

# COMMAND AND CONTROL

## Command and Control was impaired at all levels, delaying relief

### Summary

Command and control are key aspects of emergency management, and the federal government has taken several steps, most notably developing an Incident Command System (ICS), to promote unity of command among local, state, and federal authorities. However, during and immediately after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, there were lapses in command and control within each level of government, and between the three levels of government.



Local governments' command and control was often paralyzed by the complete destruction of their entire emergency management infrastructure. While state command and control facilities (such as the Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)) were generally intact after the storm, the magnitude of the storm and a variety of operational factors impaired their unity of command. The federal government also struggled to maintain unity of command across different agencies and within individual agencies. These problems exacerbated the challenges of coordinating across all levels of government and prevented overall unity of command.

One of the factors that impaired command and control was the lack of communications and situational awareness. While the reasons for these deficiencies were detailed previously (see the COMMUNICATIONS chapter), their impact was to paralyze normal command and control mechanisms. Local governments in many locations in Louisiana and Mississippi lost all communications capabilities for some period. This prevented them from communicating their situation and needs to the state level.

The state EOC in Louisiana experienced its own communications problems. State officials in the EOC could not reliably communicate with local officials, other state officials, or federal officials. Similarly, the federal government lost some communications, and initial efforts to bring in supplemental capabilities to improve command and control were unsuccessful. Other key factors that impaired command and control can be traced to a lack of sufficient qualified personnel, inadequate training, and limited funding.

The lack of effective command and control, and its impact on unity of command, degraded the relief efforts. Delays and otherwise poor assistance efforts caused by a lack of command and control are documented in this and other chapters. They include:

- delayed and duplicative efforts to plan for and carry out post landfall evacuations at the Superdome;
- uncoordinated search and rescue efforts that resulted in residents being left for days without food and water;
- separate military commands for the National Guard and Department of Defense (DOD) active duty troops;
- confusion over deliveries of commodities because some officials diverted trucks and supplies without coordination with others;



- lack of clarity as to who was assisting hospitals to evacuate; and
- the collapse of the New Orleans Police Department and its ability to maintain law and order.

## Finding: Command and Control was impaired at all levels of government

### Command and control are key aspects of emergency management

Command and control are key aspects of emergency management, and the federal government has taken several steps to promote unity of command among local, state, and federal authorities. For example, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) was developed in 2004 to enable all responders, regardless of jurisdictions or discipline, to effectively and efficiently work together. The NIMS “provides a nationwide template enabling federal, state, local, and tribal governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively and efficiently to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”<sup>1</sup>

In addition, NIMS incorporated the ICS, which has been in existence since the early 1970s. ICS is the standardizing scalable concept designed to provide for an integrated and organized structure while eliminating jurisdictional boundaries.<sup>2</sup> The National Response Plan (NRP) calls for the implementation of NIMS and the ICS upon activation of the NRP to ensure maximum flexibility of operation during the situation at hand.<sup>3</sup>

Optimal levels of coordination occur when there is unity of command, unity of effort, and an accepted chain of command. Unity of effort encompasses the concept that all parties to a mission should be focused upon the same agreed-to objectives and should work together to achieve them. Unity of command is the concept that an individual has only one superior to whom he or she is directly responsible, creating a clear line of supervision and command and control.

Chain of command furthers the concept of unity of command, creating a line of authority from the lowest ranking individual to those in command, establishing a highly effective and efficient system. It requires that orders are given only to those directly below an individual in the chain of command and orders are received from only those directly superior in the chain of command. Those at the appropriate level in the chain of command can then, as authorized, coordinate their activities with peers in their partner organizations.

### Many local governments lost command centers or otherwise could not establish unity of command

Achieving unity of command — with local, state, and federal authorities all acting together seamlessly to plan and conduct emergency operations — is often a challenge during a major disaster. It was particularly so when Hurricane Katrina made landfall. Local



governments’ command and control was often paralyzed by the complete destruction of their entire emergency management infrastructure.

In Alabama, local counties had the least problems with command and control. Because Katrina turned to the west and hit Mississippi and Louisiana the hardest, Alabama counties were able to maintain their emergency management infrastructure. Both Baldwin and Mobile counties still had operating EOCs and generally were able to stay in contact with the state EOC.<sup>4</sup>



In Mississippi, there was a massive storm surge that destroyed government facilities, making

it very difficult for the local communities to establish command and control. According to FEMA's Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) for Mississippi, Bill Carwile, much of the emergency management and public safety infrastructure was destroyed in the coastal counties.<sup>5</sup> Mayor of Waveland Tommy Longo said the city staged at various points around the city some of the resources it expected to need to respond to the storm's damage, and it also staged some of these resources about 10 miles north of the city as a backup in the event of a catastrophic event.<sup>6</sup> Despite the city's preparations, the hurricane destroyed these resources. The storm decimated all of Waveland's public buildings, severely limiting its ability to provide command and control and to mount a response to the storm.<sup>7</sup>

Similarly, Hancock County lost its EOC—the location from which it expected to provide command and control for the county's response to the storm—because of severe flooding early on in the hurricane.<sup>8</sup> Pearl River County also lost its EOC in the early hours of the storm due to wind and water damage that knocked out its emergency backup generator and caused other damage, making the center inoperable.<sup>9</sup>

In Louisiana, there was a similar level of destruction to the basic emergency management infrastructure at the parish level. Many of the parish EOCs and public safety facilities were wiped out or flooded.<sup>10</sup> While Jefferson Parish was hard hit, it was in better shape to respond because it had protected its EOC. Jefferson Parish Emergency Manager Dr. Walter Maestri explained the EOC was in a hardened facility — an old incinerator with cement walls — with the command center, living quarters, and emergency generator all on upper floors.<sup>11</sup> While the EOC suffered immediate problems with communications being down, and it eventually had a shortage of fuel for its generator, it was able to keep operating at some level.<sup>12</sup>

Lack of command and control was particularly a problem in New Orleans. The authorities in the city lost their command and control facilities after the levee breaches and subsequent flooding. The city abandoned

its EOC when City Hall was flooded and the emergency generator was flooded, cutting out power.<sup>13</sup> As discussed in more detail in the LAW ENFORCEMENT chapter, the New Orleans Police Department headquarters and district stations were flooded, crippling command and control for that department.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, the Louisiana National Guard, with headquarters at Jackson Barracks in New Orleans, lost its command and control due to flooding and had to abandon its operations center and re-establish it in an elevated parking structure at the Superdome.<sup>15</sup> According to Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, "...Jackson Barracks flooded at the most inopportune time, and he [Major General Landreneau—the Louisiana Adjutant General] had to relocate in the middle of trying to gain situational awareness and coordinate the response."<sup>16</sup> Thus, in New Orleans, for at least some period of time, emergency managers, the police, and the military lost command and control over their own personnel and lost unity of command with the other local, state, and federal agencies that needed to be involved in the relief efforts.

