area. The chapters also redirect their reports of service delivery activity from the service area to the disaster relief operation headquarters.

Disaster Relief Operation Headquarters

The relief operation headquarters establishes direct communications with the affected chapters regarding the overall service delivery plan and resource requirements. The relief operation
distributes incoming resources in accordance with the service delivery plan and monitors performance actions and accomplishments. The relief operation headquarters also establishes direct communication with state emergency operations centers and various federal disaster field offices via Red Cross liaisons. The chapters continue to maintain liaison activities with local emergency management.

The relief operation headquarters reports to Red Cross national headquarters while continuing to engage the service area in planning and consultation. If the post-landfall operation is more limited in scope than initially expected, the service area and the Disaster Operations Center will discuss the level of ongoing operations management support to the relief operation.

**Affected Service Area**

As the disaster relief operation headquarters becomes operational, the service area reduces its chapter guidance activities. The service area continues to provide consultation and support to the relief operation headquarters and provides additional service area-based resources as available.

Information from the pre-landfall stage transfers to the disaster relief operation through the planning cell of the service area and the functionality of the service area's pre-landfall structure ceases.

**Support Service Areas**

Service areas not directly affected by the storm are designated support service areas. These units work directly with the Disaster Operations Center in channeling needed resources to the disaster relief operation(s) established for the hurricane. Chapters within support service areas may provide service to evacuees as well. Upon notification from national headquarters, support service areas will activate their Response units in the same configuration as the affected service areas.

Should the need arise, the support service areas stand ready to disseminate information and assist their chapters in providing Individual Client Services, particularly Welfare Information, and to meet any need for Community Services (i.e. assistance to stranded travelers at airports due to the storms). Any activities associated with the hurricane response will be reported to national headquarters, including volunteer and donation management information.

Material Support Services activities most likely to occur include assisting national headquarters with any requests to move supplies from the Disaster Field Supply Centers, shipping supplies directly to the event site from major vendors in the support service area's jurisdiction and alerting chapters housing national ERVs to respond to the disaster-affected area(s). This will involve the chapters providing the ERV teams and reporting when the ERVs can deploy.

Staff Services activities most likely to occur include recruiting, training and preparing disaster volunteers for deployment to the relief operation as requested by the Disaster Operations Center. The support service area's DSHR Senior Associate will receive a request from the Staff Deployment Center at national headquarters to begin communicating with chapters, ensuring DSHR availability is accurately recorded in the DSHR System, and placing available staff (supervisor and above) on alert as described in the Deployment Manual. Any assignment or
grouping of personnel for deployment will occur only at the request of the affected service area or by the relief operation.

Support service areas will continue to respond to disasters that affect their respective jurisdictions while supporting service area(s) affected by hurricanes. If staff or equipment from a support services area are committed to a hurricane response and there is a need for those resources in their home jurisdiction, the support service area would request assistance in replenishing their resources from neighboring service areas through the Disaster Operations Center.

National Headquarters

National headquarters continues consultation with the affected service area(s) while providing human and material resources and guidance to the relief operation. The Disaster Operations Center engages support service areas for additional resources needed by the relief operation. National headquarters will conduct national-level public relations and fundraising campaigns and activities. National headquarters will also maintain and leverage national agreements with partner groups and agencies. The Staff Deployment Center will activate and communicate with the Staff Services member of the planning cell and service area's DSHR Senior Associate. This activity will entail:

- Communication with unaffected service areas to request notification of available DSHR members (supervisors and above) of alert status.
- Notification, through the non-affected service area's DSHR Senior Associate, to place all Community Services, Partner Services (Government and Emergency Management Liaisons), and Information Management (Disaster Assessment) supervisors on standby status.
- Implementation of Deployment Manual notification procedures regarding staff support, including notifying Travel Office, BTI/World Travel and Corporate Lodging of preliminary needs and activation status.
- Implementation of Deployment Manual procedures for staff recruitment and deployment to the affected area.
Identification and Implementation of Lessons Learned

The Senior Vice President, Preparedness and Response, conducts a Lessons Learned Study of actions during the prior hurricane seasons by December 31. This study includes the development of recommendations for future performance enhancements and allied action plans that must be completed by June 30. Those resulting issues and actions involving systems improvements and program level guidance are assigned to the Preparedness and Response Department at national headquarters. Chapter development and human resource requirements are assigned to the respective service areas. Recommendations and allied actions related to individual chapters are assigned to the respective chapter manager. All units assigned Hurricane Response Lessons Learned action items report their completion to the Senior Vice President, Preparedness and Response, by June 30.

Chapter Priority Resource Requirements

The service areas at risk from hurricanes conduct a hurricane response assessment of the human, material and equipment resources needed by their chapters to deliver services and assistance before, during and after a threatening hurricane by May 31. This inquiry focuses on the five key activities (not a preferential order):

- Sheltering
- Feeding
- Government and Emergency Management Liaison
- Disaster Assessment
- Public Information and Fundraising

Upon completion of this assessment and in conjunction with the Lessons Learned study, the service areas work with their chapters to develop resources to fill these identified shortfalls and determine appropriate resource availability within their respective jurisdictions.

The service areas match chapter shortfalls against progress of resource development by July 1. These resource shortfalls are described as the chapter’s hurricane priority requirements (the deliverable of the Annual Continuous Improvement Cycle) for the approaching hurricane season and are used to prioritize the provision of resources to each of these chapters when they are threatened by a hurricane.

A listing of each chapter’s hurricane priority resource requirements is provided to Preparedness and Response at national headquarters and used by that department in providing resource support to each of the hurricane-prone service areas.
Upon the approach of a tropical storm or hurricane, the threatened service area reconfigures its structure, priorities and actions to provide support, guidance and resource assistance to its threatened chapters. The service area augments its staff with pre-identified Red Cross volunteers and employees from throughout its service area jurisdiction. When required, the service area secures additional resources through the Disaster Operations Center at national headquarters.

Each service area reconfigures its internal staff in accordance with the charts in Attachment 3. This configuration consists of the following four interdependent elements working in concert, each with a specific focus: the Response Manager, the planning cell with its forward headquarters cell, the information and resource management Cell and service area response operations.

**Response Manager**

The mission of the response manager is to oversee the Red Cross response to the threatening and/or occurring disaster incident. In consultation with the service area executive, the Response Manager activates the service area hurricane action plan and so informs the Disaster Operations Center. The Response Manager or designee –

1. Ensures appropriate staffing of the individual activities.
2. Hosts conference calls with the hurricane risk chapters.
3. Conducts staff meeting with the members in the Major Disaster Response Structure.
4. Ensures appropriate and accurate reports are compiled and distributed to the Disaster Operations Center and Red Cross liaisons at the state emergency operations centers.
5. Participates in conference calls with the federal Regional Response Coordination Center.
6. Ensures appropriate Red Cross representation at activated state emergency operations centers and Red Cross representation for ESF 6 at the federal Regional Response Coordination Centers.
7. Participates in response strategy sessions hosted by the Disaster Operations Center.
8. Deploys personnel to the disaster relief operations headquarters and staging areas.
9. Approves the activation and movement of service area-based human and material resources to the hurricane-threatened chapters.
10. Consults with the Disaster Operations Center and disaster relief operation to determine the appropriate time to transfer personnel, data and authority to the disaster relief operation.

**Planning Cell**

The mission of the planning cell is strategic with a concentrated focus on service delivery and service delivery support, looking forward five to seven days. The planning cell develops an anticipated service delivery plan and deploys the forward headquarters cell, which enables the relief operation to begin service delivery immediately after the storm makes landfall. All planning cell information and communication beyond the major disaster response structure flows to and from the information and resource management cell.
The planning cell accomplishes its mission via cross-functional activities performed together by Operations Management, Community Services, Material Support Services and Staff Services members. The relief operation director is likely to be present in the planning cell; other members assigned must be managers (Administrators for Community Services) in their respective DSHR groups and be available for a three week assignment with the expectation of moving to the disaster relief operation.

General activities performed by the planning cell include:

1. Utilize subject matter experts (Community Services, Material Support Services, etc., which could include activity leads and national headquarters) to analyze plans, data and evaluate resource needs and shortfalls (human and material) provided by the information and resource management cell.

2. Initiate an anticipated service delivery plan (including recommended resource allocations, locations for service centers, aid stations, long-term shelters, etc.) and share it with the Response Manager and disaster relief operation headquarters.

3. In consultation with the Disaster Operations Center and Response Manager, determine potential budget implications and develop an estimated range of the evolving service delivery plan.

4. Deploy its forward cell(s) to establish the relief operation headquarters.

5. Maintain constant communication with the disaster relief operations headquarters to share updates of resource deployments, chapter requirements and information.

6. Ensure human and material resources have been identified and requested.

7. Establish initial requirements and make recommendations for resource requests to enable implementation of initial service delivery plan.

8. Develop a plan for time phased allocation of resources based on chapter shortfall analysis, projected needs and the final best estimate of affected geography. The plan should take into consideration existing chapter resources or vendor relationships in order to make best use of limited resources. For example, a chapter with multiple community partner kitchens and restaurant vendors may only need vehicles to initiate significant community feeding as opposed to a neighboring chapter which may need several days to establish a mobile kitchen before being able to deliver services.

9. Prepare a briefing for the forward headquarters cell providing all information and assessments available. The briefing should include:
   a. The scope and extent of the disaster based on best available data at the time
   b. Continuing service delivery
   c. Issues and critical needs
   d. Key contacts with Red Cross leadership (chapters, stations, service area, etc.), government (local and state) and other voluntary agencies
   e. A plan and timetable for the scaling up to the relief operation
   f. The preliminary budget range

10. At the time deemed appropriate by the Response Manager (in coordination with the Disaster Operations Center and the relief operation headquarters), transfer appropriate personnel, data and authority to the disaster relief operation.
Additional Community Services activities performed by the planning cell include:
1. Estimate immediate post landfall needs for feeding and non-evacuation host sheltering.
2. Develop recommendations for the service area to push heater meals, food handling equipment, sheltering equipment, emergency aid station supplies and bulk distribution product, which may be pre-deployed in advance of landfall, to safe locations. Chapters can then quickly access those resources following the storm in order to initiate the scaling up of service delivery.
3. The Community Services planner must interact with a Partner Services representative to –
   a. Access situation reports and disaster data from emergency operations centers
   b. Participate in framing resource requests for support from government entities in collaboration with Materials Support Services if appropriate
If the complexity of the event demands it and at the discretion of the Response Manager, initiate direct contact with ESF 6 lead agency at the state emergency operations center to confer about high level interagency planning of initial mass care response and coordination of voluntary response organization activities, including Salvation Army and Southern Baptist Convention.
4. Utilize projected feeding needs relative to chapter shortfall analysis to define needs for Southern Baptist Convention feeding resources and coordinate activation, staging (if appropriate) and deployment with the Community Services lead in the Disaster Operations Center.

Additional Material Support Services activities performed by the planning cell include:
1. Maintain records to track all proposed resource movements.
2. Address the physical or life safety and security of Red Cross workers, facilities and equipment.
3. Survey any potential headquarters sites for technology capacity and deficiencies.
4. Analyze Client Assistance System infrastructure requirements. Identify chapters in the pre-landfall area that currently use the Client Assistance System and review their technology plans for a supporting infrastructure in their chapter's jurisdiction.

Additional Staff Services activities performed by the planning cell include:
1. Analyze impact and potential impact information that may affect Staff Services including, but not limited to, the following:
   a. Potential for unaffiliated and affiliated volunteers from the affected chapter participating in relief operation activities (short and long term)
   b. Lodging effects and potential issues
   c. Issues concerning or having the potential to concern staff wellness, health and safety
   d. Issues related to hardship codes
   e. Recommendations for training
   f. Other languages the affected population speaks (for recruitment and training)
g. Groups for unaffiliated volunteer recruitment (for example, colleges, “strong Southern Baptist area,” six out of eight shelters are in Lutheran churches, etc.)

2. Track proposed human resource requests by chapter.

3. Participate in daily conference calls with the Staff Deployment Center and service area DSHR Senior Associate; report on the following:
   a. Planning cell Staff Services activities
   b. Known information regarding the service delivery plan and its development
   c. Affected chapters and their human resource capacity status
   d. Potential human resource needs and time frames
   e. Statistics and demographics of expected impact areas
   f. Known information from the disaster relief operation headquarters and their current and future human resource needs
   g. Information above which may affect Staff Services and recommendations regarding the information (for example, based on X, recommend hardship code Y or based on A, recommend staff shelter initially, etc)
   h. Any additional pertinent information

Forward Headquarters Cell

This is the deployed unit of the planning cell; its task is to establish a relief operation headquarters and receive human and material resources. Material Support Services representatives secure the facility using pre-disaster agreements and complete the Facility Agreement form, as well as initiating any utilities needed to operate the site and acquire and set-up any needed equipment and furniture.

At this point, service delivery is not a component of the cell’s purpose. However, the Community Services representative ensures operational continuity during the transfer of staff and responsibility from the planning cell post-landfall and may direct resources to and coordinate with chapters during the initial response in accordance with the established service delivery plan.

During the transfer period, the forward headquarters cell will maintain regular communications with the planning cell, service area and the Disaster Operations Center to maintain information flow and stay up-to-date about resource movements.

The forward headquarters cell members will be fully briefed by the planning cell regarding existing and pending commitments and actions within their state. In the event of a multi-state impact where the planning cell leadership team is directed to the most heavily impacted state, the forward headquarters cells in the other states may be assigned as the interim relief operation leadership until others can be assigned.
Planning Cell Equipment and Resources:
- access to the DSHR System database
- DROMIS computer
- Staff Request forms
- e-mail capability
- phone
- deployment Manual
- Staff Services activity book

Information and Resource Management Cell

The American Red Cross makes decisions about mobilizing resources and responding to hurricanes and tropical storms based on numerous factors:
- The given risk to a geographic area and potential pre-landfall hazards.
- National Hurricane Center Watches, Warnings and other advisories as well as size, speed, intensity, projected storm track, forecasting errors and erratic or unusual storm characteristics.
- Information from emergency management officials such as evacuation orders and recommendations or spontaneous evacuations.
- Accurate assessment, availability and deployment time of resources and capabilities (people, equipment, vehicles, etc.).
- Identification of resource and capability shortfalls and a given method to monitor their ongoing status, such as Chapter Disaster Readiness Assessments, Exercises or other historical operational data.

The information and resource management cell will gather, receive, summarize, maintain and distribute information and allocate and deploy resources concerning these and other factors generated by the Red Cross response effort regarding a threatening or occurring disaster. The information and resource management cell mission is tactical with a concentrated focus on gathering information and supporting chapters in the immediate response to evacuations and the impending storm. All information and communication beyond the Major Disaster Response Structure flows to and from the information and resource management cell.

The information and resource management cell accomplishes its mission via cross-functional activities performed together by Community Services, Information Management Support Services, Material Support Services and Partner Services members and the chapter support section. To avoid duplication and streamlining communication, the chapter support section will be the primary chapter information and interaction channel broker.

The members assigned to the information and resource management cell must be managers (supervisors for Community Services) in their respective DSHR groups and be available for a three week assignment with the expectation of moving to the disaster relief operation.

General activities performed by the information and resource management cell include:
1. Implement reporting requirements.
2. Receive or gather information from all units regarding actions and financial commitments.
3. Complete the Initial Hurricane Response Report and provide it to the Disaster Operations Center, per national headquarters requirement. The information and resource management cell gathers data for the Initial Hurricane Response Report as follows:
   a. Each day shelter managers will report status and counts to their chapters at noon and midnight.
   b. Chapters will report their collective status and counts to the service area by 1 a.m. and 1 p.m. each day.
   c. The information and resource management cell will accomplish the Initial Hurricane Response Report and provide it to the Disaster Operations Center by 3 a.m. and 3 p.m. (all times are local to the shelter).

The Response Manager may institute additional reporting requirements as driven by the needs of partners or other constituencies.

4. Ensure the provision of timely Red Cross information to non-government organizations, partners and Red Cross liaisons in state and federal facilities.

5. Conduct data analysis and promptly inform the Response Manager of occurring or emerging problems.

6. Track resource requests from chapters and deployed resources to chapters.

7. Request additional resources (both human and equipment) from service area or the Disaster Operations Center to support the current needs and requirements of chapters or future needs identified in the service delivery plan.

8. Acquire any transportation resources required, including cars, trucks and national vehicles.

9. Maintain records to track resource movements.

10. Procure, secure and deploy or disperse requested expendable and non-expendable supplies, equipment and services through in-kind donations, loans or by renting, leasing or purchasing items with the approval of and within the financial authorities of the Response Manager or service area executive.

11. At the time deemed appropriate by the Response Manager (in coordination with the Disaster Operations Center and the relief operation headquarters), transfer appropriate personnel, data and authority to the disaster relief operation.

Additional Chapter Support activities performed by the information and resource management cell include:

1. Review resource requests for chapters and verify requests with appropriate chapter officials; ensure requests are completed and promptly inform the Response Manager of occurring or emerging problems. The chapter support section is not an approving authority.

2. Provide, through the Community Services Sheltering Manager assigned to the chapter support section, limited technical guidance and coaching for shelter/evacuation center operational issues as needed but not in a management capacity. Any significant incidents in shelters will be channeled to the Response Manager.
Additional Information Management Support Services activities performed by the information and resource management cell include:

1. Disseminate listings and contact information of team members and daily reports to participating units (affected chapters, service area and national headquarters).

2. Produce situation and status reports, as required, for internal and external audiences; at minimum the daily 5266, SitRep, DOIS, impact and disaster assessments and Initial Hurricane Response Reports will be sent to the Disaster Operations Center.

3. Provide critical information elements to the Online Resource Book (ORB@usa.redcross.org) of the Response Center (1 (866) Get Info).

4. Monitor and display storm tracks, forecasts and current weather conditions, including river levels and flooding potential, and apprise all units of these conditions, as technology permits.

5. Gather and consolidate impact assessment information from chapters, government, utility companies and news media reports to allow the planning cell to define the priorities of the disaster relief operation. This assessment should be completed within a few hours following landfall and include the extent of damage to essential facilities, storm surge, visible housing damage and boundaries of the storm or at least the counties impacted. This is not a preliminary damage assessment.

6. Begin to gather and consolidate preliminary damage assessment from affected chapters as reported and consolidated on the Damage Assessment Summary Sheet (Form 5233).

7. Send bills and commitments to national headquarters for processing and payment.

8. Upon establishment of the disaster relief operation, reports, such as the 5266, will continue sequentially as the reports of the relief operation; all under the same DR number.

Additional Material Support Services activities performed by the information and resource management cell include:

1. Maintain accurate documentation of all sites used.

2. Receive, inspect, assign and maintain records of all vehicle, driver and transportation resources.

3. Open and maintain vendor accounts in support of the operation.

4. Oversee the warehousing of disaster relief supplies.

5. Track expenses by program service codes; process all invoices received for prompt payment.

6. Address the physical and life safety and security of Red Cross workers and clients along with the physical safety and security of Red Cross facilities and equipment.

7. Receive, track and maintain technology and communication equipment.

8. Establish a relationship with local amateur radio groups to assist with communications at pre-landfall sites. Depending on the effects of the storm on the local infrastructure, this may be the only reliable form of communications for the first 72 hours.
Additional Partner Services activities performed by the information and resource management cell include:

1. Establish and maintain liaison with non-government partner agencies and organizations.
2. Relay issues and problems conveyed by the Red Cross liaisons in the state emergency operations centers to the Response Manager and conduct follow-up actions to ensure issues and problems are addressed and resolved.
3. Conduct rumor investigation and control measures, as required, to address those problems.
4. Determine how many emergency operations centers will stand up; determine capacity to staff round the clock.
5. Determine ESF 6 staffing needs at all locations; coordinate with ESF 6 lead in the Disaster Operations Center for additional support.
6. Determine need for any additional liaison support at federal operations centers other than FEMA; coordinate with federal response unit in Disaster Operations Center for support.

