Chapter 1

Introduction and Executive Summary

Introduction

After the September 11 attacks, the highest-level U.S. government officials publicly declared that the fight against al Qaeda financing was as critical as the fight against al Qaeda itself. It has been presented as one of the keys to success in the fight against terrorism: if we choke off the terrorists’ money, we limit their ability to conduct mass casualty attacks. In reality, completely choking off the money to al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups has been essentially impossible. At the same time, tracking al Qaeda financing has proven a very effective way to locate terrorist operatives and supporters and to disrupt terrorist plots.

As a result, the U.S. terrorist financing strategy has changed from the early post-9/11 days. Choking off the money remains the most visible aspect of our approach, but it is not our only, or even most important, goal. Ultimately, making it harder for terrorists to get money is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of our overall strategy. Following the money to identify terrorist operatives and sympathizers provides a particularly powerful tool in the fight against terrorist groups. Use of this tool almost always remains invisible to the general public, but it is a critical part of the overall campaign against al Qaeda. Moreover, the U.S. government recognizes—appropriately, in the Commission staff’s view—that terrorist-financing measures are simply one of many tools in the fight against al Qaeda.

This monograph, together with the relevant parts of the Commission’s final report, reflects the staff’s investigation into al Qaeda financing and the U.S. government’s efforts to combat it. This monograph represents the collective efforts of a number of members of the staff. John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille did the bulk of the work reflected in this report. Thanks also go to Dianna Campagna, Marquittia Coleman, Melissa Coffey and the entire administrative staff for their excellent support. We were fortunate in being able to build upon a great deal of excellent work already done by the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities.

The starting point for our inquiry is 1998, when al Qaeda emerged as a primary global threat to U.S. interests. Although we address earlier periods as necessary, we have not attempted to tell the history of al Qaeda financing from its inception. We have sought to understand how al Qaeda raised, moved, and stored money before and after the September 11 attacks, and how the U.S. government confronted the problem of al Qaeda financing before and after 9/11. We have had significant access to highly classified raw and finished intelligence from the intelligence community, have reviewed law enforcement, State Department, and Treasury Department files, and have interviewed at
length government officials, from street-level agents to cabinet secretaries, as well as non-government experts, representatives from the financial services industry, and representatives of individuals and entities directly affected by U.S. government action to combat al Qaeda financing.

This monograph does not attempt a comprehensive survey of all known data on al Qaeda financing and every government action to combat it. Rather, we have sought to understand the issues that make a difference, what the 9/11 disaster should have taught us about these issues, and the extent to which the current U.S. strategy reflects these lessons. What we have found is instructive in the larger analysis of what the U.S. government can do to detect, investigate, deter, and disrupt al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups bent on mass casualty attacks against the United States.1

Executive Summary

September 11 financing

The September 11 hijackers used U.S. and foreign financial institutions to hold, move, and retrieve their money. The hijackers deposited money into U.S. accounts, primarily by wire transfers and deposits of cash or travelers checks brought from overseas. Additionally, several of them kept funds in foreign accounts, which they accessed in the United States through ATM and credit card transactions. The hijackers received funds from facilitators in Germany and the United Arab Emirates or directly from Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM) as they transited Pakistan before coming to the United States. The plot cost al Qaeda somewhere in the range of $400,000–500,000, of which approximately $300,000 passed through the hijackers’ bank accounts in the United States. The hijackers returned approximately $26,000 to a facilitator in the UAE in the days prior to the attack. While in the United States, the hijackers spent money primarily for flight training, travel, and living expenses (such as housing, food, cars, and auto insurance). Extensive investigation has revealed no substantial source of domestic financial support.

Neither the hijackers nor their financial facilitators were experts in the use of the international financial system. They created a paper trail linking them to each other and their facilitators. Still, they were easily adept enough to blend into the vast international financial system without doing anything to reveal themselves as criminals, let alone terrorists bent on mass murder. The money-laundering controls in place at the time were largely focused on drug trafficking and large-scale financial fraud and could not have detected the hijackers’ transactions. The controls were never intended to, and could not, detect or disrupt the routine transactions in which the hijackers engaged.