Even where there was still some infrastructure in place and communications were less of a problem, local command and control suffered from lack of clarity. The most notable example of this was at the Superdome in New Orleans. Although there were both National Guard and New Orleans Police Department officials on site to physically establish a unified command and personally talk to each other face to face, there was no consensus on who was in charge. Louisiana National Guard officers who ran security operations at the Superdome, Colonel Mark Mouton and LtC. Jacques Thibodeaux said the New Orleans Police Department had the lead for command and control.<sup>17</sup> They stated that the National Guard was there in support of the police.<sup>18</sup>

These statements directly conflict with New Orleans Police Department comments that the National Guard had the lead for command and control at the Superdome. Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain, the senior New Orleans Police Department officer at the Superdome, said the National Guard always had the lead for command and control at the Superdome and the police were there in support of the military.<sup>19</sup> In support of this position, New Orleans officials said the Superdome was a state facility, so a state agency (the National Guard) would naturally be in charge.<sup>20</sup>

One FEMA official, Deputy FCO Scott Wells, also said there was no clear unity of command at the Superdome.

He said he arrived there on Wednesday, August 31, and when he tried to contact the leadership at the location to coordinate FEMA activities, he found “nobody in charge, and no unified command.”<sup>21</sup> For example, he said there was no organization or structure to collect requests, prioritize them, and pass them on to the next appropriate echelon. He described the conditions as “chaotic” and said there appeared to be no one planning the next steps.<sup>22</sup>

The Cloverleaf was another location in New Orleans where the command and control structure was unclear. Louisiana State Police officials Ralph Mitchell and Joseph Booth stated that one government agency (they did not know which one) set up a medical triage and treatment center at the Cloverleaf on Wednesday, August 31.<sup>23</sup> Crowds grew there as people came to the dry land on their own accord or were dropped off by the helicopters or boats that rescued them from the water.

On Thursday, September 1, medical patients were evacuated, but the rest of the crowd grew to about 6,000-7,000 people. By Thursday afternoon and evening, the crowd started getting restless. At one time, there were 60 state police officers there, in addition to National Guard troops. The two officials — who had been on site — said they did not know who was in charge of command and control or which agency had set up the medical triage center there in the first place.<sup>24</sup> Later on Thursday night and Friday morning, some relief came from FEMA and the National Guard, and the Cloverleaf was completely cleared by Saturday, September 3.<sup>25</sup>

The Convention Center, discussed in more detail in the EVACUATION chapter, suffered from no official presence at all. There was not even an attempt to establish command and control there until the rescue mission arrived on Friday, September 2 (four days after landfall).<sup>26</sup>

While there may have been some type of command structures set up at both the Superdome and the Cloverleaf, they do not appear to have been effective. The fact that the senior officials who were stationed at or visiting these locations disagreed on who was in charge, could not find out who was in charge, or did not know who was in charge, shows there was a significant lapse in command and control and demonstrates there was little unity of command at these locations in New Orleans.

### State government unity of command was impaired by the magnitude of Katrina and other operational factors

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While state command and control facilities (such as their EOCs) were generally intact after landfall, the magnitude of the storm and a variety of operational factors impaired their unity of command.

Again, Alabama encountered the fewest command and control problems because it was least affected by Katrina. According to Alabama Emergency Management Agency (EMA) Director Bruce Baughman, the state EOC was up and running, with effective command and control throughout the hurricane and its aftermath. Unlike Louisiana (discussed below) where the parishes and EOC lost use of their emergency management software, Alabama used its software effectively. The software, known as “EM 2000,” was used by county EOCs to send requests for assistance and by the state EOC to task appropriate state or federal agencies and to track the status.<sup>27</sup> Select Committee staff were able to review the EM 2000 database and confirm the system was effectively used to track and close out many of the local requests.

Many examples demonstrate the effectiveness of Alabama’s EOC and the EM 2000 system. On August 29 at 9:30 p.m. the Mobile Police Department requested vehicles for search and rescue operations. This task was marked complete in the EM 2000 database in a little over one hour at 10:41 p.m.<sup>28</sup> Earlier on August 29, Baughman ordered 40 truck loads of ice and 40 truck loads of water from Lipsey Water. This task was marked complete by 2:00 p.m. the next day.<sup>29</sup> At 6:41 p.m. on August 29, Baldwin County EMA requested, through EM 2000, five generators for use at water wells. This task was marked complete at 9:16 am the next morning.<sup>30</sup>

When some FEMA requests were made, however, they were not immediately addressed. On August 29, Mobile



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County EMA Director Walter Dickerson requested two FEMA operations personnel and two FEMA logistics personnel to augment his staff. This need was not addressed until September 21.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, on August 30, when Monroe County requested shelter supplies from FEMA, it had to wait for six days for the task to be closed. 150 cots were needed in addition to a self-contained shower and bath trailer.<sup>32</sup>

The Select Committee encountered severe disagreements about whether the State of Louisiana maintained effective unity of command. Some FEMA officials were very critical of Louisiana's command and control. Michael Brown, Director of FEMA during Katrina, called the state of Louisiana "dysfunctional" and said it did not have unity of command.<sup>33</sup> Brown cited this as one of the main reasons for delays in relief efforts in Louisiana and New Orleans.<sup>34</sup>