Information and Resource Management Cell Equipment and Resources
- DROMIS computer
- printer
- e-mail or fax capability
- phone

Service Area Response Operations

This is the day-to-day operations staff of the service area which includes fundraising, communications, the DSHR Senior Associate and Chapter Solutions Managers. Service Area Response Operations will become an active response component at the point the service area moves to the Major Disaster Response Structure. They will interact and provide information to the information and resource management cell in the pre-landfall stage while continuing to provide ongoing day-to-day operational support.

The service area communicator or designee will:
1. Ask chapters to review and implement their communications plans.
2. Contact the Communication and Marketing activity lead at national headquarters to strategize and coordinate efforts.
3. Plan staffing for service area Public Affairs activity, as appropriate, with the service area’s DSHR Senior Associate.
4. Monitor situation and continue to support chapters and communicate across various levels.
5. Transfer all records to Organizational Support on the relief operation when it is established.

The service area Development Director or designee will:
1. Assign fundraising staff from the service area (if members are needed from beyond the service area, Director, Managers, and Officer of Fund Raising positions will be approved by the activity lead at national headquarters).
2. Ask chapters to review and prepare to activate Disaster Fundraising Action Plans.
3. Contact Fund Raising activity lead at national headquarters to strategize and coordinate efforts.
4. Coordinate with the service area communicator for consistent messaging.
5. Plan staffing for service area fundraising activities as appropriate with the service area DSHR Sr. Associate.
6. Monitor situation and continue to support chapters and communicate across various levels.
7. Transfer all records to Organizational Support on the relief operation when it is established.

The DSHR Senior Associate recruits, assigns, deploys and provides human resource support in the form of transportation and lodging to affected chapters. Specifically, he or she will -
1. Review the chapter hurricane priority requirements and begin identifying and recruiting available DSHR members to fill identified staff shortfalls.
2. Notify the Response Manager of any shortfalls unable to be filled within the service area as soon as they are identified.
3. Fill staff requests received from affected chapters by recruiting, assigning and deploying qualified, available DSHR members from within the service area using procedures in the Deployment Manual.
4. Obtain lodging for deployed staff through Corporate Lodging by following the procedures in the Deployment Manual.
5. Obtain appropriate travel for deployed staff by following the procedures in the Deployment Manual.
6. Receive staff requests and information from the Staff Services member assigned to the planning cell.
7. Participate in daily conference calls with the Staff Deployment Center and Staff Services member assigned to the planning cell.
8. Activate service area procedures to expand recruitment capabilities as outlined in the Deployment Manual.
9. Be proactive in determining the number of potentially available staff and identifying shortfalls using the reports and recruitment tools found in the Deployment Manual.
10. Forward any unfilled requests to the Staff Deployment Center within four hours of receipt.
11. Communicate with unaffected chapters requesting DSHR member availability by following the procedures in the Deployment Manual.
12. Transfer all records to Staff Services on the relief operation when it is established.

The capacity, role and influence of the Chapter Solutions Managers are built through non-disaster interaction and relationships with their chapters. Chapter Solutions Manager are within the response structure but are not assigned to the relief operation. They will play a primary role in keeping open communication channels between the service area, disaster relief operation and the chapters in their respective territory. The Chapter Solutions Managers may troubleshoot potential problems, provide resolution and, as needed, give management support for affected chapters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Pre-landfall</th>
<th>Post-landfall</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sheltering</td>
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<td>Feeding</td>
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<td>Government Liaison</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Disaster Assessment</td>
<td>Disaster Assessment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Public Information and Fundraising</td>
<td>Public Information and Fundraising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Report service delivery activities to service area</td>
<td>Report and coordinate service delivery activities with disaster relief operation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Affected Service Area   | • Shift to major disaster response structure                                 | • Major disaster response structure ceases when deemed appropriate to transfer personnel, data and authority to the disaster relief operation |
| (includes those hosting evacuees) | • Support chapters and deploy assets                                     | • Consult and support national headquarters and the relief operation |
|                         | • Determine shortfalls of risk and host chapters                           | • Staff federal facilities; when Joint Field Office is established, transfer responsibility to relief operation |
|                         | • Provide information and resource management in support of impacted chapters and to partners and constituents | |
|                         | • Deploy forward headquarters cell                                         | |
|                         | • Staff federal facilities                                                  | |
| Support Service Areas   | • Assess staff and equipment availability                                  | • Channel requested resources (coordinated by the DOC) to the relief operation |
| Disaster Relief Operation| • Forward headquarters cell of service area; establishes headquarters location and receives human and material resources | • Establish direct communications with affected chapters |
|                         | • Establish direct communication with state emergency operation centers and federal disaster field offices | • Implement service delivery plan |
|                         | • Reports directly to national headquarters                                 | • Distribute incoming resources |
| National Headquarters   | • Activate DOC                                                               | • Monitor performance actions and accomplishments |
|                         | • Send liaisons to federal operation centers                                | • Establish direct communication with state emergency operation centers and federal disaster field offices |
|                         | • Alert other service areas, coordinate human and material resources as requested | • Reports directly to national headquarters |
|                         | • Continue consultation with service areas                                  | • Support relief operation with human and material resources and guidance |
|                         | • Support federal requests                                                  | |

American Red Cross
Tropical Storm and Hurricane Action Plan
Page 18 of 23
Hurricane Plan Response Models

I. American Red Cross Routine Business Model Structure
II. Service Area Major Disaster Response Structure
III. Hurricane Pre-Landfall
IV. Hurricane Relief Operation Response Model
Hurricane Response Plan
Routine Business Model Structure

American Red Cross
American Red Cross Hurricane Relief Operation

NHQ

Support Service Areas

Affected Service Area

Affected Chapters

Disaster Relief Operation

Staging Area

Joint Field Office

State Emergency Operation Center

Local Emergency Operation Center

Regional Response Coordination Center

Interagency Incident Management Group

Homeland Security Operations Center

Health & Human Services Operations Center

National Response Coordination Center

*Regional Response Coordination Center Generally Stands Down with Establishment of the Joint Field Office

**Depending on the Requirements of the Relief Operations, Staging Areas May or May Not be Established by the Service Area of NHQ.
HURRICANE KATRINA

ZCZC MIATCDAT2 ALL
TTAA00 KNHC DDHHMM
HURRICANE KATRINA DISCUSSION NUMBER 14
NWS TPC/NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER MIAMI FL
5 PM EDT FRI AUG 26 2005

MOST RECENT REPORTS FROM AN AIR FORCE HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT INDICATE THE CENTRAL PRESSURE HAS DROPPED TO 965 MB...BUT THE FLIGHT-LEVEL WINDS HAVE ONLY INCREASED TO 94 KT AT 700 MB...WHICH IS ABOUT AN 85-KT SURFACE WIND. A 17012 DROPSonde IN THE NORTHEAST QUADRANT REPORTED 85 KT SURFACE WINDS. THEREFORE...THE INITIAL INTENSITY IS HELD AT 85 KT FOR THIS ADVISORY...EVEN THOUGH THE CENTRAL PRESSURE SUPPORTS ABOUT 95-KT SURFACE WINDS. THE EYE WALL IN THE NORTHWEST QUADRANT HAS REMAINED OPEN...PROBABLY DUE TO DRY AIR ENTRAINMENT...AND THIS MAY PARTLY EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OBSERVED WINDS AND WHAT THE CENTRAL PRESSURE TYPICALLY SUPPORTS.

THE INITIAL MOTION IS WEST-SOUTHWESTWARD...OR 255 DEGREES...AT 07 KT. KATRINA REMAINS CAUGHT BETWEEN THE NORTHEASTERLY FLOW ON THE WEST SIDE OF AN INVERTED TROUGH OVER THE WESTERN CARIBBEAN SEA AND THE NORTHEASTERLY FLOW IN THE SOUTHEAST QUADRANT OF THE SUBTROPICAL RIDGE LOCATED TO THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF KATRINA. BOTH THE Ridges AND TROUGH ARE FORECAST TO SLOWLY WEAKEN OVER THE NEXT 12-24 HOURS...WHICH ALLOW THE HURRICANE TO TURN MORE WESTWARD...AND MOST OF THE NHC MODEL GUIDANCE AGREES ON THAT SCENARIO. AFTER 24 HOURS...THE MODELS ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT ON A SHORTWAVE TROUGH CURRENTLY OVER THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL FLA S STATES TO GRADUALLY SLOW SOUTH-EASTWARD ACROSS THE CENTRAL AND WESTERN GULF OF MEXICO AND ERODE THE RIDGE...WHICH ALLOWS KATRINA TO MOVE NORTHWARD BY 22 HOURS. AS A RESULT...THE MODELS HAVE SHIFTED SIGNIFICANTLY WESTWARD AND ARE NOW IN BETTER AGREEMENT. THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE OFFICIAL FORECAST TRACK BEING SHIFTED ABOUT 150 NMI WEST OF THE PREVIOUS TRACK...ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE GUIDANCE ENVELOPE. HOWEVER...PROJECTED LANDFALL IS STILL ABOUT 72 HOURS AWAY...SO FURTHER MODIFICATIONS IN THE FORECAST TRACK ARE POSSIBLE.

KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO BE MOVING OVER THE GULF LOOP CURRENT AFTER 36 HOURS...WHICH WHEN COMBINED WITH DECREASING VERTICAL SHEAR...SHOULD ALLOW THE HURRICANE TO REACH CATEGORY FOUR STATUS BEFORE LANDFALL OCCURS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SHIPS AND GFSD MODELS...WHICH BRING KATRINA UP TO 118 KT. THE FSU SUPERENSEMBLE MODEL IS MORE ROBUST AND BRINGS KATRINA UP TO 129 KT JUST BEFORE LANDFALL.

FORECASTER STEWART

FORECAST POSITIONS AND MAX WINDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>MAX WIND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL</td>
<td>26/2100Z</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12HR VT</td>
<td>27/0600Z</td>
<td>24.9N</td>
</tr>
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<td>27/1800Z</td>
<td>25.2N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
36HR VT  20/0600Z 25.6N 86.4W  100 KT
48HR VT  20/0800Z 26.9N 87.7W  105 KT
72HR VT  20/1000Z 30.0N 88.5W  115 KT
96HR VT  21/0000Z 35.0N 86.5W  35 KT ...INLAND
120HR VT  21/0600Z 40.5N 79.0W  25 KT ...DISSIPATING INLAND

$$$
Hurricane KATRINA

ZC2C MIA2PFL2 ALL
TTL400 NNHC DDHHMM
HURRICANE KATRINA PROBABILITIES NUMBER 15
NWS TPC/NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER MIAMI FL
11 PM EDT FRI AUG 26 2005

PROBABILITIES FOR GUIDANCE IN HURRICANE PROTECTION
PLANNING BY GOVERNMENT AND DISASTER OFFICIALS

AT 11 PM EDT...0300Z...THE CENTER OF KATRINA WAS LOCATED NEAR
LATITUDE 24.6 NORTH...LONGITUDE 83.6 WEST

CHANCES OF CENTER OF THE HURRICANE PASSING WITHIN 65 NAUTICAL MILES
OF LISTED LOCATIONS THROUGH 8PM EDT MON AUG 29 2005

LOCATION A B C D E LOCATION A B C D E
25.0N 86.0W 46 X X X 46 BURAS LA X 2 11 6 19
26.0N 87.5W 20 10 X X 30 NEW ORLEANS LA X X 8 9 17
27.0N 89.0W 1 15 6 1 23 NEW IBERIA LA X X 2 12 14
MUN 219N 850W 2 X X 2 PORT ARTHUR TX X X X 9 9
JACKSONVILLE FL X X X 2 2 GALVESTON TX X X X 7 7
VENICE FL 1 1 1 3 FREEPORT TX X X X 5 5
TAMPA FL X 1 1 1 3 PORT O CONNOR TX X X X 3 3
CEDAR KEY FL X 1 1 3 5 GULF 29N 85W 1 9 3 2 15
ST MARKS FL X 1 4 4 9 GULF 29N 87W 1 13 5 2 21
APALACHICOLA FL X 5 5 3 13 GULF 28N 89W 1 11 9 2 22
PANAMA CITY FL X 5 6 4 15 GULF 28N 91W X 1 1 5 17
PENSACOLA FL X 2 9 6 17 GULF 28N 93W X X 2 9 11
MOBILE AL X 1 8 8 17 GULF 28N 95W X X X 6 6
GULFPORT MS X 1 8 9 18 GULF 27N 96W X X X 3 3

COLUMN DEFINITION PROBABILITIES IN PERCENT
A IS PROBABILITY FROM NOW TO 8PM SAT
B FROM 8PM SAT TO 8AM SUN
C FROM 8AM SUN TO 8PM SUN
D FROM 8PM SUN TO 8PM MON
E IS TOTAL PROBABILITY FROM NOW TO 8PM MON
X MEANS LESS THAN ONE PERCENT

FORECASTER AVILA

SS
NNNN

Tropical Cyclone, Tropical Weather, & TPC Information Topics:
Hurricane KATRINA

ZC6C MIATCDAT2 ALL
T2A00 KNHC DDDHHMM
HURRICANE KATRINA DISCUSSION NUMBER 15
NWS TPC/NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER MIAMI FL
11 PM EDT FRI AUG 26 2005

THE SATELLITE PRESENTATION HAS CONTINUED TO IMPROVE AND CONSISTS OF A PERFECT A COMMA-SHAPED CLOUD PATTERN WHICH BEGINS OVER WESTERN CUBA AND WRAPS AROUND A LARGE CLUSTER OF VERY DEEP CONVECTION. THIS BAND IS PROBABLY PRODUCING NEAR TROPICAL STORM FORCE WINDS ALONG THE NORTH COAST OF WESTERN CUBA. ALTHOUGH THE EYE IS NOT CLEARLY VISIBLE ON IR IMAGES...RADAR DATA INDICATE THAT THE EYE IS EMBEDDED WITHIN THIS CIRCULAR AREA OF DEEP CONVECTION. T-NUMBERS FROM SAB AND TAEF HAVE INCREASED TO 6.0 ON THE DVORAK SCALE. THEREFORE...THE INITIAL INTENSITY HAS BEEN ADJUSTED TO 90 KNOTS. AN AIR FORCE RECONNAISSANCE PLANE IS SCHEDULED TO BE IN KATRINA IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS. THE HURRICANE IS EXPECTED TO BE UNDER A TYPICAL 200 MB ANTICYCLONE...WITH A CYCLONIC CIRCULATION EXTENDING UPWARD TO THAT LEVEL. THIS IS THE TYPICAL PATTERN OBSERVED IN INTENSE HURRICANES. IN ADDITION...KATRINA IS FORECAST TO MOVE DIRECTLY OVER THE WARM LOOP CURRENT OF THE GULF OF MEXICO...WHICH IS LIKE ADDING HIGH OCEANIC FUEL TO THE FIRE. THEREFORE...THE OFFICIAL FORECAST BRINGS KATRINA TO 115 KNOTS...OR A CATEGORY FOUR ON THE Saffir-Simpson HURRICANE SCALE. THE GFDL IS MORE AGGRESSIVE AND CALLS FOR 124 KNOTS AND 922 MB. THE FSU SUPERENSEMBLE IS EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE BRINGING KATRINA TO 131 KNOTS.

KATRINA CONTINUES TO MOVE STUBBORNLY TOWARD THE WEST-SOUTHWEST OR 250 DEGREES AT 7 KNOTS ALONG THE EASTERN SIDE OF A VERY STRONG DEEP-LAYER MEAN HIGH CENTERED OVER TEXAS. IN FACT...DATA FROM THE NOAA JST JUST RELAYED BY THE METEOROLOGIST ONBOARD INDICATE THAT THE HIGH CONTINUES TO BE VERY STRONG. HOWEVER...THIS FEATURE IS EXPECTED TO MOVE WESTWARD AND LEAVE A WEAKNESS OVER THE CENTRAL GULF OF MEXICO. KATRINA WILL LIKELY TAKE THAT OPPORTUNITY AND BEGIN TO TURN GRADUALLY TOWARD THE WEST-NORTHWEST AND THEN NORTHWARD. THE OFFICIAL FORECAST BRINGS THE CORE OF THE INTENSE HURRICANE OVER THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF OF MEXICO IN 48 HOURS OR SO. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE GUIDANCE SPREAD HAS DECREASED AND MOST OF THE RELIABLE NUMERICAL MODEL TRACKS ARE NOW CLUSTERED BETWEEN THE EASTERN COAST OF LOUISIANA AND THE COAST OF MISSISSIPPI. THIS CLUSTERING INCREASES THE CONFIDENCE IN THE FORECAST.

FORECASTER AVILA

FORECAST POSITIONS AND MAX WINDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Max Wind</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL</td>
<td>27/0300Z 24.6N 83.6W</td>
<td>90 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12HR VT</td>
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<td>28/0000Z 25.0N 86.0W</td>
<td>115 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36HR VT</td>
<td>28/1200Z 26.0N 87.5W</td>
<td>115 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48HR VT</td>
<td>29/0000Z 27.0N 89.0W</td>
<td>115 KT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hurricane KATRINA

72 HR VT  30/0000Z 30.5N 89.5W  115 KT
96 HR VT  31/0000Z 35.0N 87.5W  35 KT...INLAND
120 HR VT  01/0000Z 40.5N 81.0W  25 KT...BECOMING EXTRATROPICAL

$$$ NNNN

Tropical Cyclone, Tropical Weather, & TPC Information Topics: Storm Information, Hurricane Awareness, Historical Information, Tropical Analysis and Forecasting Branch, About Us, Contact Us

NOAA/National Weather Service
National Centers for Environmental Prediction
National Hurricane Center
Tropical Prediction Center
11691 SW 17th Street
Miami, Florida, 33145-1209 USA
Page last modified: Friday, 26-Aug-2005 22:55:07 EDT

The Honorable George W. Bush  
President  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C.

Through: Ms. Mary Lynne Miller  
Acting Regional Director  
FEMA Region IV  
3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road  
Atlanta, Georgia 30341

Under the provisions of Section 501 (a) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.35, I request that you declare an emergency for the State of Mississippi as a result of the anticipated impacts of Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina is expected to impact the State of Mississippi as a strong Category 4 hurricane with winds in excess of 145 mph. Hurricane Katrina is expected to produce significant damages associated with coastal storm surges, high winds, tornadoes, torrential rainfall, and inland flooding. Our response to this event began on August 26, 2005, and is continuing. Current forecasts also indicate that the State will receive rains averaging eight inches as far north as the State's northern border with Tennessee and some isolated rains in excess of 10 inches. The counties of Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Pearl River, Stone, Marion, Forrest, Jefferson Davis, Covington, Jones and Lamar are in the direct path of Hurricane Katrina and are anticipated to sustain the greatest amount of damages.

In response to the situation I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 26, 2005 in accordance with Section 501 (a) of the Stafford Act as well as issuing a State of Emergency for the entire State effective August 27, 2005 as well.

Pursuant to 44 CFR § 206.35, I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster.
I am specifically requesting Direct Federal Assistance and the Public Assistance Program for Category A (Debris Removal) and Category B (Emergency Protective Measures) for Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Pearl River, Stone, Marion, Forrest, Jefferson Davis, Covington, Jones and Lamar Counties.

Preliminary estimates of the types and amount of emergency assistance needed under the Stafford Act, and emergency assistance from certain Federal agencies under other statutory authorities are tabulated in Enclosure A.

The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this emergency:

Local County Governments and the Department of Human Services with the assistance of the Department of Health have prepared to open more than 25 general population and special needs shelters as well as anticipating the opening of numerous additional shelters to meet the needs of the forecasted number of evacuees.

The State has purchased water, ice and other emergency commodities in order to be prepared to provide emergency supplies to the affected areas as well as placing sufficient numbers of National Guard Soldiers on State Active Duty to execute distribution to the local level.

The Department of Transportation, Public Safety, Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, and Military departments are sustaining personnel, materials and equipment cost in support of evacuations, including management of traffic flow along evacuation routes from Louisiana and Alabama as well as search and rescue missions.