1 Our investigation has focused on al Qaeda financing and the country’s response to it. Although much of our analysis may apply to the financing of other terrorist groups, we have made no systematic effort to investigate any of those groups, and we recognize that the financing of other terrorist groups may present the government with problems or opportunities not existing in the context of al Qaeda.
There is no evidence that any person with advance knowledge of the impending terrorist attacks used that information to profit by trading securities. Although there has been consistent speculation that massive al Qaeda–related “insider trading” preceded the attacks, exhaustive investigation by federal law enforcement and the securities industry has determined that unusual spikes in the trading of certain securities were based on factors unrelated to terrorism.

One of the pillars of al Qaeda: Fund-raising

Al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin obtained money from a variety of sources. Contrary to common belief, Bin Ladin did not have access to any significant amounts of personal wealth (particularly after his move from Sudan to Afghanistan) and did not personally fund al Qaeda, either through an inheritance or businesses he was said to have owned in Sudan. Rather, al Qaeda was funded, to the tune of approximately $30 million per year, by diversions of money from Islamic charities and the use of well-placed financial facilitators who gathered money from both witting and unwitting donors, primarily in the Gulf region. No persuasive evidence exists that al Qaeda relied on the drug trade as an important source of revenue, had any substantial involvement with conflict diamonds, or was financially sponsored by any foreign government. The United States is not, and has not been, a substantial source of al Qaeda funding, although some funds raised in the United States may have made their way to al Qaeda and its affiliated groups.

After Bin Ladin relocated to Afghanistan in 1996, al Qaeda made less use of formal banking channels to transfer money, preferring instead to use an informal system of money movers or bulk cash couriers. Supporters and other operatives did use banks, particularly in the Gulf region, to move money on behalf of al Qaeda. Prior to 9/11 the largest single al Qaeda expense was support for the Taliban, estimated at about $20 million per year. Bin Ladin also used money to train operatives in camps in Afghanistan, create terrorist networks and alliances, and support the jihadists and their families. Finally, a relatively small amount of money was used to finance operations, including the approximately $400,000–500,000 spent on the September 11 attacks themselves.

U.S. government efforts before the September 11 attacks

Terrorist financing was not a priority for either domestic or foreign intelligence collection. As a result, intelligence reporting on the issue was episodic, insufficient, and often inaccurate. Although the National Security Council considered terrorist financing important in its campaign to disrupt al Qaeda, other agencies failed to participate to the NSC’s satisfaction, and there was little interagency strategic planning or coordination. Without an effective interagency mechanism, responsibility for the problem was dispersed among a myriad of agencies, each working independently.
The FBI gathered intelligence on a significant number of organizations in the United States suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. Highly motivated street agents in specific FBI field offices overcame setbacks, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and what they believed to be a dysfunctional Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) system to gain a basic understanding of some of the largest and most problematic terrorist-financing conspiracies since identified. The FBI did not develop an endgame, however. The agents continued to gather intelligence with little hope that they would be able to make a criminal case or otherwise disrupt the operations. The FBI could not turn these investigations into criminal cases because of insufficient international cooperation, a perceived inability to mingle criminal and intelligence investigations due to the “wall” between intelligence and law enforcement matters, sensitivities to overt investigations of Islamic charities and organizations, and the sheer difficulty of prosecuting most terrorist-financing cases. As a result, the FBI rarely sought to involve criminal prosecutors in its terrorist-financing investigations. Nonetheless, FBI street agents had gathered significant intelligence on specific groups.

On a national level the FBI did not systematically gather and analyze the information its agents developed. It lacked a headquarters unit focusing on terrorist financing, and its overworked counterterrorism personnel lacked time and resources to focus specifically on financing. The FBI as an organization therefore failed to understand the nature and extent of the jihadist fund-raising problem within the United States or to develop a coherent strategy for confronting the problem. The FBI did not, nor could it, fulfill its role to provide intelligence on domestic terrorist financing to government policymakers and did not contribute to national policy coordination. For its part, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice had no national program for prosecuting terrorist-financing cases, despite a 1996 statute that gave it much broader legal powers for doing so. The Department of Justice could not develop an effective program for prosecuting these cases because its prosecutors had no systematic way to learn what evidence of prosecutable crimes could be found in the FBI’s intelligence files, to which they did not have access.