In addition, Wells said there was no unity of command in the EOC. Wells was particularly critical of the state for not practicing unity of command with the federal government's planning and coordination efforts.<sup>35</sup> Wells said state officials were "preoccupied with the evacuation" and would not participate in critical pre-landfall "hasty" planning in other areas such as (1) search and rescue, (2) rapid assessment teams, (3) medical evacuation, (4) sheltering and temporary housing, (5) commodity distribution, and (6) debris removal.<sup>36</sup>

According to Wells, these "hasty plans" would have helped guide the course of activities for the first couple

of days after landfall, when situational awareness was weak and before more deliberate planning could take place.<sup>37</sup> FEMA went ahead and developed the hasty plans, but without the benefit of state EOC personnel participating. He said such state personnel should have participated because they had expertise in state and local conditions and capabilities.<sup>38</sup>

The only exception to this was the commodity distribution hasty plan. Wells said that was the only plan the state worked with FEMA to develop before landfall.<sup>39</sup> As another example, Wells cited the incident

(covered in more detail in the MILITARY chapter) where the Louisiana Adjutant General requested DOD active duty forces directly without going through or even notifying FEMA.<sup>40</sup> Instead of practicing unity of command, Wells said the state bypassed FEMA for federal assistance, then later complained FEMA did not know what was going on, and that FEMA could not coordinate the federal effort.<sup>41</sup>

Other FEMA officials were not as harsh in their criticisms of Louisiana. Bill Lokey, the FEMA FCO in the state EOC, said there was at least a minimum level of command and control and unity of command, to the extent the various parties were working together to set common priorities for common objectives.<sup>42</sup> Lokey attributed any lack of unity of command and control to a variety of operational factors (detailed below) and the catastrophic nature of the event.<sup>43</sup>

Similarly, another FEMA official who was in the EOC and in New Orleans, Deputy FCO Phil Parr, said some level of chaos occurs in any disaster, so it was not particularly unusual that the EOC seemed chaotic under the circumstances.<sup>44</sup> As discussed in the next section, Lokey and Parr both stated that not only was the state government overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster, but the federal government was overwhelmed as well.<sup>45</sup>

Louisiana state officials, including State Coordinating Officer (SCO) Jeff Smith, countered FEMA criticisms by saying the EOC was fully functional.<sup>46</sup> Smith said it was always clear who was in charge at the EOC: the SCO.

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He also maintained the EOC and the state did maintain unity of command.<sup>47</sup> In response to then-FEMA Director Brown's comment that he arrived at the EOC and could not figure out who was in charge, Smith said that such comments were "just plain bull."<sup>48</sup> Smith stated — and Lokey concurred — that the SCO and FCO worked closely together throughout the crisis.<sup>49</sup> Smith also provided the Select Committee with a photo taken during the crisis of Lokey and Smith together in the EOC.<sup>50</sup> According to Smith, "if FEMA Director Michael Brown had wanted to find out who was in charge of the EOC, all he had to do was find his FEMA FCO, because I was standing right next to him."<sup>51</sup>

The Select Committee attempted to make an independent determination of the effectiveness of command and control in the EOC by listening to conference calls between the EOC and parishes.<sup>52</sup> Based on a review of pre-landfall conference calls, the EOC appeared to be organized and unified to the limited extent this could be determined through these calls.<sup>53</sup> For example, the SCO was clearly in charge of coordinating state and parish activities and managing all discussions and decisions in an orderly and logical fashion.<sup>54</sup> Participation in the calls was very broad, to include multiple state agencies, more than a dozen key parishes, federal agencies, other states, and the American Red Cross. In addition, every organization got its opportunity to talk, and there was time for each organization to ask questions. It appeared pre-landfall decisions and issues were fully vetted among the participants. However, these conference calls do not cover the period just after landfall — the most critical and challenging time for establishing and maintaining command and control.<sup>55</sup>

Despite the disagreements over the degree of effective command and control in the state EOC, federal and state officials both cited several operational factors that made unity of command difficult to maintain. Among the most significant factors were a lack of communications and situational awareness and a lack of sufficient qualified personnel, inadequate training, and limited funding. These are described later in this chapter as separate findings. The other operational factors impairing command and control in the state EOC, described by a number of federal and state officials, included the following:

- **Katrina's late turn toward Louisiana:** State officials indicated that Katrina had taken a "dramatic shift" toward Louisiana on Friday (August 26). They said they were not fully aware of the situation until Saturday and were therefore not as prepared as they otherwise would have been.<sup>56</sup>
- **Overwhelming number of requests:** The size of Katrina and the destruction she wrought was immense, including the flooding of New Orleans and subsequent problems with security and the post-landfall evacuation. All of these circumstances led to an overwhelming number of requests for assistance.<sup>57</sup>
- **Overcrowding in the EOC:** The EOC building and main room were very crowded by the large contingent of state and federal officials.<sup>58</sup> The EOC main room has a capacity of about 50 people, but there were about 200 people. The EOC building as a whole was also overcrowded with about 750-1,000 people in it. There were only 12 Emergency Support Function (ESF) rooms for 15 ESFs. State officials cited the size of the current Joint Field Office (JFO) (in an old department store with thousands of staff) as an indication of the amount of physical space and number of people needed to run an operation the size of Katrina.<sup>59</sup>
- **EOC Information Technology was overloaded:** The Information Technology system was overloaded by the number of additional computers logged in and the volume of information processed. This was slowing down and destabilizing the system, and officials had to add two servers in the middle of the response.<sup>60</sup>
- **Deviation from normal procedures:** Due to the overwhelming number of requests and degraded



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communications, officials had to deviate from normal procedures for requesting assistance.<sup>61</sup> The federal government contributed to this problem by also deviating from normal procedures. Specifically, other federal agencies tasked FEMA directly rather than putting requests to the parishes in the first place so they could go through the normal process (e.g., from the parish to the state and then to FEMA to be mission-assigned to other federal agencies.)<sup>62</sup>

- **Freelancing by other federal, state, and local agencies:** State officials said, and a FEMA official confirmed, that federal agencies were “freelancing,” or just showing up without coordinating with the appropriate authorities at FEMA or the state. They would bypass the command structure and just appear in the EOC.<sup>63</sup> In addition, several freelancers showed up from other state and local agencies, again, without coordinating with the appropriate authorities. They too would just appear in the EOC not knowing what to do.<sup>64</sup>
- **Visits by politicians and celebrities:** Several elected officials from the state and national levels showed up in the EOC. While they just wanted to see what was going on and were trying to help, their presence distracted the EOC personnel.<sup>65</sup> There were similar visits by celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey and Sean Penn.<sup>66</sup> Most visits by elected officials and celebrities had large media crews covering them, further distracting the EOC personnel from their more urgent tasks.<sup>67</sup>