Other state agencies continue to incur costs necessary to execute their responsibilities under the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.

I certify that for this emergency, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Mississippi agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easement, and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work.
Honorabale George W. Bush  
August 27, 2005  
Page 3  

2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work;

3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement; and

4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 502 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5192 & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Thomas M. Womack as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He/she will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessments and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

Haley Barbour  
Governor

[Signature]
**Urgent Weather Message**

National Weather Service
New Orleans, LA

1011 AM CDT
Sun Aug 28 2005-09-07

---

**Devastating damage expected**

Hurricane Katrina, a most powerful hurricane with unprecedented strength, rivaling the intensity of Hurricane Camille of 1969.

Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks - perhaps longer. At least one half of all homes will have roof and wall failure. All gabled roofs will fail - leaving homes with severely damaged or destroyed.

The majority of industrial buildings will become non-functional, partial to complete wall and roof failure is expected. All wood-framed low-rise apartment buildings will be destroyed. Concrete block low-rise apartment buildings will sustain major damage - including some wall and roof failure.

High-rise office and apartment buildings will sway dangerously - a few to the point of total collapse. All windows will blow out.

Airborne debris will be widespread - and may include heavy items such as household appliances and even light vehicles. Debris-filled vehicles and light trucks will be moved. The blown debris will create additional destruction. Persons - pets - and livestock exposed to the winds will face certain death if struck.

Power outages will last for weeks - as most power poles will be down and transformers destroyed. Water shortages will make human suffering incredible by modern standards.

The vast majority of native trees will be snapped or uprooted. Only the heaviest will remain standing. But be totally demolished. Few crews will remain. Livestock left exposed to the winds will be killed.

All livestock and wildlife within the evacuation zone are urged to leave the area. All pets and livestock will be left exposed to the winds and will be killed.

An inland hurricane wind warning is issued for widespread sustained winds and hurricane force or greater gusts up to 150 mph. All areas are in danger. All areas are in danger.

---

Once tropical storm and hurricane force winds onset - do not venture outside!
August 28, 2005

The Honorable George W. Bush
President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC

Through: Ms. Mary Lynne Miller
Acting Regional Director
FEMA Region IV
3003 Chamblee – Tucker Road
Atlanta, GA 30341

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.36, I request that you declare a major disaster for the State of Mississippi as a result of Hurricane Katrina. The hurricane is expected to cause catastrophic damage from flooding, high-winds as well as tornadoes and severe thunderstorms. Our response to this hurricane started on August 26, 2005 and is continuing. The state is expected to receive Hurricane force winds along the entire Mississippi Gulf Coast and as far as Jackson in the central part of the State. Current forecasts indicate that the State will receive heavy rains, averaging eight inches as far north as the northern border with Tennessee and some isolated areas with rains in excess of ten inches.

In response to the situation, I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 27, 2005 in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act as well as issuing a State of Emergency for the entire State effective August 27, 2005, as well. The State Mitigation Plan has been submitted and approved by FEMA.

A Preliminary Damage Assessment has been requested. I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster. I am specifically requesting 100 percent Direct Federal Assistance, 100 percent for Category A and B under the Public Assistance Program, for debris removal and emergency protective measures in the first 72 hours. I request the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program for the entire State. I request direct Federal Assistance for work and services to save lives and protect property. I request Hazard Mitigation Grant Program for the entire State. I also request Public Assistance (Categories A-G) and Individual Assistance for the counties lying in or near the path of Hurricane Katrina that are likely to experience high-winds and torrential rains. I am requesting the full complement of the Individual Assistance Programs, to include the Individuals and Households Programs, Disaster Unemployment Assistance, Crisis Counseling, Disaster Counseling, Disaster Legal Services, and the Small Administration Disaster Loans Program.

The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this disaster:

- Local County Governments and the Department of Human Services with the assistance of the Department of Health have opened over 25 general population shelters and several special needs shelters as well as anticipating the opening of numerous more to meet the needs of the forecasted number of evacuees from our coastal areas as well as from the States of Alabama and Louisiana.

- Transportation, Public Safety, Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks, and the Military Departments are sustaining personnel, materials, and equipment costs in support of evacuations, including management of traffic flow along evacuation routes from Louisiana and Alabama as well as search and rescue missions and law enforcement efforts.

- Other State Agencies continue to incur cost necessary to execute their responsibilities under the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.

I certify that for this major disaster, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Mississippi agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easements and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work;

2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work;

3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement; and

4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.
In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 403 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170b & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Thomas M. Womack as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessment and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Haley Barbour
Governor
Federal Register Notice

Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-3213-EM]

Mississippi; Emergency and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of an emergency for the State of Mississippi (FEMA-3213-EM), dated August 28, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 28, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 28, 2005, the President declared an emergency declaration under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the emergency conditions in certain areas of the State of Mississippi, resulting from Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 27, 2005, and continuing, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant an emergency declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such an emergency exists in the State of Mississippi.

You are authorized to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act to save lives, protect public health and safety, and property or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the designated areas. Specifically, you are authorized to provide debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B), including direct Federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program, at 75 percent Federal funding. This assistance excludes regular time costs for subgrantees’ regular employees. In addition, you are authorized to
provide such other forms of assistance under Title V of the Stafford Act as you may deem appropriate.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration to the extent allowable under the Stafford Act.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, William L. Carwile, III, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared emergency.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Mississippi to have been affected adversely by this declared emergency:

The counties of Covington, Forrest, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Jefferson Davis, Jones, Lamar, Marion, Pearl River, and Stone for Public Assistance Categories A and B (debris removal and emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance, at 75 percent Federal funding.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individuals and Households Housing; 97.049, Individuals and Households Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individuals and Households Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security.
Federal Register Notice

Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1604-DR]

Mississippi; Major Disaster and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for the State of Mississippi (FEMA-1604-DR), dated August 29, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 29, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 29, 2005, the President declared a major disaster under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the damage in certain areas of the State of Mississippi, resulting from Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, and continuing, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such a major disaster exists in the State of Mississippi.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

You are authorized to provide Individual Assistance and assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B) under the Public Assistance program in the designated areas, Hazard Mitigation throughout the State, and any other forms of assistance under the Stafford Act you may deem appropriate subject to completion of Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs), unless you determine the
incident is of such unusual severity and magnitude that PDAs are not required to
determine the need for supplemental Federal assistance pursuant to 44 C.F.R. 206.33(d).
Direct Federal assistance is authorized.

Consistent with the requirement that Federal assistance be supplemental, any Federal
funds provided under the Stafford Act for Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and the
Other Needs Assistance under Section 408 of the Stafford Act will be limited to 75
percent of the total eligible costs. For a period of up to 72 hours, you are authorized to
fund assistance for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, at
100 percent of the total eligible costs. Federal funding for debris removal will remain at
75 percent.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration to the extent allowable
under the Stafford Act.

The time period prescribed for the implementation of section 310(a), Priority to Certain
Applications for Public Facility and Public Housing Assistance, 42 U.S.C. 5153, shall be
for a period not to exceed six months after the date of this declaration.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant
to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, William
L. Carwile, III, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this
declared disaster.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Mississippi to have been
affected adversely by this declared major disaster:

Amite, Forrest, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Lamar, Marion, Pearl
River, Perry, Pike, Stone, Walthall, and Wilkinson Counties for Individual Assistance.

Adams, Amite, Attala, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Claiborne, Clarke, Clay, Copiah,
Covington, Forrest, Franklin, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison, Hinds, Itawamba,
Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Jefferson Davis, Jones, Kemper, Lamar, Lauderdale,
Lawrence, Leake, Lee, Lincoln, Lowndes, Madison, Marion, Monroe, Neshoba, Newton,
Noxubee, Oktibbeha, Pearl River, Perry, Pike, Rankin, Scott, Simpson, Smith, Stone,
Walthall, Warren, Wayne, Webster, Wilkinson, and Winston Counties for debris removal
and emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance. For a period of
up to 72 hours, assistance for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal
assistance, will be provided at 100 percent of the total eligible costs. The period of up to
72 hours at 100 percent excludes debris removal.

All counties within the State of Mississippi are eligible to apply for assistance under the
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.
(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individual and Household Housing; 97.049, Individual and Household Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individual and Household Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

/s/

Michael D. Brown,  
Under Secretary,  
Emergency Preparedness and Response,  
Department of Homeland Security.
August 28, 2005

The Honorable Bob Riley  
Governor of Alabama  
State Capitol  
Montgomery, Alabama 36130  

Dear Governor Riley:

I have declared an emergency under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), for the State of Alabama due to the emergency conditions resulting from Hurricane Katrina, beginning on August 28, 2005, and continuing. I have authorized Federal relief and recovery assistance in the affected area.

The Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), intends to coordinate all disaster relief efforts that have the purpose of alleviating the hardship and suffering caused by the emergency on the local population and to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act, to save lives, protect public health and safety, protect property, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the designated areas. Specifically, FEMA is authorized to provide debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B), including direct Federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program. Any Federal funds for Public Assistance will be limited to 75 percent of the total eligible costs.

FEMA will coordinate Federal assistance efforts and designate specific areas eligible for such assistance. The Federal Coordinating Officer will be Mr. Ron Sherman of FEMA. He will consult with you and assist in the execution of the FEMA-State Agreement for emergency assistance governing the expenditure of Federal funds.

Sincerely,

George W. Bush
August 28, 2005

The Honorable George W. Bush
The White House
Washington, DC

Through: Mary Lynne Miller
Acting Regional Director
FEMA Region IV
3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road
Atlanta, GA 30341

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. (the Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.36, I request that you declare an emergency disaster declaration for the State of Alabama as a result of Hurricane Katrina beginning August 28, 2005 and continuing. I am requesting that Baldwin, Choctaw, Clarke, Mobile, Sumter, and Washington Counties be declared in the disaster declaration.

In response to the situation, I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 28, 2005, in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act.

The Governor has declared a State of Emergency for the entire state on August 28, 2005. The Governor authorized mandatory evacuations on August 28, 2005, in Mobile and Baldwin Counties.

State and local damage assessments are underway. I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary. I am specifically requesting:

Public Assistance, Category A (Debris Removal), and Category B (Emergency Protective Measures) at 100 percent for the first 72 hours.

The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this disaster:

implementation of the State Emergency Plan
Activation of the State Emergency Operations Center
Activation of the local Emergency Operations Centers
Statewide mobilization of assets

The manpower and assets of the state are overwhelmed due to the storm. The state is estimating cost figures in excess of several million dollars. As soon as conditions allow, the state will be requesting post-disaster damage assessment assistance.

I certify that for this emergency, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.
I request direct Federal assistance for work and services to save lives and protect property.

(a). Estimated 9.5 million cubic yards of debris (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)

Estimated 1.3 million pounds of ice daily (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)

Estimated 650,000 liters of water daily (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)

(b). Debris Removal (Category A)

Emergency Protective Services (Category B) to include, but not limited to water, ice, and food.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Alabama agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easements and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work;

2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work;

3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement; and

4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 502 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 5170 (b) & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Bruce P. Baughman as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessment and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

Bob Riley,
Governor

BB:ph
August 29, 2005

The Honorable George W. Bush
The White House
Washington, DC

Through: Mary Lynne Miller
Acting Regional Director
FEMA Region IV
3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road
Atlanta, GA 30341

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.36, I request that you declare an expedited major disaster for the State of Alabama as a result of Hurricane Katrina beginning August 28, 2005 and continuing. I am requesting that Baldwin, Choctaw, Clarke, Mobile, Sumter, and Washington Counties be declared in the disaster declaration.

In response to the situation, I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 28, 2005, in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act.

The Governor has declared a State of Emergency for the entire state on August 28, 2005. The Governor authorized mandatory evacuations on August 28, 2005, in Mobile and Baldwin Counties.

The State of Alabama has completed a Standard State Mitigation Plan which was approved in October 2004. The State is currently revising and updating the plan with effects for Hurricanes Ivan and Dennis in order to apply for an enhanced State Mitigation Plan status. Of the 67 Alabama counties, 64 counties have FEMA approved plans at this time.

A Preliminary Damage Assessment has been requested and/or is underway. I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary. I am specifically requesting:

Individual Assistance, including the Individuals and Households Program (IHP), Disaster Unemployment Assistance, Crisis Counseling, Small Business Administration disaster loans for Mobile, Baldwin, and Washington Counties and Public Assistance, Category A (Debris Removal) and Category B (Emergency Protective Measures) to include Direct Federal Assistance (DFA) at 100% for the first 72 hours for Baldwin, Choctaw, Clarke, Mobile, Sumter, and Washington Counties, and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program for the entire state.
The Honorable George W. Bush
Page 2
August 29, 2005

The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this disaster:

   Implementation of the State Emergency Plan
   Activation of the State Emergency Operations Center
   Activation of the local Emergency Operations Centers
   Statewide mobilization of assets

I certify that for this major disaster, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Alabama agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easements and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work;

2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work;

3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement; and

4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 403 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170b & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Bruce P. Baughman as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He/she will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessment and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Governor
Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-3214-EM]

Alabama; Emergency and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of an emergency for the State of Alabama (FEMA-3214-EM), dated August 28, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 28, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 28, 2005, the President declared an emergency declaration under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the emergency conditions in certain areas of the State of Alabama, resulting from Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 28, 2005, and continuing, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant an emergency declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such an emergency exists in the State of Alabama.

You are authorized to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act to save lives, protect public health and safety, and property or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the designated areas. Specifically, you are authorized to provide debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B), including direct Federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program at 75 percent Federal funding. This assistance excludes regular time costs for subgrantees' regular employees. In addition, you are authorized to provide such other forms of assistance under Title V of the Stafford Act as you may deem appropriate.
In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration to the extent allowable under the Stafford Act.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, Ron Sherman, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared emergency.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Alabama to have been affected adversely by this declared emergency:

The counties of Baldwin, Choctaw, Clarke, Mobile, Sumter, and Washington for Public Assistance Categories A and B (debris removal and emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance, at 75 percent Federal funding.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individuals and Households Housing; 97.049, Individuals and Households Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individuals and Households Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security.
Federal Register Notice

Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1605-DR]

Alabama: Major Disaster and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for the State of Alabama (FEMA-1605-DR), dated August 29, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 29, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 29, 2005, the President declared a major disaster under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the damage in certain areas of the State of Alabama, resulting from Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, and continuing, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such a major disaster exists in the State of Alabama.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

You are authorized to provide Individual Assistance and assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B) under the Public Assistance program in the designated areas, Hazard Mitigation throughout the State, and any other forms of assistance under the Stafford Act you may deem appropriate subject to completion of Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs), unless you determine the incident is of such unusual severity and magnitude that PDAs are not required to
determine the need for supplemental Federal assistance pursuant to 44 C.F.R. 206.33(d). Direct Federal assistance is authorized.

Consistent with the requirement that Federal assistance be supplemental, any Federal funds provided under the Stafford Act for Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and the Other Needs Assistance under Section 408 of the Stafford Act will be limited to 75 percent of the total eligible costs. For a period of up to 72 hours, you are authorized to fund assistance for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, at 100 percent of the total eligible costs. Federal funding for debris removal will remain at 75 percent.

The time period prescribed for the implementation of section 310(a), Priority to Certain Applications for Public Facility and Public Housing Assistance, 42 U.S.C. 5153, shall be for a period not to exceed six months after the date of this declaration.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, Ron Sherman, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared disaster.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Alabama to have been affected adversely by this declared major disaster:

Baldwin, Mobile, and Washington Counties for Individual Assistance.

Baldwin, Clarke, Choctaw, Mobile, Sumter, and Washington Counties for Public Assistance Categories A and B (debris removal and emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance. For a period of up to 72 hours, assistance for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, will be provided at 100 percent of the total eligible costs. The period of up to 72 hours at 100 percent excludes debris removal.

All counties within the State of Alabama are eligible to apply for assistance under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individual and Household Housing; 97.049, Individual and Household Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individual and Household Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)
/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security.
THE GOVERNOR

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and the private seal of the State of Louisiana, in the City of Baton Rouge, on this 25th day of August, 2005.

SIGNED UNDER SEAL OF STATE

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco

GOVERNOR OF LOUISIANA

On this 25th day of August, 2005, I, Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of the State of Louisiana, do hereby order, for the protection of the citizens of Louisiana, that the state of emergency be declared throughout all of the parishes of the state of Louisiana, by the authority vested in the Governor of the state of Louisiana, to provide for the safety and security of the citizens of Louisiana, by the authority vested by law in the Governor of the state of Louisiana, to declare the state of emergency.

NOW THEREFORE, I, Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of the state of Louisiana, do hereby order:

WHEREAS, on August 25, 2005, Hurricane Katrina poses an immediate threat to the state of Louisiana, and
WHEREAS, the state of Louisiana finds a disaster or emergency has occurred, or that there is an
WHEREAS, the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act of 2002, Title III, Section 3, provides that the Governor of the state of Louisiana may, in the event of an emergency, by proclamation, establish a state of emergency.

STATE OF EMERGENCY - HURRICANE KATRINA

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

PROCLAMATION NO. 48 KB 2005
State of Louisiana
MILITARY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY
AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

August 27, 2005

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Through: Regional Director
FEMA Region VI
800 North Loop 288
Denton, Texas 76209

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 501 (a) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.35, I request that you declare an emergency for the State of Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina for the time period beginning August 25, 2005, and continuing. The affected areas are all the southeastern parishes including the New Orleans Metropolitan area and the mid-state Interstate 1-49 corridor and northern parishes along the I-20 corridor that are accepting the thousands of citizens evacuating from the areas expecting to be flooded as a result of Hurricane Katrina.

In response to the situation I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 25, 2005 in accordance with Section 501 (a) of the Stafford Act. A State of Emergency has been issued for the State in order to support the evacuations of the coastal areas in accordance with our State Evacuation Plan and the remainder of the state to support the State Special Needs and Sheltering Plan.

Pursuant to 44 CFR § 206.35, I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster. I am specifically requesting emergency protective measures, direct Federal Assistance, Individual and Household Program (IHP) assistance, Special Needs Program assistance, and debris removal.

Preliminary estimates of the types and amount of emergency assistance needed under the Stafford Act, and emergency assistance from certain Federal agencies under other statutory authorities are tabulated in Enclosure A.

The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this emergency:

- Department of Social Services (DSS): Opening (3) Special Need Shelters (SNS) and establishing (3) on Standby.
- Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH): Opening (3) Shelters and establishing (3) on Standby.
- Louisiana State Police (LSP): Providing support for the phased evacuation of the coastal areas.
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (WLF): Supporting the evacuation of the affected population and preparing for Search and Rescue Missions.
Mr. President  
Page Two  
August 27, 2005

- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Coordinating traffic flow and management of the evacuations routes with local officials and the State of Mississippi.

The following information is furnished on efforts and resources of other Federal agencies, which have been or will be used in responding to this incident:
- FEMAERT-A Team enroute.

I certify that, for this emergency, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

I request Direct Federal assistance for work and services to save lives and protect property.

(a) List any reasons State and local government cannot perform or contract for performance, if applicable.

(b) Specify the type of assistance requested.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Louisiana agrees that it will, with respect to Direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide, without cost to the United States, all lands, easement, and rights-of-way necessary to accomplish the approved work.
2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work.
3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement.
4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 402 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5172 and 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris in response to this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Mr. Art Jones as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessments and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco  
Governor  
Enclosure
ENVELOPE A TO EMERGENCY REQUEST

Estimated requirements for other Federal agency programs:
- Department of Social Services (DSS): Opening (3) Special Need Shelters (SNS) and establishing (3) on Standby. Costs estimated at $500,000 per week for each in operation.
- Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH): Opening (3) Shelters and establishing (3) on Standby. Costs estimated at $500,000 per week for each in operation.
- Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP): Providing generators and support staff for SNS and Public Shelters. Costs estimated to range from $200,000-$100,000 to support (6) Shelter generator operations.
- Louisiana State Police (LSP): Costs to support evacuations - $300,000 for a non-direct landfall.
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (WLF): Costs to support evacuations - $200,000 for a non-direct landfall.
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Costs to support evacuations - $200,000 for a non-direct landfall.