The U.S. intelligence community largely failed to comprehend al Qaeda’s methods of raising, moving, and storing money, because it devoted relatively few resources to collecting the strategic financial intelligence that policymakers were requesting or that would have informed the larger counterterrorism strategy. Al Qaeda financing was in many respects a hard target for intelligence gathering. But the CIA also arrived belatedly

---

2 This monograph is a survey and analysis of the government’s efforts with regard to terrorist financing both before and after 9/11. This necessarily touches on many different aspects of the government’s counterterrorism efforts, including the FISA review process and barrier between law enforcement and intelligence information. We did not attempt, however, to conduct an exhaustive review of those issues. Rather, we refer the reader to the 9/11 Commission Report, pp.78-80.

3 We use the term jihadist to include militant Islamist groups other than the Palestinian terrorist groups, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Lebanese Hizbollah. The other jihadist groups who have raised money in the United States appear to loosely share a common ideology, and many of them have been linked directly or indirectly to al Qaeda. These groups raise funds in the United States to support Islamist militants around the world; some of these funds may make their way to al Qaeda or affiliated groups. The Palestinian groups and Hizbollah, which have raised large amounts of money domestically, present different issues that are beyond the scope of our investigation.
at an understanding of some basic operational facts that were readily available—such as the knowledge that al Qaeda relied on fund-raising, not Bin Ladin’s personal fortune. The CIA’s inability to grasp the true source of Bin Ladin’s funds and the methods behind their movement hampered the U.S. government’s ability to integrate potential covert action or overt economic disruption into the counterterrorism effort. The lack of specific intelligence about al Qaeda financing frustrated policymakers, and the intelligence deficiencies persisted through 9/11.

Other areas within the U.S. government evinced similar problems. The then-obscure Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the Treasury organization charged by law with searching out, designating, and freezing Bin Ladin assets, lacked comprehensive access to actionable intelligence and was beset by the indifference of higher-level Treasury policymakers. Even if those barriers had been removed, the primary Bin Ladin financial flows at the time, from the Gulf to Afghanistan, likely were beyond OFAC’s legal powers, which apply only domestically.

A number of significant legislative and regulatory initiatives designed to close vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system failed to gain traction. Some of these, such as a move to control foreign banks with accounts in the United States, died as a result of banking industry pressure. Others, such as a move to regulate money remitters, were mired in bureaucratic inertia and a general antiregulatory environment.

The U.S. government had recognized the value of enlisting the international community in efforts to stop the flow of money to al Qaeda entities. U.S. diplomatic efforts had succeeded in persuading the United Nations to sanction Bin Ladin economically, but such sanctions were largely ineffective. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, necessary partners in any realistic effort to stem the financing of terror, were ambivalent and selectively cooperative in assisting the United States. The U.S. government approached the Saudis on some narrow issues, such as locating Bin Ladin’s supposed personal wealth and gaining access to a senior al Qaeda financial figure in Saudi custody, with mixed results. The Saudis generally resisted cooperating more broadly against al Qaeda financing, although the U.S. government did not make this issue a priority in its bilateral relations with the Saudis or provide the Saudis with actionable intelligence about al Qaeda fund-raising in the Kingdom. Other issues, such as Iraq, the Middle East peace process, economic arrangements, the oil supply, and cutting off Saudi support for the Taliban, took primacy on the U.S.-Saudi agenda.

The net result of the government’s efforts, according to CIA analysis at the time, was that al Qaeda’s cash flow on the eve of the September 11 attacks was steady and secure.

**Where are we now?**

It is common to say the world has changed since September 11, 2001, and this conclusion is particularly apt in describing U.S. counterterrorist efforts regarding financing. The U.S. government focused, for the first time, on terrorist financing and devoted considerable
energy and resources to the problem. As a result the United States now has a far better understanding of the methods by which terrorists raise, move, and use money and has employed this knowledge to our advantage.

With an understanding of the nature of the threat and with a new sense of urgency, the intelligence community (including the FBI) created new entities to focus on, and bring expertise to, the area of terrorist fund-raising and the clandestine movement of money. These entities are led by experienced and committed individuals, who use financial information to understand terrorist networks, search them out and disrupt their operations, and who integrate terrorist-financing issues into the larger counterterrorism efforts at their respective agencies. Equally important, many of the obstacles hampering investigations have been stripped away. The current intelligence community approach appropriately focuses on using financial information, in close coordination with other types of intelligence, to identify and track terrorist groups rather than to starve them of funding.