State officials who directed operations in the EOC — Col. William Doran and Mr. Jim Ballou — noted that with all of these operational factors, it would be easy for an outsider to conclude the EOC was a chaotic place.<sup>68</sup> In response to criticism from FEMA’s Michael Brown, these two state officials (as well as the SCO Smith) said some level of confusion was to be expected in the EOC under the circumstances. They said FEMA should have been more sympathetic and provided more assistance when it was clear Louisiana was overwhelmed by the size of Katrina’s devastation.<sup>69</sup>

**Federal government also lacked unity of command across and within agencies**

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Like the states, the federal government also struggled to maintain unity of command across and within agencies. According to Louisiana SCO Smith, the federal government did not follow its own plan, the NRP, which calls for a unified command. In his prepared statement before the Select Committee, Smith stated “[a]nyone who was there, anyone who chose to look, would realize that there were literally three separate Federal commands.”<sup>70</sup> Smith’s statement goes on to describe these three separate command structures:

- **FCO and Joint Field Office (JFO):** This was the unified joint command with the FCO (Lokey) and SCO (Smith) located initially at the state EOC, then moved to the Joint Field Office (in the old department store) once that was established.<sup>71</sup> The FCO, by doctrine, is the individual that is supposed to be in charge of all federal response operations, and only the FCO has the authority to obligate federal funds.<sup>72</sup>
- **Principal Federal Official (PFO):** Smith said that “[t]he Primary [*sic*] Federal Officer (PFO) by doctrine is not supposed to be an operational person directly involved in response activities . . . . The PFO in Katrina went operational and began directing and guiding response operations and to a large degree left out the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).”<sup>73</sup> This was inconsistent with the NRP: “The PFO cell was operating on its own, communicating directly with the Governor, communicating directly with the Mayor of New Orleans and a myriad of other local elected officials,” Smith said.<sup>74</sup>
- **Joint Task Force Katrina:** This command was intended to serve DOD active duty forces. According to Smith, “[w]henver the task force commander of Hurricane Katrina, General Honoré, came onto the scene, he was also operating independently with little regard whatsoever for the Joint Field Office, which should have been the only unified command.”<sup>75</sup>

The Select Committee found ample evidence supporting the view that the federal government did not have a unified command. For example, FEMA officials Lokey and Wells supported Smith’s position, saying the PFO was not supposed to have an operational role and

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was not supposed to bypass the FCO.<sup>76</sup> They stated the initial PFO, Michael Brown, followed protocol. However, the second PFO, Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, immediately began directing operations and established a separate command in New Orleans, set apart from the SCO and FCO in the Joint Field Office. Both FEMA officials said Allen's direction of operations as a PFO exceeded his authorities as enumerated in the Stafford Act.<sup>77</sup>

Eventually Allen was appointed FCO in addition to PFO.<sup>78</sup> As Smith noted, "DHS in essence acknowledges that there was a problem ...when DHS appointed the PFO as the FCO as well. DHS discovered the PFO did not have the authority to obligate money. Only the FCO has authority to obligate money."<sup>79</sup> This issue also arose in an April 2005 national level exercise sponsored by DHS called TOPOFF 3, where there was confusion over the different roles and responsibilities performed by the PFO and FCO.<sup>80</sup> The PFO issue is also discussed in detail in the NATIONAL FRAMEWORK chapter.

FEMA officials also acknowledged that DOD frequently acted on its own, outside the established unified command. Lokey said Honoré was directing activities from his JTF Katrina command ship (the USS Iwo Jima, docked pier-side in Orleans) without coordinating with the FCO at the state EOC and later the Joint Field Office.<sup>81</sup> He said Honoré, like the PFO was coordinating directly with local parishes and was accepting taskings from them, which violated established federal protocols.<sup>82</sup> Requests for assistance are supposed to go from the local level, to the state SCO, then to the FEMA FCO, and if appropriate, then to the Defense Coordinating Officer for DOD support.<sup>83</sup> Some may forgive Honoré for bypassing this process because it was broken and therefore unworkable after Katrina (as we discuss in the NATIONAL FRAMEWORK chapter). In fact, Lokey praised Honoré for "doing what had to be done to get things moving."<sup>84</sup> However, one of the results of Honoré's *modus operandi* of acting independently was further impairing FEMA's ability to maintain unity of command across the federal government. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale testified that "[m]ilitary command and control was workable, but not unified."<sup>85</sup> Additional difficulties between FEMA and DOD are discussed in the MILITARY chapter.

In addition to the problems with establishing and maintaining a unified command with DOD, FEMA struggled to establish a unified command with other organizations within DHS. According to Wells, the Coast Guard did not fuse their command in the search and rescue operation with the state and FEMA. Wells stated that for "the U.S. Coast Guard, who had junior officer representation but no authority to direct search and rescue air operations, all operations were directed by senior Coast Guard officers from another location. These officers refused to meet and conduct joint search and rescue operations with FEMA and state agencies."<sup>86</sup> Captain Bruce Jones, the Coast Guard officer in charge of air operations, commented that airborne search and rescue was sufficiently coordinated between the Louisiana National Guard's Task Force Eagle at the Superdome and the Coast Guard's air operations center at Belle Chasse Naval Air Station and that having two incident commands was an effective way to divide the work load.<sup>87</sup> Regardless of the positive outcome of saving lives, there was not unity of command across the function of search and rescue.

In addition to its problems coordinating with other federal agencies, FEMA had problems coordinating its own activities. Because most communications systems were impaired, Lokey could not talk directly with his advance team leader in New Orleans, Parr.<sup>88</sup> Thus, they were unable to coordinate their activities. As another example, Lokey and his staff in the EOC did not know another FEMA official, Marty Bahamonde, was in New Orleans during and immediately after landfall until they were informed by FEMA headquarters on late Monday, August 29. Before that time, they did not even know Bahamonde was there or what his function was.<sup>89</sup> More generally, Lokey said the federal government and particularly FEMA, were overwhelmed.<sup>90</sup> Overwhelmed organizations cannot achieve unity of command.