Totals: $9,000,000

Estimated Requirements for assistance under the Stafford Act:

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<tr>
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<th>AMOUNT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical and advisory assistance</td>
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<td>Debris removal</td>
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<td>Emergency/protective measures</td>
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<td>Individuals and Households Program (IHP)</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
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<td>Distribution of emergency supplies</td>
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<td>Other (specify)</td>
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Totals: $9,000,000
Grand Total: $9,000,000

Note: Estimates are to reflect total eligible costs before any cost sharing.
State of Louisiana
MILITARY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY
AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

August 28, 2005

The President
The White House
Washington, DC

Through: Regional Director
FEMA Region VI
800 North Loop 288
Denton, Texas 76209

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5171-5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.36, I request that you declare an extended major disaster for the State of Louisiana as Hurricane Katrina, Category 5 Hurricane approached our southeast coast of New Orleans beginning on August 28, 2005 and continuing. The affected areas include all the southeastern parishes including the City of New Orleans directly impacted by the brunt of the storm and the mid state and northern parishes accepting the thousands of citizens forced to evacuate from the impacted areas directly affected by Hurricane Katrina.

Parishes expected to receive major damage based on the anticipated track of Hurricane Katrina are:
Ascension, Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, and Washington.

In addition we are expecting that the following parishes to suffer significant damage as tropical storm force winds and heavy rainfall occur in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina's landfall: Acadia, Calcasieu, Cameron, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberville, Jefferson, St. Mary, Vermilion, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana.

Parishes that are affected by the evacuation of persons from the southeastern parishes of the state as we implement the Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan are: Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, Desoto, East Carroll, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, Nachitoches, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, and Winn.

In response to the situation, I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 26, 2005, in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act. A State of Emergency has been issued for the State in order to support the evacuations of the coastal areas and the remainder of the state to support the State Evacuation and Sheltering Plan.

A Preliminary Damage Assessment will be conducted as soon as possible after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. Based on the predictions we have received from the National Weather Service and other sources, I have determined that this incident will be of such severity and magnitude that effective response will be beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that supplementary Federal assistance will be necessary.

I am specifically requesting:

United States General Services Administration, 409 9th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405, (202) 501-4400, Fax: (202) 501-4282.
Mr. President  
Page two  
August 23, 2005  

Individual Assistance, including the Individual and Household Program (IHP), Disaster Unemployment Assistance, Crisis Counseling, Public Assistance (Category A - G funding at 100%), Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loans and Direct Federal Assistance (DFA) funding at 100% for the following parishes: Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Calcasieu, Cameron, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberville, Iberia, Jefferson, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, Lafourche, Livingston, Pointe Coupee, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John, St. Mary, St. Martin, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion, Washington, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana.

To support the evacuation/evacuation effort, I am also requesting Individual Assistance, including the Individual and Household Program (IHP), Crisis Counseling, and Public Assistance (Category B) for the following parishes: Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, De Soto, East Carroll, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, La Salle, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Landry, Texas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, and Winn.

The State Hazard Mitigation Plan (SHMP) was approved by FEMA on April 13, 2005. We are requesting Hazard Mitigation for eligible applicants that have a FEMA Approved Local Hazard Mitigation Plan and the parishes that are approved within the application period for this disaster.

The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this disaster:

- Ten Special Need and six General Population shelters have been opened in the affected parishes on 8/23/2005.
- Ascension and St. James Parishes have instituted precautionary evacuations.
- St. Charles, Jefferson (Grand Isle and Lafitte), Lafourche (outside of flood gates), Plaquemines, Orleans (portions) and Assumption Parishes have instituted mandatory evacuations.
- St. Bernard, Terrebonne (south of the Intracoastal Waterway), Orleans and St. John the Baptist Parishes have recommended evacuations.
- Louisiana began contra-flowing traffic on LA10, LA35, and portions of LA20. contra-flow will cease 6 hours prior to landfall.
- Bridges, ferries and airports are expected to close when maximum sustained winds reach 1 mph.
- Department of Social Services (DSS)/ARC: Open (8) Special Need Shelters (SNS) and establishing (3) on Sunday.
- Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH)/ (DSS): Opening (8) Special Needs Shelters (SNS) Shelters and establishing (3) on Sunday.
- LANG and the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP): Providing generators and support staff for SNS and Public Shelters and field personnel and equipment.
- Louisiana State Police (LSP): Costs to support evacuations.
Mr. President
Page Three
August 28, 2005

- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (WLF): Costs to support evacuations.
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Costs to support evacuations.

Due to the extraordinary nature of this catastrophic hurricane and based on the anticipated damages in the impacted areas including the New Orleans Metropolitan region, I am requesting an increase of the Federal cost share from 75% to 100% for Individual Assistance, Public Assistance (All Categories) and Direct Federal Assistance. I certify that for this major disaster, the State and local governments will assume the applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

I request direct Federal assistance for work and services to save lives and protect property.

(a) We do not anticipate State and local government resources to be able to accomplish the volume of debris removal requested for this disaster.

(b) We are requesting a direct debris removal mission assignment for Hurricane Katrina.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Louisiana agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easements and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work;
2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work;
3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement; and
4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 403 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170b & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Mr. Arthur O. Jones as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessment and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Governor

Enclosure
ENCLOSURE A TO EXPEDITED REQUEST

Estimated requirements for other Federal agency programs:
- Department of Social Services (DSS): Opening (3) Special Need Shelters (SNS) and establishing (3) on Standby. Costs estimated at $500,000 per week for each in operation.
- Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH): Opening (3) Shelters and establishing (3) on Standby. Costs estimated at $500,000 per week for each in operation.
- LANG and the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP): Providing generators and support staff for SNS and Public Shelters. Costs estimated to range from $250,000-$500,000 to support (6) Shelter generator operations and personnel/equipment support.
- Louisiana State Police (LSP): Costs to support evacuations - $500,000 for a direct landfall.
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (WLF): Costs to support evacuations - $500,000 for a direct landfall.
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Costs to support evacuations - $5,000,000 for a direct landfall.

Totals: $130,000,000

Estimated Requirements for assistance under the Stafford Act:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>Technical advisory assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debris removal</td>
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<td>Emergency protective measures</td>
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<td>Individuals and Household Program (IHPI)</td>
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<td>Totals:</td>
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<td>Grand Total:</td>
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(*) Based on Hurricane Isabel, 916-12 (FEMA 1435, 1422, 1548).

Note: Estimates are to reflect total eligible costs before any cost sharing.
Federal Register Notice

Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-3212-EM]

Louisiana; Emergency and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of an emergency for the State of Louisiana (FEMA-3212-EM), dated August 27, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 27, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 27, 2005, the President declared an emergency declaration under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the emergency conditions in certain areas of the State of Louisiana, resulting from Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 26, 2005, and continuing is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant an emergency declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such an emergency exists in the State of Louisiana.

You are authorized to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act to save lives, protect public health and safety, and property or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the designated areas. Specifically, you are authorized to provide debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B) under the Public Assistance program, including direct Federal assistance, at 75 percent Federal funding. This assistance excludes regular time costs for subgrantees’ regular employees. In addition, you are authorized to provide
such other forms of assistance under Title V of the Stafford Act as you may deem appropriate.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration to the extent allowable under the Stafford Act.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended; William Lokey, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared emergency.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Louisiana to have been affected adversely by this declared emergency:

The parishes of Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, De Soto, East Baton Rouge, East Carroll, East Feliciana, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, La Salle, Lincoln, Livingston, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Helena, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, West Feliciana, and Winn for Public Assistance Categories A and B (debris removal and emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance, at 75 percent Federal funding.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individuals and Households Housing; 97.049, Individuals and Households Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individuals and Households Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security.
Federal Register Notice

Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1603-DR]

Louisiana; Major Disaster and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for the State of Louisiana (FEMA-1603-DR), dated August 29, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 29, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 29, 2005, the President declared a major disaster under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the damage in certain areas of the State of Louisiana, resulting from Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 29, 2005, and continuing, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such a major disaster exists in the State of Louisiana.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

You are authorized to provide Individual Assistance and assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B) under the Public Assistance program, and Hazard Mitigation in the designated areas; and any other forms of assistance under the Stafford Act you may deem appropriate subject to completion of Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs), unless you determine the incident is of such
unusual severity and magnitude that PDAs are not required to determine the need for supplemental Federal assistance pursuant to 44 C.F.R. 206.33(d). Direct Federal assistance is authorized.

Consistent with the requirement that Federal assistance be supplemental, any Federal funds provided under the Stafford Act for Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation and the Other Needs Assistance under Section 408 of the Stafford Act will be limited to 75 percent of the total eligible costs. For a period of up to 72 hours, you are authorized to fund assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, at 100 percent of the total eligible costs. Federal funding for debris removal will remain at 75 percent.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration to the extent allowable under the Stafford Act.

The time period prescribed for the implementation of section 310(a), Priority to Certain Applications for Public Facility and Public Housing Assistance, 42 U.S.C. 5153, shall be for a period not to exceed six months after the date of this declaration.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, William Lokey, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared disaster.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Louisiana to have been affected adversely by this declared major disaster:


The parishes of Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Calcasieu, Cameron, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Pointe Coupee, Plaquemines, St. Barnard, St. Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John, St. Mary, St. Martin, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion, Washington, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana for Public Assistance Categories A and B (debris removal and emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance. For a period of up to 72 hours, assistance for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, will be provided at 100 percent of the total eligible costs. The period of up to 72 hours at 100 percent excludes debris removal.
The parishes of Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, Desoto, East Carroll, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, and Winn for Public Assistance Category B (emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance, will be provided at 100 percent of the total eligible costs.

The parishes of St. Mary, St. Tammany, and Ouachita in the State of Louisiana are eligible to apply for assistance under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individual and Household Housing; 97.049, Individual and Household Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individual and Household Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security
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<td>28</td>
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As of 08/10/00DEC05

Based on the estimates of LADC distribution to evacuees and responders.

and Water from 28 Aug to 3 Sep

Superdome Personnel, MRES,
Persinger, John M.

From: Nielsen, Kirstjen M.
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2005 3:08 PM
To: Kaniewski, Daniel J.
Subject: RE: Red Cross Hurricane Katrina Prep

Conf call should be fine
Thanks!!!!!!!!!!

-----Original Message-----
From: [mailto:]
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2005 3:00 PM
To: Nielsen, Kirstjen M.
Subject: RE: Red Cross Hurricane Katrina Prep

Okay...have advised our folks that you'll want a brief Monday morning and they are flexible on time...also will you want them to come up (we're just down here at 2025 E Street) Conf call?
Thanks

-----Original Message-----
From: Nielsen, Kirstjen M. [mailto:]
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2005 2:57 PM
To: Hall, Carol
Subject: RE: Red Cross Hurricane Katrina Prep

Thanks Carol
This is very helpful. Will get back to you with a time tomorrow.

-----Original Message-----
From: [mailto:]
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2005 2:48 PM
To: [mailto:]
Cc: [mailto:]; Nielsen, Kirstjen M.
Subject: Red Cross Hurricane Katrina Prep

In preparation for Hurricane Katrina's expected landfall in the New Orleans vicinity, the American Red Cross has every resource at its disposal on alert/moving in anticipation of this event to include personnel, equipment, and materials.

Below are some highlights of Red Cross activities as of 1400 hours today, Saturday, August 27th:

-Chapters across the region are opening shelters in support of evacuations in all states -275,000 heater meals being moved to Baton Rouge -225,000 heater meals being moved to Montgomery, Alabama -15 sites being identified to bring in big kitchens with our NGO partners, the Southern Baptists, to provide 300,000 meals per day feeding capability -All 14 Disaster Field Supply Centers (warehouses) loading non perishable support items to include up to 50,000 cots, up to 100,000 blankets, comfort kits and clean up kits -All vehicles in the Red Cross fleet across the country are on alert for possible deployment/being dispatched to staging areas (500+) -Staffing Center recruiting/sending 1,300 person push package of volunteers to the staff processing center in Montgomery, AL (this in addition to 500 volunteers already deployed to south Florida to augment local volunteers in relief efforts there) -All 8 Emergency Communications Response Vehicles (ECRVs) on alert/deploying to staging areas -Red Cross staff providing liaison support to
NRCC, Region VI RRCC, and Region IV RRCC as well as all ERT-As and RNATs requesting ESF 6 presence

Please let me know if you have questions

Thanks

Carol

Tracking:

Recipient

Kaniewski, Daniel J.

Read

Read: 8/27/2005 3:10 PM
Impact of the Second Landfall of Katrina

As of 5:00 pm on Monday, August 29th, Hurricane Katrina was listed as a category one hurricane with maximum sustained winds at 95 mph and higher gusts. Weakening is forecast during the next 24 hours as the center continues moving over land. However, hurricane force winds are expected to spread as far as 150 miles inland along the path of Katrina. Hurricane force winds extend outward up to 125 miles from the center, and tropical storm force winds extend outward up to 230 miles.

New Orleans was spared direct hit. However, an estimated 770,000 utility customers in Louisiana are reported without power; Entergy Corp. alone reporting 700,000 and Cleco Corp reporting 70,000 outages. Reports of flooding vary based on region with some levees in New Orleans reportedly breached. Extensive flooding in the Lower 9th Board and St. Bernard Parish may be a result of water going over the tops of the levees. Boil water alerts have been issued.

A curfew is effective in New Orleans from Monday afternoon until dawn Tuesday, and dusk until dawn each day thereafter.

In Mississippi, local media reported 10,000 power outages, but no updates have been reported. Local media also reported a storm surge of more than 20 feet, with waves as high as 33 feet.

Hurricane Katrina is expected move north along the Mississippi River, resulting in showers and thunderstorms for the four state area, especially in northcentral Louisiana and southcentral Arkansas. These storms are not expected to become severe, although localized flooding will be possible across portions of Louisiana and Arkansas.

Alabama-Gulf Coast reports that blood drives have been cancelled for today resulting in a loss of 200 units in collections. AL-GC estimates that there will be a loss of 500 units collected over the next several days due to cancelled drives. The Mobile facility remains open with Mobile minimal staff present. All hospitals supported by Mobile received extra blood units prior to the storm. Mobile facility received superficial damage and is operating on auxiliary power.

(SOURCES: The Weather Channel/National Weather Service/CNN/The Times-Picayune)
Red Cross Response and Activation for Second Landfall of Katrina

Community Services

Feeding
- Identified, with the Southern Baptists, sites for 25 kitchens, which are on stand-by, each with 20,000 daily capacity (for a total of 500,000), to be moved to sites post landfall.
- Requested an additional ten kitchens (with a daily capacity of 200,000). Spirit of America and Henry’s Kitchen are being moved to Montgomery, AL for staging. (The Sysco Kitchen will move to the area post-landfall.)

Material Support Services

SAS:
- A Safe Area has been identified in the HQ facility for DRO staff
- A Weather Alert Radio has been set up, tested and is working
- An Evacuation Plan for the HQ facility has been completed

Logistics
- A Client Assistance Card (CAC) activation unit is operational at the Response Maintenance Center in Austin, TX
- Follow on orders for Sysco to support Baptist and Red Cross kitchens
- The Time Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) for kitchen has been received and is in stage one of implementation.
- Working with federal response for support of operations
- Henry’s Kitchen and Spirit of America have arrived in Montgomery, AL
- 166 ERVs from the 48 continental United States have been deployed to the impacted region
- Approximately 288,000 heater meals are staged in Baton Rouge, with another 150,000 in Montgomery
- Obtaining FEMA cambros for Montgomery, AL
- Working with FEMA for equipment requests (fuel, dry boxes, generators, dumpsters, grey water containers, ice, water, forklifts, pallet jacks, shower units, port).
- Open SAM’s accounts in Mississippi and Florida
- 2500 clean-up kits staged in Mississippi
- 5000 comfort kits in Mississippi

RTT
- ECRVs are staged in Alabama and Houston, with others supporting or in route to Louisiana.
- Received 25 check-ins from Red Cross communication-net.
- Creating 40 To-Go packs for the Kitchens
- Setting up coordinated communication networks for the affected areas to communicate with the Service Areas and National Headquarters

IKD
- Received offers from or placed requests by donors for support of relief operations
Partner Services

Government/Emergency Management Liaison

- **Alabama**: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is fully activated with a Red Cross Liaison present.
- **Louisiana**: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is fully activated and a Red Cross Liaison is present.
- **Florida**: Florida's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) remains fully activated with a Red Cross Liaisons present.
- **Mississippi**: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is fully activated with Red Cross Liaisons present.
- **Georgia**: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) continues operating at Level I (monitoring). No Red Cross Liaisons requested at this time.
- **South Carolina**: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) continues operating at Level I (monitoring). No Red Cross Liaisons requested at this time.
- **Tennessee**: Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) activated the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at noon on Monday, August 29th until further notice. This is a 24-hour partial activation to include a Red Cross liaison.

Federal

- An ESF#6 multi-partner coordination center has been established at Red Cross national headquarters in Washington, DC, and will be operational effective Tuesday, August 30th. The center will ensure better interagency coordination between the Red Cross, Federal agencies, other NGOs active in disaster, and public/private sector partners as we support community response actions.
- FEMA Region IV and Region VI Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) are staffed 24/7 by Red Cross. Red Crossers support the Emergency Response Team – Advanced (ERT-A) teams in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. Rapid Needs Assessment Teams (RNAT) ESF#6 are staffed in Florida and Mississippi.
- FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center remains staffed 24/7 with ESF#6.
- ESF#6 partners are anticipating requests post-landfall.

External Affairs Liaison (EAL)

- EAL public members are present at the Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida State EOCs.
- Alabama, Louisiana, Florida and Mississippi Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) are fully activated today with Red Cross Liaisons present.

Non-government

- An ESF#6 Mass Care Coordination group was officially formed today. NGO representatives will convene at the new ESF#6 Mass Care Coordination Center at ARC NHQ. Initial NGO members include:
  - Adventist Community Services
  - America’s Second Harvest (invited)
  - The Salvation Army
  - Southern Baptist Convention/North American Mission Board
  - American Humane Society
  - Church World Service (invited to coordinate faith-based organizations)
  - Labor representation
- VOAD partners are preparing for post landfall support in LA, MS and AL.
- Beginning calls with emotional and spiritual care national NGO partners.
- ESF #6 NGO committee members are being identified to deploy to DOC.
Individual Client Services

- Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) staff are at NHQ assisting Red Cross in developing protocols for recruitment and deployment of their personnel and will have a representative in the DOC for the duration.
- Initiated contact with Mental Health Partners to mobilize their resources to augment operational staffing.
- Will train staff, via OJT, on the procedures and tools for the new Welfare Information system.

Organizational Support Services

Public Affairs

- Satellite equipment has been set up so interviews can be conducted from the Disaster Operations Center.
- Public Affairs is receiving a number of international media calls.
- Rapid Response Team coverage continues in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi.
- Rapid Response Teams are conducting media interviews and supporting the Southeast Louisiana Chapter in their public affairs efforts.