The CIA has devoted considerable resources to the investigation of al Qaeda financing, and the effort is led by individuals with extensive expertise in the clandestine movement of money. The CIA appears to be developing an institutional and long-term expertise in this area, and other intelligence agencies have made similar improvements. Still, al Qaeda financing remains a hard target for intelligence gathering. Understanding al Qaeda’s money and providing actionable intelligence present ongoing challenges because of the speed, diversity, and complexity of the means and methods for raising and moving money; the commingling of terrorist money with legitimate funds; the many layers and transfers between donors and the ultimate recipients of the money; the existence of unwitting participants (including donors who give to generalized jihadist struggles rather than specifically to al Qaeda); and the U.S. government’s reliance on foreign government reporting for intelligence.

Since the attacks, the FBI has improved its dissemination of intelligence to policymakers, usually in the form of briefings, regular meetings, and status reports. The creation of a unit focusing on terrorist financing has provided a vehicle through which the FBI can effectively participate in interagency terrorist-financing efforts and ensures that these issues receive focused attention rather than being a footnote to the FBI’s overall counterterror program. Still, the FBI needs to improve the gathering and analyzing of the information developed in its investigations. The FBI’s well-documented efforts to create an analytical career track and enhance its analytical capabilities are sorely needed in this area.

Bringing jihadist fund-raising prosecutions remains difficult in many cases. The inability to get records from other countries, the complexity of directly linking cash flows to terrorist operations or groups, and the difficulty of showing what domestic persons knew about illicit foreign acts or actors all combine to thwart investigations and prosecutions. Still, criminal prosecutors now have regular access to information on relevant investigations, and the Department of Justice has created a unit to coordinate an aggressive national effort to prosecute terrorist financing.
In light of the difficulties in prosecuting some terrorist fund-raising cases, the government has used administrative blocking and freezing orders under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) against U.S. persons (individuals or entities) suspected of supporting foreign terrorist organizations. It may well be effective, and perhaps necessary, to disrupt fund-raising operations through an administrative blocking order when no other good options exist. The use of IEEPA authorities against domestic organizations run by U.S. citizens, however, raises significant civil liberty concerns because it allows the government to shut down an organization on the basis of classified evidence, subject only to a deferential after-the-fact judicial review. The provision of the IEEPA that allows the blocking of assets “during the pendency of an investigation” also raises particular concern in that it can shut down a U.S. entity indefinitely without the more fully developed administrative record necessary for a permanent IEEPA designation.

The NSC’s interagency Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on terrorist financing has been generally successful in its efforts to marshal government resources to address terrorist-financing issues in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, although its success likely resulted more from the personalities of its members than from its structure. As the government’s response to the problem has evolved over time, the NSC is better situated than an agency or a stand-alone “czar” to take the lead in forming an interagency strategic and operational response to terrorist financing.

The attacks galvanized the international community to set up a near-universal system of laws, tied to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, to freeze the assets of terrorists and their supporters. The United States pursued an ambitious course of highly visible asset freezes of terrorists, terrorist supporters, and terrorist-related entities. The State Department embarked on a course of intense diplomatic pressure to ensure that the asset freezes were truly international. Multilateral institutions, such as the Financial Action Task Force, began to develop international antiterrorist finance standards for financial institutions.

Saudi Arabia is a key part of our international efforts to fight terrorist financing. The intelligence community identified it as the primary source of money for al Qaeda both before and after the September 11 attacks. Fund-raisers and facilitators throughout Saudi Arabia and the Gulf raised money for al Qaeda from witting and unwitting donors and divert funds from Islamic charities and mosques. The Commission staff found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or as individual senior officials knowingly support or supported al Qaeda; however, a lack of awareness of the problem and a failure to conduct oversight over institutions created an environment in which such activity has flourished.

From the 9/11 attacks through spring 2003, most U.S. officials viewed Saudi cooperation on terrorist financing as ambivalent and selective. U.S. efforts to overcome Saudi recalcitrance suffered from our failure to develop a strategy to counter Saudi terrorist financing, present our requests through a single high-level interlocutor, and obtain and
release to the Saudis actionable intelligence. By spring 2003 the U.S. government had
corrected these deficiencies. Not just a more effective U.S. message but more especially
al Qaeda operations within the Kingdom in May and November 2003 focused the Saudi
government’s attention on its terrorist-financing problem, and dramatically improved
cooperation with the United States. The Saudi government needs to continue to
strengthen its capabilities to stem the flow of money from Saudi sources to al Qaeda. A
critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat terrorist financing must be to monitor,
encourage, and nurture Saudi cooperation while simultaneously recognizing that terrorist
financing is only one of a number of crucial issues that the U.S. and Saudi governments
must address together. Managing this nuanced and complicated relationship will play a
critical part in determining the success of U.S. counterterrorism policy for the foreseeable
future.