Louisiana EOC conference calls provide additional evidence there was a lack of coordination within FEMA.<sup>91</sup>

Once emergency communications were restored and the Louisiana EOC restarted its conference calls with the



parishes on September 9, it was clear FEMA activities were not well-coordinated. The September 9 call recorded a discussion in which Smith stated FEMA's "right hand is not always knowing what the left hand is doing."<sup>92</sup>

Parish officials agreed with this assessment and provided several examples. They noted the local FEMA representatives (situated in the parish EOCs) were working hard to resolve their problems, but that "other FEMA people just keep showing up."<sup>93</sup> The call indicates some FEMA officials were making commitments to various local elected officials, without coordinating with the FEMA FCO, the state EOC, or the parish EOC. One parish official said this situation was "creating downright chaos."<sup>94</sup>

Temporary housing was cited as a particular area where FEMA coordination was unacceptable to the state and parishes. According to Smith, a FEMA regional housing team was not coordinating with the JFO. Smith said he "blew his top" that morning because these FEMA regional officials were bypassing the state and parish EOC process in planning for temporary housing. FEMA needs to have appropriate state and parish representatives involved in any FEMA discussions of temporary housing, he said. Smith told the parishes the FEMA FCO needs to "ride herd" on the FEMA regional housing group so they follow established procedures.<sup>95</sup>

## Finding: Lack of communications and situational awareness paralyzed command and control

### Localities, without communications, could not participate in unified command

One of the key factors that impaired command and control was the lack of communications and situational awareness. While the reasons for these deficiencies were detailed previously (see the COMMUNICATIONS chapter), their impact was to paralyze normal command and control mechanisms. Many local governments in Mississippi and Louisiana lost all communications capabilities for some period. This prevented them from communicating their situation to the state level.

Alabama, as noted before in this chapter and the COMMUNICATIONS CHAPTER, experienced relatively few communications problems. Federal and state



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officials alike concluded their communications capacity functioned well during their response to Katrina.<sup>96</sup> The Alabama EMA has various communications redundancy programs to ensure that it maintains a high level of connectedness throughout the state. The EOC has equipment and trained personnel to communicate over all types of communications networks, including satellite, 800 MHz digital phone service, amateur radio, and others. Communications systems and capabilities are viewed by AEMA staff as a strength, and during Katrina, this redundancy proved effective. That said, the goal of true interoperability within and among county emergency response and law enforcement agencies remains elusive since each county has its own authority and timetable to procure communications technology.<sup>97</sup>

In Mississippi, most land-based communications systems, including cellular phones, were inoperable. According to Mississippi's EMA Director, Robert Latham, voice and data systems statewide were also inoperable.<sup>98</sup> As a result, often the only communications capability present in Mississippi — for both the state EMA as well as the affected counties — was through satellite phones and



STAFF PHOTO

radios, which operate by connecting to satellites rather than routing calls through land-based lines or cellular towers. Despite FEMA efforts to bring in additional communications capabilities to the affected counties' EOCs, Carwile reported that communications capabilities were far short of what was needed to be effective.<sup>99</sup>

To illustrate the problem in Louisiana, the EOC uses conference calls as a way to provide command and control and ensure unity of effort among the state and effected parishes. However, after the conference call during landfall on Monday morning, August 29, the parishes lost their communications capabilities and were unable to convene another conference call until 11 days later, on Friday, September 9.<sup>100</sup> Even then, the participants in the conference call noted that it was still hard to make regular phone calls.<sup>101</sup>

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### State of Louisiana officials lost local input to unified command, and were unreachable for coordinating activities

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The state EOC in Louisiana experienced its own communications problems, with officials in the EOC unable to communicate reliably with local officials, other state officials, or federal officials.<sup>102</sup> In one conference call, Smith noted that part of the problem was the state EOC had not been wired for the volume of communications required for a major catastrophe.<sup>103</sup> Many e-mails noted the difficulty of communicating with the state EOC. As one example, a U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) e-mail that laid out the procedures for requesting DOD assistance through the Defense Coordinating Officer in the EOC also emphasized the EOC telephone appeared to be continuously busy.<sup>104</sup>

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### Federal government also lost communications and failed in initial efforts to improve command and control

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Similarly, the federal government lost some communications, and initial efforts to bring in supplemental capabilities to improve command and control were unsuccessful. For example, FEMA has a mobile command and control suite, named Red October, which is housed in an oversized tractor trailer.<sup>105</sup> Lokey and his staff said during Hurricane Katrina, Red October

was pre-deployed to Shreveport, in northern Louisiana, to keep it out of harm's way but also to allow rapid movement into Baton Rouge or New Orleans after the hurricane passed.<sup>106</sup> Red October, once deployed and opened up, had a command and control suite with about 30 work stations and robust communications.

As the situation unfolded in New Orleans, and the flooding destroyed much of the command and control capability of the city, FEMA officials decided to move Red October to New Orleans to provide on-site command and control to its advance team and to help connect with New Orleans and National Guard authorities at the Superdome.<sup>107</sup> However, while some tractor trailers were able to get into the flooded city, Red October was unable to do so because of its oversized dimensions. Other FEMA communications vehicles, such as the Mobile Emergency Response Support detachments, noted in the COMMUNICATIONS chapter, were not capable of driving through the floodwaters without damaging their sensitive electronic equipment. Therefore, FEMA was unable to use these to restore command and control with its forward team in New Orleans, led by Parr.<sup>108</sup>

## Finding: A lack of personnel, training, and funding also weakened command and control

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### A lack of sufficient personnel hindered command and control

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The lack of trained, professional personnel at both the state and federal level greatly hindered the response. According to FEMA, the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) had an inadequate staff, both in numbers and training. "There were too few professional staff" provided by the state, according to Wells.<sup>109</sup> The FCO Operations Chief, Tony Robinson, agreed, saying the EOC had only 40 full-time trained staff, leaving only 20 staff to operate in 12 hour shifts.<sup>110</sup> Twenty people were far too few to run the EOC during a large disaster and the state should have developed a surge capacity, Robinson said.<sup>111</sup>