Fundraising

- Call 1-800-Help Now to make a contribution

Staff Services

- Moving staff to forward deployment centers in Houston, TX and Montgomery, AL
- A 1 time $50.00 allowance will be added to the Disaster Staff Cards for personal preparedness for staff assigned to all Hurricane Katrina related disaster relief operations. These funds are to be used for the following personal preparedness items to ensure Red Cross staff members are prepared to maintain themselves in the Red Cross and partner staff shelters:
  - Flash light and extra batteries
  - Personal FA Kit and other personal choices for over the counter remedies
  - Bedding-sheets/sleeping bag, etc
  - Towels and wash cloths
  - Insect repellent
  - Sun screen
  - Hand sanitizer (Purell, packets, etc.)
  - Lip balm
  - Tissues
- Recruiting 1,900 DSHR members in the next three days
- 885 staff have been assigned and have arrived at all Hurricane Katrina operations; 39% of that number (342) were assigned to southern Florida

Preparedness

- Providing a list of appropriate brochures to Community Services (Mass Care) for public distribution to enhance awareness on safety information.
- Adjusting our preparedness content for this event to focus on people using bottled water and less on water treatment due to the significant amount of flood water, chemicals, or other hazards that can compromise water sources.
Response Center

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<tr>
<th>Post-Landfall Report for Katrina 1, DR 863-06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Facts in Southern FL as of 8:00 PM August 28, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Shelters Currently Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Shelter Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service Centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verified Hospitalized</td>
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<td>Verified Ill/Injured</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health Service Contacts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mental Health Contacts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Disaster Volunteers to Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>T&amp;M Volunteers to Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile Feeding Units to Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comfort Kits Distributed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impact and Assessment for the First Landfall of Katrina

Early damage assessment reports in southern Florida (Miami-Dade) indicate 795 homes with major damage and 457 with minor damage. Damage assessment teams in Miami-Dade are heading south to the upper Keys and three teams in Key West are headed north. Damage assessment for Broward County is almost complete.

As of Sunday at 2:00 PM, power was restored to all but 162,800 customers in Broward County and 332,400 customers in Miami-Dade (total of 736,800). Source: Florida Power and Light

Client Services

Service delivery will be by outreach in Broward and Miami-Dade and a combination of outreach and service centers in the Keys. It is anticipated that there will be 3000 cases opened in Miami-Dade and the Keys and 250 in Broward.

Web-Based Resources

- Louisiana State Police Emergency web site: [http://www.lsp.org/emergency.html](http://www.lsp.org/emergency.html)
- Mississippi Emergency Management Administration: [http://www.msema.org/index.htm](http://www.msema.org/index.htm)
John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), asked me to verify that your office had received the documents it needed from the Army Corps of Engineers. I was told that there was some question whether you had the situation report from Col. Wagenaar for August 29, 2005. This is a copy of said report.

If this is not what you are looking for, or if you require some other document, please call me or COL Mike Donovan at [redacted].
I. Situation
Hurricane Katrina went over the city of New Orleans on Monday. Winds were 145-mph winds. River Reading: 10.1 ft River Crest (Carrollton Cage): 15.5 ft at 0900 hrs
A. General
CEMVN's CMT and CAT are coordinating the execution plan with the Unwatering Planning Response Team. District employees are calling in to the Alternate Headquarters Site to inform their supervisors of their status. CEMVNS's CMT continues to brief CEMVSN's CMT on CEMVSN's AOR. The Commander's Reevaluation team inspected the District Headquarters Building and found minor damages to northeast corner of the third floor. COL Wagenaar reconstituted the EOC in the District Headquarters building.

B. Weather
Rain and Windy
81 degrees F
Feels Like 85 degrees F
Wind: From WSW at 28 mph

C. Damage Assessment
No damages to report at this time.

D. Secondary Impacts
There is reported flooding in Kenner with water 4-5 ft. on Williams Blvd. There is flooding in St. Bernard Parish with reports of water up to the roofs of homes. It has been reported that Causeway Blvd. has about 4 ft. of standing water. It has been reported that Arabi, in St. Bernard Parish, is under 10 ft. of water.

E. Other

PARISH EVACUATIONS:

SHELTERS:
Special Needs open: 9
General Population Shelter: 113

ROAD CLOSURES: Causeway Bridge; LA 23 Belle Chase Tunnel

A.1. MVN Project Operations
CDR has coordinated with Jefferson Parish and has the following information as of 1300 29Aug05:

3 pump stations in East Jefferson Parish are inoperable - no pump stations have operators on site - therefore no water is exiting the drainage canals and they are overtopping with rainwater and flooding the local streets. We observed 4 feet of water standing in Williams Blvd.

East Jefferson Parish Levee District personnel have driven the length of the Lake Ponchartrain Levee and report that the levee is in good condition, with no evidence of overtopping or erosion, only minor waves may have lapped over the levee.
We observed most houses with major damage to their roofs - roofing will be a huge mission for FEMA.

We have been unable to contact St. Tammany, Plaquemines, Orleans, St. Charles, or St. Bernard Parishes. We continue to try to reach parish officials to assess the situation. We understand that some or all pump stations in Orleans parish have been inoperable. We have been unable to confirm this. Info from the net indicates that St. Bernard Parish experienced heavy inundation.

Have heard from sources that water came from 17th St Canal into Lake View, a subdivision in New Orleans.

Trying to make initial contacts with Memphis PPPMD, but phone lines and email have not been functional most of the day.

A.2. Waterways Operations

The Mississippi River is closed to traffic from Southwest Pass to Natchez, MS.

The dredge Wheeler remains docked in Baton Rouge, LA and is likely to remain there throughout Monday.

A.3. Locks and Control Structures

Port Allen Lock is closed to most traffic due to the closure of the railroad bridge. On 29 Aug at 0525 hrs, sporadic rain, 25 mph winds, river gage 6.9 ft (was 5.9 ft at 1500 hrs. on 28 Aug.); canal gage 1.6 ft (was 1.8 ft. at 1500 hrs. on 28 Aug). As of approximately 1730 hours on 29 Aug, the railroad bridge at Port Allen Lock is operational and USACE hydrographic survey boats will be able to exit the lock into the Mississippi River.

Harvey Lock remains closed. Lost power but is on generator power. On 29 Aug at 0550 hrs, steady rain with 65 mph winds. Gage readings unobtainable at this time. At midnight river gage 5.0 ft and canal gage 1.45 ft. On 29 Aug at 1055 hrs, the gage on the canal side of Harvey Lock is at 3.0 ft and rising; the river gage at the lock is at 15.0 ft. There are approximately 30-40 trees down and all trees in the area are damaged. Hatch covers for the engine room were bolted down but blew away and several buildings in the area have roof damage. On 29 Aug at 1330, water is rising on the canal side and is about 1/2 ft. from topping the bank (gage is at 4.0 ft.) and the river is dropping. The canal is backed up and overtopping its banks in areas.

Algiers Lock remains closed. On 28 Aug at 2300 hrs. canal gage reading 0.75 ft. On 29 Aug at 0500 hrs. extensive rain and wind. Canal gage reading unobtainable at this time.

LaHNC Lock remains closed. Water is rising fast on canal side and is beginning to overtop concrete floodwall. Lock lost commercial power and generator power due to flooding from overtopping of floodwall along the west side of the LaHNC. On 29 Aug at 0610 hrs, river gage is 9.1 ft. and canal gage is 14.4 ft. On 29 Aug at 1325 hrs, there is about 16 inches of water in the tunnels. The tide in the canal is going down (gage is about 11.0 ft.) and the Florida Ave. Bridge is under water. It has been reported that the electrical components of the lock were flooded, but the machinery was above the water level. Approximately a 1-block section of the floodwall along the canal failed on the east side of the canal & north side of Judge Seiber Bridge.

Bayou Boeuf Lock sustained no visible damage and reported only small tree debris on the grounds. They
are on generator power and have enough fuel for about a week and a half. There is no visible damage to any of the buildings and the lock should be able to open at 1900 hrs on 29 Aug.

All other facilities are open for normal operations.

A.4. Pumping Stations

Jefferson Parish pumping stations at Duncan & Bonnabel canals are damaged. All Jefferson and Orleans Parish Pumping Stations are inoperable as of 29 Aug.

B. USACE Authorities

C. FEMA Mission Assignments

C.1. ICE Mission

C.2. Water Mission

C.3. Emergency Power Mission

C.4. Debris Mission

C.5. Temporary Roofing Mission

C.6. Temporary Housing

C.7. Technical Assistance

C.8. Regional Activation

A. Personnel

# Assigned = 47
# Accounted = 254
# Unknown = 839

Accountability of district personnel: Supervisors continue their attempts to contact all personnel, but connections are limited by cell phone traffic limitations. Employees have been instructed to call in to MVN and MVK toll-free numbers to gain accountability. Those that get through have expressed difficulty in making telephone contact because of cell phone traffic limitations and land-line long distance connection problems.

cw/df - 29 Aug 05

B. Information Management

Continue to address computer related problems and connectivity issues. Cell phone service is diminished. Out going long distance phone service was lost and remains down. Network connectivity with the New Orleans District is currently down. DLB

C. Logistics

New Orleans District Facility status:

(NOTE: This is an initial status report.)
Shops building roof over the office area is coming off. 
Canopy to new mail room (bldg 748) has has blown off. 
NOD building has significant substantial damages, e.g., north side. 
Also damages to Child Care Center building. 
Door to the 400 kw generator blew in, generator has been shut down. Bunker is being supported by the 50kw generator. 

MVN RECON team is scheduled to return to New Orleans ASAP to do site survey of damages. This is essential before we can reopen our district headquarters.

GSA leased vehicles that were on the grounds are damaged/destroyed; not sure to what extent. GSA Regional Fleet Office was notified of this status and requested to be prepared for emergency replacement of vehicles. 

Port Allen Lock has been designated as staging area for FEMA and COE. (Brad Blanchard, [redacted], is available on site to coordinate actions.

LM personnel status report: 23 assigned; 10 accounted, 13 unknown. Various times today attempts have been made to contact unknown via personal cell, however, no calls have gone through. LM will continue calling.

Continuing coordination with local hotels to ensure CMT, CAT members are being accommodated with lodging. Hotel staff has been very supportive but there is much confusion ensuring that our team continues to have a room. Available rooms in Vicksburg area are extremely hard to locate or non-existent at this time. One additional room was reserved today to a new team member added.

Additionally the local area has experienced several power outages throughout the day and has had to switch to generator power. MVK personnel have been released due to no electrical power in the building. Hotels are now also reporting lost of water due to city problems.

Supported EOC by inputting data into Englink; also prepared T&A sheets for CMT & CAT team members. Initiated action to all members to fill out emergency deployment evacuation TDY Travel regarding legal dependents who accompanied Corps team member. RM requested this information to estimate cost.

D. Public Affairs

Phone outage: Due to long-distance phone outage, incapable of making outgoing long-distance calls back to media. Requested MVN PAO patch media directly to us and tell media about the situation and to keep calling us.

29 Aug Media interviews conducted:
- New York Times, Andrew Revkin - science reporter
- John Hall - conditions at levees
- Chicago Tribune, Jeffrey Manier
- John Hall and Al Naomi - overall situation, weaknesses
- Newsweek, Susanna Schrobsdorff
- returned call only
- ENR, Andrew Wright
- phone line busy

28-29 Aug
- NPR, Emily Baracas,
- John Hall, Al Naomi, Maj Murray Starkel - overall situation

Positive media for the most part. Fox News reported "Corps of Engineers did a miraculous with the levees."
Live video coverage of New Orleans and vicinity at: http://www.wdsu.com/index.html

Rumors reported in St. Bernard Parish are that the Corps, in cohorts with FEMA, blew the levee at Industrial Canal at Tennessee Street to prevent toppling at Orleans. Contacted local TV and WLL radio to help dispel the rumors. The following was emailed:

From: New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Date: Aug. 29, 2005

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers said Monday that reports are untrue that the Corps had created breaches in the hurricane levees. There have been no breaches of the levees by human action of any kind at this point.

If breaching of a levee to release water is required, it would be done only after careful coordination between the Corps of Engineers, levee districts and other local authorities.

At this point, the Corps of Engineers has no confirmed reports of levee breaching or levee failure of any kind during Hurricane Katrina. We are investigating for the possibility of any breaching, and we are also investigating whether levees have been overtopped at any point.

We have confirmed a floodwall failure on the Industrial Canal. The failure occurred on the east bank north of North Claiborne Avenue and south of Florida Avenue. It is about one block long.

We also have a confirmed report that there is no damage to the hurricane levees in Jefferson Parish and that the Jefferson Parish hurricane levees has not been overtopped.

New Orleans District Public Affairs can be reached at .
Crisis Action Team operating temporarily in Vicksburg, MS.

E. Security & Safety

F. Contracting
Spoke with 15 additional CT personnel. All were evacuated. Spoke with MVM contracting and unwatering team members on contracting strategy. Received numerous inquiries from potential vendors. Verbal NTP issued Saturday for two tow boats to support the Dredge Wheeler. Attempting to locate survey contractors with hydographic abilities. (JAB 8-29-05)

G. Resource Management
FCCE
Class 210 funding: $50K

Notified CENWO to process 80 hours of pay for all workers in New Orleans District. Will need to do prior period adjustments on return to work.

The fully burdened labor cost estimate for billets assigned to the various hurricane teams is $62,700 a day.

RAF

H. Engineering
Richard Pinner is located in Baton Rouge and is prepared to deploy on down river inspection. Richard has design experience with St. Bernard Parish and Orleans Parish floodwalls and levees.
Gages: Evaluation of storm surge was hampered by lack of gages and gage failure or not reporting. Also Internet problems also were encountered. Mississippi River gages on rivergages.com were accessed. The Carrollton gage crested at 15.5 feet at 0900. Venice gage was inoperable due to overtopping.

ADCIRC model was functional and helped to indicate water levels where gage data was not available or suspect.

I-walls: Floodwalls were overtopped on the east side of the 17th street Canal and the east side of the IHNC. Sections of wall failed in each area.

Doug Dillion is Engineering Division representative on the unwatering team and is currently deployed in Memphis.

We are inventorying our P&S under design for availability for construction.

CEMVN-ED stands ready to provide engineering support to Memphis and St. Louis Districts for unwatering and remedial flood control repairs and other civil works efforts.

I. Real Estate

Contacted C/Real Estate, Memphis District, to deploy to Port Allen Lock on 31 Aug 05 - they anticipate handling roof mission for FEMA. FEMA will also be located at Port Allen Lock. Memphis RE has received no tasks associated with the unwatering plan.

A. Bunker

The Commander's Reevaluation team moved back to the EOC in the District Headquarters Building.

A. Command and Control

Bunker (located at New Orleans District):
COL Richard P. Wagenaar Commanding

James Walters National Manager

CMT (located at Vicksburg District):
MAJ Murray P. Starkel Deputy Commander

Herbert "Joey" Wagner National Disaster Manager

A. Field Officers

Mike Lowe
Smith, Jeff

From: Robinson, Tony  
Sent: Thursday, September 15, 2005 10:38 PM  
To: Smith, Jeff

On 8/31/05 at 0130 verbal notification was given to provision buses. The first tasker was for 455 buses.

Tony Robinson  
Response and Recovery Division Director  
DHS-FEMA Region VI  
Office:  
Fax:  
email:  

This communication, along with any attachments, is covered by federal and state law governing electronic communications and may contain confidential and legally privileged information. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, use or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this in error, please reply immediately to the sender and delete this message. Thank you.

9/19/2005
From: john.jordan
Sent: Sunday, September 04, 2005 10:33 AM
To: Michael D; Brown, Michael D; russel.honore; russel.honore; thomas.thompson; thomas.thompson; WIninger Walter E COL USA USNORTHCOM DCE; ronald.rose; christian.degraaf; christian.degraaf
Cc: Update - 4 SEP AM - LNO to PFO
Subject: Card for <John.jordan>

Update from FEMA PFO - 4 SEP2005 (AM)

- PFO Staff has increased in size significantly and is rapidly gaining situational awareness and is working issues.
- JFCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters personnel have arrived (approx 40 pax) and is now assisting JFO-LA and PFO staff in their operations.
- Some notes from this morning's update from JFO-LA:
  - JTF-K is establishing pickup points throughout city of New Orleans and is establishing regular bus service to these locations to facilitate rapid evacuation of the city. Police and military are delivering evacuees to these sites.
  - 3 hospitals/clinics in New Orleans are now able to begin taking patients again and JFO is working plan to shift some immediate care to these facilities, although mandatory evacuation of city continues.
  - All Hospitals in New Orleans are cleared of patients (reported by us last night, but reiterated for emphasis, given news reporting to contrary).
  - Evacuations continued throughout night - total of 2287 evacuated between 031800-040600. Total evacuations now at 61K according to JTF-K.
  - Priority for evacuation is now Algiers - 3000 pax at that location. Began evac operation at 0730R and will finish at 1630R.
  - Convention Center and Superdome are now locked - no further evacuations from this area, although some evacuees moving to these locations have been identified and are being addressed.
  - Search and Rescue reports significantly less evacuees on rooftops and therefore a reduced requirement for airdrops of water and food.
  - JTF-K is now able to handle calls for evacuation support. For example, call came in last night to evac 60 nursing home residents. JTF-K dispatched vehicles with security and addressed this requirement.
  - JFO is focused on assessing and addressing needs for commodities and evac of St. Bernard Parish. FEMA has personnel on the ground at that location.
  - MREs arrived last night - FEMA has 18 trucks loaded now (approx 21K cases each). Will receive 1.9M meals tonight (over 150K cases). Appears that flow is now sufficient to meet all needs.
  - Sheltering is being addressed by tiger team today. Issue is establishment of local shelter's facilities to allow in state relocation at some future point.
  - Key Point. Appears State is reluctant to execute a true mandatory evacuation - i.e. forced if necessary. Therefore, State is pushing for shelters (includes all life support) in city to house citizens that will not leave voluntarily.
  - Major issue working from State. New Orleans has requested, according to PFO, a complete replacement of city services for New Orleans, to include Police and Fire. Exact details are sketchy, but this issue is being worked very hard by PFO and FEMA National is very engaged in this discussion.

NOTE: JFO-LA will move to permanent headquarters tomorrow, 5 SEP. Plan being worked to ensure no degradation of operational capability.
From: john.jordan
Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 9:13 PM
To: john.yingling, joseph.inge, mark.graham, Brown, Michael D; Brown, Michael D; O'Bryan, Stewart M; RDM; russell.horne
Cc: MAJ Kraig Sheetz; christian.degraf; ronald.rose; thomas.thompson; Winlinger Walter E COL USA USNORTHCOM DCE
Subject: Update from MIL ASST to PFO
Attachments: Card for <john.jordan2>

Sir,

See attached update from PFO. We are trying to improve our format to make it a bit easier to read. Will still be Blackberry Friendly.

v/r
John J. Jordan
COL, U.S. Army

Update from Principal Federal Official (PFO) Military Assistants

5 SEP 2005 (PM)

1. Information from 1800 FCO-LA Update Brief

   a. Rescue and Evacuation.
      - Governor Blanco has decided not to force any evacuations in New Orleans. Residents are still encouraged to evacuate.
      - Buses were sent through NO on previously identified evac routes today and no additional residents would board buses for voluntary evacuation. It appears that the evacuation phase of operations is winding down, or may be completed.

   b. Commodity Distribution
      - Since NO is not being fully evacuated, requirements now exist to provide all commodities to the remaining population. Since FEMA did not anticipate reversal of decision for mandatory evacuation, crisis-action planning is now underway to provide this support.
      - Special note: Porta-potties ordered for support of Superdome and Convention Center (when full of evacuees) arrived today. This will provide some relief to the residents remaining in NO.
      - Logistics reported zero balance on MREs again – after pushing all remaining stocks to PODs. Will attempt to determine daily requirement and ascertain whether stocks of MREs are simply collecting at points outside the LSA at Camp Beauregard. Numbers of MREs pushed has increased each day and it is not clear whether we are tracking and meeting requirements, or simply pushing everything forward.

   c. Medical
      - DMAT went to outlying Parishes (St. Charles and Tangany) and conducted assessments. No major medical facility issues, but medical supply is a critical requirement. Issue is being addressed by HRS (ESP-8).
      - Full DMAT support will be provided to Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes tomorrow. Includes provisions for medical care, medical supply, etc. to support fatigued medical providers in those locations.
      - DMAT continues to assess ability to bring hospitals in the 13 impacted
d. Mortuary
- Plan for collecting and processing remains was presented by Mortuary Tiger Team to State HHS leadership but no decision was made.
- Meeting was held today between DMORT, 82nd ABN, State F&K, Urban Search and Rescue, and USCG to address roles and responsibilities for house to house search for survivors and/or remains.
- DMORT currently has 472 Mortuary Affairs Officers and Type I, II and III Recovery Teams available. Major increase since yesterday's report.

e. Security
- ESF-12 (DOE) brought up issue of security at refineries. Exxon Refinery in St. Bernard Parish specifically requested assistance with security. Action was passed to State for their consideration.

f. Sheltering
- State has still not identified location to replace previously planned shelter location at Camp Minden, LA. FEMA remains ready to be in immediate work once location is identified. Major issue that needs high-level attention to maximize use of time and available other resources.

g. Recovery
- Community Relations Teams are in place in the eight most impacted Parishes, as prioritized by the State of Louisiana. CRTs will expand into other five Parishes beginning tomorrow. Teams are also being deployed to remote sheltering locations in States outside Louisiana to answer evacuees questions and provide FEMA authorized assistance.
- State requested assistance with facility to house NO City Government. Idea included an afloat location (quarter boat / deck boat) near Algiers.