The domestic financial community and some international financial institutions have
generally provided law enforcement and intelligence agencies with extraordinary
cooperation, particularly in providing information to support quickly developing
investigations, such as the search for terrorist suspects at times of emergency. Much of
this cooperation, such as providing expedited returns on subpoenas related to terrorism, is
voluntary and based on personal relationships. It remains to be seen whether such
cooperation will continue as the memory of 9/11 fades. Efforts within the financial
industry to create financial profiles of terrorist cells and terrorist fund-raisers have proved
unsuccessful, and the ability of financial institutions to detect terrorist financing remains
limited.

Since the September 11 attacks and the defeat of the Taliban, al Qaeda’s budget has
decreased significantly. Although the trend line is clear, the U.S government still has not
determined with any precision how much al Qaeda raises or from whom, or how it spends
its money. It appears that the al Qaeda attacks within Saudi Arabia in May and November
of 2003 have reduced—some say drastically—al Qaeda’s ability to raise funds from
Saudi sources, because of both an increase in Saudi enforcement and a more negative
perception of al Qaeda by potential donors in the Gulf. However, as al Qaeda’s cash flow
has decreased, so too have its expenses, generally owing to the defeat of the Taliban and
the dispersal of al Qaeda. Despite our efforts, it appears that al Qaeda can still find money
to fund terrorist operations. Al Qaeda now relies on the physical movement of money and
other informal methods of value transfer, which can pose significant challenges for those
attempting to detect and disrupt money flows.

Understanding the difficulties in disrupting terrorist financing, both in the United States
and abroad, requires understanding the difference between seeing “links” to terrorists and
proving the funding of terrorists. In many cases, we can plainly see that certain
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or individuals who raise money for Islamic
causes espouse an extremist ideology and are “linked” to terrorists through common
acquaintances, group affiliations, historic relationships, phone communications, or other
such contacts. Although sufficient to whet the appetite for action, these suspicious links
do not demonstrate that the NGO or individual actually funds terrorists and thus provide
frail support for disruptive action, either in the United States or abroad. In assessing both
the domestic efforts of the U.S. government and the overseas efforts of other nations, we must keep in mind this fundamental and inherently frustrating challenge of combating terrorist financing.

Case studies and common themes

The Commission staff examined three significant terrorist-financing investigations in existence prior to September 11 in order to (a) understand U.S. efforts to stem al Qaeda-related terrorist financing before the September 11 attacks, (b) trace the evolution of U.S. policy and operations since the attacks, and (c) illustrate the problems and opportunities in the area of terrorist financing. These case studies—a Somalia-based worldwide money-remitting organization with alleged ties to al Qaeda; two Illinois charities that allegedly raised money for al Qaeda; and an international Saudi-based private charity, with ties to the Saudi government, accused of being a conduit of terrorist money—have given the staff insights into the larger problems and recommendations.

Al-Barakaat: The informal movement of money and its implication for counterterrorist financing

Al-Barakaat (literally, “the blessing”), a money-remitting system centered in Somalia with outlets worldwide, took shape after the collapse of the government and the banking system in Somalia. The intelligence community developed information that Usama Bin Ladin had contributed money to al-Barakaat to start operations, that it was closely associated with or controlled by the terrorist group Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya (AIAI), and that some of al-Barakaat’s proceeds went to fund AIAI, which in turn gave a portion to Usama Bin Ladin.

In the United States the FBI developed an intelligence case on the al-Barakaat network in early 1999, and had opened a criminal case by 2000. Shortly after 9/11 al-Barakaat’s assets were frozen and its books and records were seized in raids around the world, including in the United States. Subsequent investigation by the FBI, including financial analysis of the books and records of al-Barakaat provided in unprecedented cooperation by the UAE, failed to establish the allegations of a link between al-Barakaat and AIAI or Bin Ladin. No criminal case was made against al-Barakaat in the United States for these activities. Although OFAC claims that it met the evidentiary standard for designations, the majority of assets frozen in the United States under executive order (and some assets frozen by other countries under UN resolution) were unfrozen and the money returned after the U.S.-based al-Barakaat money remitters filed a lawsuit challenging the action.