Wells said LOHSEP's supplemental staff were inadequately trained, and LOHSEP relied too heavily on the Louisiana National Guard troops to work the EOC.<sup>112</sup>

He characterized the guardsmen as well meaning but not trained to be professional emergency managers.<sup>113</sup> Wells cited this as one of reasons the state EOC personnel did not understand the unified command under the ICS.<sup>114</sup> Robinson also said the ability to effectively operate decreased as the state's cadre of professional emergency managers was augmented by these inexperienced guardsmen.<sup>115</sup> FEMA was also significantly short on available trained staff to send into the field.<sup>116</sup> Finally, Wells stated that "[w]e did not have the people. We did not have the expertise. We did not have the operational training folks that we needed to do our mission."<sup>117</sup>

### A lack of training also hindered command and control

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In Louisiana the lack of adequately trained personnel was also a major impediment to utilizing ICS and achieving effective command and control over state and federal resources. Wells said the state personnel lacked overall discipline, lacked clear control lines of authority, lacked a clearly understood command structure, and lacked consistency in operational procedures.<sup>118</sup> "If people don't understand ICS, we can't do ICS. And if we can't do ICS, we cannot manage disasters," he stated in testimony before the Senate.<sup>119</sup>

Valuable time and resources were expended to provide on-the-job training in ICS to state personnel assigned to the emergency operations center in Baton Rouge.<sup>120</sup> Wells noted that state officials hired a consultant to teach their EOC staff about ICS after landfall.<sup>121</sup> Specifically, the state hired former FEMA Director James Lee Witt as a consultant, and one of Witt's staff (a former FCO) was training the state staff in the EOC on Tuesday and Wednesday, August 30 and 31.<sup>122</sup> Wells said it was ridiculous to try to teach unified command after the hurricane had hit when everyone in the EOC should have already known it by then; at that point, it was too late, and the training created additional confusion in the EOC, Wells said.<sup>123</sup>

In Mississippi, ICS issues were less of a problem. According to Carwile, "[t]here had been training previous to Hurricane Katrina by the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency on down to the county emergency managers. So, it worked well."<sup>124</sup>

### Inadequate funding cited as reason for inadequate personnel and training

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As addressed more fully in the FEMA PREPAREDNESS chapter, the lack of adequate staff and insufficient training are directly attributable to limited funding for FEMA operations. For example, the funding for training exercises is, and has been deficient. This is evident in the lack of coordination of FEMA staff. According to Carwile, training funding for national emergency response teams dried up in 2003.<sup>125</sup> Teams sent to the Gulf coast never had an opportunity to train together beforehand. Prior to activation, the teams were nothing more than names on rosters. This contributed greatly to the inefficient and timely delays in the initial federal response. Senator Joe Lieberman described the training and funding issues as "a FEMA disaster waiting to happen because we weren't giving [FEMA] the resources to get ready for this."<sup>126</sup>

*Senator Joe Lieberman described the training and funding issues as "a FEMA disaster waiting to happen because we weren't giving [FEMA] the resources to get ready for this."*

### Finding: Ineffective command and control delayed many relief efforts

The lack of effective command and control, and its impact on unity of command, degraded the relief efforts. Moreover, the problems experienced individually by the local, state, and federal governments exacerbated the challenges of coordinating across all levels of government and prevented overall unity of command.

The evacuation of the Superdome provided one of the clearest examples of how ineffective command and control and the lack of unity of command hindered urgently needed relief. It was planned multiple times by different parties. On the day after Katrina's landfall, Parr worked with the Louisiana National Guard to devise a



plan for evacuating the Superdome through the use of Chinook and Blackhawk helicopters.<sup>127</sup> After working through most the night, the plan was ready for execution Wednesday morning. Parr and the Louisiana National Guard officer working with him estimated it would take 30 hours to completely evacuate the Superdome. However, earlier that day Blanco had instructed Landreneau of the Guard to contact Honoré of Northern Command to arrange for active duty military support of response operations in Louisiana.<sup>128</sup>

This request was made outside the unified command and without the knowledge of FEMA and Parr. During the early morning hours of Wednesday, Landreneau instructed Louisiana National Guard officials at the Superdome to cease planning for the evacuation as Honoré would be “taking charge” of the evacuation project, thus bypassing the unified command and requirements that state requests to federal agencies go through FEMA to further coordinate and limit duplication.<sup>129</sup> Parr said this resulted in the

evacuation of the Superdome population 24 hours later than would have occurred under the joint National Guard / FEMA plan put together at the Superdome.<sup>130</sup>

Other delays and poor assistance efforts caused by a lack of command and control, mainly in Louisiana, include:

- Search and Rescue. Search and Rescue efforts were uncoordinated. During the critical first days after Katrina and the flooding, there was no unity of command between the various local, state, and federal agencies participating in search and rescue efforts. While heroic efforts by these agencies immediately saved lives, there was little coordination of where the victims should be or actually were taken. This resulted in victims being left in shelters or out in the open on high ground for days without food and water. For more details, see the EVACUATION chapter.

## *“All levels of government have “a fundamental lack of understanding for the principals and protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS.”*

- **Military Support.** Much of the military support was also uncoordinated. The Louisiana National Guard and DOD active duty forces, under Joint Task Force Katrina, were under separate commands. Federal attempts to bring them under the same command were rejected by the Governor. This resulted in delays in the arrival of DOD active duty troops—troops that provided a robust reservoir of manpower and a wide array of capabilities. For more details, see the MILITARY chapter.
- **Medical Evacuations.** There was confusion over which agencies or personnel were supposed to assist with hospital evacuations. Hospitals reported that Army and FEMA officials came and surveyed the situation and never returned despite saying that they would. This resulted in delays in evacuating patients, with sometimes fatal consequences. For more details, see the MEDICAL CARE chapter.
- **Lawlessness in New Orleans.** The New Orleans Police Department, in addition to losing hundreds of its personnel who did not report to duty, lost command and control over those that still reported to work. This resulted in delays in determining where problems were, dispatching officers to those locations, and otherwise planning and prioritizing operations to restore law and order. For more details, see the LAW ENFORCEMENT chapter.