2. Current PFO activities.

a. Staff is establishing itself at new PFO/JFO location and continues to build situational awareness.
b. Deputy PFO is increasing PFO staff size to accommodate scope of mission requirements. Expect some additional personnel to arrive in next few days. New hard site JFO will facilitate staff expansion.
c. Primary focus will be building a better awareness of JFO-Mississippi situation and establishing an operational rhythm to improve situational awareness and enhance ability to provide PFO with best possible decisional information.

3. Focus of PFO for 24-72 Hours.
- Continue house to house search for survivors and remains.
- Continue to work toward sheltering decision and preparation of shelter plan.
- Complete expansion into outlying Parishes to establish FEMA presence and basic life sustenance.
- Continue improvement of logistics system.

4. Miscellaneous.

a. Our office is up and running at new PFO facility at 15th Avenue and Florida Street in Baton Rouge, LA. It is located on the second floor in the PFO Suite immediately across from Mr. Brown's office. Phone is . Cell numbers remain same.

b. Good visit today by POTUS - visited State EOC and held discussions will all key leaders at local, state and federal levels. Mr. Chertoff completed his 2-day visit today as well.

c. RADM O'Bryan, SJFHQ from JFCOM briefed Mr. Brown today on their capabilities and recommendations for use to facilitate ongoing FEMA operations. Mr. Brown approved concept brief and directed execution. SJFHQ tasks are to provide the PFO and all subordinate FEMA elements with a common operating picture and to suggest improvements in processes to support better situational awareness and information flow throughout the FEMA structure. Agreed focus was current operations, not long-range planning.
e. Order from JTF-K indicates that JTF-NORTHCOM mission has changed. They will not move to Baton Rouge to support FEMA long-range planning. Will work with RADM O'Bryan (SJFEC-GFCOM) to see if he recommends expansion of his focus to support FEMA long-range planning.
Sir,

Our update for this morning.

v/r
John
John J. Jordan
COL, U.S. Army

Update from Principal Federal Official (PFO) Military Assistants

6 SEP 2005 (AM)

1. Information from 0600 FCO-LA Update Brief

   a. Rescue and Evacuation.
      - Decision by Governor Blanco to not force any evacuations in New Orleans
        remains in place.
      - Mayor of New Orleans is not forcing evacuations in NO and is not
        prohibiting residents from returning. Residents are still strongly encouraged
        to evacuate.
      - Limited bus circuits through NO will continue to evacuate residents who did
        not previously decide to evacuate. Major evacuation operations are completed and all
        evacuee collection points have been cleared.

   b. Commodity Distribution
      - As reported last SITREP, since NO is not being fully evacuated,
        requirements exist to provide all commodities to the remaining population. FEMA is
        focused on that effort today.
      - Major push today to develop lines of supply to all outlying Parishes. Task
        Force Pelican establishment of National Guard operations in these locations will greatly
        facilitate POD operations and provide better C2 of commodity distribution.

   c. Medical
      - Animal disease assessment and environmental assessment beginning today in
        Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes.
      - Continuing medical assessment and beginning medical re-supply in St.
        Charles Parish today.
      - Medical assessment in all 13 impacted Parishes continues and is expected to
        be complete in 48 hours.
      - CDC experts in environmental and occupational health arrive today to assist
        State and FEMA in their areas of expertise.

   d. Mortuary
      - Meeting today at 1000 hours among all interested parties to address body
collection and mortuary operations.
- Advance Party from 54 QM CO (Mortuary Affairs) is on the ground. Expect deployment of main body on 8 SEP.

e. Security
- State reports all Parishes secure except Orleans. Expect Orleans to be secure in next 24 hours.

f. Sheltering
- Sheltering remains a major priority of FCO-LA.
- Movement of evacuees from Astrodome in Houston to 2 cruise ships in Galveston, TX area is beginning today. Third cruise ship will arrive Thursday vic Mobile, AL.

g. Recovery
- POTUS directed that a FEMA representative will be placed in every shelter to facilitate contact with evacuees. FCO goal is to accomplish this mission NLT Thursday. Larger shelters outside LA are being addressed by FEMA headquarters in Washington through the FEMA region offices.
- FEMA is working a national information campaign to contact evacuees and residents of impacted area to provide contact information and being process of relief and assistance to entitled persons and businesses.

2. Current PFO activities.

a. Staff is establishing itself at new PFO/JFO location and continues to build situational awareness.

b. Deputy PFO is increasing PFO staff size to accommodate scope of mission requirements. Expect some additional personnel to arrive in next few days. New hard site JFO will facilitate staff expansion.

c. Primary focus is building a better awareness of JFO-Mississippi situation and establishing an operational rhythm to improve situational awareness and enhance ability to provide PFO with best possible decisional information.

3. PFO Focus Areas, as established in 0900 Executive Conference today:
- Evacuation
- House to House Searches
- Body Recovery Operations and Disaster Mortuary Services
- Assistance to Outlying Parishes
- Issue of non-enforcement of mandatory evacuation order - way ahead and ultimate end state.
- Public Health and Environment

4. Miscellaneous.

a. Our office is up and running at new PFO facility at 15th Avenue and Florida Street in Baton Rouge, LA. It is located on the second floor in the PFO Suite immediately across from Mr. Brown's office. Phone is 123456. Cell numbers remain same.

b. As previously reported, Mr. Chertoff directed establishment of a FEMA Deputy PFO-Forward in New Orleans to assist Mr. Brown's FEMA operations within this severely damaged city. Director will be VADM Allen, Vice Commandant of the USCG. Key to note that Mr. Brown remains PFO for the entire disaster area, including New Orleans and its environs - DoD needs to understand this FEMA organizational structure.

e. Orders indicate deployment of an Army SAMS cell from Fort Leavenworth to join SFJFO and assist in their support to FEMA PFO/JFO. ADM O'Bryan is aware of this deployment and will C2 this cell.
Evacuation began Wednesday afternoon for special needs patients and four buses of general population. Resumed on Thursday morning.

Number of people evacuated from Super Dome:
- 1500 Special Needs patients
- 2000 plus general pop.

Arrived at Superdome:
- 21 Buses with 2500 plus folks

10 Additional buses have notified the Astrodome that they are inbound.
Evac stopped last night due to darkness and shooting. Resumed this morning.
We do not have a confirmed number of total buses involved. Working this now.
WHEREAS, the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, R.S. 29:721, et seq., confers upon the governor of the state of Louisiana emergency powers to deal with emergencies and disasters, including those caused by fire, flood, earthquake or other natural or man-made causes, to ensure that preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with such emergencies or disasters, and to preserve the lives and property of the citizens of the state of Louisiana;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005, a state of emergency was declared and is currently in effect;

WHEREAS, R.S. 29:724(D)(4) provides that the governor, subject to any applicable requirements for compensation, may commandeer or utilize any private property if she finds it necessary to cope with the disaster or emergency;

WHEREAS, there is an immediate need for mass transportation to move citizens to shelters and other safe locations from disaster areas; and

WHEREAS, given the current exigent circumstances, buses are the most reasonable and practical mode of mass transportation to move our citizens to safety;

NOW THEREFORE, KATIEEN WABINEAUX BLANCO, Governor of the state of Louisiana, by virtue of the authority vested by the Constitution and laws of the state of Louisiana, do hereby order and direct as follows:

SECTION 1: Each Superintendent of Education for each school district in Louisiana that remains substantially operational following the passage of Hurricane Katrina shall contact the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness at 225-925-3916 and provide an inventory of school buses and bus drivers in their district;

SECTION 2: As determined by the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, such buses shall be made available to be used as necessary for the mass transportation of Hurricane Katrina evacuees, accompanying law enforcement personnel, and necessary supplies to and from areas of concern to areas of safety;

SECTION 3: The Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness is hereby authorized to commandeer and utilize such buses for such purposes;

SECTION 4: Each Superintendent of Education for each school district in Louisiana that remains substantially operational following the passage of Hurricane Katrina shall coordinate with local law enforcement agencies and peace officers to ensure that at least one peace officer ride in each bus and at least two marked law enforcement vehicles accompany every ten buses;

SECTION 5: The Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness shall make efforts to work with the superintendents and local boards of education to minimize interruption of regular transportation of students;

SECTION 6: La. R.S. 17:158, relative to parish and city school boards providing free
transportation to students, is hereby suspended until Sunday, September 25, 2005, unless reinstated sooner; and

SECTION 7: La. R.S. 32:402, relative to the requirement for drivers to secure commercial driver's license (CDL), is hereby suspended until September 25, 2005, unless reinstated sooner. Notwithstanding the above suspension, such drivers must have a valid Louisiana or other valid driver's license of their state of residence.

SECTION 8: Executive Order No. KBB 2005-31, issued on August 31, 2005, is hereby rescinded and terminated.

SECTION 9: This Order is effective upon signature and shall continue in effect until amended, modified, terminated, or rescinded by the governor, or terminated by operation of law.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand officially and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of Louisiana, at the Capitol, in the city of Baton Rouge, on this 2nd day of September, 2005.

/S/ Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
GOVERNOR OF LOUISIANA

ATTEST BY
THE GOVERNOR

/S/ Al Ater
SECRETARY OF STATE
Andy is asking that we make special note of bus services being offered by our callers, for potential use in both evacuations from New Orleans and movement of victims between shelters.

In order to facilitate bus coordination, we need to evaluate the legitimacy of the bus services being offered. To do so, ask the following questions:

--- How many people can the bus hold?
--- Where is the bus currently located?
--- Is the driver an experienced, professional bus driver?
--- Will you have any additional assistance available on the bus for the sick or those with special needs?
--- When is the bus available, and for how long?
--- What is the fuel capacity of the bus, and what mileage per gallon does it cover?

Finally, ensure that the caller will arrange to have at least two local law enforcement agents (i.e. sheriff's deputies) traveling on the bus. They should not expect for us to provide law enforcement, but the safety situation here is obviously uncertain.

For now, we will follow the same protocol that we have to this point—the staff at the workforce commission will collect and prioritize bus service offers from us. Please ensure that tomorrow they receive any offers you have collected tonight. Put the callers on standby for a return call as soon as we can ID specific bus service needs.

Thanks,
Miles
From: Jones, Gary
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 6:03 AM
To: Craig, Daniel; Buikema, Edward
Cc: Lowder, Michael; Lokey, William; Wells, Scott; Robinson, Tony
Subject: LA evacuees going to Houston

Ed and Dan, I assume you both know of the plan to move LA evacuees to the Houston Astro Dome. I just got a call from Scott Wells and he said the Gov of LA has not approved this plan. Jack Colley just advised me that Gov Perry has not received a call from Gov Blanco regarding this plan. Jack said he heard that she was going to make the call early this morning, again this has not happened. Jack advised me again that this is going to be a tremendous expense for the State of Texas and FEMA should declare at least an emergency declaration for his state. I know you both are busy but I wanted to keep you in the loop on what I know at this time.

Gary
From: Rhode, Patrick
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 6:07 AM
To: Brown, Michael D
Subject: Fw:

----Original Message----
From: Lowder, Michael <Michael.Lowder@...>
To: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@...>; Buikema, Edward <Edward.Buikema@...>;
'Ken.Burris@...' <Ken.Burris@...>
CC: 'brooks.altshuler@...' <brooks.altshuler@...>
Sent: Fri Sep 02 22:55:53 2005
Subject: RE:

This is flat wrong! We have been flying planes all afternoon and evening.

----Original Message----
From: Rhode, Patrick
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 10:43 PM
To: Buikema, Edward; Lowder, Michael; 'Ken.Burris@...'
CC: 'brooks.altshuler@...'
Subject: Fw:

----Original Message----
From: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@...>
To: 'patrick.rhode@...' <Patrick.Rhode@...> Altshuler, Brooks
<Brooks.Altshuler@...>
Sent: Fri Sep 02 22:37:56 2005
Subject:

Spoke to Mineta and Cino. ATA has arranged for commercial air carriers to ferry evacuees. United, Delta, etc. But, no action from us. Carriers will withdraw planes if not used. If we're not we should let carriers know why, etc. Please get me info or call Cino asap.

Hope this is the last of these I send and we can have the cell down here handle.

Also, be aware that Gen H is going into the convention center tonight to secure it - room by room, remove bodies etc. We've kept quiet so media won't be around.
From: Hill, Ken

Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 8:22 PM

To: Jackson, Michael (DepSec); Brown, Michael <DHS>; Hale, Janet; McQueary, Charles; Stephan, Bob; Beardsworth, Randy; Perry, Phil; Collins, Thomas; Divine, Robert C; Basham, W; Mayor, Matt; Lockwood, Thomas

Cc: Wood, John (COS); Cannatti, Ashley; Boudreaux, Chad; Rhode, Patrick; Filler, Joshua; Richmond, Susan; Maner, Andrew; Tambone, Victor; Ressler, Shila; Kiska, Jennifer; IAIPExecSec; Armstrong, Sue; Woods, Keshia; Pultz, Rick; Hehr, Casey; Paar, Tom; Woodard, Steven; Heinlein, Elaine; Wall, Kenneth; Weber, Scott; Mandelker, Sigal; Isles, Adam; DHS ExecSec; Wiley, Miles; Sullivan, Timothy (Adm.); Alshuler, Brooks; Ayers, Dana; Shea, Robert F

Subject: Hurricane Katrina - Designation of Principal Federal Official

Attachments: Designation of Principal Federal Official for Hurricane Katrina - Internal DHS memo.pdf

Attached please find a memo from Secretary Chertoff declaring Hurricane Katrina an "Incident of National Significance" and designating U/S Michael Brown as the Principal Federal Official (PFO).
Catastrophic Incident Annex

Coordinating Agency:
Department of Homeland Security

Cooperating Agencies:
All Federal departments and agencies (and other organizations) with assigned primary or supporting Emergency Support Function (ESF) responsibilities

Introduction

Purpose

• The Catastrophic Incident Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP-CIA) establishes the context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident.

• A more detailed and operationally specific NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) that is designated “For Official Use Only” will be approved and published independently of the NRP Base Plan and annexes.

Scope

• A catastrophic incident, as defined by the NRP, is any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic incident could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. All catastrophic incidents are Incidents of National Significance. These factors drive the urgency for coordinated national planning to ensure accelerated Federal/national assistance.

• Recognizing that Federal and/or national resources are required to augment overwhelmed State, local, and tribal response efforts, the NRP-CIA establishes protocols to preidentify and rapidly deploy key essential resources (e.g., medical teams, urban search and rescue teams, transportable shelters, medical and equipment caches, etc.) that are expected to be urgently needed/required to save lives and contain incidents.

• Accordingly, upon designation by the Secretary of Homeland Security of a catastrophic incident, Federal resources—organized into incident-specific “packages”—deploy in accordance with the NRP-CIS and in coordination with the affected State and incident command structure.

Policies

• The NRP-CIA strategy is consistent with NRP and National Incident Management System protocols and Incident Command System conventions.

• Only the Secretary of Homeland Security or designee may initiate implementation of the NRP-CIA.

• All deploying Federal resources remain under the control of their respective Federal department or agency during mobilization and deployment.
• Federal resources arriving at a Federal mobilization center or staging area remain there until requested by State/local incident command authorities, when they are integrated into the incident response effort.

• Federal assets unilaterally deployed in accordance with the NRP-CIS do not require a State cost-share. However, in accordance with the Stafford Act, State requests for use of deployed Federal assets may require cost-sharing.

• Unless it can be credibly established that a mobilizing Federal resource identified in the NRP-CIS is not needed at the catastrophic incident venue, that resource deploys.

• The occurrence or threat of multiple catastrophic incidents may significantly reduce the size, speed, and depth of the Federal response. If deemed necessary or prudent, the Federal Government may reduce the availability or allocation of finite resources when multiple venues are competing for the same resources, or hold certain resources in reserve in case of additional incidents.

Situation

Incident Condition: Normal procedures for certain ESFs may be expedited or streamlined to address the magnitude of urgent requirements of the incident. All ESFs must explore economies of scale to maximize utilization and efficiency of scarce resources. In the case of catastrophic incident, it is expected that the Federal Government or other national entities provide expedited assistance in one or more of the following areas:

• Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services (ESF #6): The ability to provide temporary shelter, food, emergency first aid, clothing, and other essential life support to people may be complicated by contaminated resources or facilities.

• Urban Search and Rescue (ESF #9): Resources and personnel to perform operational activities (e.g., locating, extricating, and providing onsite medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures) are limited. If search and rescue operations are required in areas of contamination, the limited availability of properly equipped resources supports or underscores the need for prompt Federal response.

• Decontamination (ESF #8 and #10): Incidents involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) may require decontamination of casualties, evacuees, animals, equipment, buildings, critical infrastructure, and other areas. Given the potentially large numbers of casualties and evacuees, resulting decontamination requirements may quickly outstrip local and State capabilities.

• Public Health and Medical Support (ESF #8): There is a significant need for public health and medical support, including mental health services. Medical support is required not only at medical facilities, but at casualty evacuation points, evacuation shelters, and other locations to support field operations. In addition, any contamination requirement increases the requirement for technical assistance.

• Medical Equipment and Supplies (ESF #8): Shortages of available supplies of preventive and therapeutic pharmaceuticals and qualified medical personnel to administer available prophylaxis are likely. Timely distribution of prophylaxis may forestall additional illnesses, and reduce the impact of disease among those already exposed.

• Casualty and Fatality Management and Transportation (ESF #8): Federal resources may be required to manage the transportation and storage of deceased, injured, and exposed victims if their numbers are extremely high. In addition, the immense numbers of casualties are likely to overwhelm the bed capacities of local and State medical facilities.

• Public Information (ESF #15): When State and local public communications channels are overwhelmed during a catastrophic incident, the Federal Government must immediately provide...
resources to assist in delivering clear and coherent public information guidance and consistent messages to the affected areas.

Planning Assumptions

- A catastrophic incident results in large numbers of casualties and/or displaced persons, possibly in the tens of thousands.

- The Secretary of Homeland Security designates the event an Incident of National Significance and directs implementation of the NRP-CIA.

- A catastrophic mass casualty/mass evacuation incident triggers a Presidential disaster declaration, immediately or otherwise.

- The nature and scope of the catastrophic incident may include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive attacks, disease epidemics, and major natural or manmade hazards.

- Multiple incidents may occur simultaneously or sequentially in contiguous and/or noncontiguous areas. Some incidents, such as a biological WMD attack, may be dispersed over a large geographic area, and lack a defined incident site.

- A catastrophic incident may occur with little or no warning. Some incidents, such as rapid disease outbreaks, may be well underway before detection.

- The incident may cause significant disruption of the area’s critical infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, telecommunications, and public health and medical systems.

- The response capabilities and resources of the local jurisdiction (to include mutual aid from surrounding jurisdictions and response support from the State) may be insufficient and quickly overwhelmed. Local emergency personnel who normally respond to incidents may be among those affected and unable to perform their duties.

- A detailed and credible common operating picture may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours (or longer) after the incident. As a result, response activities must begin without the benefit of a detailed or complete situation and critical needs assessment.