The Illinois Charities: Domestic charities used to fund al Qaeda?

Two Illinois-based charities, the Global Relief Foundation, Inc. (GRF), and the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), have been publicly accused of providing financial support to al Qaeda and international terrorism. GRF, a nonprofit organization
with operations in 25 countries, ostensibly devoted to providing humanitarian aid to the needy, raised millions of dollars in the United States in support of its mission. U.S. investigators long believed that GRF devoted a significant percentage of the funds it raised to support Islamic extremist causes and jihadists with substantial links to international terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, and the FBI had a very active investigation under way by the time of 9/11. BIF, a nonprofit organization with offices in at least 10 countries, raised millions of dollars in the United States, much of which it distributed throughout the world for purposes of humanitarian aid. As in the case of GRF, the U.S. government believed BIF had substantial connections to terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, and was sending a sizable percentage of its funds to support the international jihadist movement. BIF was also the subject of an active investigation before 9/11.

After 9/11 OFAC froze both charities’ assets, effectively putting them out of business. The FBI opened a criminal investigation of both charities, ultimately resulting in the conviction of the leader of BIF for non-terrorism-related charges. The Immigration and Naturalization Service detained and ultimately deported a major GRF fund-raiser. No criminal charges have been filed against GRF or its personnel.

The cases of BIF and GRF illustrate the U.S. government’s approach to terrorist fund-raising in the United States before 9/11 and how that approach dramatically changed after the terrorist attacks: the government moved from a strategy of investigating and monitoring terrorist financing to actively disrupting suspect entities through criminal prosecution and the use of its IEEPA powers to block their assets in the United States. Although effective in shutting down its targets, this aggressive approach raises potential civil liberties concerns, as the charities’ supporters insist that they were unfairly targeted, denied due process, and closed without any evidence they actually funded al Qaeda or any terrorist groups. The BIF and GRF investigations highlight fundamental issues that span all aspects of the government efforts to combat al Qaeda financing: the difference between seeing links to terrorists and proving funding of terrorists, and the problem of defining the threshold of information necessary to take disruptive action.

Al Haramain: International charities and Saudi Arabia

Al Haramain Islamic Foundation is a Saudi Arabia–based Islamic foundation. It is a quasi-private, charitable, and educational organization dedicated to propagating a very conservative form of Islam throughout the world. At its peak, al Haramain had a presence in at least 50 countries with estimates of its total annual expenditures ranging from $30 to $80 million. The government of Saudi Arabia has provided financial support to al

---

4 Legal actions taken by the aggrieved parties have been largely unsuccessful either because, as in the case of al-Barakaat, the government unfroze assets, or because of the highly deferential standard of review afforded to the President in the exercise of his Commander in Chief powers under IEEPA. The issue is not whether the government had the power to conduct the actions that it did. Rather, the issue is whether, based on the nature and quality of the evidence involved, and the threat of likely harm, the government appropriately exercised those powers against U.S. persons.
Haramain in the past, although that has perhaps decreased in recent years. At least two Saudi government officials have supervisory roles (nominal or otherwise) over al Haramain.

Since at least 1996 the U.S. intelligence community has developed information that various al Haramain branches supported jihadists and terrorists, including al Qaeda. Since 9/11 high-level U.S. officials have considered their options regarding al Haramain. As of January 2003 the U.S. government was concerned that personnel in 20 of al Haramain’s offices, including personnel within Saudi Arabia, were aiding and abetting al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups.

In March 2002 the U.S. and Saudi governments froze the assets of the Somali and Bosnian offices of al Haramain and, simultaneously, submitted these names to the United Nations for international listing as terrorist supporters. The United States has raised al Haramain’s involvement in terrorist financing with the Saudi government repeatedly, in different forms and through different channels, since 1998, but most effectively since 2003. The Saudi government has made some moves to rein in the charity since May 2003, including replacing the executive director of al Haramain, announcing the shutdown of all overseas branches of al Haramain, and changing its relevant laws and regulations. Some of these actions proved to be ineffective and, as a result, the U.S. and Saudi governments froze the assets of four additional branch offices of al Haramain in January 2004 and five additional branch offices in June 2004. The U.S. government took additional action against the U.S. entities in February 2004 and against the former executive director in June 2004. It remains to be seen whether the Saudis have the political will to develop the necessary capabilities to stem the flow of funds to al Qaeda and its related groups and to sustain these efforts over the long haul.