## Conclusion

In responding to Hurricane Katrina, elements of federal, state, and local governments lacked command, lacked control, and certainly lacked unity. Some of the reasons for this can be traced back to the magnitude of the storm, which destroyed the communications systems that are so vital to effective command and control. In addition, the magnitude of the storm created so much damage across such a wide area that it overwhelmed agencies and individuals who were struggling to mount an organized response.

But some of the lapses in command and control can be traced back to agencies and individuals demonstrating a *failure of initiative* to better protect their command and control facilities, better clarify command and control relationships on location, and better follow established protocols for ensuring unity of command. This problem of not following protocols is summed up well in a recent DHS-IG report on an exercise involving federal, state, and local governments: all levels of government have “a fundamental lack of understanding for the principals and protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS.”<sup>131</sup>

Finally, to some degree, lapses in command and control can be traced to a lack of sufficient qualified personnel, inadequate training, and limited funding. In total, these factors paralyzed command and control, leading to an agonizingly disjointed and slow response to the disaster. ■

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- <sup>1</sup> U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, *National Response Plan*, (Dec. 2004) at 1 [hereinafter *NRP*].
- <sup>2</sup> *Id.* at 66.
- <sup>3</sup> *Id.* at 1.
- <sup>4</sup> See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Leigh Anne Ryals, Emergency Manager, Baldwin County [hereinafter Ryals Interview], in Washington, DC, via telephone from AL (Oct. 25, 2005); see Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Walter Dickerson, Emergency Manager, Mobile County [hereinafter Dickerson Interview], in Washington, D.C., via telephone from AL (Oct. 25, 2005).
- <sup>5</sup> *Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi Before Select Comm.*, 109th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2005) at 5 (written statement of William L. Carwile) [hereinafter *Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing*].
- <sup>6</sup> *Id.* at 125-127 (statement of Steve Longo).
- <sup>7</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>8</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Hootie Adams, Director, Emergency Management for Hancock County, MS, in Hancock County, MS (Oct. 14, 2005).
- <sup>9</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bobby Strahan, Director, Pearl River County Emergency Management Agency, in Washington, D.C., via telephone from MS (Nov. 29, 2005).
- <sup>10</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jeff Smith, Deputy Director, LA Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness [hereinafter Smith Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005).
- <sup>11</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Walter Maestri, Emergency Manager for Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005).
- <sup>12</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>13</sup> See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Rex Macdonald, Information and Technology and Communications Director, Department of Public Safety and Corrections [hereinafter Macdonald Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Terry Ebbert, Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans [hereinafter Ebbert Interview], in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005).
- <sup>14</sup> Macdonald Interview; see also Ebbert Interview.
- <sup>15</sup> See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jacques Thibodeaux, LtC, LA Nat'l Guard [hereinafter Thibodeaux Interview], in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005); see Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Mark Mouton, Col, LA Nat'l Guard [hereinafter Mouton Interview], in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005).
- <sup>16</sup> *Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm.*, 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) at 194 (statement of H Steven Blum) [hereinafter *Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing*].
- <sup>17</sup> See Thibodeaux Interview; Mouton Interview.
- <sup>18</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>19</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lonnie Swain, Deputy Chief New Orleans Police Department [hereinafter Swain Interview], in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005).
- <sup>20</sup> Ebbert Interview.
- <sup>21</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells, Deputy Fed. Coordinating Officer, FEMA [hereinafter Wells Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005).
- <sup>22</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>23</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Ralph Mitchell, LA State Police [hereinafter Nov. 4, 2005 Mitchell Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Joseph Booth, LA State Police [hereinafter Booth Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005).
- <sup>24</sup> Mitchell Interview; see also Booth Interview.
- <sup>25</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>26</sup> See Thibodeaux Interview; Swain Interview.
- <sup>27</sup> See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Baughman, Director, AL Emergency Management Agency [hereinafter Baughman Interview], in Clancy, AL (Oct. 11, 2005); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with David Tranter, General Counsel for AL Emergency Management Agency [hereinafter Tranter Interview], Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005).
- <sup>28</sup> AL Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-1992, (Aug. 29, 2005) (Doc. No. AL 002567).
- <sup>29</sup> AL Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-1969, (Aug. 30, 2005) (Doc. No. AL 002600).
- <sup>30</sup> AL Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-1948, (Aug. 30, 2005) (Doc. No. AL 002625).
- <sup>31</sup> AL Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-1974, (Sept. 21, 2005) (Doc. No. AL 002593).
- <sup>32</sup> AL Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-2096, (Sept. 5, 2005) (Doc. No. AL 002444).
- <sup>33</sup> *Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Before Select Comm.*, 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005) at 32, 157 (statement of Michael Brown) [hereinafter *Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing*].
- <sup>34</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>35</sup> Wells Interview.
- <sup>36</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>37</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>38</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>39</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>40</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>41</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>42</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bill Lokey, FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer [hereinafter Lokey Interview], in Washington, DC (Dec. 2, 2005); see also *Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana Before Select Comm.*, 109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005), at 229-230 (statement of Bill Lokey) [hereinafter *Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing*].

<sup>43</sup> Lokey Interview; *see also* Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 229-230 (statement of Bill Lokey).

<sup>44</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Phil Parr, Dep. Fed. Coordinating Officer, FEMA [hereinafter Parr Interview], in Washington, DC (Dec. 6, 2005).

<sup>45</sup> Lokey Interview; *see also* Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 196 (statement of Phil Parr).

<sup>46</sup> *See* Interview by Select Comm. Staff with LTC William Doran, Chief, Operations Division, LA Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) [hereinafter Doran Interview]; *see* Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jim Ballou, Operations Division, LA Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) [hereinafter Ballou Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005); *see also* Smith Interview.

<sup>47</sup> Smith Interview.

<sup>48</sup> *Id.*

<sup>49</sup> Smith Interview; *see also* Lokey Interview.

<sup>50</sup> Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing, Appendix: Photo Presentation Slide 26 (written statement of Jeff Smith).

<sup>51</sup> Smith Interview.

<sup>52</sup> *See generally* Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26 – Sept. 9, 2005).