- Federal support must be provided in a timely manner to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe damage. This may require mobilizing and deploying assets before they are requested via normal NRP protocols.

- Large-scale evacuations, organized or self-directed, may occur. More people initially are likely to flee and seek shelter for attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents than for natural events. The health-related implications of an incident aggrivate attempts to implement a coordinated evacuation management strategy.

- Large numbers of people may be left temporarily or permanently homeless and may require prolonged temporary housing.

- A catastrophic incident may produce environmental impacts (e.g., persistent chemical, biological, or radiological contamination) that severely challenge the ability and capacity of governments and communities to achieve a timely recovery.

- A catastrophic incident has unique dimensions/characteristics requiring that response plans/strategies be flexible enough to effectively address emerging needs and requirements.

- A catastrophic incident may have significant international dimensions. These include potential impacts on the health and welfare of border community populations, cross-border trade, transit, law enforcement coordination, and other areas.

- If the incident is the result of terrorism, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) level likely may be raised regionally, and perhaps nationally. Elevation of the HSAS level carries additional local, State, and Federal security enhancements that may affect the availability of certain response resources.
Concept of Operations

Local and State Response: Local and State response operations and responsibilities are covered in the NRP and the NRP-CIS. This annex addresses the proactive Federal response to be taken in anticipation of or following a catastrophic incident to rapidly provide critical resources to assist and augment State, local, and tribal response efforts.

Federal Response

- In accordance with NRP provisions for proactive Federal response to catastrophic incidents, the NRP-CIA employs an expedited approach to the provision of Federal resources to save lives and contain the incident.

- Guiding principles for a proactive Federal catastrophic incident response include the following:
  - The primary mission is to save lives, protect property and critical infrastructure, contain the event, and protect the national security;
  - Standard procedures outlined in the NRP regarding requests for assistance may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances, temporarily suspended in the immediate aftermath of an incident of catastrophic magnitude, pursuant to existing law;
  - Preidentified Federal response resources are mobilized and deployed, and, if required, begin emergency operations to commence life-safety activities; and
  - Notification and full coordination with States occur, but the coordination process should not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and deployment of critical Federal resources.
  - Upon recognition that a catastrophic incident condition (e.g., involving mass casualties and/or mass evacuation) exists, the Secretary of Homeland Security immediately designates the event an Incident of National Significance and begins, potentially in advance of a formal Presidential disaster declaration, implementation of the NRP-CIA. Upon notification from the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) that the NRP-CIA has been implemented, Federal departments and agencies:
    - Take immediate actions to activate, mobilize, and deploy incident-specific resources in accordance with the NRP-CIS;
    - Take immediate actions to protect life, property, and critical infrastructure under their jurisdiction, and provide assistance within the affected area;
    - Immediately commence those hazard-specific activities established under the appropriate and applicable NRP Incident Annex(es), including the NRP-CIA; and
    - Immediately commence functional activities and responsibilities established under the NRP ESF Annexes.
  - NRP-CIA actions that the Federal Government takes in response to a catastrophic incident include:
    - All Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross initiate actions to mobilize and deploy resources as planned for in the NRP-CIS;
    - All Federal departments, agencies, and organizations (e.g., the American Red Cross) assigned primary or supporting ESF responsibilities immediately begin implementation of those responsibilities, as appropriate or when directed by the President;
    - Incident-specific resources and capabilities (e.g., medical teams, search and rescue teams, equipment, transportable shelters, preventive and therapeutic pharmaceutical caches, etc.) are activated and prepare for deployment to a Federal mobilization center or staging area near the incident site. The development of site-specific catastrophic incident response strategies (as detailed in
the NRP-CIS) that include the preidentification of incident-specific critical resource requirements and corresponding deployment/employment strategies accelerate the timely provision of critically skilled resources and capabilities;

- Regional Federal facilities (e.g., hospitals) are activated and prepared to receive and treat casualties from the incident area. Federal facilities are directed to reprioritize services (in some cases reducing or postponing certain customary services) until life-saving activities are concluded. The development of site-specific catastrophic incident response plans that include the preidentification of projected casualty and mass care support requirements and potentially available facilities expands the response architecture and accelerates the availability of such resources;

- Supplementary support agreements with the private sector are activated; and

- Given the projected high demand for Federal augmentation support, as well as the potential national security implications of a catastrophic incident, Federal departments and agencies may be asked to redirect efforts from their day-to-day responsibilities to support the response effort.

### Responsibilities

This section summarizes Federal department and agency responsibilities under the NRP-CIA. For a complete listing of Federal department and agency responsibilities under the NRP-CIA, refer to the NRP-CIS, which is designated For Official Use Only and maintained as a separate document. For additional Federal department and agency responsibilities, refer to the individual ESF Annexes and hazard-specific Incident Annexes in the NRP.

**Coordinating Agency: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)**

- Establish that a catastrophic incident has occurred and implement the NRP-CIA.

- Notify all Federal departments and agencies to implement the NRP-CIA and the NRP-CIS.

- Upon implementation of the NRP-CIA:
  - Activate and deploy (or prepare to deploy) DHS-managed teams, equipment caches, and other resources in accordance with the NRP-CIS;
  - Identify, prepare, and operationalize facilities critical to supporting the movement and reception of deploying Federal resources;
  - Activate national-level facilities and capabilities in accordance with the NRP-CIS and standard NRP protocols;
  - Establish and maintain communications with incident command authorities to ensure a common and current operating picture regarding critical resource requirements. As specific resource requirements are identified, advise the Department of Transportation to reprioritize and adjust accordingly the schedule of execution for resource flow in the NRP-CIS; and
  - Make every attempt to establish contact with the impacted State(s) to coordinate the employment of Federal resources in support of the State.

### Cooperating Agencies

- When notified by the HSOC that the Secretary of Homeland Security has implemented the NRP-CIA, Federal departments and agencies (and the American Red Cross):
  - Activate and deploy (or prepare to deploy) agency- or ESF-managed teams, equipment caches, and other resources in accordance with the NRP-CIS;
• Commence ESF responsibilities as appropriate;
• Commence assessments of the probable consequences of the incident and projected resource requirements; and
• Commence development of shorter and longer term response and recovery strategies.

The NRP-CIS provides a list of the specific actions that are initiated upon activation of the NRP-CIA. The following Federal departments and agencies and other organizations are assigned specific responsibilities as cooperating agencies:

- Department of Agriculture
- Department of Defense
- Department of Energy
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of Transportation
- Department of Veterans Affairs
- Environmental Protection Agency
- American Red Cross

Departments and agencies assigned primary responsibility for one or more functional response areas under the NRP-CIS appendixes are identified below.

- **Mass Care:** American Red Cross
- **Search and Rescue:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Decontamination:** Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Health and Human Services
- **Public Health and Medical Support:** Department of Health and Human Services
- **Medical Equipment and Supplies:** Department of Health and Human Services

- **Patient Movement:** Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Defense
- **Mass Fatality:** Department of Health and Human Services
- **Housing:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Public and Incident Communications:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Transportation:** Department of Transportation
- **Private-Sector Support:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Logistics:** Department of Homeland Security
### Summary:

Marty Bahamonde of FEMA Public Affairs made two aerial over flights of the New Orleans area the afternoon of Monday, August 29, 2005. As additional information becomes available it will be reported.

He concluded the two immediate major problems would be:

1. Access to the city because roads are flooded to the north and east.
2. Housing

His observations include the following:

- The I-10 Twin Span bridges to the east of the City to Slidell are compromised in both directions for a stretch of five to seven miles. On the east side bridge sections are gone, on the west side bridge sections are buckled and askew.
- There is no way to enter New Orleans from the east. Highway 11 appears generally in fact but is under water where it enters the City and will require some repair but appears to be a quick fix.
- The western I-10/I-610 junction connecting Jefferson and Orleans Parish is under water.
- Entrance from the north is not possible because as roads get into the city, they are under water.
- I-10 to the west appears to have several underwater sections.
- The Airline Highway by the airport is above water.
- There is a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to flow into the City.
- The levee in Metairie is in fact.
- Only one of the main pumps is reported to still be working but cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful.
- In the neighborhoods there are many small fires where natural gas lines have broken.
- Flooding is greatest in the north and east in New Orleans, Metairie.
and north towards Slidell – an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water.

- The flights did not go all the way north to Slidell so conditions there are not reported.
- Some homes were seen with water to the first floor and others completely underwater.
- Hundreds of people were observed on the balconies and roofs of a major apartment complex in the city. The location has been provided to City officials.
- Downtown there is less flooding. Most buildings have windows blown out but otherwise appear structurally sound.
- West and South of the City appear dry.
- Lake Front Airport by Lake Pontchartrain is under water.
- There is an oil tanker grounded in the Industrial Canal – two tugs were observed working with the ship.
- The Coast Guard reported two other tankers aground but they were not observed.
- The Coast Guard is flying rescue missions for people stuck on roofs. They reported seeing about 150 people but also said that as they lifted people out, they saw others breaking through the roofs of adjacent homes.
- The Coast Guard will use night vision devices and continue rescue missions into the night.
- Search and Rescue will need boats, in some locations high wheeled trucks may be usable. FEMA USR Teams are coordinating boat use with Louisiana Fish and Game officials.
- The City reports about 300 people have been rescued by boat so far. These rescue operations will continue through the night.
- Boat traffic is not restricted and movement of supplies by boat and barge is feasible.
- The Inter Harbor Canal is not visible.
- A few bodies were seen floating in the water and Coast Guard pilots also reported seeing bodies but there are no details on locations or numbers.

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<th>Significance:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Actions/Follow-Up: N/A</td>
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<td>Miscellaneous:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepared By: Mathew Thompson NRCC Planning Section Analyst</td>
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September 15, 2003

Secretary Tom Ridge
Department of Homeland Security
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for taking the time to meet with me Friday regarding grant consolidation and the overall preparedness strategy of the Department. My sole motivation regarding these topics is to ensure that you have the benefit of all perspectives during your decision making process. As I mentioned in our conversation, decisions regarding grants and preparedness will have a substantial impact upon the future mission of FEMA. Regardless of your final decision, I will have one reaction. I will support and apply all necessary assets and manpower to implement your decision.

I believe the following proposals present a unique opportunity to achieve a tremendous success for both the Department and the Administration. Undoubtedly, individuals within and outside the Department will raise concerns regardless of your ultimate decision. Through your leadership and a focused effort to answer these concerns, I am confident these proposed actions will not only placate the detractors, but will ultimately gain their praise when the advantages to the first responder and the preparedness of the nation are revealed.

The proponents of moving grant programs and FEMA’s preparedness mission to the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination (OSLGC) describe the reorganization as an effective way to consolidate preparedness and grants responsibilities to achieve an effective, Department-wide, terrorism preparedness initiative or a “one-stop shop”.

In reality, their proposed action does not consolidate grants or preparedness initiatives. The proposal would still result in a bifurcation of these functions within the Department. There will still be congressionally mandated all-hazards grant and preparedness programs within EP&R. Additionally, the proposed move would ignore the painful lesson FEMA learned years ago during the 1985 Pennsylvania tornadoes and Hurricane Andrew that the separation of the preparedness mission from the response mission inevitably leads to an ineffective and uncoordinated response. These realities shaped President Bush’s proposal for EP&R and reinforce my continuing belief that the only way to truly consolidate these programs within the Department is to consolidate both the grant and preparedness programs within EP&R by moving ODP to FEMA.
This proposal is consistent with the National Strategy for Homeland Security. It directly tracks several of President Bush’s priorities in his proposed legislation for the Department. The proposal is also consistent with the President’s '04 Budget that calls for the transfer of a handful of FEMA grants to ODP. The goal of the President’s budget is the consolidation of grant programs. You can achieve that consolidation and remain consistent with the budget by using the Secretary’s administrative powers to move ODP into EP&R. It is this same logic that allows the move of ODP into OSLGC, as the budget does not address the move of ODP once the proposed grant programs are incorporated into it.

The goal of creating a grants and preparedness “one-stop shop” for the first responder and State and local governments is truly achieved only by moving ODP to EP&R. This move will eliminate potential political liabilities for the Secretary by distancing the Secretary’s office from the operational and decision making role of the disbursement of billions of dollars of highly sought after and contested grant monies. The example of the Fire service’s active lobbying with regards to grant funding and their tensions with other entities competing for limited grant dollars is a primary reason to remove these political liabilities from the direct office of the Secretary. Moving ODP and these functions into an operational directorate provides the Secretary’s office with the appropriate oversight of these programs while removing the direct responsibility of addressing the tensions and criticisms that arise from the first responder community. Simply put, a denial letter comes from an Under Secretary rather than the Office of the Secretary.

President Bush clearly signaled that First Responder Grants belong in EP&R when he proposed the First Responder Initiative in his budget proposal of January 2002. The President later advocated moving ODP to EP&R in his proposed legislation for the Department. The recommendation to move ODP to FEMA received far greater scrutiny and policy review by the President’s senior staff than has the current proposal to move ODP into the OSLGC. In fact, the move to OSLGC has never been formally vetted at the senior staff level within the Department. Additionally, both the President in his proposal and Congress in the Act, clearly indicated that the preparedness mission should reside within the EP&R directorate by including the word ‘preparedness’ in the Directorate’s name and mission.

While the President’s attempts to move ODP were unsuccessful, it is important to note that during the creation of the Department, the President’s legislative strategy was centered on gaining several key and unprecedented management authorities for the Secretary of DHS. This calculated strategy was made knowing that later, these powers could be exercised to achieve many of the President’s unfulfilled legislative priorities. Due to the President’s successful efforts to gain these authorities, you are now in the position to move ODP to EP&R thereby delivering on a key element of the President’s original proposal for the Department.

The precedent setting use of the Secretary’s unique management authorities should be exercised for high-level initiatives so as not to dilute the baseline upon which these
authorities are utilized. Moving ODP and a handful of grants from FEMA to the OSLGC reduces the threshold of these powers. Instead of consolidating all aspects of grants and preparedness within one directorate of the department, it uses the authority to move limited aspects of programs from a division level office to a different support office. This will not result in the sought after Departmental consolidation of preparedness responsibilities. The move of ODP to OSLGC will not solve the fundamental problem of the separation of some preparedness activities (i.e. terrorism preparedness) from the all-hazards preparedness and grant functions of FEMA. The move of ODP to OSLGC will also dilute the future abilities of DHS Secretaries to exercise these unprecedented authorities at the appropriate level and indeed, could further limit your ability to exercise these authorities during your tenure.

FEMA has an existing infrastructure to handle the transfer of ODP that is far more robust in structure, experience, regional presence, and established historical relationships with State and local entities and first responders than that of the OSLGC. Since FEMA’s inception in 1979, it has cultivated an extensive infrastructure enabling effective coordination of emergency preparedness and response through our long-standing relationships with State and local entities. This infrastructure is founded in common efforts among Federal and State entities to coordinate throughout the entire continuum of the emergency management cycle.

FEMA’s relationships with its State and local partners have been formed, maintained, and improved over the course of 111 emergency declarations, 912 major disaster declarations and numerous response operations. Similarly, our decades of operations in these areas is buttressed by a developed financial management system that supports our expertise in grants administration by disbursing a massive amount of awards each year. In FY ’03 alone, FEMA has distributed $5.4 billion in 175,374 awards. This is compared to ODP’s awards of approximately $2.8 billion in 204 awards in FY ’03.

Moving ODP to EP&R will create the full integration of all preparedness functions within one Directorate. ODP will enhance the terrorism delta on FEMA’s solid all-hazards foundation. It will merge ODP’s strong point of law enforcement prevention grants and training functions with FEMA’s solid relationships with fire, EMS, public works, local officials, and emergency managers. Additionally, the move will match ODP’s experience in the mandated state homeland security plans with the strong relationship FEMA has developed with the Governors, mayors, and State and local emergency managers that execute these state plans. The result will be a unified and balanced approach to all preparedness activities.

In my opinion, there is one hurdle that the proposal of moving ODP to EP&R must overcome. A traditional tension between the division of influence between the fire and police services must be addressed. Currently, the fire community opposes moving Fire grants to ODP due to its concern that fire issues will be given a lower priority in the historically law enforcement oriented approach of ODP. Vice versa, moving ODP to EP&R raises similar concerns with the law enforcement community. I believe a
politically viable and beneficial strategy exists for this issue and FEMA can lead its implementation immediately.

To address the concerns of the law enforcement community, I am proposing a reorganization of the Preparedness Division of FEMA. Currently, the U.S. Fire Administrator is the Director of Preparedness. This will raise concerns from the law enforcement community. To address this issue, EP&R will modify the structure of the Preparedness Division to incorporate a Presidentially appointed senior representative and advocate from both the fire and police services. These representatives will serve as the operational Deputy Directors of Preparedness under the newly confirmed Sue Mencer who would be the Director of Preparedness. This will facilitate a unified and balanced approach to the Department’s preparedness activities.

The newly designated Deputy Director of Preparedness and U.S. Fire Administrator would represent the fire services. The newly created Deputy Director of Preparedness and U.S. Law Enforcement Representative would represent law enforcement services. Both of these positions would be filled with proven, experienced, and respected senior officials from their respective service. The creation of these co-equal positions will provide each of the traditional services with an advocate who is recognized as one of their own.

The creation of the U.S. Law Enforcement Representative gives the police services something they have never had within the Federal government. Local police officials have associated their preparedness activities with the Department of Justice. Regardless of the existing perception of ODP representing law enforcement issues, there exists a reality that DOJ/ODP represents the Federal law enforcement views rather than local police interests. The police services have never had one of their ‘own’ representing their issues at the appropriate level of ODP or DOJ. This proposed reorganization of FEMA’s Preparedness Division gives them their own representative. Cops identify with cops, not the FBI.

The USFA representative will focus more on preparedness issues for fire, EMS, and the traditional FEMA constituency. The Police Representative will focus more on preparedness issues relating to prevention and law enforcement. Each of these Deputy Directors should benefit from the expertise of liaisons from IAP, S&T, USCG, USSS, and BTS in order to fully integrate all missions of the Department into a common delivery of a unified, all-hazards preparedness strategy.

If appropriately executed, this strategy will gain the support of first responders, the law enforcement community, and their representatives in Congress.

In light of your administrative powers and the President’s initial proposal, the question is not why should ODP be in EP&R, but rather why should ODP not be in EP&R? In my opinion, no sufficient policy justifications exist to justify the proposition that ODP should not be in EP&R.
While detractors resort to the fact that the President twice unsuccessfully tried to move ODP, they fail to account for the reality that the dynamics behind the Congressional opposition to the move have changed due to committee realignments. Detractors also ignore the fact that you wield Congressionally granted reorganizational authorities that the Executive did not possess during its prior attempts to effectuate the move. Mark Twain once said, “We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it- and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove-lid again- and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one either.”

The transfer of ODP to FEMA will help facilitate the development of a true one-stop shop for first responders. The one-stop shop will consist of a web portal that will include training standards, equipment procurement, training coursework, grant resources, and applications combined into a viable portal that can be utilized by the smallest communities to our largest cities. FEMA’s development of the Compendium of Federal Terrorism Training is the preexisting foundation for the development of a comprehensive, interagency, terrorism training and preparedness portal. Having all preparedness and grant functions in EP&R will enable the Department to streamline its ability to determine training needs; determine responsibility for developing specific training among the Directorates and the federal government in order to fill gaps and avoid duplication; develop and maintain required training; and ensure quality, consistency, and conformity with existing standards.

The backbone of our one-stop shop concept is the development of a National Terrorism Mission-essential Task List (NTMETL). This element is the key to any system that focuses on the needs of the first responder. First responders consistently state that their single biggest need is to have a list of tasks that they can train against. NTMETL will enable the Department to target preparedness efforts by organizing available training and grants in a system that considers the discipline (i.e. public health, law enforcement), scenario (i.e. RDD, communicable bio agent), role (i.e. technician, operations), and tasks (i.e. condition, standard). Adding the delta to this system of the existing training compendium, a standardized equipment list for each task, available grants to help acquire the suggested training and equipment, and an online application will make the system a true “one-stop shop”.