We completed our investigation of al Haramain in early June 2004. Subsequently, the Saudi government announced that it would dissolve the al Haramain Islamic Foundation and that a new Saudi charity commission would “take over all aspects of private overseas aid operations and assume responsibility for the distribution of private charitable donations from Saudi Arabia.” We have not assessed the state-of-play or impact of these actions. They are moving targets and it is difficult to come to any final conclusions about the status of al Haramain. Regardless, we believe the discussion in this chapter tells an important story about U.S.-Saudi cooperation on terrorist financing in the post 9/11 period from which important lessons can be drawn.
Findings

The funding of the hijackers

- The 9/11 plot cost al Qaeda approximately $400,000–500,000, of which approximately $300,000 was deposited into U.S. bank accounts of the 19 hijackers. Al Qaeda funded the hijackers in the United States by three primary and unexceptional means: (1) wire transfers from overseas to the United States, (2) the physical transport of cash or traveler’s checks into the United States, and (3) the accessing of funds held in foreign financial institutions by debit or credit cards. Once here, all of the hijackers used the U.S. banking system to store their funds and facilitate their transactions.

- The hijackers and their financial facilitators used the anonymity provided by the vast international and domestic financial system to move and store their money through a series of unremarkable transactions. The existing mechanisms to prevent abuse of the financial system did not fail. They were never designed to detect or disrupt transactions of the type that financed 9/11.

- Virtually all of the plot funding was provided by al Qaeda. There is no evidence that any person in the United States, or any foreign government, provided any substantial funding to the hijackers.

- Exhaustive investigation by U.S. government agencies and the securities industry has revealed no evidence that any person with advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks profited from them through securities transactions.

Raising and moving money for al Qaeda

- Contrary to public opinion, Bin Ladin did not have access to any significant amounts of personal wealth (particularly after his move from Sudan to Afghanistan) and did not personally fund al Qaeda, either through an inheritance or businesses he owned in Sudan. Rather, al Qaeda relied on diversions from Islamic charities and on well-placed financial facilitators who gathered money from both witting and unwitting donors, primarily in the Gulf region.

- The nature and extent of al Qaeda fund-raising and money movement make intelligence collection exceedingly difficult, and gaps appear to remain in the intelligence community’s understanding of the issue. Because of the complexity and variety of ways to collect and move small amounts of money in a vast worldwide financial system, gathering intelligence on al Qaeda financial flows will remain a hard target for the foreseeable future.
Intelligence gathering on al Qaeda

- Within the United States, although FBI street agents had gathered significant intelligence on specific suspected fund-raisers before 9/11, the FBI did not systematically gather and analyze the information its agents developed. The FBI as an organization failed to understand the nature and extent of the problem or to develop a coherent strategy for confronting it. As a result the FBI could not fulfill its role to provide intelligence on domestic terrorist financing to government policymakers and did not contribute to national policy coordination.

- Outside the United States, the U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 devoted relatively few resources to collecting financial intelligence on al Qaeda. This limited effort resulted in an incomplete understanding of al Qaeda’s methods to raise, move, and store money, and thus hampered the effectiveness of the overall counterterrorism strategy.

- Since 9/11 the intelligence community (including the FBI) has created significant specialized entities, led by committed and experienced individuals and supported by the leadership of their agencies, focused on both limiting the funds available to al Qaeda and using financial information as a powerful investigative tool. The FBI and CIA meet regularly to exchange information, and they have cross-detailed their agents into positions of responsibility.

Economic disruption of al Qaeda

- Before 9/11 the limited U.S. and UN efforts to freeze assets of and block transactions with Bin Ladin were generally ineffective.

- Before 9/11 the Department of Justice had little success developing criminal cases against suspected terrorist fund-raisers, despite a 1996 law that dramatically expanded its power to do so. Because of the “wall” between criminal and intelligence matters, both real and perceived, the prosecutors lacked access to the considerable information about terrorist fund-raising in the United States maintained in the FBI’s intelligence files.