<sup>53</sup> *Id.*

<sup>54</sup> *Id.*

<sup>55</sup> *Id.*

<sup>56</sup> *See* Doran Interview; Ballou Interview.

<sup>57</sup> *Id.* *see also* Lokey Interview; *see also* Parr Interview.

<sup>58</sup> *Id.*

<sup>59</sup> *Id.*

<sup>60</sup> *See* Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; *see also* Parr Interview.

<sup>61</sup> *See* Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; *see also* Lokey Interview; Parr Interview.

<sup>62</sup> *See* Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; *see also* Parr Interview.

<sup>63</sup> *See* Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; *see also* Lokey Interview; Parr Interview.

<sup>64</sup> *See* Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; *see also* Parr Interview.

<sup>65</sup> *See* Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; *see also* Lokey Interview; Parr Interview.

<sup>66</sup> Nicole Bode, *Sean Penn Gets into Rescue Act*, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.) (Sept. 8, 2005) at 6; Ryan Parry, *150 Hurricane Brits Missing*, MIRROR (London) (Sept. 5, 2005) at 1, 4 (“Last night [Sept. 04] TV’s Oprah Winfrey arrived in New Orleans with 33 supply trucks.”).

<sup>67</sup> *See* Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; *see also* Parr Interview.

<sup>68</sup> *See* Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; *see also* Lokey Interview; Parr Interview; Smith Interview.

<sup>69</sup> *See* Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; *see also* Smith Interview.

<sup>70</sup> Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 16 (written statement of Jeff Smith).

<sup>71</sup> *Id.*

<sup>72</sup> *Id.*

<sup>73</sup> *Id.*

<sup>74</sup> *Id.*

<sup>75</sup> *Id.*

<sup>76</sup> Lokey Interview; *see also* Wells Interview.

<sup>77</sup> *Id.*

<sup>78</sup> Smith Interview.

<sup>79</sup> Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 16 (written statement of Jeff Smith).

<sup>80</sup> Office of Inspector General, Dep’t of Homeland Security, *A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise* (Rpt. No. OIG-06-07) at 1, 12 (Nov. 2005) [hereinafter *DHS IG Report*].

<sup>81</sup> Lokey Interview; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense: Legislative Affairs, *DOD Support for Hurricane Katrina Relief: Executive Summary* Mon., Sept. 12, 2005 as of 0700 (Sept. 12, 2005).

<sup>82</sup> Lokey Interview.

<sup>83</sup> *Id.*

<sup>84</sup> *Id.*

<sup>85</sup> Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 134 (statement of Paul McHale).

<sup>86</sup> *Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operational Professionals Before Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs*, 109th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2005) at 45 (statement of Scott Wells) [hereinafter *Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing*].

<sup>87</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Jones, Captain, Coast Guard, in Washington, D.C. via telephone from New Orleans, LA (Jan. 10, 2006).

<sup>88</sup> Lokey Interview; *see also* Parr Interview.

<sup>89</sup> *Id.*

<sup>90</sup> Lokey Interview.

<sup>91</sup> *See* Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26 – Sept. 9, 2005).

<sup>92</sup> *Id.*

<sup>93</sup> *Id.*

<sup>94</sup> *Id.* It was not possible to determine exactly which parish official made this statement.

<sup>95</sup> *See* Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Sept. 9, 2005).

<sup>96</sup> *See generally* Ryals Interview; *see also* Dickerson Interview; Baughman Interview; Tranter Interview.

<sup>97</sup> Baughman Interview; *see also* Tranter Interview.

<sup>98</sup> Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 34 (statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr.).

- <sup>99</sup> *Id.* at 7 (written statement of William L. Carwile).
- <sup>100</sup> See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26 – Sept. 9, 2005).
- <sup>101</sup> See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Sept. 9, 2005).
- <sup>102</sup> Macdonald Interview.
- <sup>103</sup> See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Sept. 9, 2005).
- <sup>104</sup> E-mail correspondence from Clair Blong (DHS/FEMA NORAD USNORTCOM IC) to FEMA-NRCC and FEMA-HSOC Staff (Sept. 01, 2005 7:51 p.m.), citing e-mail correspondence from Nanette Nadeau (DAF NORAD USNORTHCOM), to Clair Blong, Sept. 01, 2005 (Doc No. DHS-FEMA-0028-0000685).
- <sup>105</sup> Lokey Interview; *see also* Parr Interview.
- <sup>106</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>107</sup> *Id.* It is not clear which FEMA official ultimately approved this decision.
- <sup>108</sup> Lokey Interview; *see also* Parr Interview.
- <sup>109</sup> *Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing* at 5 (written statement of William L. Carwile).
- <sup>110</sup> Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Tony Robinson, FEMA JFO Operation [hereinafter Robinson Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 10, 2005).
- <sup>111</sup> Robinson Interview.
- <sup>112</sup> Wells Interview.
- <sup>113</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>114</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>115</sup> Robinson Interview.
- <sup>116</sup> Wells Interview.
- <sup>117</sup> *Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing* at 58 (statement of Scott Wells).
- <sup>118</sup> Wells Interview.
- <sup>119</sup> *Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing* at 46 (statement of Scott Wells).
- <sup>120</sup> Wells Interview.
- <sup>121</sup> *Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing* at 46 (statement of Scott Wells).
- <sup>122</sup> Wells Interview.
- <sup>123</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>124</sup> *Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing* at 48 (statement of William L. Carwile).
- <sup>125</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>126</sup> *Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing* at 61 (statement of Senator Joseph Lieberman).
- <sup>127</sup> Parr Interview.
- <sup>128</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>129</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>130</sup> *Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing* at 70-72 (statement of Phil Parr).
- <sup>131</sup> *DHS IG Report* at 1, 12.





*"In the early hours of Hurricane Katrina, and without regard to their own safety, and in many cases, knowing their own homes were probably destroyed, these great citizens of Louisiana began to go out, by helicopter and boat, to begin the massive search and rescue operations.*

*"Pulling residents from rooftops, out of attics, and directly from the water, the men and women of the Louisiana National Guard were there, saving thousands of lives ..."*

Major General Bennett C. Landreneau  
The Adjutant General, State of Louisiana  
Select Committee hearing, October 27, 2005