The benefit to the first responder will be the ability for them to have a performance/training roadmap for their emergency personnel, determine training priorities, access course information, contact training providers to schedule training, plan exercises using standardized performance criteria, and apply for grants. The benefit to the Department will be an ability to use empirical data to guide federal training management, tie equipment and grants to key preparedness activities, control training gaps and duplication, and provide an empirical basis to determine the preparedness of the nation as well as determining necessary funds to adequately prepare. Ultimately, we will be able to truly compare a state’s plan to its level of preparedness.
This one-stop shop proposal could be achieved with a series of milestones announced along the way to a complete, operational one-stop shop. The stage of completing the Compendium of Federal Training portion is essentially complete today. The completion of cataloguing available Federal grants can also be achieved in short order. The final element of creating the NTMELT will take more time, but can be achieved in a reasonable period if it is given the right resources and appropriate interagency priority.

To facilitate this effort, I believe it would be extremely helpful if an Executive Order were issued to designate DHS (operational responsibility would be delegated to EP&R) as the lead for this interagency effort. Strong IT contracts supported by an interagency working group comprised of program experts operating under a stringent timeline for deliverables will enable this project to succeed. The inter-agency is already accustomed to EP&R/FEMA acting as the inter-agency coordinator on the Compendium, and will readily embrace this role, too.

The final issue I would like to address is the impact of removing the preparedness mission from FEMA will have on its response mission. Just as grants are so closely linked to preparedness, preparedness is integrally linked to response. It is for this reason that the backbone of FEMA’s responsibilities given to it in the Stafford Act are reflected in the emergency management cycle of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. This cycle forms a chain that should not be broken. Because this cycle guides every action that FEMA takes, it is clear why the agency has organized its four divisions of Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation directly in line with the priorities set out by the cycle. The preparedness function represents an integral pillar of FEMA’s ability to meet the requirements of this rigorous cycle.

The placement of the preparedness mission in the Department is a fundamental question for the future mission of FEMA. Preparedness defines EP&R’s vision of “A Nation Prepared” and drives our mission to lead the Nation to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from major domestic disasters, both natural and manmade, including incidents of terrorism.

Since FEMA’s inception in 1979, it has cultivated an extensive infrastructure enabling the effective coordination of emergency preparedness and response through our long-standing relationships with state and local entities. This infrastructure is founded in common efforts among Federal and State entities to coordinate throughout the entire continuum of the emergency management cycle.

An effective preparedness policy is validated through an increased ability to respond through training, planning, education, guidance, exercises and assessments. Preparedness is fundamentally linked to response, as it is the cornerstone of planning in advance for the response phase of the emergency management cycle. Therefore, we believe that all preparedness functions of the Department should be consolidated into FEMA where the response mission resides.
In the 1980's, FEMA learned the hard way that disjointed efforts between preparedness and response create significant problems in effectively managing disasters. As an example, the 1985 tornado outbreak that affected northwestern Pennsylvania highlighted significant planning and response problems. More recently, as Secretary Card can attest, the lack of a synchronized effort between the preparedness and response missions led to an ineffective response to Hurricane Andrew. It is interesting to note that then, as today, there were competing interests involved in the preparedness mission. Years ago this tension was caused by the separation of resources applied to the preparedness for nuclear war from all-hazards preparedness. Today, the tension is between preparedness for terrorism as opposed to all-hazards.

The Stafford Act, as we know it today, was strongly influenced by the Federal shortcomings in response to the 1985 tornado outbreaks in Pennsylvania. As a result, the Act focused on the need for an all-hazards approach to preparedness and response. The all-hazards approach operates upon the understanding that there is a cycle to emergencies that begins with preparedness and mitigation, flows into response, and ends with recovery. These primary areas or phases of disaster management are inextricably linked. The further preparedness efforts are distanced from the response, recovery, and mitigation duties, the greater the opportunity for disconnects that can result in an ineffective and uncoordinated response.

Moving the preparedness function out of FEMA and into OSLGC would fundamentally sever FEMA from its core functions of supporting first responders, State and local governments and the public. It would shatter agency morale and would completely disconnect the Department's response functions from the responders and governments they are supposed to support. It would break longstanding, effective and tested relationships with the states and first responder stakeholders. The move would also sever effective FEMA training delivery systems that directly train over 1,000,000 first responders each year. The appropriate pairing of the preparedness and response missions in the EP&R directorate compliments emergency management structures at the State and local level. In those structures, the same people responsible for responding to any emergency or disaster, no matter the cause, would be the same people responsible for preparing for it.

The preparedness mission should remain in FEMA. The agency has decades of experience in preparedness, an existing field structure in its regions, and is the Directorate tasked with providing the response to terrorist attacks and natural disasters. The Department does not need to start from scratch by shuffling and recreating preparedness responsibilities within other areas of the Department. FEMA has laid a solid preparedness foundation and the Department should build upon it.

I recognize that these proposals differ significantly from your original thinking. These proposals likewise represent a significant divergence from the original design for a one-stop shop and the role of preparedness within the Department. However, I sincerely
believe that the senior leadership of the Department would readily embrace such bold changes.

I am also convinced that you should exercise your reorganization authorities in such a way that establishes a higher baseline for the future exercise of those authorities, both for yourself and future secretaries. Whatever your decision, the dedicated employees of EP&R/FEMA will work diligently to implement them.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to outline both my concerns and these proposals.

Very truly yours,

Michael D. Brown

cc:
DuncanCampbell
March, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: Michael Chertoff
FROM: Michael D. Brown
SUBJECT: Component Head Meeting

Overview of Component:

Mission:

To lead the Nation to prepare for, to mitigate the effects of, to respond to, and to recover from major domestic disasters, both natural and manmade, including incidents of terrorism.

Key Staff:

Chief of Staff, Patrick Rhode
Deputy Chief of Staff, Scott Morris
Acting Chief Operating Officer, Ken Burris
Policy Director, Brooks Altshuler
National Security Division Director, Reynolds Hoover
Acting Director NIMS Integration Center, Gil Jamieson
Acting Preparedness Division Director, David Garratt
United States Fire Administrator, David Paulison
Acting Response Division Director, Ed Buikema
Recovery Division Director, Dan Craig
Mitigation Division Director, David Maurstad
Summary Budget Information
FEMA Operating Budget
Fiscal Year 2005 (Dollars in Thousands)

- BioDefense, $2,507,776
- Fee Supported, $2,085,742
- Other Non-Discretionary, $487,000
- Disaster Relief Fund, $2,042,380
- Rent, Security & Expenses, $72,889
- Salaries and Benefits, $191,183
- DHS Working Capital Fund, $18,501
- Remaining Operating Budget, $164,643

Supplemental to Disaster Relief Fund, $6,500,000

Total FEMA FY 2005 Budget: $14,070,114 (Dollars in Thousands)
FEMA Budget
Homeland Security (HS) vs. Non-HS
Fiscal Year 2006 President’s Budget
(Dollars in Thousands)

5% Homeland Security
$146,000

95% Non-Homeland Security
$2,988,000

FEMA Activities Designated as "Homeland Security" by OMB:
• National Incident Management System (NIMS) Integration
• Catastrophic Planning
• Medical Surge
• Continuity of Operations (COOP)
• Continuity of Governments (COG)
• National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and NDMS Support
• Noble Training Center Support
• Reimbursement to DOE for Nuclear Incident Response Team Exercises
## Reductions to FEMA Base, FY 2003-2005

Dollars in Thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003</td>
<td>30,600</td>
<td>* Transfers to DHS from FY 2002 un-obligated balances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>* Transfers to DHS from FY 2003 Annual Accounts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,598</td>
<td>* Transfer to BTS (ODP) from FY 2003 Annual Accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21,437</td>
<td>Transfer to IG for audits and investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>Transfer to TSA from Liberty Shield Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$80,135</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total FY 2003 Reductions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>Transfer to IG for audits and investigations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6,779</td>
<td>Charges for DHS Working Capital Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>National Preparedness Transfer to BTS-Office of Domestic Preparedness</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21,000</td>
<td>Reduction to Base – Disaster Relief Fund</td>
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<td></td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>* Reduction to Base – Operating Expenses</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>$90,779</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total FY 2004 Reductions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>11,697</td>
<td>* DHS Mandated Efficiencies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>18,501</td>
<td>Charges for Working Capital Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$30,198</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total Estimated FY 2005 Reductions</strong></td>
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* A total of $77.9 million has been permanently lost from the base. These permanent reductions represent a 14.8 overall decrease in FEMA’s already limited discretionary spending account since joining DHS.

FEMA
## Pre-Decisional Over-Target Requests
### FY 2007-11
Dollars in Millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>FY09</th>
<th>FY10</th>
<th>FY11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rebuild of Base Operating Budget</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Federal Regional Centers - Improvements</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. NETC/Noble Training Center</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. National Response Plan (NRP) Maintenance</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Catastrophic Planning</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Convert National Security Terms to FTE</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Facility Relocations</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>*20.7</td>
<td>*44.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. National Security Special Events</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. National Exercise Support</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td>128.1</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* Spike in Facility Relocations in FY 2008 and 2009 is due to expected FEMA Headquarters relocation.
Management of FEMA Base Budget
FY 2005

- September 2004 - FEMA froze hiring for over 500 positions to assure availability of funding for all on-board staff.

- January 2005 - FEMA issued a staffing baseline with 3,771 full-time positions, including 565 vacancies.

- January 2005 - Guidelines issued requiring case-by-case approval to fill vacancies in Preparedness, Mitigation, Response and Recovery and Administration and Regional Operations appropriations.

- FEMA is now unable to fill 189 vacancies.
Identification of Top Near-Term Management Issues

Most Important Goals

1. Operational Construct

Create and begin implementation of a revised FEMA operational construct that ensures the best utilization of the Nation’s resources when responding to disasters and emergencies. The intent is to examine our conceptual approach to disaster management and develop new approaches that improve effectiveness through re-designed processes. Examples include re-design of our disaster work force, including operational readiness of full-time FEMA staff; tracking and visibility of operational assets; and examination of the proper balance of operational roles between headquarters and regional offices.

2. Logistics Capability and Asset Visibility

Develop and begin implementation of a supportable logistical strategy that effectively and efficiently supports the DHS and FEMA disaster response and recovery requirements, to include: acquisition, deployment, tracking, warehousing, and operation and maintenance of all assets.

3. Catastrophic Planning

Develop and begin implementation of a comprehensive and integrated multi-year catastrophic planning strategy that meets the requirements of FEMA and its partners, and supports implementation of the National Response Plan.

4. National Incident Management System Integration Center (NIC)

Establish a NIC to provide strategic direction for and oversight of the NIMS to ensure a consistent, nationwide approach to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents regardless of cause, size or complexity.

5. Disaster Work Force

Establish and begin implementation of a plan to recruit, train, credential, deploy and retain a disaster workforce with the appropriate skill mix and management structure to support the operational requirements of all disaster related functions.

6. Position Management

Establish and maintain a baseline of all positions in the Agency, and hold managers accountable for developing long-range workforce plans to assure appropriate numbers, skills, and grades of employees to support current and long-term mission needs.
Most Serious Challenges:

1. Preparedness

The preparedness mission is scattered across the Emergency Preparedness & Response Directorate (EP&R), Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP), Public Affairs, and the Headquarters Integration Staff (I-Staff).

The President recommended moving ODP into EP&R in his legislative proposal for the Department. However, the Congress enacted legislation placing ODP within the BTS Directorate.

Recently, the Department missed an opportunity to consolidate the preparedness mission when DHS chose to use its own authorities to move ODP to the newly created OSLGCP. This reorganization has failed to produce tangible results due to the lack of a clearly defined chain of command. The absence of effective leadership in the preparedness mission has further spawned a complete lack of accountability for results. For example, in HSPD-8, the President called for the submission of the National Preparedness Goal with the DHS Fiscal Year 2006 budget submission. The deadline passed and OSLGCP did not submit the preparedness goal.

These recent organizational changes have divided what was intended to be one, all-hazards preparedness mission into two artificially separate preparedness categories of terrorism and natural disasters. DHS has institutionalized the split by dividing the primary responsibilities for each category between the separate organizations of FEMA and ODP. Having two organizations and several other ancillary organizations working on preparedness has bred internal and external confusion.

The DHS Preparedness mission should be centralized in the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate. This recommendation is consistent with The President’s original intent and is consistent with the Act’s direction that the first responsibility of the EP&R Under Secretary is “helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies”.

Moving OSLGCP/ODP to EP&R will create the full integration of all preparedness functions within one directorate. ODP will enhance the terrorism delta on FEMA’s solid all-hazards foundation. Most importantly, the move would reconnect the severed link between preparedness and response within the Department. The link ensures that capabilities and procedures trained will be identical to the capabilities and procedures actually applied during a real event.
2. National Response Plan and other operational planning initiatives

Ambiguity regarding the organizational placement of the National Response Plan (NRP) and other operational planning initiatives needs to be resolved. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned EP&R in Section 502 with,

(3) Providing the Federal Government's response to terrorist attacks and major disasters, including-
   (A) managing such response;
   (B) directing the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the Strategic National Stockpile, the National Disaster Medical System, and...the Nuclear Incident Response Team;
   (C) overseeing the Metropolitan Medical Response System;
   (D) coordinating other Federal response resources in the event of a terrorist attack or major disaster;

(4) Aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters;
(5) building a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal, State, and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond to such attacks and disasters; and
(6) Consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan;

Instead of assigning many of these responsibilities to EP&R, as described in the Act, the former Secretary made the decision to assign these responsibilities to varying departmental entities. For example, the development of the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System was initially assigned to TSA for development. Then after several months, the Secretary again shifted responsibility for NRP/NIMS development to the newly created I-Staff within the immediate office of the Secretary. This decision was consistent with past and subsequent decisions that removed key areas of operational responsibility from line directorates.

Since the completion of the NRP and NIMS, another operational planning function has been created and assigned, outside of EP&R, to the I-Staff. The Operational Planning Integrated Process Team (OPIPT) has been tasked with developing an operational planning approach to maximize DHS preparedness and response capabilities. This effort will center on the development of plans for 16 scenarios developed in conjunction with the HSC. It is still unclear how these plans will be reconciled with the existing Incident Annexes to the NRP, ongoing catastrophic planning at FEMA, and similar planning efforts at DOD and the NCTC. On its face, the assignment and implementation of these efforts outside of the NRP construct appears to contradict the Act’s original intent when it assigned EP&R with “Consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan.”

In addition to the OPIPT’s federal planning responsibilities, there is a proposal to also make OPIPT responsible for planning initiatives at the State and local level. These proposals ignore FEMA’s decades long expertise, relationships, and understanding of the
emergency management system and potentially ignore basic concepts of authority. The
effect of these assignments has been a confused operational framework, and an
implementation strategy that is vexing to staff as well as congressional authorizers and
appropriators.

Since the inception of the Department, responsibilities that the Act delegated and that
FEMA’s mission encompasses, have been assigned to other areas of the Department.
The result has led to confusion and the duplication of mission areas within the
Department. Fundamentally, the continual redelegation of EP&R/ FEMA’s
responsibilities for preparedness, response, and emergency/incident management has
called into question EP&R’s future role and existence within the Department.

Proposals for long-term cross-cutting effectiveness

1. Organization

The management trend since the inception of the department has been to ignore the
statutory roles of the Under Secretaries who are appointed by the President to serve as the
Department’s senior leadership team. The department has failed to enable a leadership
team that works across the department. Instead, DHS created a top-heavy organization
that is led by its staff rather than its leadership.

The department has focused on building org charts: the vertical and horizontal boundaries
of the department; the assembling of tasks into jobs and jobs into departments, and
divisions. However, the department has failed at an equally important element of
organization by excluding any attention to the personal networks that link people
throughout the department and across the department’s boundaries. These networks are
just as important, if not more important, for the execution of the department’s mission.

The lack of these networks, coupled with a skewed allocation of missions and authorities,
have encouraged unfocused empire building in duplicative mission areas rather than
facilitating the development of cohesive strategies to fill the homeland security vacuum
that DHS was created to address. To create personal networks, the leadership of the
department must be part of an environment that facilitates integration. This can be done
by having permanent office space available to the Under Secretaries and their staffs at the
NAC. This will better enable the Under Secretaries to collaborate with the Secretary,
Deputy Secretary, all other Under Secretaries, and their respective staffs. The availability
of collocated space will help create integration through the development of personal
networks at the leadership level. These networks will, in turn, be driven throughout the
respective organizations resulting in increased horizontal integration.

2. Decision Authority

The allocation of decision authority within the department - i.e. what decisions are made
by which people at what levels, with what oversight or review, is dysfunctional. The
formal delegations of authority by the Act have been ignored. Decision making authority
often resides within positions that are outside the span of control of the Under Secretaries who are statutorily responsible for particular missions.

The expectation of Under Secretaries being responsible for the management of their statutory responsibilities has eroded to an operating construct that places much of these responsibilities within newly created and expanded staff organizations such as the I-Staff and the OSLGCP. The executive office staff’s involvement in operational and management areas that are clearly within an Under Secretary’s purview has created conflicts. These conflicts are compounded by the executive office’s track record of continually bringing additional operational responsibilities into the Secretary’s Office rather than pushing them down to the directorates.

The current rationale given for expanding staff organizations is to create integration within DHS. However, these moves create the opposite affect. In an attempt to ‘integrate’, the executive office has merely pulled representatives out of their existing directorates, cut all ties from their home organization’s chain of command, and created yet another layer of bureaucracy. These staff functions are uncoordinated with the directorates and perform duplicative functions that create confusion and organizational tension.
DHS Headquarters Integrated Operations Staff Capability

CONCEPT PAPER
FOR DEPARTMENT LEADERSHIP TEAM REVIEW

January 26, 2004

Pre-decisional working paper
Purpose:

This paper discusses the need for an overarching operations staff capability within the DHS headquarters to bridge the existing gap between integrated threat monitoring and assessment (an HSOC/Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis responsibility) and corresponding integrated operational response activities (fragmented across DHS components and staff offices), on a “steady-state” basis and during contingencies. This gap also includes a lack of an appropriate mechanism to coordinate operational response activities with the interagency, as well as with the HSC/NSC (CSG).

Issue:

DHS headquarters does not have an established mechanism for linking the threat monitoring and assessment functions (in an all-hazards context) with a corresponding integrated operational response function across DHS components and activities. Although DHS headquarters does have an established and validated mechanism for enabling executive decisionmaking during “post-incident” contingency situations (Homeland Security Operations Center/Interagency Incident Management Group/Initial National Response Plan), this mechanism is currently not functional in the “steady-state” or “heightened alert” mode outside the context of an actual incident. This deficiency denies the DHS leadership the ability to consider and direct operational actions in day-to-day or “pre-incident” scenarios based upon a coordinated and integrated set of course of action recommendations developed by an appropriate integrating staff function. This deficiency also complicates DHS operational coordination with other agencies and with the HSC/NSC (CSG) during steady-state and pre-incident periods. These problems will become more acute with the implementation of the DHS regional structure if not remedied.

Proposed Operations Staff Capability

Develop a DHS headquarters staff function to: facilitate seamless horizontal integration and coordination of headquarters-level operational activities by integrating cross-directorate operations and contingency planning; providing synchronized staff support to the Department Leadership Team for day-to-day operational response, heightened alert, and crisis decision making activities; managing the operational planning and execution of headquarters-level readiness exercises; and coordinating and integrating operational planning, contingency support, and exercise requirements with DHS Regional Directors and their staffs.

Proposed Operations Staff Roles and Functions

- Develop a headquarters-level operational planning system and coordinate the development of cross-directorate and regional operations and contingency plans;
- Develop a system to facilitate integrated, cross-component operational and contingency plan execution at the national and regional levels;
- Develop a national base line “campaign” plan detailing operational activities associated with changes in the Homeland Security Advisory System;