- The United States engaged in a highly visible series of freezes of suspected terrorist assets after 9/11. Although few funds have been frozen since the first few months after 9/11, asset freezes are useful diplomatic tools in engaging other countries in the war on terror and have symbolic and deterrence value. The use of administrative freeze orders against U.S. citizens and their organizations may, at times, be necessary but raises substantial civil liberties issues.

- Since 9/11 the FBI has recognized that its investigations of terrorist fund-raising within the United States must have an endgame: to stop the funding or otherwise
disrupt the terrorist supporters. The Department of Justice has created a unit to coordinate an aggressive national effort to prosecute terrorist financing and now regularly receives information from the FBI about terrorist fund-raising in the United States, which it lacked before 9/11. Still, prosecuting most terrorist-financing cases remains very challenging.

- The financial provisions enacted after September 11, particularly those contained in the USA PATRIOT Act and subsequent regulations, have succeeded in addressing obvious vulnerabilities in our financial system. Vigilant enforcement is crucial in ensuring that the U.S. financial system is not a vehicle for the funding of terrorists.

- Financial institutions have the information and expertise to detect money laundering, but they lack the information and expertise to detect terrorist financing. As a result, banks and other financial institutions play their most important role by obtaining accurate information about their customers that can be provided to government authorities seeking to find a known suspect in an emergency or investigating terrorist fund-raisers.

- Although the government can often show that certain fund-raising groups or individuals are “linked” to terrorist groups (through common acquaintances, group affiliations, historic relationships, phone communications, or other such contacts), it is far more difficult to show that a suspected NGO or individual actually funds terrorist groups. In assessing both the domestic efforts of the U.S. government and the overseas efforts of other nations, we must keep in mind this fundamental and inherently frustrating challenge of combating terrorist financing.

**Interagency cooperation and coordination**

- Terrorist financing is, and must continue to be, closely integrated with the broader counterterrorism effort. Terrorist-financing measures both rely on and feed the broader effort. Terrorist financing is neither intrinsically different from nor more complex than other counterterrorism issues. The NSC (as opposed to an agency or a terrorist-financing “czar”) is well situated to lead the operational and strategic integration of terrorist financing with counterterrorism generally. The government should resist the temptation to create a terrorist-financing czar or specialized, stand-alone entities focused on terrorist financing, and should support the current NSC-led interagency Policy Coordinating Committee.

**Diplomatic efforts and Saudi Arabia**

- Before the September 11 attacks, the Saudi government resisted cooperating with the United States on the al Qaeda financing problem, although the U.S. government did not make this issue a priority or provide the Saudis with actionable intelligence about al Qaeda fund-raising in the Kingdom.
Notwithstanding a slow start, since the al Qaeda bombings in Saudi Arabia in May and November of 2003 and the delivery of a more consistent and pointed U.S. message, it appears that the Saudis have accepted that terrorist financing is a serious issue and are making progress in addressing it. It remains to be seen whether they will (and are able to) do enough, and whether the U.S. government will push them hard enough, to substantially eliminate al Qaeda financing by Saudi citizens and institutions. The highest levels of the U.S. government must continue to send an unequivocal message to Saudi Arabia that the Saudis must do everything within their power to substantially eliminate al Qaeda financing by Saudi sources. The U.S. government must assist by continuing to provide actionable intelligence and much-needed training to the Saudis. At the same time, the Saudis must take the initiative to develop their own intelligence and disrupt terrorist financing without U.S. government prompting.

Overall effectiveness of the U.S. government’s efforts on terrorist financing since 9/11

- All relevant elements of the U.S. government—intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and regulatory (often with significant assistance from the U.S. and international banking community)—have made considerable efforts to identify, track, and disrupt the raising and movement of al Qaeda funds.

- While definitive intelligence is lacking, these efforts have had a significant impact on al Qaeda’s ability to raise and move funds, on the willingness of donors to give money indiscriminately, and on the international community’s understanding of and sensitivity to the issue. Moreover, the U.S. government has used the intelligence revealed through financial information to understand terrorist networks, search them out and disrupt their operations.

- While a perfect end state—the total elimination of money flowing to al Qaeda—is virtually impossible, current government efforts to raise the costs and risks of gathering and moving money are necessary to limit al Qaeda’s ability to plan and mount significant mass casualty attacks. We should understand, however, that success in these efforts will not of itself immunize us from future terrorist attacks.